EDUCATION POLICY AS A MECHANISM FOR SECULARIZATION IN A CATHOLIC MAJORITY COUNTRY: THE CASE OF URUGUAY, (1877-1932)

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate School
of the University of Notre Dame
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

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July 2014
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Uruguay presents a continuing paradox to sociologists of religion. Embedded in a continent characterized by relatively high religiosity and religious dynamism, how is it that Uruguay has maintained an intensely secular society for over 100 years? The central claim of this study suggests that secularization achieved in Uruguayan society is to be understood as historically grounded, embedded in conflict between interests groups, and attributable to agency more than macro-social structures. Bourdieu’s concepts of field and capital provide a useful theoretical framework for understanding how internal dynamics of competition and conflict between anti-religious and religious elites in the sub-field of education diminished Catholic socialization capacity. Competition and conflict between religious and secular projects generated a specific form of symbolic capital—representational capital—the capacity to contextualize the elite project through
social representations to non-elites in order to affirm the project’s relevance and legitimacy. At stake for the group able to dominate discursive and representational capital was the opportunity to gain the loyalty, allegiance and trust of popular sectors. Because both secular and religious elites engaged in discursive practices, the analytical focus of this study is on discursive language, symbolic representation and strategic action that emerged in the educational field. This study employs a case study method conducted in historical perspective. A deviant case study can be particularly revealing because an explanation must be developed as to why the case did not conform to a pattern or outcome established by the other cases. This research will contribute theoretically and substantively to the historical debate of secularization by showing that secularization is not an inevitable macro-social mechanical process imputed to impersonal and abstract forces, but is carried out by people and groups who manifestly want to laicize society and its sub-structures.
To Mary Ann, Maureen, Cullen, Stephen James, Evan, Shaun Thomas and Madelyn Mary because you endured with me through project’s end.
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I would like to thank Samuel Valenzuela for his enduring patience which saw this project through multiple proposals, iterations, and endless modifications. I am especially grateful to Samuel for the numerous thought-provoking conversations on this project, for challenging my thinking in numerous ways, and for providing insightful comments. I wish to thank both Samuel Valenzuela and David Sikkink for numerous letters of recommendation for grant applications in order to fund this study. To this end, I wish to thank the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts, the Graduate School at Notre Dame (Zahm Research Grant), Center for the Study of Religion and Society, and the Department of Sociology at the University of Notre Dame for generously funding this research project. This project was made possible by the collaboration and assistance of numerous archival directors in Montevideo who guided me through the maze of archival data which they managed. These colleagues in the field include: Mónica Sarachu of the Archivo Arquidiocesano de la Curia Eclesiástica de Montevideo, Ana Laura and Marlene Flores of the Departamento de Documentación y Biblioteca in the Facultad de Humanidades in the Universidad de la Republica, Graciela Gargiulo, Sub-Director of the Biblioteca Nacional, Leticia Zuppardi Milich of the Centro de Documentación e Información in the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas. In addition I would like to thank the following colleagues in Montevideo for orienting me to various
sources within their institutional libraries and for orienting me with regard to the historical processes I was researching. These include Susana Monreal and Carolina Greising of the Facultad de Ciencias Humanas of the Universidad Católica del Uruguay, Dante Turcatti of the Facultad de Humanidades in the Universidad de la Republica, Silvia Rebuffo of the Biblioteca de la Scuola Italiana di Montevideo, Virginia of OBSUR, and Paulina Szafran of CIESU. I would especially like to thank Sabrina Alvarez who spent hours in the same archival repositories hunting down documents when I was back in the USA and sending them to me electronically. Without the assistance of these professional colleagues who became friends over time, this project would not have been possible. I wish to thank the members of my committee; David Sikkink, Fr. Timothy R. Scully, CSC, and Robert Fishman not only for their provocative and thoughtful questions in the defense of this project but for their approval and affirmation. And last, I wish to thank Chris Smith whose 2009 article entitled, *Future Directions in the Sociology of Religion* provided theoretical inspiration for this project which sought to explain secularization by incorporating a multiple modernity meta-framework which led to a theory able to adjudicate between a positivist empirical paradigm on one hand and a postmodern constructivist paradigm on the other. I am off and running as a critical realist.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

- The 1890 census of the Department of Montevideo indicates that 83 percent of the population consists of self-identified Catholics, five percent are Protestant, six percent are self-identified “liberals” and six percent did not respond.\(^1\) The census of 1908, which also included a question regarding religious/philosophical affiliation, found that in Montevideo, 63 percent of the habitants fifteen years and older are self-identified Catholics, and 25 percent are “liberal”. The demographic group that revealed the greatest change was males, who between 1890 and 1908 represented a 36 point differential (80 percent in 1890 to 44 percent in 1908).\(^2\) These changes in religious affiliation occurred in spite of the collaboration between the Commission of the National Census and the ecclesiastical authorities with regard to the design of the census questions. Monseñor Isasa exhorted faithful Catholics of the Archdiocese of Montevideo reminding them of their duty and honor to declare their Catholic identity.\(^3\)

- Noted Uruguayan scholar Zorrilla de San Martin in the year 1900 observed that; “If one remembers, in 1861, there was neither a single journalistic entity nor an individual who treated the ‘religious question’ without manifesting their fidelity to Catholicism. There is no better witness than words to measure the revolutionary transformation of conscience that has taken place in the country in less than fifteen years.”\(^4\)

- Each year during Holy Week, the Club Francisco Bilbao placed an invitation in the periodical, La Idea Liberal, in order to invite “loyal liberals” to a “Banquet


\(^{2}\) *El Anuario Estadístico de año 1908* Tomo II: Parte III, Montevideo páginas XXVI-XXVII; 948-49.


of Promiscuity” held at the Pyramid Hotel: nearly in front of the Cathedral in Montevideo on Holy Friday. On this day when Catholic faithful would fast, socialists, anarchists, liberals and the rest of the anticlerical elements participated in a grand gluttony, with an abundance of wine and bar-b-que. They did this in order to taunt and mock Catholics as they left the Mass in addition to present satires and poems ridiculing Catholics.5

- José Enrique Rodó, the great Uruguayan littérateur, himself an agnostic and ardent liberal, raised profound protest to the decision of the Batlle regime to remove crosses and religious symbols from hospitals in Uruguay. In an open letter entitled, “La Expulsión de los Crucifijos” Rodó expressed consternation by the “profound intolerance” bordering on fanaticism demonstrated by Batlle. Rodó, under no compulsion to defend Catholicism, defined excessive liberalism as “eminently intransigent” and compared it to “Jacobinism” which sought to persecute and expel those who profess Catholic faith.6

- Early in their establishment in Uruguay, the Methodists and Waldensians were united with liberals, rationalists and positivists in order to limit the influence of the Catholic Church. The Methodist’s newsletter encouraged all Protestants in Uruguay to affiliate with the “Anticlerical League.” In little time however, secularization reached the Protestants who withdrew their support from anticlericalism when the State secularized religious holidays thus renaming Christmas “the Day of the Family”, Holy Week became “Week of Tourism” and Epiphany became “Children’s Day”.7 Names of towns and barrios with religious connotations were changed to war heroes and other non-religious nomenclature.8 The Methodists periodical attributed the action of the State to an “advancing Jacobinism” and declared that the law reflected a “blind and inconceivable intolerance guided by a recalcitrant sectarianism”.9 According to the Waldensian newsletter, “the government had engaged in a ruthless war against religion by


7 Renaming religious holidays as secular ones and replacing religious names for geographic locations is consistent with Albania where State atheism was de facto since 1945 and constitutionally adopted in 1976 (Martin 1978:239).

8 Da Costa (2009:3-4) cites over thirty such changes where for example, a town name was changed from Santa Isabel to Paso de los Toros.

9 La Idea, No. 38, January 19, 1919, Montevideo, p. 1
dictating restrictive laws designed to destroy all religious sentiment and the soul of the nation”\(^\text{10}\).

- By the 1950’s German Rama’s survey (1956-1958) indicates that only 10% of the population of Montevideo attended Sunday Mass (1964: 14).

- A composite of quantitative analyses based on religious participation in Latin America in the last decade substantiate Uruguay’s status as the most secular nation in Latin America (See Table A.1)

These data points, quantitatively and qualitatively, suggest that Uruguayan society is an outlier when considering religious intensity among Latin American societies. This study makes the claim that Uruguay became an intensely secular society as it entered the 20th century and even more so as the century progressed. Uruguay presents a continuing paradox to sociologists of religion. Embedded in a continent characterized by relatively high religiosity and religious dynamism, how is it that Uruguay became the most secular society in the region? Religious pluralism on the continent has been the focus of extensive post-war scholarship in which religious change has been analyzed for its social, political and economic significance. In spite of a religiously charged environment represented by the growth of Protestantism in surrounding nations, how is it that Uruguay has entered modernity as steadfast secular society and has experienced minimal Pentecostal penetration?\(^\text{11}\) More importantly, what does this pattern of religious quiescence tell us about recent theories of secularization? Is the enduring secularization


\(^{11}\) Since 1960s, Protestantism has grown from 15 million to 48 million in 2000 representing 12 percent of the continent (PROLADES 2008; Johnstone and Mandryk 2001). In spite of religious change corresponding to the growth of Evangelicalism (Pentecostalism), Uruguay has shown the lowest levels of religious pluralism on the continent (Gill 1999). By most accounts, only 3 percent of Uruguayans claim to be Protestant (Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson 2001). Uruguay has provided relatively infertile ground for Evangelical (Pentecostal) growth compared to other Latin American countries.
of Uruguayan society an isolated and exceptional phenomenon or does it demonstrate
generalized patterns of social configuration that contribute to our understanding of
secularization? 12 By secularization I mean a decline of religious sentiment based on
multiple poles of measure: societal, institutional and individual commitment. This study
understands secularization according to a synthesis constructed from the best definitions
found in recent scholarship that includes: 1) the decline of religion in terms of a loss of
faith and decrease of religious participation; 2) the privatization of religion in the face of
a declining public role; and 3) the differentiation of secular spheres from religious
influence, such as politics, economy and science (Bruce 2002; Casanova 1994;
Tschannen; cited in Dobbelaeere 1999). 13

For sociologists of religion, the case study of Uruguay’s trajectory as a secular
society in which religion has little public influence raises a number of interesting
questions. How and when did religion lose saliency among Uruguayans? What were the

12 The notion of secularization has been difficult to conceptualize and define over the last 25 years
simply due to varying interpretations. A handful of researchers considers secularization to be a dogma
rather than a systematic set of interrelated propositions (Hadden 1987) or simply a generalization based on
limited empirical findings to bolster an implicit ideology of progress (Glasner 1977). On the other hand,
umerous attempts have been made to redefine and locate secularization processes in the post-modern and
post-industrial era in such a way that makes sense between empirical data and theoretical conc
13 For a recent empirical examination of the effects of religiosity and of religious identities on a broad
range of attitudes and social practices in seven Latin American countries, see J. Samuel Valenzuela,
Timothy R. Scully C.S.C., and Nicolás Somma, “Creencias Religiosas, Identidades y Religiosidad” in
Eduardo Valenzuela et al. (eds.), Vínculos, Creencias e Ilusiones: La Cohesión Social de los
Latinoamericanos, (Uqbar Editores, 2008), pp. 105-140.
factors that contributed to the decline in religious commitments and identification among Uruguayans? How did religion become marginalized among the popular sectors? Was secularization simply the outcome of a natural and inevitable process of modernization? What role did conflict between secular and religious elites play in shaping the religious consciousness of Uruguayan society? Church-state tensions in emergent Latin-American republics are well documented. In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to summarize the general development of church-state relationships in the Latin American region. Understanding the broad historical antecedents that contributed to the scope of church-state relationships among modernizing Latin American societies is essential for: 1) differentiating Uruguay from the universe of cases, and 2) shaping the research question. 14

**Historical Antecedents of the Church and State in Uruguay**

We know that fissures in the colonial relationship between the Spanish Crown and the Church first emerged over *el Patronato real* resulting in a loss of institutional autonomy for the Church. Multiple expulsions of the Jesuits were a significant benchmark representing state authority over the Church. Heads of States in the early formation of new republics sought to establish a policy of national patronage (*Patronato nacional*) giving the state the capacity to utilize the church as a force to legitimize the state. The aim of republican regalism was to subject the Church to the state in order to unify civil society as a whole (Serrano 2008; Lynch1984; Richards1987; Gill 1998; Mecham 1966).

Liberal democratic reform emerged from intra-elite conflict between liberals and

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14 To understand the importance of the relationship between the universe of cases and the research question, see J. Samuel Valenzuela, *Macro Comparisons without the Pitfalls: A Protocol for Comparative Research*, (The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 1997).
conservatives whose origins pre-date independence. Conservatives were usually represented by oligarchical land owners and liberals consisted of elite urban merchants. At stake was the expansion of commercial agriculture in response to world demand for commodity exports which led to incorporation in the international market. Hence, republican state-building and agrarian capitalist development was a significant departure from the colonial past (Mahoney 2001; Bushnell 1996). Scholars are quick to point to varying approaches to liberal reform usually coalescing around multiple axes such as: 1) constitutional /parliamentary government, 2) economic individualism /free trade, and 3) differentiation between secular and religious authority (Gould 1999; 1998). It is the third component that is of particular interest here. Due to varying intensity and the pace by which these three poles of liberalism develop, modern states emerge under unique contexts which contribute to varying state configurations and institutional arrangements. Concerning institutional configurations, church-building and state building generally occurred simultaneously. In early modernity, the Church relied on the state’s support in order to gain material privileges over sectarian movements and to press a uniform set of religious beliefs and practices among the general population. The state benefited from the relationship since moral regulation and social control provided a foundation for political stability (Gorski 2003). The outcomes of tensions between conservatives and liberals generally determined the status of the emergent liberal-democratic republic. One of the primary disputes confronting the modern state was “the religious question;” how would the Church, representing remaining vestiges of colonial authority, be integrated into the modernizing republic if at all (Jaksić y Posada Carbó 2011; Serrano 2008)? Many liberal reformers were also the principal carriers of anticlerical legislation to limit the influence
of the Church. As democratic-republican reforms advanced, political power became consolidated in the state which sought to remove religious authority from the political realm and increase authority over the Institutional Church (Jaksić y Posada Carbó 2011: 24). Liberal reformers enhanced state power over religion through clerical appointments, by establishing agencies to oversee the Church administration, and by seizing Church land. In Latin America, anticlerical initiatives tended to be more economic than social. Anticlerical legislation, in general, tended to include;

- Expropriation of Church property
- Educational reform (Revoking permission of the Church to teach in public schools, no Latin taught)
- Secularization of cemeteries relegating management to a municipal function.
- Assuming Civil Registry from the Church
- Religious tolerance – Legislative initiative establishing space for Masons, Protestants,  
- Civil marriage requirement
- Closing of the convents and prohibiting religious housing and recruiting
- Expulsion of priests and nuns
- Expulsion of the Archbishop, Bishop and other ecclesiastical leaders
- Denying entry of foreign priests and nuns into the host country
- Suspension of funding for the Seminary
- Instituting divorce laws
- Disestablishment

In some cases, clergy opposed anticlerical legislation by allying with elites in order to maintain influence in areas such as education. In other cases, Church officials supported liberal reforms. In each case, the pattern of Church-State tension characterized the formation of each modern republic in Latin America and ultimately shaped the character of each political regime.

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15 See for example the case of Francisco de Paula González Vigil, who, as a member of the liberal and enlightened clergy in Peru was a strong supporter of liberal republicanism and advocated for representative government.
Anticlericalism associated with the development of liberal oligarchical republics in Latin America should not be associated with secularization. While some secularizing effects may have resulted from republican state building, the intent was not to subjugate religious authority to the temporal powers associated with the state. Rather, the objective of liberal anticlerical elites was to establish a political hegemony over the whole of civil society (Richards 1987; Hale 1984; Bushnell and Macaulay 1994). The principal concern of the liberal oligarchical state was not liberty or equality but material progress. Progress was defined in a positivistic sense (Bushnell 1996; Peloso and Tenenbaum 1996; Burns 1980). Hence, the state regarded the Church as an impediment to scientific progress of humanity as the Church represented a regressive institution that was irrational and anti-scientific (Anderson 2000; McMillan 2000; Bushnell 1996; Richards 1987). Although many Latin American positivists were critical of the Catholic  

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16 Sánchez (1972: 8-9; cf. Rédmond 1999) refers to state sponsored secularism as pragmatic anticlericalism that serves as a source change thru legislation by liberal agents of who saw the clergy and the Church as a regressive institution and obstacle to social, economic and political progress thus wanting to constrain the wealth, power and influence of the institution. The target of pragmatic anticlericalism was frequently the privileged status of a clerical ‘caste’ that is perceived as hypocritical, immoral and avaricious; especially when viewed from the perspective of the egalitarian concept of popular sovereignty associated with the modern state (Bantes 2009). Many holders of pragmatic anticlericalism were deists or Enlightened Catholics informed by continental philosophy (Serrano 2008). These actions by the state could be interpreted according to what Serrano (2011:191-193) refers to as Pluralistic Liberalism in which the interest of the state was less about dismantling the public influence of the Church and more about pursuing state sovereignty and securing the right of individuals. While the concept of Pluralistic Liberalism originates from political philosophy, the debate is still vigorous whether or not the ideals of republican liberalism, enshrined in consensus oriented pluralism and equalitarian rights of the individual, were empirically achieved in the nineteenth century in Latin America. The exception may be Chile which developed one of the earliest and most comprehensive experiences of institutionalization of political competition and progressive inclusion of the electorate beginning in 1809; see J. Samuel Valenzuela, From Town Assemblies to Representative Democracy: The Building of Electoral Institutions in Nineteenth-Century Chile. (The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 2012).

17 The hegemonic view of republican liberalism, particular to the researchers cited above, has been challenged recently by varying scholars who have presented a more nuanced perspective conditioned by local contingencies. These more recent perspectives will be discussed at length later in this introduction.
Church, few of them supported Comte’s religious thesis because they recognized that the
Church, for better or for worse, was an important element in national culture and social
cohesion (Espinoza 2009; Klaiber 1977; Purnell 1999).

The Church, in general, was able to secure its legal, social and political influence
vis-à-vis the modern state either by negotiating directly with government officials in
order to restore lost privileges or indirectly by forming an alliance with the conservative
Catholic oligarchy: which invoked the Church in order to defend its own concerns (Gill
1998; Richard 1987). The Church typically achieved an alliance with elites through
education and by reinforcing their own hierarchical organization (Episcopacy
Conference). Distinct institutional patterns of church-state relations that emerged during
the period of modern state-formation set each modernizing republic on different
developmental paths (Gould 1998; 1999). In Brazil, for example, the Church welcomed
disestablishment from the State when the Republic was created in 1889. An episcopal
letter issued March 1890 spoke of newfound freedoms under the new arrangement and
that the Church had felt suffocated under the monarchy (Chesnut 2003: 30; Mecham
1966: 275). Most nations that adopted a modus vivendi (Venezuela, Ecuador) or
Concordat (Colombia), although disestablishment prohibited the state from making the
Catholic Church the state Church, Catholicism became the de facto state religion thus the
state recognized the full authority of the Church in religious matters and guaranteed the
freedom of Catholic instruction (as in Costa Rica and Guatemala). ¹⁸ Under such an

¹⁸ Various attempts to achieve a modus vivendi in Mexico (1929, 1937) were undermined by
hostile action on behalf of the state. To the degree that the Church is integrated in society has not been by
virtue of a modus vivendi, rather by armed conflict as in the Cristero War, by legal means to ameliorate the
severity of certain laws or by clandestine evasions (Gomez Peralta 2009).
arrangement, most national episcopacies were able to reclaim lost ecclesiastical privileges and, remain integrated in modern Latin American societies.

The Question At Hand

The pattern of Church-State relations that emerged during the period of modern state-formation in Uruguay set society on a path to become a relatively irreligious society by the early 1900s. While the Church was able to stand up to positivistic ideology and a state sanctioned anticlerical posture in some Latin American societies while achieving a modus vivendi in others, why was it not able to do so in Uruguay? Hence, the research question this study seeks to explain is: How did Uruguayan society become so secular in the end of the nineteenth century such that a highly secular society endures until today?¹⁹ Broadly stated, among Catholic majority nations that became republics with liberal-democratic constitutions by revolution against a Catholic colonial monarchy, how did Uruguay become the most secular society in the field of Latin American societies?

The subject of this dissertation is the secular society and how it came to be. This is a significant question because a great deal has been written in the last forty years on secularization due to the spirited debate that was initiated in the 1960s as it became clear that modernity’s social reality did not conform to the theoretical expectations of early sociologists. Scholars began to rethink the relationship between modernity and religion resulting in new explanations of secularization. Classic sociologists unanimously hypothesized that secularization would result from two social processes; 1) laicization

¹⁹ See Table A.1 which presents a hierarchy of Latin American nation’s religiosity based on multiple measures.
stemming from social/structural differentiation, and 2) from disenchantment rooted in expanding rationalization. Cultural pluralism was added to the mix under the assumption that competing ideas would relativize the plausibility of a totalizing religious worldview (Berger 1969, Luckmann 1967, Luhmann 1982). The debate was turned on its head by Religious Economy Theory (RET) which not only argued that religion is a rational commitment, but more importantly demonstrated empirically how pluralism can lead to religious vitality rather than undermine it. More recent explanations of secularization include existential security (Norris and Inglehart 2004), anti-religious elitism (Smith 2003) and neo-classical secularization (Bruce 2002). Presently, the debate has exhausted itself and is at an impasse due to varying positions attempting to verify or falsify the durability of religion in modernity.

This proposed study seeks to distinguish itself from macro-social analysis which attempts to characterize secularization as an abstract social process associated with modernity and instead seeks to explain secularization by analyzing the historical contingencies and social processes that produced a secular society (Uruguay). Shifting the burden of explanation away from abstract macro-social processes to human agency embedded in concrete and specified historical processes, this dissertation will continue the line of research initiated by Smith and associates (2003; 2008) that emphasizes the role of contestation and conflict among human actors seeking to establish competing visions of modernity. Because this dissertation is situated among recent studies on secularization, it is able to adjudicate among competing theories and explanatory approaches thus exposing the inadequate and reinforcing efficacious theoretical and methodological approaches among leading theories.
While this study locates secularization in the context of the modernizing state (background), the foreground is shaped by education policies which were a principle function of the modernizing state. The sub-field of education became a site of conflict and tension where anticlerical and clerical interests were played out. A consensus among state managers viewed themselves as the vanguard of social progress for a society suffering from economic stagnation attributable to rural oligarchs, mounting foreign debt, and regionalism resulting from rural caudillos waging periodic warfare against the liberal state. State managers perceived education as a principle means of achieving social order, unification and sustained economic growth. State managers believed that education was a tabula rasa upon which they could promote liberal reform and construct national development. The objective of educational reform was to produce practical and patriotic individuals conscientious of their rights and duties toward society. The principle obstacle was Catholic education; although modest and quasi-independent at the time of reform, confessional schools represented the principle competitor to state education. The Church was blamed for inhibiting the development of scientific and patriotic ideology necessary for political stability and hence, social progress. However the church was also interested in national unity and social progress sustained by republican values and developed an alternative strategy, albeit differentiated from the state, to achieve a modern and relevant Church. A paradox unfolds in the clerical-anticlerical conflict such that state managers who sought to restructure society in consonance with enlightenment principles of individualism and equality before the law and free-market enterprise abandoned those principles in the management of the educational field by using legislation and popular opinion to monopolize education in Uruguay.
Significance

The intellectual merit of this study is that it produces an understanding of the processes by which a relatively religious society (a Catholic majority) was transformed to a “religious ghetto” (Rodé 1964; Santa Ana 1965; Caetano and Geymonat 1997; Da Costa 2003). By analyzing historical specificity which emphasizes purposive human agency, this study seeks to show that secularization is explained by concrete social struggle and contestation between differing assumptions and beliefs regarding the construction of society. The central claim of this study is that the level of secularization achieved in Uruguayan society is to be understood as historically grounded, embedded in conflict between interests groups, and attributable to agency more than macro-social structures in a modernizing social field. This claim assumes that secularization involves a cultural, political, and psychological assault on religious people in which secular elites, occupying different social positions, are successful in establishing their definition of religion. The object of this study is to explain how anti-religious elites succeed in constructing a secular society in Uruguay by monopolizing education and marginalizing the Church’s capacity to socialize future generations of not just Catholics but Protestants as well. The advantage of this study lies in its case selection which reveals secularization as a totalizing process that has endured over a century. This aspect uniquely positions this study to engage in the on-going secularization debate both theoretically and methodologically. Theoretically, this study shifts the burden of explanation from abstract macro-social processes (differentiation, rationalization and pluralism) to human agency embedded in a purposeful and intentional struggle for cultural authority and legitimacy.
This study will continue the line of research initiated by Smith and associates (2003) that emphasizes the role of anti-religious elites in secularization. A shift in explanation is facilitated, in part, by rethinking assumptions of modernity. Rather than assume an isomorphic and inevitable Eurocentric master narrative in which secularization is a normative outcome, this study seeks to show that diverse entries into modernity are possible. When framed as the outcome of contending social programs which seek to establish a dominant social and moral order, variant modernities are possible because each is shaped by conscious human activity in response to existential problems.

Methodologically, this study will contribute insight to the existing explanations for Uruguay’s secular society by analyzing the educational field in detail in a deviant case which, although embedded in Latin America, appears to have levels of secularization comparable to France. A comparative perspective will serve to reinforce the validity of some previous explanations of secularization and attenuate others. The result will be greater clarity regarding the contingent processes by which a society moves toward greater secularity.

**Methodological Considerations**

This dissertation presents the study of a deviant case in the Latin American context. A deviant case study can be particularly revealing because an explanation must be developed as to why the case did not conform to a pattern or outcome established by the other cases. According to Smelser (1976: 56) deviant case analysis emphasizes exceptions to a general trend to locate previously unidentified independent variables that have implications for the outcome (Lijphart 1971: 692-693). In addition Uruguay can
show the limits of a generalized theory for secularization such as modernity theory, neo-classical secularization theory (Bruce 2002) and existential security theory (Inglehart and Norris 2004). This causes researchers to rethink theoretical applications. By analyzing a case that is paradoxical empirically, further questions and problems arise that must be considered by existing generalizing theories.

It may be argued that emphasis on a single case is a disadvantage. Criticism of single case studies suggests that they are useless because it is impossible to form generalizations on the basis of one case. However, generalizability may not be the best use of a single case study. Instead, the role of a deviant case in developing the content of theory, not the range of its applicability, may be more important. Stinchcombe (1978: 21-22) has pointed out that analogies upon which social theories are based are best formed by attempts to provide causal interpretation of a single case. Causal interpretation of a historically contingent outcome is accomplished methodologically through 1) a logical relationship between abstract properties and 2) a narrative and description of how conjunctive events are related. Social explanations must account for both approaches of causality. Hence, the combination of both abstract properties and historical narrative necessitates the role of human agency. Focusing on human agency suggests that neither general theory nor pure description of conjunctive events will provide a sufficient explanation. Therefore, this study capitalizes on Bourdieu’s field theory to constrain the selection of data and subsequent analysis which emphasizes micro-level action related to macro-level phenomenon that can explain a dimension of the secularization process that has largely been overlooked in previous secularization studies.
This study is not an exhaustive study of education in the period. This study focuses on the original writings and thought of key policy makers and ecclesiastic leaders (lay and clergy) on both sides of the conflict. Educational philosophies are an important source of data for their bearing on implemented policies and programs. In addition, legislative debates and collections of laws serve to understand motives behind the construction of certain policies and why they were resisted. Furthermore, documents preserved from the memorials of several Inspector Generals of Education provide insight regarding educational agendas, school budgets and statistical data on school expansion and enrollment; which provide some indication of popular response to public education. Collections of periodical provide further evidence regarding how education debates were framed in order to cultivate popular support.

**Establishing the Broader Context of Conflict: Liberal Republicanism**

In the interest of understanding the socio-political context in which irreligious anticlericalism emerged, it is important to clarify three historical social processes which frame the modernizing state in Uruguay. The first has to do with defining Liberal Republicanism – the guiding principle in post-revolution state-building which serves as the “scope conditions”, or better stated, the historical socio-political context in which the Uruguayan state modernized. Recent studies have attempted to reconsider the role of liberalism in republican state-building in Latin America thus challenging prior analysis which characterized liberalism as; 1) “an exotic transplant” from Europe lacking indigenous origins (Veliz 1980; 1994); 2) a form of patrimonial state carried over from the Spanish colonial heritage and rooted in Spanish autocracy (Morse 1964); 3) a climate
of utopian ideas and particular policies resulting in political action and social infrastructure (Bushnell 1996); 4) a responsible authoritarianism in which the end of politics was to satisfy social needs and secure national development (Hale: 1984).

Although somewhat pejorative—because these interpretations understand liberal republicanism as hegemonic and a failure—there is no doubt that the legacy of liberalism is real and critical to understanding the historical contingencies of emergent nationalism in Latin America. Recent studies have tried to avoid the broad brush strokes of prior analysis (Hale, Bushnell, Stafford) by focusing, not on a generic form of Liberalism as though there was a uniform school of thought, but on the multiple manifestations of liberal republicanism represented by the varying contingencies of each emergent republic. Although variable, revisionist accounts have a core value in common; that local contingencies are the most deterministic factors in understanding how liberal republicanism shaped nation-building (Negretto and Aguilar-Rivera 2000:366). This means that liberal doctrines such as sovereignty of the people and individual rights framed in a constitution were adapted and correspond to local conditions. Hence, this has led to a corpus of revised historiographies featuring national case studies which can be analyzed in a comparative framework (Jaksić and Posada Carbó 2011; Negretto and Aguilar-Rivera 2000; Adelman 2007; Xavier Guerra 1994; Valenzuela 1996; Knight 1985).

Revisionism has reinforced the exceptional nature of Latin American republicanism. The two biggest problems that were unique to post-revolution republican nationalism in Latin America was the consolidation of national authority in a context characterized by regional fragmentation and the institutional vacuum created by the fall
of a centralist and absolutist monarchy (Negretto and Aguilar-Rivera 2000; Xavier Guerra 1999). This development led to tensions over the continuity of a centralist-corporate state government and raised questions about how to implement constitutionalism responsive to demands for political order, economic progress, and notions of citizenship. Insipid democratic forms did emerge such as political competition and progressive inclusion of the electorate through sometimes less than honest elections and the creation of public space for discussion of emergent national issues through the press (Valenzuela 1996; Xavier Guerra 1994). These democratic forms occurred in Latin America—drawing from continental political philosophy and the example of the American and French institutions—while most European countries were still under monarchical authority and hardly celebrated elections. These developments point to the necessity of understanding the rhythms of the intellectual history within each emergent republic and how they shaped political dispositions, objectives, and orientations of political elites engaged in state-building.

Implementing the republican state meant dismantling the corporatist structure of colonial order in which the Church was a major actor. This meant that Catholics in Latin American Catholic majority countries had to reconcile their revolution with the Church and Catholicism with Liberalism. The two were not necessarily mutually exclusive however, the advent of liberal reforms led to the secular state (estado laico) thus

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20 We know that Latin American intellectuals were influenced by varying degrees by the writings of Montesquieu, Rousseau, Constant, Paine, Burke, Guizot, Tocqueville, and Bentham among others (Stafford 1984; Manent 1995; Jaksic and Posada Carbó 2011).
stimulating two questions; the religious question and the social question. The former pertains to the role of the Church in republican state-building and national character and the latter pertains to the allocation of public good attributable to the Church while both contribute to the legitimacy of religion and the parameters of influence the Church will have in society. The resultant tensions and debates that emerged over the resolution of these questions in regard to the state and Church are perhaps best captured in the bifurcation of liberalism itself proposed by Ivereigh (2000). Varying assumptions and visions of liberalism held by the Church and state could result in conflict. Ivereigh has developed the concept of “monistic liberalism”, which sees no distinction between the state and society; the state is the unified collective will of individuals and hence, there is no limit to the state’s competence. The Church has no juridical status independent from the state; in fact the Church is simply a department and function of the state. Ideational and social areas, in which the Church might have influence, can be monopolized by the state because the state is the source and sanction of all rights attributable to its absolute authority. In contrast, “ecumenical liberalism” espoused by learned and devout Catholics, views the state as a unifying authority over social entities of which the Church, communities and family are a part. Orthodox Catholicism rejects the notion of a state and individual dyad in favor of a multiple collectives because they existed before the State and derive rights apart from the state. Like the structure of the Church itself, consisting of multiple and diverse sodalities dedicated to promoting the common good, the state has

\[21\] The social question emerged later in the century corresponding to the impoverishment of wage workers in the advent of industrialization precipitating Pope Leo XIII’s *Rerum Novarum* in 1891 and further defining Catholic social doctrine.
patterned itself after a constitutional federalism and advocates for the good of all (Ivereigh 2000).

What these two theoretical variants of liberalism show is that liberalism was multifaceted and capable of co-existing with Catholicism when the state grants social space for the Church to act on its social and spiritual prerogatives. To the extent however that the liberalism can be anticlerical, the state will contend with the Church for legitimacy and cultural authority. This study recognizes the variability of liberal republicanism in Latin America, the historical contingencies that make Latin American liberalism unique in each emergent republican state, and that ecclesiastical leaders and Catholic populations in majority Catholic republics will react to liberal republicanism unevenly and manifest varying degrees of allegiance to either the Church or to the state.

**Anticlericalism and the Patronato in Post-Revolution Society**

We know that earlier forms of anticlericalism were expressed thru *regalism* associated with Bourbon Reforms in which the monarchy sought to control clerical appointment through the *Patronato Real*. *Regalism* continued in the post-revolution era and was claimed by emergent liberal republican leaders who believed that they had inherited the right of the *Patronato (Liberal)* from the defeated monarchy. Regalism and the establishment of the Catholic Church guaranteed that Catholicism would continue to be a pillar in new republics. This also meant that in some cases, power was in the hands of liberal and agnostic politicians to make ecclesiastical appointments. In addition to controlling ecclesiastical appointments, it could be used to regulate the internal life of the Church as well as to control the Church’s properties and income (Blancarte 2004:47).
Most emergent republics declared Catholicism the state religion in their constitutions and were hesitant to change the constitution lest they forfeit the right of *patronato* (Roux 2004; Serrano 2008; 2011; Blancarte 2004). The state not only benefitted by having the capacity to diminish the Church’s temporal power thru a formal and legal mechanism, but at the same time, benefited from the unifying capacity of a ubiquitous Catholicism as the state sough to establish a fragile national authority over fragmented territories and disparate people. Possibly the principal characteristic of the *Patronato* was its legal ambiguity (Lida 2004: 390; Blancarte 2004; Lisiero 1971). While providing the institutional Church juridical personality on one hand, the *Patronato* could be interpreted as a means to dissolve the ecclesiastical hierarchy altogether since the Church was simply a department of the state or it could be ignored altogether. The use of the *Patronato* depended on the discretion of republican leaders (Lida 2004). Ambiguity, inherent in the Institution of the *Patronato* typically led to the cleric and anticlerical disputes that became an integral part of republican state-building in which Uruguay was unique in this regard.

An important distinction that differentiates the Uruguayan Church from other national Church narratives in the post-revolution republican state-building era is the fact that the Uruguayan Church hardly experienced post-revolution *regalism*, until 1862 (Algorta del Castillo 1984:490; Merlano 2010: 86). *Regalism* was not an issue in the post-revolution era because both the Church and the State were very weak institutionally (López-Alves 1996). The period following the revolution (1811-1817), Artigas led an

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22 Blancarte (2004:47) attributes the ambiguity to a lack of ideological and doctrinal clarity, exacerbated by the physical and political distance of the *Holy See* from the states that were in formation.
armed struggle to establish a Federal League of Uruguayan Provinces (*La Liga Federal*) which challenged the hegemony of Buenos Aires and the Portuguese domination. Because the Federal League was short lived (1814-1817), Artigas had limited opportunity to engage in institution building. Montevideo was invaded by the Portuguese in 1817 and was incorporated into the Cisplatina Province of Imperial Portugal, Brazil and Algarves. The Luso-Brazilian occupation lasted until 1828. Soon after liberation, the state became embroiled in a failing economy, external conflicts with the French and British, and numerous internal conflicts which were finally resolved in the *Guerra Grande* (1843-1851). The Church on the other hand, was still undeveloped and canonically under the authority of the Prelate in Buenos Aires (Ferrari 2001:107).

Bazzano (1993:38) cites a second explanation why post-revolution *regalism* was mute; “The demand of the Patronato was generally carried out peacefully in the times of Larrañaga while successive governments made it a question of honor, until the conflict between the Berro administration and Mons. Vera.” The “peace” and “honor” to which Bazzano referenced is related to the reputation attached to clerical support for the revolution thus creating a more collegial relationship between that generation of clergy and state leadership. The majority of the clerics in Uruguay was in favor of the revolution and supported reforms that Artigas brought (Villegas 1978:11; Ferrari 2001:106; Bazzano et al. 1993:22-24). In fact Artigas, the Uruguayan father of the revolution, counted *los curas de la patria* among his closest allies (Ardao 1945:32-33; Caetano 2000:28; Bauzá 1965a Vol.5). 23 Clerical partiality on the side of revolution can be explained partially by

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23 So engrained in Uruguayan history is the role of clerics in the revolution that in 1928, in anticipation of the *Centenario*, the Catholic newspaper, *El Bien*, ran an article featuring the role of the “prestigious priests” who demonstrated their patriotic zeal by supporting Artigas in the Revolution (“*El
the fact that the properties and schools established by the Jesuits were taken over by the Franciscans when the Jesuits were expelled in 1767. Franciscans had either denied or withdrew their support for Scholastic Theology and adopted an encyclopedia of ideas generated by the Enlightenment (Diderot). The acceptance of these ideas and their integration with Catholicism is the basis for Liberal Catholicism (Catolicismo Ilustrado) that guided early institutional life in Uruguay (Sobardo 1968; 1969; Ardao 1962:108). According to Bazzano et al. (1993:23) there was neither an assembly, nor congress, nor diplomatic mission or other cultural work in which a cleric was not serving an important role in the early days of republican formation. This can be attributed to the fact that the priests in most cases were the most educated and familiar with the classic works of the Enlightenment— not because the Church was a powerful institution. The Church’s contribution to early civic and cultural development is indicated by the founding of the National Library by Prelate Dámaso Antonio Larrañaga, Presbyter Pérez Castellano and Friar José Benito Monterroso.24 As a result of the influence clerics had in the populace due to their role in laying the foundations for the new republic, Artigas never invoked the right of Patronato although he was keenly aware of his right to do so (Bazzano et al.

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24 The contributions by the Priests of the Motherland to the newly formed republic were incalculable and included; 1) serving as charter members of the Constitutional Assembly; 2) directors of the Escuela de la Patria; 3) Larrañaga instituted the Lancaster method in all provincial schools, 4) abolishing the death penalty; 5) creating the University of the Republic; 6) initiating the Department and Chair of Philosophy and Theology (Villegas 1978). Bralich (1987: 24; 1996) points out that under the directorship of Padre Benito Lamas, the Escuela de la Patria flew the tri-color flag and “cultivated the ideas of democracy, liberty and republicanism”.
1993:25-26). Hence, a pattern of *Regalism* was never established in the early years of the republic.

The “religious question” was not resolved formally in Uruguay until the formation of a Legislative General Assembly in 1828; whose task was to construct a provisional government and draft a republican constitution. Like most emergent republics in Latin America, the declared state religion was Roman Apostolic Catholicism. A *Patronato (Liberal)* was a part of the new constitution, which among other stipulations, included the right of clerical appointments made by the Executive office with the knowledge of the Senate or Representatives. A significant outcome of the General Assembly however was ecclesiastical independence from the authority of the Buenos Aires Bishopric thus establishing a “designated” Bishopric in Montevideo to be established by the state. Pope Gregory XVI created the Apostolic Vicar of Uruguay in 1832 by naming Dámaso Larrañaga the first Vicar. While designating the faculty of a

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25 Heavily influenced by the thinking of the French and American revolutions, the 1830 Constitution divided the government among the executive, legislative, and judicial powers and established Uruguay as a unitary republic with a centralized form of government (Merlano 2010: 92-102; Algorta de Castillo 1984: 485-87). Artículo 13 (El Estado Oriental del Uruguay adopta para su gobierno la forma representativa republicana) provided for a General Assembly composed of a Chamber of Senators (Cámara de Senadores), or Senate (Senado), elected nationally, and a Chamber of Representatives (Cámara de Representantes), elected from the departments. Members of the General Assembly were empowered to pass laws but lacked the authority to dismiss the president or his ministers or to issue votes of no confidence (Nahúm 1994). Artículo 14 (Delega al efecto el ejercicio de su soberanía en los tres Altos Poderes, Legislativo, Ejecutivo y Judicial, bajo las reglas que se expresarán) empowered the bicameral General Assembly (Asamblea General) to elect a president with considerable powers to head the executive branch for a four-year term. The president was given control over all of his ministers of government and was empowered to make decisions with the agreement of at least one of the three ministers recognized by the 1830 constitution (Nahúm 1994).

26 Article five states; “La religión del Estado es la Católica Apostólica Romana.”

27 In 1836, the Pope conceded to the Apostolic Vicar the full administrative faculty of the sacrament of confirmation and in 1837 named the position *Patronotario Apostólico* (Bazzano et al. 1993:40)
principal Vicar, the Bishop seat was *Sede Vacante*, meaning that the seat was autonomous from Buenos Aires, yet at the same time waiting for the state to erect the dioceses of Montevideo, recognize the Bishopric, and construct a Seminary.

The outcome of the General Assembly and Constitution are significant for two reasons. First, it established an autonomous ecclesiastical authority in Uruguay under the *Patronato (Liberal)* as designated by the Constitution of 1830. Ecclesiastical patronage stipulated that the President was empowered to; elect bishops and determine ecclesiastical benefits (Article 81 and Article 25), organize tribunals to hear ecclesiastical causes (Article 97), grant or refuse pontifical bulls and briefs (Article 98). In exchange, Catholicism became the established – although tolerant – religion of the state under presidential oath of office to “protect and preserve”. Second, the *Patronato* was in effect, conditioned by the state’s fulfillment to establish the dioceses of Montevideo, recognize the Bishopric, and construct a Seminary, since the Papal provision left the Apostolic Vicar’s position of Uruguay *Sede Vacante*— that is; contingent on the

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28 Article 81 states; “The President of the Republic will make objections or approve projects submitted by the Assembly General (...), celebrate in the same form [as peace treaties] concordats with the Holy See and exercise the Patronato including the right to retain or pass Pontifical Bulls conforming to the laws (...”). Article 25 states; “The following cannot be elected as a representative; individuals of the regular clergy.”

29 Article 97 states; “In addition, I will make judgments of the sentences of the Ordinaries, knowing that if cases pertain to the law, they will be elevated to the Tribunal of Appeals (*recursos de fuerza*).

30 Article 98 states; “The President reserves the right to examine and make a ruling regarding the admission or retention of papal Bulls and Briefs (*exequatur*).”

31 Article 76 states; “The president elect, upon accepting the duties of his office, will present himself before the President of the Senate, and in the presence of the General Assembly, the following oath; I (name) swear by God and the Holy Gospels, to carry out dutifully the responsibilities of the Presidency, that are conferred on me; to protect the religion of the state, preserve the integrity and independence of the Republic, and to faithfully observe the Constitution.
State’s fulfillment of these requirements. This outcome is not only consistent with the overall ambiguity associated with the Institution of the Patronato, but it became the flash point of contention when the first conflict arose over the exercise of the Patronato in 1862. However, the most important aspect regarding the history of Regalism in Uruguay is its absence. Because of the state’s weakness attributed to the Luso-Brazilian occupation, external threats from the French and British, and numerous internal conflicts which were finally resolved in the Guerra Grande (1843-1851), the state turned a blind eye to ecclesiastical activity and never enforced the right of the Patronato; at least until 1862. As a result, the Church experienced a salutary effect from the state’s preoccupation with more pressing matters in that the Church was largely self-governing, independent and autonomous from the state. For fifty years, ecclesiastical leaders had become socialized by lax enforcement of the regulatory function of the state and had grown accustomed to looking after their own affairs. This does not mean that the Church became a powerful institution in Uruguay. The Church’s weakness is indicated by the summative assessments by Presbyter José Ignacio Victor Eyzaguirre, the Chilean priest given the charge by Pope Pius IX to travel through Latin America (1856-1857), assess the conditions of the Latin American Church in light of an advancing liberalism, and submit a report that would influence the curriculum of Colegio Pio Latino Americano—Pius IX’s project designed to Romanize the Latin Church.³² Conversely, while the

³² Eyzaguirre’s assessments were published in France as Los Intereses Católicos en América (1859); chapters eight and nine were dedicated to the Church in Uruguay. Apart from the general state of the country characterized by chaos caused by perpetual fratricide, the Church was weak due to the lack of a Bishop, the current Vicar was too old, blind (referring to José Benito Lamas who died of yellow fever in 1857), and unable to perform his duties, the lack of a national clergy, clergy who are lazy, clergy who perform their duties in a perfunctory manner void of the prestige of their position, European clerics who
Church may have benefited from autonomy, it was negatively affected by the lack of a centralized diocesan structure due to the perpetual financial crisis of the state (Lisiero 1971:9).

*Regalist Liberalism*, while common in other emerging Latin republics, had not been manifest in Uruguay in any significant way until 1862. Although a complicated sequence of events, the narrative can be reduced to a confrontation between the Apostolic Vicar Jacinto Vera and the state over naming the Presbyter Inocencio Yéreguy to replace a dismissed temporary parish priest; Presbyter Juan José Bird—a measure that President Bernardo Berro claimed required state authorization according to the *Patronato*. The conflict lasted approximately a year, resulted in the exile of the Apostolic Vicar Vera, and was resolved when a past president, General Venanci Flores threatened to invade Montevideo with his army unless President Berro’s decree was rescinded (Pons 1904; Villegas 1978; Ferrari 2001). Vera’s exile ended and the Vicar continued his mission to restructure the national clergy and to energetically reinforce the position of the Church over the next twenty years. While the Vera-Berro conflict could be interpreted as an example of *regalist liberalism*, it really points to the underlying ambiguity of the *Patronato (Liberal)* as the source of conflict.  

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33 Sol Serrano (2011:191-193) makes a distinction between *Regalist Liberalism*, which emphasizes controlling corporate structures such as the Church as opposed to *Pluralistic Liberalism* emphasizing the liberty of individuals, citing that the two are sometimes integrated by the republican state’s intent to demonstrate its sovereignty in all civil matters.

34 The ambiguity of the *Patronato* written into the Constitution of 1830 was compounded by further ambiguity in the original Papal decree of 1832 making the ecclesiastic organization in Uruguay independent from Buenos Aires and establishing an autonomous ecclesiastic structure by naming Larrañaga the Apostolic Vicar of Montevideo. The language of article 81 of the Constitution, citing the *Patronato,*
The purpose of this narrative is to point to the uniqueness of the Church / State development in Uruguay. We know that the Church operated under a *Patronato de jure* yet experienced a *de facto* independence; until 1862. This is important because the clerical/anticlerical narratives that emerged in other republics (Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala, and Chile) rooted in *regalism*, were not a part of the Uruguayan narrative. While the dispute between President Berro and Mons. Vera represents an important turning point in Church-State tension, the *Patronato* was seldom invoked in future disputes. From this point forward, when the state acted against the prerogatives of the Church, it did so by Presidential decree and by promulgating new laws. For example, a law of May 22, 1885 made civil marriage compulsory and the only legal form. The civil ceremony was required and to precede a religious ceremony thus no marriage could be considered binding in law which did not conform to the civil registry. The disposition of thus giving the right of the Government to name clerical appointments, was written such that both civil and ecclesiastic authorities should proceed as if an accord (Concordat) existed between the *Holy See* and the heads of State. Lisero (1971: 23) interprets the wording of Article 81 to mean that through the “use and practice” of an “unwritten law” current creole regalism would be shaped by adapting to local circumstances and structures. When Larrañaga and associates framed the language, no one was concerned that the concept “use and practice” would be elevated to “unwritten law”. To further complicate the interpretation, article 25: Section II pertain to the President of the Republic’s right to appoint Archbishop, Bishops, Cathedral Deacons, parish priests, etc., based upon a list of qualified candidates presented by the Bishop. These dignities were a part of most *Patronatos* (i.e. Costa Rica, Guatemala). Yet in Uruguay, none of these offices existed due to the State’s delay in erecting the dioceses, constructing a Seminary and thus writing a Concordat ratifying the *Patronato*. The Holy See took the position that because the Apostolic Vicar was not named among those in the *Patronato*, it was their exclusive right to name the Apostolic Vicar of Montevideo. Mons. Vera was under no obligation to recognize the State’s right to the *Patronato*. Lisero (1971:27-29) concludes that; 1) the juridical situation of the Uruguayan Church was abnormal in comparison to other republics; 2) since 1832, the Church operated under a *Patronato de jure* while experiencing a *de facto* independence; 3) without the dignities of office associated with a structured national diocese Archbishop, Bishop, Cathedral charges, permanent parish priests, etc., it was beyond the Civil authorities’ jurisdiction to name the Apostolic Vicar, temporary priests, etc.; and 4) the attempt to adapt the *Patronato* to the demands of the state made the confrontation between civil and ecclesiastical authorizes inevitable.
the law and the subsequent decree (June 2, 1885) were achieved through amending the Civil Code rather than by the Patronato (Algorta de Castillo 1984: 490-91).

The absence of a historic clerical / anticlerical divide is accompanied by the fact that there was a unique Liberal / Conservative political dichotomy atypical to other republics. Typically we see a conservative oligarchy allied to the Church which restored and protected the prerogatives of the Church when in power only to see the prerogatives of the Church erode when the Liberals came to power as was the case in Colombia (Roux 2004), Guatemala (McCreery 1990; Sullivan-Gonzales 1998; Woodward 1993), Argentina (Ivereigh 2000; Alonso and Ternavasio 2011; Kress 1974; Aldeman 2007), and Mexico (Knight 2007, 1994; Butler 2009). The Liberal/Conservative divide frequently became the basis for political parties as we see in Chile (Valenzuela 1995; 1996; 2000) and in Colombia (Posada Carbó 2012; Roux 2004). In Uruguay, the Church did not form an alliance with either political party (López-Alves 1996). The large estanciero land-holding elites, who usually represents the anchor of conservative political parties, was bifurcated between traditional latifundio owners committed to preserving rural interests and foreign latifundio owners who aligned themselves with the urban commercial interests (Finch 1981; López-Alves 1996). Hence, both the ecclesiastic development

35 Hence, there was no “politics of religion” as discussed by Valenzuela and Maza Valenzuela (2000:189). In Uruguay, also a majority Catholic nation, political affinities were generally dominated by the Colorados. It can be argued that in spite of two traditional political parties (Blancos and Colorados), the political system prior to 1918 functioned as a predominant party system within a two-party format following Sartori’s concepts of format and system (Gonzales 1991; Sartori 1976.)

36 The first rural sector consisted of large latifundio owners of creole origin closer to the Brazilian border than to Montevideo hence they had solid connections in the Brazilian market. This group established a strong clientistic network among rural masses. During the Guerra Grande they consolidated positions as leaders in the Blanco Party; therefore, they had traditional mistrust of urban intermediaries which kept them from participating in the Montevideo market. The second group consisted of foreigners of European
and the political development in Uruguay are unique to Latin America. When irreligious anticlericalism emerged in Uruguay in the latter half of the nineteenth century, it was something other than the outgrowth of what could be interpreted as a normative clerical/anticlerical divide rooted in the Conservative/Liberal alliances.\textsuperscript{37}

\textbf{Clerical / Anticlerical Antinomies}

A third contextual variable that shaped Church-State relations in Uruguay is the clerical-anticlerical conflict that emerged in the latter half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century and carried into the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The Berro-Vera conflict discussed above marked a turning point. There were prior conflicts between Jacinto Vera and the Administration of both President Gabriel Pereira and President Berro which include; the appointment of Presbyter Jacinto Vera as the fourth Apostolic Vicar and Bishop \textit{in partibus infidelium} in 1859; 2) the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1959; 3) expulsion of Franciscans in 1860; 4) the negation of burial in the ecclesiastic cemetery to a Mason (Jacobsen) and the corresponding secularization of all cemeteries in 1861; and 5) the polemic regarding the return of the Jesuits 1865. These conflicts were conducted by Presidential decree rather than by invoking the \textit{Patronato} except the appointment of Vera which was negotiated descent who established close links with urban bankers and merchants. These owners of large \textit{latifundios} were located in the littoral regions near Montevideo which became the backbone of the Uruguayan economy thru sheep-raising. The \textit{Ganadero Censo} of 1900 indicated that these two groups represented 64 and 36 percent respectively of the landed elite, yet the foreign owned \textit{latifundios} owned 55 percent of the livestock. Furthermore, the refusal of the foreign-born \textit{estancieros} to participate in the government weakened the leverage of the creole rural interests with the State that were strong in other pastoral economies such as in Argentina (Barrán and Nahum 1979; López-Alves 1996).

\textsuperscript{37} It also disputable that anticlericalism was simply a response to clericalism associated with ultramontanism. Both ultramontanism and anticlericalism developed out of separate antecedents and were driven by local contingencies which also require contextual explanations rooted in intellectual histories and trajectories.
diplomatically between the Papal Nuncio of Buenos Aires, Mons. Marini, and President Berro (Algorta del Castillo 1984:490; Merlano 2010: 86). However, by most accounts, the conflict in which Berro exercised the right of Patronato corresponding to the clerical appointment of Presbyter Juan José Bird served as a flashpoint for the clerical / anticlerical conflict because it became a public spectacle through the press— which took sides in the conflict— and it lasted over a year (See Ardao 1962:161-189; Sobrado 1968: 110-11; Lisiero 1971:160-229; Merlano 2010). Until recently, the standard historical interpretation of the Berro-Vera conflict has been dominated by Ardao (1962: 109-189) who suggests the conflict was rooted in what had been a tradition of syncretistic engagement between Catholics and Masons (clergy and laity who were Masons and members of Masonic lodges). Antecedents of Catholic-Masonry were attributed to the Franciscan order which dominated the Rio Plata following the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767 (Ardao 1962: 105, 109). These were the clergy who collaborated with Artigas and the revolution, whose intellect had been molded by the encyclopedia, and were the same clergy who both shaped the early republic and became the first apostolic vicars of the Church (Dámaso Antonio Larrañaga, Lorenzo A. Fernández, and José Benito Lamas; see Ardao 1962: 111, 194). This cohort of clergy, according to Ardao, were formed with an enlightened and liberal disposition transmitted by the Franciscan Order (influenced by Lamennais, Lacordaire and Montalembert) and in direct opposition to the Jesuits (Ardao 1962:100, 105-06, 112). Thru the continuing collaboration of the first cohort of clergy in the early national political life, Catholic liberalism was planted in the political consciousness of the Church (Ardao 1962: 112). In the 1850s, Masonry flourished in Montevideo under the constitution of the Gran Orient of Uruguay and was facilitated by
the yellow fever epidemic of 1857 which led to the unification of lodges forming \textit{La Sociedad Filantrópica} thus centralizing the Mason’s public response to victims of yellow fever. The growth of Masonry in a Catholic society led to the integration of church members with masonic lodges due to the Catholic liberal tradition (Ardao 1962: 142-43). Vera’s resistance to Berro’s exercise of the Patronato came on the heels of a Jesuit conflict with Masonry in the 1850s and marks the first time that ultramontane tendencies had been introduced to the socio-religious landscape. Ardao postulates that Catholic-Mason syncretism produced a philosophical religious-rationalism while the Jesuits were the labyrinth for ultramontanism that emerged under Vera. A consequence of the Berro-Vera conflict was the departure of Catholic-Masons who became responsible for developing religious-rationalism serving as a philosophical basis for an anticlerical liberalism while an antirational, anti-liberal and dogmatic ultramontanism developed under Mons. Vera in collaboration with the Jesuits (Ardao 1962: 188-89, 194).

Until recently, numerous Uruguayan historians who have referenced the Berro-Vera conflict have reiterated the Ardao thesis with little amending (Paris Oddone 1958; Oddone 1963; Santa Ana 1965; Menthol Ferre 1969; Lisiero 1971; Fernandez Cabrelli 1990; Caetano and Geymonat 1997). Ardao’s thesis is important is because it suggests a pivot or ideological shift in the orientation in the Church. Underlying this thesis is the question of an internecine conflict within the Church; between liberal and ultramontane Catholicism which according to Ardao (1962: 184-85) is a source of clerical and anticlericalism conflict in Uruguay (see Merlano 2010: 86). A more nuanced study by Fernández Techera (2007) and Merlano (2010) challenge the Ardao thesis. They cite several points that make the liberal-ultramontane dichotomy less clear. First, Fernández
Techera (2007:187) cites that to date, there have been no in-depth studies on the lives of the three vicars that confirm commitments to liberal ideology. Ardao’s principle sources are bibliographies, such as Camuso’s work on Larrañaga (1922), but these bibliographic sources lack academic rigor. Second, Fernández Techera (2007: 187-88) cites inconsistencies in behavior of the first three vicar patriots which legitimately question their liberal commitments. Fernández Techera questions if manifested commitments to political liberalism in the juridical-political realm—while serving on the Constitutional Assembly (both Larrañaga and Fernández were members and participated in framing the constitution of 1830)—carry over to other ambits such as economic, moral, religious doctrine, etc.? Larrañaga is known to have opposed the construction of a British church in 1840 at the request of the British, North American and Swiss consuls, which occurred in a period corresponding to the absence of the Jesuits. Larrañaga’s letter to the government cites six reasons for his renunciation of the project in which he “considered the proposal to be; 1) illegal, 2) incompetent, 3) undiplomatic, 4) inopportune, 5) peculiar, and 6) unnecessary” (Camusso 1922: 169). Mons. Fernandez, while serving as Apostolic Vicar cooperated with Pope Gregory XVI’s encyclical prohibiting the reading of Protestant Bibles. During the tenure of Mons. Lamas as Apostolic Vicar he petitioned the government to intervene and impede the diffusion of secret societies and Masonry in accordance with Pope Leon XII’s letter Quo graviora. These incidents occurred in an era of supposed tolerance under a republican constitution that espoused tolerance toward other religions and granted freedom of conscience (Article 134 and 141). Two historians, Ardao (1962) and Fernandez Cabrelli (1990: 191-92), refer to these incidents as “anti-liberal” yet performed by liberal vicars without the influence of the Jesuits who were
either still in expulsion or were in Santa Lucia (Canelones). Fernández Techera’s argument suggests incoherence with a trajectory of liberal Catholicism calling into question the degree to which liberal commitments were stable. Third, Fernández Techera (2007: 190) cites that prior to Vera’s work to consolidate and expand the Catholic mission, the state of the church was weak as accounted for by Eyzaguirre’s evaluation (1859; see footnote No. 30); the hierarchy was almost non-existent, clergy did not have a strong intellectual formation, and were scarce. The political divide at the time tended to be oriented toward affiliation with either the Blancos or the Colorados, neither of which was steeped in ideological foundations as evidenced in the weakness of the state supported by incipient democratic structures. Uruguay was still a frontier Church, distant from Rome thus making it difficult to enforce doctrinal and ideological positions as had been the norm in Europe. Furthermore Fernández Techera challenges the assessment that Vera was controlled by the Jesuits as the Jesuits expulsion from 1767 did not end until March 1843 when 18 landed from Bueno Aires. A small band of Jesuits founded the school Colegio Oriental de Humanidades in Montevideo where they dedicated themselves to education until the end of the Guerra Grande in October 1851. In light of the ensuing peace, the same group of Jesuits relocated to Santa Lucia, Canelones where they opened a new school in December 1853 and remained there until their expulsion by decree from President Pereira in January 1859.  

While a full account of the Jesuits’ 16-year stay in Uruguay is detailed by Villegas (2005), Fernández Techera argues that Ardao

38 The decree by Pereira terminated the state’s authorization of the school, Colegio Santa Lucia, and expelled the Jesuit Order from the national territory. The conflict was derived by the Jesuits assistance to a young woman who wanted to enter the Hermandad de Caridad Order without consent of her mother (Barrán 1988: 31-32; Geymonat 2004: 255).
was informed by limited sources regarding the Jesuits (See Ardao 1962:113) and cites numerous periodical articles which were decidedly biased toward the Jesuits. Other than collaborate with the Jesuits as a mediator in establishing their school in Santa Lucia, Vera’s parish, there is little evidence that Vera drew inspiration from the Jesuits as Ardao suggests (1962: 112). 39 When the Berro-Vera conflict arose in 1862, the Jesuits expulsion had been in effect for over two years.

This discussion shows that there were both liberal-Catholic and ultramontane tendencies prior to Vera, making it difficult to compartmentalize the behavior of the first three Apostolic Vicars and their cohort as unequivocally committed to liberal Catholicism thus attenuating Ardao’s thesis; that has been readily accepted uncritically, until recently, by several Uruguayan scholars. The constellation of ultramontanism associated with Vera under the influence of the Jesuits and the origins of liberal anticlericalism emerging from internecine conflicts within the Catholic clergy producing dichotomous and defined forces appears more ambiguous when considering further accounts. In regard to Vera, his ecclesiastical formation was initiated with Lazaro Gadena—a Franciscan and professor of Latin and Humanities— as well as Mons. Larrañaga and Mons. Fernández; all of whom were among the eight clergy who served on the 71 member Constitutional Assembly and in the case of Larrañaga and Fernández, served as Apostolic Vicars in Montevideo (Pons 1904: Fernández Techera 2007:191). In regard to education, Larrañaga, as the founder of the University of the Republic, refused to be the first rector at the request of President Manuel Oribe when the University was

39 Vera was cura apostólico of the Canelones parish and presided over the Junta Económico Administrativa of Canelones in 1953 which was the body inviting the Jesuits to establish a school in their department (Villegas 2005).
inaugurated in July 1849. The president wrote to Larrañaga; “I desire to give you, as the head of our Church, and see you also the head of our honorable establishment consecrated to the study of the sciences” (Camusso 1922: 167). In his study of the history of education in Uruguay, Bralich (1987:45; 1996: 43) comments that Larrañaga’s refusal to unify the Church with superior education in order to control education was an exception to the norm in Latin American republics. On the other hand, when an Apostolic Delegation from Mons. Marini of Buenos Aries sought information from the newly appointed Apostolic Vicario and Bishop in partibus infidelium, Jacinto Vera, question No. 38 asked if the Ecclesiastic Authority would seek to intervene in teaching establishments [public education]. Vera responded, “The Ecclesiastic Authority will not intervene in the [public] teaching establishments. There does not exist any type of sacred subjects” (quoted from Merlano 2011: 17). Merlano explains that Vera was stating that clergy would not intervene in religious education in the public schools because it was in the hands of the teachers, albeit who lacked preparation for religious instruction. Vera was cited by Merlano in the context of the Institute of Public Instruction in 1847 whose preamble states; “To promote, diffuse, standardize, systematize, and methodize public education, especially primary education” (Araujo 1911: 635). Bralich (1987:38; 1996:34) cites the preamble of the Institute as the inspiration for the state monopolization of education stressing the authority of the state. This juxtaposition of institutional objectives is significant because as a confessional state, one would expect Vera to desire the subordination of all popular education under the oversight and control of the Church which would be financed by the state in accordance with the constellation of
ultramontane objectives. As we will see in subsequent chapters, this was not the case in Uruguay. In regard to education, both Larrañaga and Vera showed liberal tendencies that were not consistent with Papal intentions of bringing education under control of the Church.

The collectivity of these accounts reinforces the notion that a study of ultramontanism and anticlericalism needs to be understood in the specificity of national experiences with a focus on the role of human agents engaged in networks of social relations conditioned by a political culture and institutional orientations that shaped the conflict. Clerical / anticlerical tensions that are the focus of this case study in 19th century Uruguay, although influenced transnationally by events in Europe, were played out in an entirely different historical context. Uruguay was a constitutional democratic confessional republic in which many democratic rights—freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of conscience, and religious tolerance—were embedded in the constitution. As we will see, concepts of civilization, doctrines of progress and sovereignty of the people were valued and embraced by both sides of the conflict. In spite of serving as a point of misrepresentation by anticlericals, it was implausible that a monarchy would be restored or that national sovereignty would be threatened by a Papal theocracy. In a technical sense of the term, ultramontane did not correctly apply to the clergy or the hierarchy of the Church in Uruguay because Gallicanism, in a generic sense, was the order of the day as the Church was subordinate to the state in matters of temporal power. A consequence of the Berro-Vera conflict was both greater clarity and ambiguity.

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40 This was the case in several instances such as the Colombian Concordat (Article 12); Ecuadorian Concordat (Article 3); Venezuelan Concordat, and in the Costa Rican Constitution.
regarding the jurisdictions of the Church and State. The Church had the right to petition
the state and to exercise indirect power by influencing the state thru popular polity;
principally by its members. Apart from a meager material benefit, the state for its part,
would respect the Church’s authority in its moral and spiritual mission in society and
protect its institutional interests; not including the right of Patronato (Merlano 2010:98-
101, 190; Algorta del Castillo 1984; Pereira 2010). This meant that the principle ambit of
operation for the Church was thru cultural means setting up future confrontations with the
juridical-legislative powers of state managers interested in modernizing the state. 41
Locating the clerical/anticlerical conflict in the domain of culture meant that every sphere
of social life would be at stake; education, the press, marriage and gender relations,
associational culture, symbols of national identity and control of public space.

This study specifically investigates the field of education in the context of a
modernizing state as a site where clerical/anticlerical prerogatives played out. The
conflict pitted state institutions, anticlerical politicians, journalists, and free-thinking
associations against the Catholic hierarchy, the Vatican, lay leaders, lay associations, and
the Catholic press in a struggle for values and collective practices in modern life.
Education was one of the most important instruments in Catholic reproduction. Preaching
alone was inadequate to maintain intergenerational transmission of religious values
hence; education was a principle mechanism for the Church to remain a relevant social
actor in the context of a modernizing state. The Church could concede the laicization of
cemeteries, civil registry, marriage and even the public school domain, but needed an

41 A Concordat was not possible at this time for the same reason that the Patronato was
ineffective; there was no Bishopric established in Montevideo (Merlano 2007: 96, 189).
effective private educational system in order to socialize successive generations for the purpose of maintaining cultural authority and a Catholic moral order and discipline in society. The conflict that emerged between anticlerical state managers and Catholics, both clergy and lay, in the field of education represented a paradox in a democratic and republican society where the liberty of education is invoked in the interest of Catholic liberty in the face of state interference and monopolization of the educational field.

Chapter Outline

History and theory are interwoven throughout this study. Chapter two briefly assesses previous literature composed by Uruguayan scholars who have attempted to explain Uruguayan secularization. In addition, I will situate the Uruguayan case in the context of contemporary secularization theories and explain why these varying positions in the current debate cannot explain how Uruguay came to exist as durable secular society. The limitations of these studies create theoretical space for an alternative explanation. Chapter three presents the theoretical framework utilizing Bourdieu’s concepts of field, capital and habitus which provide a useful framework for understanding Uruguay’s modernizing state as an autonomous field due to internal dynamics of competition and conflict between secular and religious elites stimulating the production of their respective social projects. Competition and conflict between religious and secular projects generated a specific form of symbolic capital— representational capital— the capacity to contextualize the elite project through social representations to non-elites in order to affirm the projects relevance and legitimacy. At stake for the group able to dominate discursive and representational capital was the opportunity to gain the
loyalty, allegiance and trust of popular sectors. Because both secular and religious elites engaged in discursive practices—preserved in original writings, official state records, ecclesiastic documents, and the press—the analytical focus of this study is on the discursive texts, the symbolic representations they generated and strategic action that emerge related to the field of education. The empirical core constitutes the heart of this study: the discursive sites where empirical data generated by cultural elites and religious actors are interpreted through the lens of symbolic capital. Hence, chapter four begins by identifying the *habitus* of principle state managers and religious leaders who are representative of the ideological underpinnings that motivated each group to pursue specific social outcomes thru education. Esoteric rationalism was the philosophical framework from which anticlerical liberalism emerged. Jose Pedro Varela came to typify urban doctors by serving as the architect of educational reform thru his works *La Educación del Pueblo* (1874) and the *La Legislación Escolar* (1876) which became blueprints for the 1877 Law of Common Education. The laicization project of the state began with Varela’s reforms. In contrast, the Church’s liberty of education project was embedded in the writings of Francisco Bauzá and Mariano Soler who were able to interpret and contextualize Pope Pius’ Syllabus of 1864 and construct an alternative educational strategy consistent with the republican democracy in which they operated. Chapter five offers a brief sketch of educational reform, which sets the context for the conflict between educational projects. I use official records to show that the state was largely ineffective at achieving a goal of universal primary education. Rather than perceiving Catholic schools as an ally in achieving goals associated with educational reform, state managers expressed distain and contempt for confessional schools which is
revealed in discursive analysis of their writings which appear in state records. Chapter six identifies legislative policies that were designed to hinder, harass and discredit Catholic education thus attenuating the socializing function of Catholic schools. I explain how monopolizing the educational field served as a significant causal factor contributing to a diminished religious influence in Uruguay. Secular elites in Uruguay sought not just to implement a deliberate policy of laicization of the public school system, but to impede Catholic participation in the educational marketplace where Catholics sought to develop their own competing educational system. Chapter seven argues that the personalisitic influence of José Batlle y Ordoñez combined with the anticlerical press served as a principal mechanism of popularizing, sensationalizing and disseminating ideas of secular elites, university professors, members of the anti-clerical clubs and professional associations that distorted and misrepresentative Catholic education among the general population. In addition chapter seven summarizes my findings and I make theoretical conclusions that will contribute to the on-going debate over the social process that explains secularization in modern societies.
CHAPTER TWO
EXPLAINING URUGUAY’S SECULAR SOCIETY

Chapter two evaluates extant literature that could explain how Uruguay became a highly secular society in the late nineteenth century and how the Church lost influence in the public sphere. Literature will be classified into three groups; 1) studies based on historical contingencies of the Uruguayan context; 2) studies that interpret Uruguay’s modernity through a generalized theory of secularization; and 3) recent studies that have developed a generalized theory of secularization as an attempt to overcome the impasse between religious economy theory and classic secularization theories.

1. Historical Studies:

The earliest attempts to interpret and explain Uruguay’s secular society came in the 1960s. Typically these studies were produced by religious practitioners, or at least researchers sympathetic to religion, who attributed weak religiosity, at least weak Catholicism, to the lack of a colonial heritage (Fitzgibbon 1954; Villegas et al. 1978; Santa Ana 1965; Rodé 1964; Bazzano et al. 1993). Spanish colonization in la Banda Oriental did not begin in earnest until the eighteenth century and the first diocese was not established in Montevideo until 1878. In short, the standard narrative suggests that the absence of a colonial history resulted in weak ecclesiastical institutions and a scarcity of priests. A weak infrastructure contributed to a fragmented network of churches that were
dependent on a hierarchy based in Buenos Aires (Villegas 1978: 10). An undeveloped national clergy and infrastructure was unprepared to respond to positivistic rationalism that produced anticlerical elites who came to dominate politics such that Uruguay essentially became a laicized state (Bazzano et al. 1993; Ardao 1962). The historical argument is best outlined by Bazzano and associates (1993: 73):

1. Uruguay was the last sector colonized and therefore the last to be evangelized.
2. The rural population was unstable and unsociable. They manifested a lack of sacramental commitments except baptism.
3. A minimal ecclesiastical structure based in the province and was dismantled during the wars of independence first and later by the state.
4. The minimal ecclesiastical structure was exacerbated by a lack of native-born clergy and by instability in the clergy which existed.
5. The absence of a bishop (a definitive ecclesiastical authority) detracted from the evangelization impulse and coherence during a good part of the 19th century.
6. Waves of immigration changed the complexion of Montevideo first and then the entire country. The majority of immigrants proceeded from Europe, principally Italy, and brought with them strong anticlerical resentment and bias.

I will address points one through five as an aggregated argument because these five points coalesce conceptually into a singular narrative that I will call the “weak Catholic institutional” narrative. The correlation between the “weak Catholic institutional” narrative and secularization in Uruguay appears plausible when Uruguay is considered in isolation to other Latin American republics. However, when considered in comparative perspective, for example, to the historical development of the Church in Costa Rica, the explanation is less forceful. Consider the background and ecclesiastical development of both republics. Both regions missed-out on most of the colonial era because there was nothing to exploit; no mines, no precious metals and no labor (Perez-Brignoli 1989:91; Picado 1994:136; Villegas 1995:84). There were few indigenous in
either area. ¹ What little evangelization occurred was conducted by the Jesuits and Franciscans who established few reducciones.² Due to limited population and commercial interest, the Colonial Church, when it did become organized, functioned as a mission on the frontier of the a more established archdiocese: Montevideo was dependent on the Archdiocese of Buenos Aires and the Costa Rican Church was dependent on the Archdiocese of Leon Nicaragua. Hence, the Church in both Montevideo and Cartago (the colonial capital of Costa Rica) were decentralized, dependent, and institutionally weak. The clergy were poor and isolated. Because it was dependent on the Archdiocese of Leon in Nicaragua, in order to survive, the Costa Rican clergy had to serve as judges and serve the state for income. Geography made travel difficult, especially during the rainy season; therefore, there were no regular meetings between the leadership in Nicaragua and the priests in the Costa Rican frontier (Picado 1988: 50). Neither colonial church had a bishop, nor cathedral, or a seminary with which to build an institutionalized ecclesiastical structure.

Montevideo became a vicariate in 1832 and later a Diocese in 1878 thus receiving its first Bishop, Jacinto Vera. In spite of its late formation by 1838, the vicariate consisted of 33 parishes, 51 churches and chapels, and was supported by 100 clerics (both regular

¹ According to Godoy Urrutia’s study on literacy in 1952, he identifies Costa Rica with the smallest proportion of indigenous peoples at .03 percent (4,200) of the population, smallest only next to Uruguay which does not appear on in his analysis at all; I assume because Uruguay’s indigenous population was non-existent.

and secular) serving a population of 114,000 (Bazzano et al. 1993:34). This corresponds to a parish for every 3,454 Uruguayan and a priest for every 1,140. The municipal census of Montevideo in 1889 reveals that 83 percent of the respondent are self-identified Catholics out of a population of 180,000. In spite of the absence of an extended colonial history, Catholicism, both real and nominal, did become embedded in Uruguayan culture.

Costa Rica followed a similar pattern of ecclesiastical development. Costa Rica did not achieve an independent bishopric until 1851. Candidates for the priesthood still had to travel to León for training and Costa Rica did not have a seminary until 1878 (Mecham 1966: 332). The average number of regular and secular clergy until 1850 (when it became an independent Archdiocese) was 50 (Arias 1988:10; Sanabria 1984). This means that the priests-to-parishioner ratio at the time of independence was approximately 1,260 (Woodward 1991:8). According to Picado (1988:137), thru the colonial era reducciones were slowly transformed into parishes which totaled 23 by the time of Independence. If Woodward (1991:8) is correct in estimating the general population of Costa Rica to be 63,000 in 1820, this resulted in parish for every 2,739 residents.

Two conditions existed, characterizing both Uruguay and Costa Rica, which impacted ecclesiastical development. Whereas in other Latin American countries, the state expropriated church properties in order to enrich the state at the expense of the Church, this was not the case in Costa Rica or Uruguay. We can reject the notion that the wealth of the Church impeded capitalistic development by monopolizing land holdings that were in turn left uncultivated or outside of commercial use (Picado: 1988: 57). More

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importantly however, is the absence of an alliance between the Church and a conservative oligarchy. There was no collectivity of conservative landholding elites in Costa Rica with whom the Church could have formed an alliance. There were no latifundios because there were so few indigenous and colonists did not import slaves. In Costa Rica, the agrarian-economic model was the campesino nuclear family owning its own piece of land. It was a rural democracy in which the principle elite agents in the post-independence era were the merchant class (Yashar 1997; Williams 1989). Hence Costa Rica did not experience the typical Conservative – Liberal cleavages and civil wars. The Church did not have an alliance partner with the conservative elites because as a collectivity, it did not exist. In Uruguay, there were latifundios and there were conservative rural elites that resisted liberal impulses. However, in Uruguay, the collectivity of wealthy rural landholders was not a monolithic block. There were two clearly differentiated groups of rural elites — whose interests were divided — which had profound implications for the state development in Uruguay. The first group consisted of criollo elites and their gaucho followers. These were the core of the blanco party and

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4 When considering aggregated groups of elites who participated in or resisted post-revolution republican state building in emerging Latin America nations, it is common to find references in scholarly literature to the owners of large estates as an “oligarchical class” (Ricahrd 1987; Mahoney 2001; Negretto and Aguilar-Rivera 2000; Rock 2000; Bushnell 1996). Wealthy land owners are typically understood to collectively represent a social and political cleavage that resisted liberal reform fearing that commercial agricultural modernization would threaten their interests and way of life. While a “class” designation may be useful analytically, such an inference glosses over the diversity of social and political interests that existed in the rural context among elite landowners. Analysis in this study attempts to recognize the heterogeneity of social and political interests that existed among landowning elites in Uruguay and Costa Rica.

5 A site where the Liberal-Conservative cleavage was most pronounced and was reflected in political conflict was Colombia where the Church found a supportive ally in the Conservative party. See Eduardo Posada-Carbó, *The Catholic Church, Elections and Democracy in Colombia, 1830-1930*, (The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 2012).
their conflict with the urban doctors led to cycles of rural rebellions by party militias (Rock 2000: 181; López-Alves 1996; Finch 1981). The second group consisted of the modernizing land owners of the Littoral and the South, closer to Montevideo: most of whom were British Protestants. The modernizers had a rural business linkage to the bankers in Montevideo. Modernization led to the enclosure and to displacement of rural workers who became the rural and urban poor. As a result of disparate economic interests among the two groups, there was little linkage between the Montevideo and the hinterland, hence, the state in Uruguay remained undeveloped and weak (Finch 1981: 32; Rock 2000: 181; López-Alves 1996). As a result of this division, there was no alliance between the Church and a collectivity of conservative rural elites in Uruguay and hence, no real threat to Liberals.

Both the Costa Rican and Uruguayan Church were institutionally, politically and economically weak, and not a threat to the liberal-republican vision of the state. Hence, this background does not explain why the liberal reformers attacked the Church in either nation because: 1) there was no powerful church that was an obstacle to reform, 2) there was no conservative ally of the Church threatening the liberals. In spite of the commonality between the ecclesiastical development in Uruguay and Costa Rica, the role of the Church in the formation of the modern state and entry into modernity were entirely different in each society. The Costa Rican Church, as institutionally weak as it was, was able to resist secularizing impulses pressed by personalistic dictators, entered in to a modus vivendi with secular elites, and the Church has been a stable actor in Costa Rican society; Uruguay became radically secular by comparison.
Point number six above refers to a second historically contingent narrative corresponding to the notion that secularization in Uruguay can be attributed, in part, to European immigration. Massive and spontaneous immigration as a source of secularization in Uruguay is argued by several researchers (Julio Santa Ana 1965:94-6; Rodé 1964:6; Bazanno et al. 1993; Rossi 1989; Rodríguez Villamil and Saprisa 1983). Scholars generally recognize six waves or periods of immigration beginning in the late 1860s and continuing until the 1930s (Rodriguez Villamil and Sapriza 1983:18; Oddone 1966). Immigrants, mostly Spanish and Italians, it is believed, were carriers of new ideas and customs that influenced Uruguayan society. The standard narrative reads like this: these immigrants were not characterized by nostalgia for the homeland because they were pushed out by civil wars and political conflict thus motivated by the possibility of a better future. Concentrated in the working class, immigrants to Uruguay became the social base for the nascent worker-anarchists movement corresponding to the emergence of industrialization in Montevideo. These immigrants, coming from Catholic countries, arrived to Uruguay with anticlerical sentiments because the Church symbolized the oppression and misery that they sought to abandon (Fitzgibbons 1954). Hence, Italian and Spanish immigrants dominated the social base whose anticlerical dispositions penetrated all aspects of the national life. One effect that immigration is believed to have had is the displacement of the criollo heritage and ethos since immigrants and their children had no experience or memory of historical struggles essential to national formation and narrative (Bazanno et al. 1993: 62-63). Hence, immigration is attributed to transforming Uruguay into a cosmopolitan society that had little national recollection of the Church’s role in shaping the national conscience.
While this explanation is plausible and appears to be the default narrative concerning immigration to the Río Plata region, investigations over the last two decades have revisited immigration data and raise doubts concerning certain aspects of this narrative; these include the methodology employed to quantify the immigrant population (linear or circular) and assumptions regarding settlement patterns (homogeneity / heterogeneity, assimilation / pluralistic model). Quantitatively, researchers who have closely studied the phenomenon of Uruguayan immigration and demographics in the period of interest (1870-1930), elaborate extensively on the lack of reliable data (Rial 1980; 1981; Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1983:18; Oddone 1966a; Pereira and Trajtenberg 1966; Goebel 2010; Oddone 1966b:12). Limited data produced exaggerations among earlier analysis (see Valliant 1873; Bordoni 1885: cited in Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1983 ) leading to more rigorous studies in the 1960s that attempted to reconstruct a plausible history of both immigration and emigration using the most dependable data available (Oddone 1966; Pereira and Trajtenberg 1966).  

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6 Juan Rial (1981: 50), the most esteemed Uruguayan demographer, made the following evaluation regarding the challenges of accurately quantifying immigration and demography in this era; “The Directors of Census and Statistics recently realized that the accounting of annals of population beginning in 1882 were, in many cases, evidently wrong.”. Regarding the limited availability and reliability of data, Rial (1981:51) wrote; “Between 1908 and 1963, there were no Census on the national level, only up-dates on the department level and of very poor quality.” Regarding the accounting of foreign immigrant Rial (1981:53) writes; “…although between 1905 and 1912, the impressionistic testimonies indicate an increase in the number of European immigrants, lamentably, it is difficult to quantify because the corresponding lists of passengers from 1906 to 1912 has been lost.” Clearly demographers have been frustrated in attempting to produce accurate figures of European immigration and demographics in the era under study.

problem with the census data is that it is cross-sectional and does not reflect the temporary nature that characterized immigration. The larger question that researchers must address is; is immigration linear or is it circular when considering trans-national immigration in this era? Did European immigrants arrive to Uruguay and remain permanently? Some did but many did not. Devoto (2003: 35) suggests that the data empirically support a circular pattern of immigration. Between 1861 and 1920, almost 50% of all of Italians and 35% of Spaniards returned home. Many of the Italians were *golondrinas*, seasonal agriculture workers who spent half the year in Europe and the other half in South America (Piore 1980). Immigrants tended to work in secondary labor-markets characterized by labor-intense and low wages; hence, the promise of a better life in Uruguay was not always realized prompting immigrants to return home or to move on to Buenos Aires (Oddone 1966:12, 17; Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1983: 88-89).

Apart from the xenophobic era associated with the Rojas regime in which immigration in Uruguay outpaced Argentina, Montevideo was in fact considered backwaters to Buenos Aires. By the mid-nineteenth century, Argentina had more favorable macro-economic and political development and greater availability of land (Goebel 2010: 202; Oddone 1966). Gobel (2010: 203) points out that rather than a final destination, Uruguay was primarily a country of transit within a broader migratory circuit (Finch 1981:25; Hanson 1979:9). Using the Registry of Legal Citizens, Zubillaga (1993:83) identified that between 1874 and 1901; only 1,596 foreigners became Uruguayan citizens.

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8 Immigrant’s preference for Buenos Aires as a destiny over Montevideo is supported quantitatively. In Argentina the average net contribution of immigration to total population growth from 1895 to 1914 was 15.8 per thousand. In Uruguay, the average net contribution of immigration to total population growth from 1895 to 1914 was 1.1 per thousand. Clearly, immigration was more significant in Argentina than in Uruguay (International Population Conference. London 1969, vol.1: 716).
Naturalization may have been uncommon because of the ease of assimilation with few advantages derived from becoming a Uruguayan citizen. On the other hand, it may have been that immigrants were hesitant to symbolically break with their homeland because they knew that they would be returning there one day. Hence, census data, even if it calculates the immigrant population in 1852, 1860 and 1908, does not capture the transitory nature of the shifting population. A better source of data would be one that not only quantifies the inflow of Europeans to Uruguay, but captures the true extent of both emigration and on-going migration to Argentina. An attempt to calculate this migratory dynamic was realized by Pereira and Trajtenberg (1966) who then compared their findings to those in multiple volumes of the *Anuario Estadístico*. The practice of the *Anuario Estadístico* to register passengers arriving at all of Uruguay’s ports did not begin until 1893 (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1983:15). They noted lapses (1907-1913; 1922-1930) in which the criteria for classifying incoming passengers vary considerably and many primary records prior to 1920 were simply unintelligible due to poor conservation. They found numerous errors regarding the total movement of immigrants. For example, immigrants who exited by boat across the Uruguayan River to Argentina were not recorded. The same *Anuarios* showed, for example, that between 1912 and 1944, 90,000 more Uruguayan citizens entered the country than exited yet there is no corroborating record of a net emigration of Uruguayan citizens in that timeframe — the return into the country was recorded in the *Anuarios* but not the departure (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1983:16).

The point of this discussion corresponds to the argument regarding the influence that European immigrants had on Uruguayan society. This argument is based in part on
inflated numbers of European immigrants who are believed to have been predominately anticlerical, challenging *criollo* religious traditions, and thus shaping the social base of society. Re-visiting these claims, based on recent research, challenges earlier claims regarding the magnitude of immigration. Because of unreliable entry statistics, estimates of the total net inflow of European immigrants from 1880 to 1915 vary wildly. Albornoz cites a figure of 361,300, which is too high given the balance of movement between immigration and emigration. Data from the *Anuario Estadisticos* suggest that European immigration at the port of Montevideo, the only relevant point of entry for Europeans, was estimated at 270,009 which is unreliable because it under-records exits to Argentina (Rodriquez Villamil and Sapriza 1983). Rodriquez Villamil and Sapriza (1983:28) offer a more conservative estimate of 153,987 European (net) immigrants between 1880 and 1915, which if this estimate were correct, would result in an average of 4,400 European immigrants annually. In comparison to natural population growth, immigration growth was low.

Rothman, in a paper submitted to the International Population Conference, London 1969, presented the following demographic chart comparing quinquennial population rates based on natality, mortality and immigration data for Argentina and Uruguay. Table 2.1 shows that the average natural increase (difference between births and deaths) between 1895 and 1919 in Uruguay was 24.6 per thousand whereas the net

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10 Hanson (1979:9) suggests the average net migration to Uruguay between 1879 and 1903 was 4,000 annually.
contribution of immigration to the total population growth for the same period was 0.9 per thousand.  

**TABLE 2.1**

**ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY: ESTIMATED POPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC RATES**

**CRUDE RATES PER 1000 POPULATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and Period</th>
<th>Population in Thousands</th>
<th>Births</th>
<th>Death</th>
<th>Natural Increase</th>
<th>Migration</th>
<th>Total Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Argentina</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895-1899</td>
<td>4,426</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-1904</td>
<td>5,296</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905-1909</td>
<td>6,337</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-1914</td>
<td>7,583</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-1919</td>
<td>8,652</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uruguay</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895-1899</td>
<td>826.3</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-1904</td>
<td>934.8</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905-1909</td>
<td>1,054</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-1914</td>
<td>1,189</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-1919</td>
<td>1,318</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Rothman (1969:714) comments that “In the case of Uruguay, the importance of immigration— which in relative figures *might have been significant* in the second part of the 19th century— seems to have diminished in the 20th century.” Her statement references page 47 of Oddone’s work (*La Formación del Uruguay Moderno: la Inmigración y el Desarrollo Económico y Social*, 1966) in which Oddone uses data from

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11 Rothman (1969:714) explains the reason she began with 1895 data for Uruguay is because “estimations have a certain degree of reliability because they have been performed after the evaluations and corrections of historical data.” Argentina, in contrast to Uruguay experienced an average natural increase (difference between births and deaths) between 1895 and 1919 of 35.9 per thousand whereas the net contribution of immigration to the total population growth for the same period was 12.3 per thousand. Clearly, immigration was of greater significance in Argentina than in Uruguay (See Devoto 1991; 2003:33).
the 1889 Censo Municipal del Departamento de la Ciudad de Montevideo to support the notion of immigrant growth. We have already referenced Rial’s evaluation (see Note No. 4) regarding the unreliability and errant data corresponding to immigration figures in Census material from this era. Rothman cannot say with any degree of certitude using the demographic data available to her that immigration was quantifiably significant. The bottom line is that although immigration was a factor in determining the social base of Uruguay, especially in Montevideo, its influence may have been overstated.\textsuperscript{12}

The second assumption regarding Uruguayan immigration has to do with the composition of the immigrant communities. The assumption suggests that many of the immigrants were of proletariat origins, experienced limited opportunities for social mobility due to the oppressive nature of capitalist expansion in particular areas of Italy and Spain, hence, fled their homeland to look for better opportunities in Latin America. They brought with them either an affiliation with or a disposition toward worker-anarchists movements which emerged in Montevideo in conjunction with the modernization of the economy. The immigrant work force was inherently anticlerical and hostile toward Catholicism because the Church represented the way of life they abandoned in their land of origin. A significant factor in this narrative is the motivation

\footnote{Juan Rial (1981: 16, 30), a principal Uruguayan demographer, has attempted to sort out Uruguayan demographics between 1870 and 1930. Regarding the reliability of recording the immigrant population he writes; “Precisely until 1930 the accounts concerning immigrants were notoriously stupid, what we can say is that a good proportion of the population, especially in Montevideo, are descendants of older immigrants.” Regarding the lack of nuanced and diverse census data on European immigration, Rial (1981: 104) states; “The presence of the foreign population did not attract the attention of government authorities who assumed that the offices of statistics quantified the phenomenon, however did not realize in any case a major or minor disaggregation of information referencing the foreign population and the quality of existing data is poor. Until now, we have utilized only two bivariate classifications; foreigner or native, without entering other characteristics.”}
for immigrating in the first place. With regard to Uruguayan immigration, consisting principally of Italians and Spanish, the principle works remain Juan Antonio Oddone, who published two books in 1966 on Uruguayan immigration. Oddone attempts to frame immigration as a consequence of social change associated with agrarian capitalism and the industrial revolution, particularly when it emerged in Italy and Spain. Principle changes included urbanization, industrialization (at least in northern Italy), and proletariatzation of the labor force, which, gave rise to class consciousness, class conflict, and eventually “societies of resistance” which revolted against the status quo of which the Church was a collaborator. However, Devoto (2003: 31-32) cautions against an overly simplistic explanation. It is not at all clear if immigrants were motivated by capitalistic expansion at home that increased rural pauperism and labor disputes in the urban areas — all of which contributed to a push factor — or was migration influenced by a pull factor? Destinations like Uruguay and Buenos Aires were attracting potential immigrants with promises of social mobility. There is empirical evidence to support both. Devoto points out that push factors were fragmented, geographically determined, and not uniform. Capitalistic development was uneven and social ills created by expanding capitalism and industrialization was also uneven. Second, the greater amount of empirical evidence seems to support the pull factor: that emigration from Italy occurred because of expanding opportunities in foreign destinations. Rodriquez and Sapriza (1983:89-91) refer to the offices of the Dirección General de Inmigración which were created for the

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13 La Formación del Uruguay Moderno: La Inmigración y el Desarrollo Económico-social; and La Emigración Europea al Río de la Plata: Motivaciones y Proceso de Incorporación.
very purpose to persuade European immigrants to stay in Uruguay. However, the notion that immigration should be analyzed on the national (macro) level is susceptible to producing distortions because analysis rests on the assumption that economic markets and public policy are more important than individual motivations to migrate. This involves an overvaluation of the state’s role in the juridical, administrative, and economic spheres which homogenizes immigrants and assumes that impersonal market forces are determining factors. We know from recent migration studies that primary social networks are a far greater motivation for migration than economic factors (Massey 2002; 2004; 1987; 1998). Networks based on occupational skills or village linkage appear to be a better indicator of migration than the assumption of a “migratory chain” (Devoto 2003:40; Baily 1999:13). This may have been especially true for the Spanish immigrants for whom emigration to the Spanish-American colonies had been a long tradition. Moya (1998: 68-72) studied migratory patterns of Spaniards to Rio Plate and found that kinship networks more than emigration agents or labor contractors were the principal motivation for emigrating. Resembling more of a web than a chain, networks transcended immediate family to include village paisano relations. Although migration to the Rio Plate region was disrupted by events such as Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian peninsula (1807-1814), the War of Independence (1810-1816), and civil war that followed, the network may have been dormant but did not end; kept alive by family memories. Hence, some

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14 Apart for a brief period of intentional colonization (1852-1880), fiscal lands were more available and easier to acquire in Argentina than Uruguay. Political instability, poorer economic opportunity and the lack of land for agricultural use were factors that limited immigration to Uruguay (Rock 2000; Hanson 1979; Oddone 1966a).
Spanish emigrants were motivated more by family ties and networks in Uruguay than by economic issues at home (cf. Devoto 2003:33, 38).

This discussion points to the fact that trans-continental migration is characterized by greater heterogeneity than homogeneity; homogeneity is the assumption of the Uruguayan immigration narrative outlined above. Some immigrants may have been predisposed to be unionists, anarchists and anticlerical; but not all immigrants. What assumptions are plausible regarding the composition of Italian and Spanish immigrants based on region of origin and settlement patterns? Regarding regional factors, researchers of Italian migration reference the vast regional difference between northern and southern Italy over time.

### TABLE 2.2

**AVERAGE ANNUAL EMIGRATION FROM ITALY:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Center</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Insular Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881-82</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-01</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-12</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A reproduction of Gould’s findings in Table 2.2 regarding the Italian diaspora indicates a shift from the North to the South over a thirty year span. Because Uruguayan statistics did not record regional origins of immigrants, Goebel (2010: 200) used marriage records to determine regional origin among Spanish and Italian immigrants.15

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15 Goebel (2010:194-95) also cites problems of the immigration data in the National and Municipal Census records. He cites the lack of disaggregated data (occupation, religion, region of origin, or
Due to the inadequacy of official immigration and demographic records in Uruguay, Goebel created a data set of 5,056 marriage records as a proxy for group interaction and to provide insight about the characteristics of immigrants and their descendants. The advantage of using marriage records is that place of birth for each spouse was listed as well as nationality and occupation of both sets of parents. Based upon the sample of marriage records he was able to make the following observations about regional origins of foreigners; 1) Central Italy had little representation; 2) By the 1880s Italians came predominately (65 percent of males in Montevideo and equal percentage in rural areas) from the north, particularly from Liguria, Piedmont and Lombardy. Second was the Mezzogiorno; mainly Campania, Calabria and Basilicata (27 percent of males in Montevideo and 30 percent for rural areas); 3) By 1900s, the trend had shifted in Montevideo such that 50 percent of males were southerners and 42 percent northerners, with fewer southerners than northerners in the rural areas. 4) In the 1920s, the percentage of southern males in Montevideo increase to 58 percent. In sum, according to Goebel’s findings (2010: 200), northern Italians arrived earlier and settled more often in the countryside while southern Italians came later and remained predominately in

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16 The sample consisted of a proportional distribution of marriage records representing Montevideo (urban) and Canelones, Colonia and Paysandú (rural) from 1889, 1907-08, and 1928 in order to utilize longitudinal analysis. Goebel included only marriages with at least one foreign spouse (2010: 195-96).
Montevideo. Goebel’s findings are corroborated by government incentive plans thru the *Comisión Central de Inmigración* to populate the rural areas beginning in 1865 (Zubillaga 1992: 234 Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1983:86-88). Not only was the Commission actively recruiting European immigrants thru consular agents, but had an intricate plan of essentially indentured servitude resulting in the acquisition of land suitable for an “intermediate private enterprise.” The Commission evaluated the project favorably because it was profitable for the immigrant family and satisfied the government plan to colonize agricultural zones (Zubillaga 1992: 242-43). Hence, Montevideo did not emerge as a primary location of Italian immigrant settlement until the 1890s when the majority of immigrants were southerners.  

Region of origin may have implications if we accept generalizations regarding cultural and traditional differentiations. For example Putnam (1993: 121-148) argues that Italian immigrants coming from the south were inclined to be agricultural workers, poorer and accustomed to a more feudalistic social order dominated by aristocratic land owners in which the Church served as an authoritative institution. In the south, there was virtually no industry and no large cities. Northern Italians, in contrast, were more inclined to be: 1) a part of Italy’s industrialization, 2) living in an urban area, 3) engaged in the 1848-49 upheavals, and 4) conditioned by unionization and anticlerical dispositions. If we accept these generalizations, we would expect to find some Italian immigrants in

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17 As comparative data, Goebel references the work of Camou and Pellegrino (1993:57) who looked at Italian emigration statistics which corroborate a higher proportion of southerners among immigrants to Uruguay: 78.3 percent in 1890s; 69.3 percent in the 1900s; and 71.8 percent in the 1910s.

18 Zubillaga (1992:235) adds that the majority of Italian immigrants that participated in the Commission’s settlement program came from Liguria, Piamonte, Lombardía, Veneto, and to a lesser degree, Tuscany.
Montevideo receptive to the Church and others who conform to the Garibaldino motif. It seems reasonable to expect that heterogeneity of social conditioning related to place of origin would not have produced a homogeneous critical mass of Italian immigrants in Uruguay who were collectively predisposed toward anticlericalism; especially when we consider neighborhood settlement patterns.

Researchers who have looked closely at neighborhood settlement patterns among Italian immigrants recognize that mutual aid societies played an important role in facilitating immigrant adjustment and provide important insight regarding social dynamics and community organization. Mutual aid societies were an important community resource because they helped immigrants find employment, locate housing, establish meaningful social relations, defend their interests and improve working and living conditions. Therefore, understanding how mutual aid societies functioned within Italian immigrant communities should help to evaluate the degree to which the “social base” of the immigrant community in Uruguay was significantly anticlerical as many researchers have hypothesized (Julio Santa Ana 1965:94-6; Rodé 1964:6; Bazanno et al. 1993; Rossi 1989; Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1982).

Mutual aid societies were not an immigrant innovation but emerged in principally Northern Italy as a voluntary organization providing a means for trade and craft associations to continue when guilds were abolished. The principle aim of societies was to provide rudimentary social insurance such as old-age pension, sick pay, funeral costs, and other forms of benevolence to members and their families. Clark (1984:76) suggests that societies emerged due to expediency at a time when traditional Catholic charities were disrupted due to political conflict and before the state introduced its own social
security. In general societies were viewed positively by the ruling class as a source of collaboration among workers, promoted education, morality and contributed to the public good. While Neufeld (1961: 60-63) and Clark (1984:75-78) agree that in their early formation societies did not take on a class conscience but included masters and employees, were mixed assemblies which included craftsmen of all trades, however they disagree over the political nature of societies. Clark suggests that societies were committed to a particular political view be it conservative, clerical or Republican while Neufeld suggests they were strictly apolitical and focused on social welfare. However, both Clark and Neufeld agree that mutual aid societies evolved into single-trade associations and became forerunners to organized labor groups and moved from strictly charity to agitation.\footnote{Neufeld (1961: 174) does not suggest that mutual aide societies became labor unions, rather that societies served the cause of organized labor by providing members with material support over difficult times of resulting from militant union activity and strikes.}

While Neufeld and Clark both agree that the period from 1860 to 1890 is characterized as the golden age of mutual aide societies, they provide conflicting accounts of the political orientation of societies; especially in regard to their adhesion to the Church. The Institute of Catholic Congresses and Committees of Italy (Opera dei Congressi e dei Comitati Cattolici d’Italia) founded in 1874 gave rise to a structure of lay committees in parishes and diocese as well as organized periodic congresses. Created to reunite Catholic associations in order to defend the rights of the Pope, Opera dei also served to unite Catholic social interests. The Institute was divided in two divisions; one to works of charity and one to the moral and economic conditions of tradesmen and agriculture workers thru mutual aid societies (Neufeld 1961: 182). Although Clark
(1984:87) cites that by 1883 there were 993 parish committees in the North, 263 in Central Italy and 57 in the South; he also states that they were not numerous to the degree that only one parish in ten had a committee. However, by 1897, the *Opera dei* claimed 3,982 parish committees, 708 youth sections, 17 university circles, 688 worker associations, 588 rural banks, 24 daily newspapers, 105 periodicals and many other organizations and activities, mostly concentrated in Veneto, Lombardy and the Piedmont (Clark 1984:107). Where Neufeld and Clark differ is over the political orientation of these associations. Neufeld (1961: 183) states that the mutual aid societies had been monopolized by the democratic–liberal elements of the Mazzinian—Garibaldian persuasion thus assumed an anticlerical disposition; which if true, manifested an implacable aversion toward the Church. Neufeld does cite that by 1887, traditional Catholic mutual aid societies made a come-back, maintained a confessional disposition under the guidance of ecclesiastic authorities, and indicated concern for a full range of labor problems thus giving rise to Catholic labor leagues. However, Clark (1984:87, 107) argues that from the beginning, the *Opera dei* fought against the established Liberal order and operated under a new centralized Church committed to creating a national Catholic movement opposed to the Liberal state. In fact by 1897, the movement of Catholic intransigents had become so strong that it posed a threat to the Liberal government prompting the Prime Minister to crack down on Catholic associations and ban meetings that were viewed contrary to the liberal order. What Clark (1984: 108) refers to as the “persecution of 1897-98” resulted in the abolition of the traditional Catholic network of social, educational and economic associations that had come to represent Social Catholicism in that time frame. The importance of this discussion is that mutual aid
societies were effective means of organization and association that served both anticlerical and traditional Catholic interests.

What we know about mutual aid societies in Latin America comes principally from research in Buenos Aires. In his comparative study of Italian immigrants in Buenos Aires and New York City between 1870 and 1914, Baily (1982; 1983; 1999; 2003) has looked closely at informal and formal institutions of family, household and local neighborhood. Mutual aide societies were an important formal institution in the lives of most Italian immigrants regardless of destination. Mutual aide societies not only provided assistance to new immigrants and facilitated adjustment to a new world, but they were provided space where the immigrant community could share resources, exchange social capital, find employment, locate professional services, etc.. Baily’s study includes maps of immigrant communities which typically include ethnic local business, schools, and other small institutions, including a Church. Frequently local Churches also served as a functional mutual aid society (See also Gandolfo 1988:163). Italian immigrants in Buenos Aires have generated numerous studies utilizing mutual aid societies as a unit of analysis. From these studies we know that mutual aid societies did not represent a monolithic block of unified interests but manifested inter-ethnic tensions as Gandolfo (1992) found that Italian anarchists and socialists came to resent the mutual aid societies that would not support militant labor activities and found such societies to be in competition rather than complement the labor movement. In spite of ethnic

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20 Putnam showed interest in mutual aid societies because they represented an embryonic formation of the associative process which and supports his thesis that civic participation and reciprocity networks became a basis for democratic institutions and originated primarily in northern Italy (1993: 138-143).
commonalities, political tensions in the larger immigrant community found their way into mutual aid societies typically between supporters of Garibaldi-Mazzini republicanism or conservative monarchists who, even after Italian unification were hoping for reconciliation between Church and State. Bailey (1999:174) studied the history of the Unione e Benevolenza, the oldest and largest society in Buenos Aires and found that conflict between republicans and royalists led to the withdrawal of dissident royalists in order to find their own society (Nazionale Italiana) while a few years later radical republicans also split-off over a dispute to find an autonomous society. In larger societies, Cibotti (1988) found leadership in the Unione to be dominated by wealthy merchants, businessmen and lawyers and in a network with other important institutions in Buenos Aires; while the majority of members consisted of the working class. Although relationships between leaders and working class members were clientistic, workers supported the society because of the benefits offered. Not all mutual aid societies were prone to internal conflict. Estrada (1992) found that if societies wanted to be serviceable and fulfill their benevolent objectives, societies had to be apolitical. In terms of internal dynamics, societies, although with hundreds of members enlisted experienced low participation at meetings and for this reason, only met every six months. Estrada found three levels of membership; 1) executive; 2) intermediate functionaries; 3) and the majority was characterized by passive members. Estrada found that outside of a few larger and well-established mutual aid societies, most societies were small, unstable and collapsed after a few years; especially when a worker-pension had to be paid. In terms of linkages to labor union formation in Montevideo, Zubillaga (1992: 244-45) found that mutual aid societies served as a base of recruitment for labor unions but that participation
was diversified due to a plurality of union ideologies usually consolidated under the banner of a larger labor organization; there were socialists (*Unión General de Trabajadores*); anarchists (*La Federación Obrera Regional*) and Christian-socialists (*Círculos Católicos de Obreros del Uruguay*).

In spite of political orientations, how did religion factor into mutual aid societies? Health care was not the only benefit offered by mutual aid societies. Silberstien (1992) found that in Rosario, although anticlerical societies had been long established and had created five laical schools, Salesians came to Rosario in 1878 and thru informal associational networks were able to create a full service educational system that included a primary school, a night school for adults (*artes y oficios*) and children’s schools of skills and crafts (*oratorios festivos*). By 1906, two Salesiano schools in Rosario had more students than five *escuelas mutuas Italianas* combined. According to Devoto’s case study (1991:228) of barrio *La Boca*, “it was the most anticlerical in the city of Buenos Aires.” Devoto found Salesians implementing Don Bosco’s strategy that was successful in Piamonte and Liguria; a School of *Festivos Oratorios*, which disarmed parents by providing education combined with games and religious instruction in the open air led to the establishment of a primary school, supplemented by a school for girls attended by the *Hermana de María Auxiliadora*, which were supported by a lay-led Catholic Association of Mutual Aid, Cofradía de la Virgen de Carmen, Cofradía Sagrado Corazón de Jesús. A few years later were joined by the Conference of St. Vincent of Men and Women and Catholic Youth Society. Devoto explains that the key to the Salesian success was that the priests spoke the same dialect as the people in the barrio. It was the inability of the Scalabrini missionaries to speak the local dialect that Favero (1989) attributed to the
failure of the Scalabrini work in Buenos Aires. Forming a community of priests, who were to be the nucleus of a new congregation composed of priests who came from Cuba, Philippines and Spain, did not appeal to the Italian immigrants who wanted the Mass in their native tongue.

Unfortunately, studies of mutual aid societies in Montevideo are lacking. What we know about mutual aid societies comes principally from Rossi (1989) whose thesis suggests that Italian immigration constitutes the origins of militant anticlericalism that characterized Uruguayan liberalism. Rossi specifically argues that Italian immigrants represented a populist current that became the heart of the Colorado party under batllismo which was expressed as a form of Jacobinism. The study however offers very little quantitative data. Rossi identifies eight mutual aid societies in Montevideo in 1910 totaling 5,364 members; 3,778 of the members are associated with Societa Italiana di Mutuo Soccorso. If we accept Rial’s figures for the 1908 National Census, there were approximately 40,112 Italians in Montevideo. This corresponds to one society member for every 13 Italians living in Montevideo. However, the real question pertains to the nature and objective of each mutual aid society.

Italian immigration has recently been revisited by Uruguayan scholars who have attempted to sort thru misrepresentations based on over-estimates of statistical data and questionable qualitative accounts which have led them to ask if earlier records on ethnic immigration contributed to certain urban legends or to historically credible accounts. Revisiting Italian immigration has been initiated by a team of well qualified scholars whose first collective work is an annotated bibliographic compilation of 1,242 sources pertaining to the Italian immigrant community; ranging from collections of letters
referencing personal accounts to popular and/or scholarly works (see Caetano 1996). Each entry has been placed in a thematic category. Under the category of “association” there are 170 literary entries listed and 108 with the term ‘socorros mutuo” in the title or annotation. Of these, 108 entries pertaining to mutual aid societies, eight entries have a definitive reference to “Garibaldi”, “September 20”, “Republican”, “Pro-Patria”, “Mazzini” in the annotated description giving a clue to the society’s orientation. Conversely, six entries decidedly corresponded to a Catholic oriented society based on its annotated description. Of the sixteen entries corresponding to “society rules”, one corresponds to a decidedly “Garibaldi” society and one to a Catholic society. Of the 20 entries with the term “statutes” in the title, five are decidedly related to Garibaldismo. Hence, based on the annotated entries compiled by Caetano’s research team related to associations among Italian immigration, there is no clear evidence that mutual aid societies were dominated by Garibaldismo, in spite of Rossi’s claims.

Possibly the most reliable study concerning the relationship between Italian immigration and anticlerical orientation has been conducted by Carlos Zubillaga (1992a). The objective of Zubillaga’s study is to clarify the relationship between “Italian immigration, anticlericalism, philosophical liberalism, and irreligiosity” (1992:68). The difficulty separating fact from fiction can be attributed to Garibaldi’s participation in the Guerra Grande from 1841-1848 which made him a legendary hero in Uruguay. Carlos Rama’s work entitled, Garibaldi en Uruguay (1968) provided some academic credibility to Garibaldi’s contribution to Risorgimento. However, Zubillaga cites that because

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21 Caetano’s research team included Alcides Bereta, Ana María García Etcheverry de Bareta, Roger Geymonat, Fernando Devoto, Nadir Morosi, Alvaro Martinez, Juan A. Oddone, Alejandro Sanchez, Manuel Santos Pírez, and Carlos Zubillaga.
political conflicts of the patria were followed intensely by members of the immigrant community, and in some cases generated the reason for emigration, partisanship was inevitable; as was class division. Italian elite who were conversant with liberal and positivist creed and who had taken part in various conflicts in Risorgimento found consonance with local intellectualism and political elite in Montevideo. However, for the working class and peasant immigrants, identity was shaped more importantly by region than by national citizenship. Therefore, ideologies and interests were as fragmented as paesani groups. After the conquest of Rome in 1870, and the Mazzinian influence diminished, the “roman question” emerged thus reinforcing clerical and anticlerical partisanship. Hence, September 20th every year after became a divisive event and a reminder of the multiple associative structures. The discussion in Congress in 1883 to erect a monument of Garibaldi was controversial and contentious thus reflecting the incessant fragmentation. Zubillaga pivots and uses material found in the archives of the Curia to substantiate the pastoral action of principally the Salesians and Capuchinos who, thru the means of festive oratory schools of skills and crafts, penetrated modest working-class barrios of Italian immigrants; with names such as Vittorio Emanuele II, Garibaldino, Nueva Savona, and Nuevo Genova. These were followed by schools for girls founded by the Hijas de María Santísimo del Huerto, the Sales de la Visitación de Santa María. One of the most important factors contributing to pastoral action was the capacity to speak the dialect of the barrio. Commitments to formal institutions were complemented by popular religiosity which took on a “manera Italiana” and were public and ostentatious, representing local devotions to San Cono, Virgen de las Flores, and Virgen de Pompeya,
depending on the consecration of the barrio. Zubillaga found letters pertaining to seventy Italian clergy who arrived between 1850 and 1930 not to mention those who entered vocations and were trained in the Seminario Conciliar in Montevideo.

Zubillaga’s thesis (1992a:69), in comparison to Rossi, is that Italian immigration to Uruguay was not a homogeneous universe but characterized by multiple affinities including religious practices and traditions manifested within the context of the barrio. Zubillaga (1993:68) cites documents from the Comisión Central Directiva de Inmigración containing baptismal records among immigrants. In 1868, the document cites 1919 immigrant males in intermarriages to Uruguayans sought to baptize their children, of whom 519 (29.7 percent) were Italian, and of 1,232 immigrant women in exogamous marriages to Uruguayans, 366 (29.7 percent) were Italian. If we accept demographic figures from 1868, Italians were approximately 13 percent of the immigrant population. In 1908, 6797 immigrant males baptized their children, of whom 1,746 (25.7 percent) were Italian men, while among 5722 foreign women, 1,423 (24.9 percent) Italian wives sought to baptize their children at a time when Italians represented 34.4 percent of the total immigrant population. The proportion of Italian immigrant families, albeit in exogamous marriages, who sought baptism for their children exceeded what would be expected given the anticlerical narrative associated with Italian immigrants. Other researchers (Caetano and Geymonat 2004: 162; Barrán 1988: 6) who question the “Garibaldi thesis” do so on the basis of the 1889 Censo del Departamento de Montevideo which disaggregates religious categories into “Nacionales” and “Extranjeros.”

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22 The annotated bibliographic index compiled by Caetano and his research team on the Italian immigrant community in Uruguay contains countless entries pertaining to popular religion.
Montevideo, 80 percent of nationals were identified by the municipal census as Catholics while eight percent were categorized as liberals in comparison to 87 percent of foreigners who were identified as Catholic and six percent were categorized in the census as liberals. Barrán (1988:6) states that “The 1889 Census shows that if impiety and indifference have invaded the country, the responsibility does not correspond to the immigrant profile because they appear to be less incredulous.”

The counter-arguments presented here, while not invalidating the “social base” and “weak institutional Church” claims, make it more difficult to assume that urban demographics and ecclesiastical history in Uruguay are significantly correlated to the secularization of Uruguayan society. While not irrelevant, it is possible that the explanatory power of these factors is weaker than previously assumed. Hence, further research is necessary to clarify the strength and weakness of these claims.

Aside from the principle studies mentioned above, a series of investigations emerged from the 1960s and forward that embraced or rejected certain historical contingencies highlighted by Bazzano et al. (1993). For example, Alberto Menthol Ferré (1969:47-51) dismissed, to some degree, immigration as a principle cause of secularization because the dominant Uruguayan culture was still criollo and he viewed the anticlerical measures of Batlle as symbolic rather than substantive. Rather, Menthol Ferré saw the defeat of Aparicio Saravia, a revolutionary leader of the Blanco party who fought against the Uruguayan government, as a critical factor. Saravia, traditionally Catholic and representative of the agro-exporters, was the last provincial political leader of the Nationalist Party to take up arms against the Colorados. A few years later, the Unión Cívica was formed by ardent Catholics as a third political party. The inability of
the *Unión Cívica* to recruit the majority of Catholics (who remained with the two principal political parties) meant that the *Unión Cívica* was never able to develop a critical mass. Hence, according to Menthol Ferré, the demise of Catholicism in Uruguay was tied to the misfortunes of the *Unión Cívica*. Carlos Rama (1964:19-21) attributes the “de-Christianization” of Uruguay to an emergent pluralism, institutional differentiation, and the disestablishment of religion (1917) concluding that the Church could not compete in an modernizing world. Sobrado (1968; 1969) argues that at a critical juncture in its development, the Church poorly appraised its role in modernity and opted for an ultramontane retrenchment as opposed to a tactical emphasis on the social needs of the nation. Rodé (1964:6-11) summarizes the secularization process as a sequence of historical events that ultimately led to a deep political divide. These events include; a weak colonial / institutional Church, multiple waves of migration, an ultramontane disposition of the ecclesiastical leadership toward modernity, and a dominant rational liberalism. Similarly, Santa Ana (1965) cites four reasons for the demise of the Uruguayan Church; 1) the institutional weakness of the Church, 2) the Church’s inability to adapt to modernity, 3) pluralistic ideologies emerging from the University, and 4) an anticlerical disposition of the state.

A second wave of thoughtful and intense scholarly investigations, conducted by Uruguayan social scientists, looked closely at the historical Church–State conflict and attributes the decline of the Church to socio-political causes. This collection of authors generally understand secularization to be a function of modernity defined in the classic sense – a progressive force promising to liberate humankind from ignorance and irrationality in which the democratic-capitalist nation-state is the chief organizing
principal (Rama 1964: 19; Santa Ana 1965:93; Barrán 1988; Barrán and Caetano 1996; Caetano and Geymonat 1997; Caetano 2006; Da Costa 2003, 2009; Zubillaga and Cayota 1988). Religion, in this narrative, is an impediment to the consolidation of the state, to social progress, and especially economic development (Zubillaga and Cayota 1988; Barrán 1988). In the face of social change associated with modernity, the Catholic elites in Uruguay became entrenched in ultramontanism thus alienated from the Church’s core constituents (Barrán 1988; Santa Ana 1965). For example, José P. Barrán (1988) attributes the decline of the Church in part to the failure to capture the urban capitalist class. Barrán cites the Churches defense of workers rights, clergy represented a threat to male headship of the family, and the appropriation of daughters and dowries contributed to the alienation of the Church from the urban bourgeoisie. In a subsequent work, Barrán (1998) explores the relationship of the Church to the economy by analyzing change over time regarding the content of wills and last testaments from 1732-1890. Not only does the study cite a shift over time noted by language emphasizing the salvation of the soul (religious invocation, declarations of faith, asking for intercession) to more mundane aspects of burial (a description of material goods and identification of inheritors), but Barrán uses the de-monopolization of death as a lens to understand secularization, especially when the state assumed the management of cadavers and cemeteries from the Church. Over time, the economic relationship between the Church and society shifted from serving as a receptor of wealth (thru bequests of land and money, charges for funeral services, etc.) to a primary agent of charity since the Church used its resources to finance social justice. Eventually, in Uruguay, a clientistic state monopolized public good thus reducing the role of the Church in the modern era. In a collection of essays that
reflect on the meaning citizenship and national ethos in light of the preparation for the first Centenario (centennial celebration of National Independence in 1925), Caetano and associates (2000) evaluate how political agents reconcile modern Uruguay (a secular society) with its decidedly religious past. The focus is less about secularization processes than about the defense of the Church’s role as sustainer of stability, moral order and public good as opposed to the state’s abuse and coercion of the concept of freedom of conscience as a justification for controlling education. Lastly, in response to Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum Novarum, Zubillaga and Cayota (1988) document the development of a Social-Christian movement, from gestation to organization, and the ensuing tensions between the ecclesiastical hierarchy and conservative Catholics (urban bourgeoisie), conflict with Liberals, conflicts with the Nationalist party, and ultimately with the reform movement of Batlle. The underlying thesis promoted by the authors is that the pathway forward for the Church in modernity is to become an ally to the working class and to enter into their struggle for dignity and social justice thus promoting the public good.

2. Neo-Secularization Studies

More recently, Uruguayan social scientists acquainted with multiple secularization theories stemming from continental thought have attempted to understand the secularization processes by applying varying frameworks to the Uruguayan context. Caetano and Geymonat (1997), for example, elaborate on five theoretical approaches to secularization in the introduction of a study that interprets Uruguayan secularization as a transition of religion from the public to private domain of individual’s lives.
(privatization). These works generally reflect a more sophisticated sense of secularization. For example, Caetano and Geymonat (1996:16) suggest that in Uruguay, the modernizing state supplanted the Church by playing a double role: 1) instrumentally, the state provided social order, and 2) symbolically the state provided national unity. Allegiance to progress and national identity facilitated by the state became a source for a “religion of the republic” in which a collection of sacred beliefs about the emerging nation displaced orthodox Catholicism in what amounted to a civil religion—a transcendent universal religion of the nation that does not claim an identifiable social group short of the entire society itself. Sacredness, once associated with religion, was transferred to the political realm and personal morality became defined by good citizenship. Civil religion in Uruguay sacralized various aspects of communitarian life through public rituals and civic liturgies thus provided national symbols that reinforced social order and national identity for an otherwise heterogeneous society (Caetano and Geymonat 1997: 29, 38). Civil religiosity is therefore understood to be a common, if not socially integrative, set of beliefs in transcendent principles and reality against which the historical experience and actions of the nation can be evaluated: independent of traditionally religious institutions.

Consistent with the neo-modern paradigm, several researchers (Caetano and Geymonat 1996; Da Costa 2003, 2009, 1999) explain secularization in terms of a polarization between the public and the private spheres. Religion in Uruguayan society has been atomized and exists principally as a private commitment by individuals and family members representing a minority in society, among who even a smaller minority participate in institutional religion (Da Costa 1996, 2003). If the public sphere is
monopolized by the state, by privatized religion these researchers really mean a form of “ethical individualism” which reflects a modern tendency to insist on personal choice in matters of morality and faith rather than seeking primary guidance from adherence to religious traditions. Catholics in modern Uruguay have been left to construct his or her own meaning system by drawing from traditional religious piety and contemporary secular philosophies (bricolage). However, religion became a “symbolic universe of meaning” detached from an institutional framework that infused individual Catholics with a privatized sense of sense of transcendent purpose. Gone from public view were the popular forms of public processions, cults of saints, veneration of the Virgin and the Sacred Heart which reminded citizens that religion had direct bearings on public order (Caetano 2006).

Accepting the norm of invisible religion, Da Costa (2009; 2003) explained secularization according to Hervieu-Léger’s thesis (2002) which understands secularization not only as a loss of influence by religious institutions but also as the production of new forms of religion by modern societies. In fact, it is modernity itself that demands imagined references to tradition and thereby shapes modern expressions of the need to believe. This results from the fact that modernizing societies, driven by forces of capitalism, lead to a disintegration of collective memory. In this perspective, religion appears as a particular mode of believing in relation to the authority of a tradition and to

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23 The term bricolage signals the individualization of religion: People "pick and choose" what to believe, selecting their preferred religious practices and ethical options. This phenomenon has been called "religion à la carte" because people disregard the set church "menu": In their religious outlook, they mix elements from different religious systems and incorporate folk-religious practices, superstitions, and ideas typical of psychoanalysis and group dynamics. As a consequence, one may allude to religious re-composition or refer to a patchwork: different elements integrated in a personal religious system (Dobbelaere 1998).
the continuity of belief. Thus religion in modernity is conceived as a form of \textit{collective memory} and the legitimizing reference to an authorized version of such memory (Da Costa 1996; 2003). The collapse of traditional primary groups, which once served as carriers of the collective memory, have been replaced in modernity by the development of elective fraternities—collectives, networks, and associations. Elective fraternities are founded on the act of choice and depend on the strength of emotional ties. Emotional experiences of the sacred are completing the withdrawal of religion as contemporary forms of religion are continually deinstitutionalized (Da Costa 2003).

Altogether, this body of research has produced plausible findings that enable researchers to state with some degree of confidence certain realities that inform our knowledge regarding the secularization of Uruguayan society. First, we know that the Church was at a disadvantage due to its late establishment in the colonial era and dependence on the Archdiocese of Buenos Aires thus affecting its development in the post-independence era. This left the Church ill-equipped to respond to the pluralistic challenge represented by various iterations of esoteric rationalism.\footnote{The attribution of secularization to the intellectual class and the diffusion of esoteric rationalism that influenced all sectors of Uruguayan will be the focus of chapter three corresponding to the theoretical section of this dissertation and analyzed in depth in chapter four.} Second, when confronted with social changes associated with modernization, it is assumed that the Church retrenched rather than find ways to contextualize its message and social organizations to a new social reality.\footnote{I purposefully use the term “assume” here because that is implied in much of the historical literature that evaluates the Uruguayan Church in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Regarding the strategies and tactics employed by the Church as it attempted self-reform will be taken up in chapters three and four of this dissertation.} Third, forces of modernity produced a pluralistic
and heterogeneous society in which rationalization of labor and institutional
differentiation marginalized the church making religion appear regressive and anti-
intellectual, thus alienating certain social sectors that otherwise would have embraced
religion, including the conservative rural oligarchy and conservative bourgeoisie.

At the same time, the extant explanations of secularization in Uruguay, as helpful
as they are, involve certain methodological and theoretical limitations. First, any
discussion of causality usually involves: 1) a logical relationship between abstract
properties, and 2) an explanation of a historically contingent outcome. The first is usually
accomplished by proposing a theory that justifies the selection of significant variables
and the second by a description of relevant and sequential empirical events. Social
explanation must include both understandings of causality. Since neither a theoretical
framework nor a pure description of events is sufficient to provide a causal explanation,
there must be a relationship between both theoretical and historical causality. The
historical contingency argument evidenced in the “weak institutional Church” and
“immigrant social base” discussion above, while providing a substantive narrative, lacks
a theoretical orientation. This does not invalidate the merit of the arguments, rather it
points to the difficulty of constructing a relationship between theoretical and historical
causality.

Second, the historically contingent nature of European immigration implies a
tension between general explanation and accurate description. The fact is that most
studies that argue for Uruguay’s uniqueness stemming from European immigration rely
on the same exaggerated and uncritical sources (Vanger 1980, Bazzano 1993; Fitzgibbon
1954; Weinstein 1975; Hanson 1979; Santa Ana 1965; Rodé 1964). Accounts that
attribute Uruguay’s secular status to European immigration not only rely on exaggerated data but lack a “parallel demonstration of history” which could illustrate how this explanation works across space and time (Skocpol and Somers 1980). The lack of comparative analysis of Spanish and Italian immigration to Argentina and New York City — which in fact had different outcomes in terms of religiosity compared to immigrants in Uruguay — could have provided insight to the relationship between European immigrants and secularization in Uruguay.

Third, the framing of “modernity” arguments above (both classic and neo-secularization) hinge on the development of macro-social processes such as 1) industrialized-economic growth, 2) differentiation, 3) rationalization, 4) scientific orientation, 5) urbanization and so on, as central dynamics of a theorized process of modernity. Particularly important to religion is the fact that social theorists and theories consistently believe that modernity is unavoidably destructive of religion. This concept assumes that belief in spiritual realities, objective universals, non-naturalistic metaphysics, and "traditional cultures” will generally diminish. Modernity contains "acids"— it is widely believed — that are necessarily secularizing, disenchancing and fostering of a naturalistic and materialist outlook. This view is most clearly represented by Barrán (1998: 11);

Evolutionary and psychoanalytical theories tend to interpret secularization as an inevitable process of the decline of religious faith in light of growing social complexity reflected in the maturation of the personality finally liberated from the primitive state or infantile human psyche— previously constrained by religion.

And again, capturing both institutional differentiation and individual disenchantment with religion associated with modernity, Barrán (1998: 12) states;
The progressive empowerment of autonomous economic, political and cultural behavior has occurred simultaneously to the progressive loss of temporal power, authority and influence of the Church and the Christian associations over the State, civil society and individual behavior.

The case has been made however, that religion will not disappear entirely, but become invisible — expressed by concepts such as autonomization, privatization, generalization, and individualization (Caetano and Geymonat 1996; 1997; Caetano 2006; Da Costa 2003, 2009, 1999). As a result, modernity theory has developed into a very particular theoretical model for understanding history such that this pattern of social development is believed to be inevitable, linear, and isomorphic in that it produces predictable uniformity—which is Eurocentric.

While this framework of modernity appears logical when analyzing societies such as Uruguay, Estonia, and Sweden—where a historical decline in religiosity is measurable, however, this view of modernity cannot explain why, in some societies, modernity has had a compounding effect on religion. For example, modernity has mediated the rise of fundamentalism as a conservative response to secularizing influences (Gill 2001:124; Marty and Appleby 1991: ix, 22-23; Keddie 1998; Berger 1999). Although interpretations of fundamentalism’s emergence vary, the common belief suggests that fundamentalism challenges modernity’s assumptions and impulse to secularize society. As with pluralism, modernity may have unintended consequences, that serve to stimulate religiosity. For example, urbanization, one of modernity’s principal macro-social forces, is capable of generating social and economic dislocations which may be a factor in stimulating both fundamentalism and Pentecostalism (Keddie 1998; Martin 1990; Beyer 1994; Haynes 1998; Gill 2001:125; Riesebrodt 1993). Modernity has been
found to enhance religion’s appeal to provide meaning and belonging by creating social conditions that intensify social-psychological needs that religion is qualified to satisfy (Greeley 1972; Bell 1980; Hervieu-Leger 2000). The point is that modernity in some cases can explain both secularization (Uruguay, Estonia, and Sweden) and religious vitality (United States, Middle East, and global South). In addition, recent accounts of religion’s durability in the global South, Middle East, Africa and the United States are indicators that it is possible to enter modernity with religious vitality intact (Berger 1996; Marty and Appleby 1991; Martin 1990, 2005, 2002; Jenkins 2007; Cox 1995, 1984).

Global variations of religious intensity challenges core assumptions of modernity itself, suggesting that the modernity paradigm needs to be revisited. Rethinking modernity has led to variant interpretations whereby it is possible for different societies to be modern and not end up looking like Sweden, Estonia or Uruguay; in regard to religion, culture or morality.

What is needed is a view of modernity that not only considers abstract macro-social forces (differentiation, rationalization, scientific orientation, urbanization, etc.), but also contestation and conflict among social actors and their representative group interests. That is, a view of modernity that can accommodate secularization as a calculated, determined and purposeful outcome by politically motivated actors whose intent is to marginalize religion in society. This issue of modernity and human agency will be continued on the other side of the third category of literature that corresponds to secularization theory.

3. Generalized Theories of Secularization
In addition to situating this dissertation among Uruguayan scholarship dedicated to explaining Uruguay’s secular intensity, it is necessary to adjudicate among recent generalized theories of secularization corresponding to the emergence of the “new paradigm” in the early 1990s which re-energized the debate over secularization (Warner 1993); that is theoretical discourse that pitted rational choice / religious economies theory (Stark and Finke 2000) against a re-vitalized neo-classical theory (Bruce 2004) and existential security theory (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Although this debate has produced valuable theoretical and substantive discourse, it has focused almost exclusively on contemporary religious dynamics and lacks historical perspective. Not only has this debate focused almost exclusively on developed western societies (Casanova 2006:9; 2003:17), but it focuses on abstract historical processes (differentiation, rationalization, pluralism) apart from concrete social and political processes that involve historical agents engaged in struggles to reconstitute society.26 Therefore, this section seeks to explain, both methodologically and theoretically, why varying positions in the current debate cannot explain how Uruguay became a durable secular society.

Bruce (2002) offers a re-constituted classic secularization theory. While God is Dead attributes secularization in Western Europe to the confluence of multiple factors, the argument is not based on the explanation of generative mechanisms and how they work conjunctively to produce a specific outcome. Rather he offers an analytical description of processes of social change posing as a normative ideology of progress based on assumptions that are ultimately connected to macro-social processes of

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26 Gorski’s work (2003) on the role of social discipline in the context of modern state building, Smith et al. (2003) work on the secular revolution, and Gill on national church strategies (1998) is the exception to this pattern.
differentiation and rationalization. The explanatory power of his argument relies on
deductive logic. The weakness of deductive logic is that it sets out to argue the transition
from premise to conclusion by providing a logically valid conclusion based on the
premise. The validity of the conclusion is implicit in the feasibility of the premise and
therefore deductive logic does not tell us anything new about the phenomenon other than
what is established by the premise. Bruce’s conclusion is analytical to the degree that the
validity of the conclusion is dependent on following the rules of deduction, however,
independent of the mechanisms that make secularization possible. In the absence of
causal or theoretical linkage that explain why parts to the secular paradigm actually
generate secularization, Bruce’s paradigm and component parts can be described but
cannot be explained according to the mechanisms that generate a secular effect. As a
result, Bruce assumes that secularization is in a zero-sum relationship to religion whereby
religion’s decline is linear and can only mean a secular outcome.

The fundamental flaw in classical and neo-classic secularization theory is its
explanatory capacity which is limited due to positivistic assumptions about modernity
(Chaves and Gorski 2001:277). First, differentiation is undoubtedly a core constituent of
modernity as a product of rationalization which is manifested in cultural sub-systems and
institutions (Casanova 2006:9; Eisenstadt 1992:412). However, there is nothing
inherently or ontologically subversive to religion in differentiation; neither in
rationalization that produces it, nor in the pluralism that it generates. Rather, Bruce’s
secularization theory assumes that a conjunctive contingent and linear relationship exists
(between rationalization and differentiation) which generates a predictable and
Counterfactual research has shown that other outcomes are possible when these relationships are studied empirically. For example, Gorski has shown empirically that differentiation can be recursive resulting in de-differentiation (2000:160-61; also see Tiryakian 1992:89-91 and Rueschemeyer 1986:141-169). Each time that Stark and Finke show pluralism and religion to be positively related, religion appears to be very rational (2005; 2000; 1988). As a result, neo-classical secularization theory cannot explain social change. Second, the teleological character of secularization theory implies secularism as a universal principle (Gorski and Altinoudu 2008:74). A teleological assumption frames secularization as an isomorphic process of functional differentiation of both institutions and cultural sub-systems as a norm in modern societies (Casanova 2006:9). This cannot be substantiated empirically. When modernity is reduced to a set of positivistic relationships (change in X produces a change in Y) empirical outcomes are believed to be caused by correlated factors. Mistaking causation with correlation is a misguided interpretation of any phenomena (Bellin 2008, Mahoney 2001; Ragin 2000). Lastly, related to the aforementioned point, neo-classical secularization theory, takes into account on-going endeavors at structural reform as a collective aspiration of “society building” which is a cardinal feature of social change. Modernity cannot presuppose one organizational principle or one societal model of modernity when in fact, cycles of social processes and counter-processes in multiple centers provides a better informed conceptualization of modernity (Tiryakian 1992:177). Modernity may be a common global phenomenon, however, there is nothing inevitable regarding routes to and the routes of experience through modernity that have emerged in varying social contexts (Therborn 1992:63).
Therefore, Bruce’s argument struggles to explain why Uruguay is a secular society because it operates on the level of macro-social analysis. It assumes that broad sweeping generalized patterns of social processes coalesce to a particular end. Macro-social analysis favors abstraction over historical specificities and tends to obscure concrete social and political factors that account for social outcomes (Smith 2003:14). Hence, Bruce’s understanding of secularization is not deduced by studying a society with an established secular history. He does not problematize the secular in the same way that he does the religious. By ignoring the political and legal efforts to secularize culture he fails to analyze the effect that policy making has on religious expressions in Western countries. This would include the institutions of secularism such as universities, school systems, and media elites. Hence, Bruce’s approach is theoretically and methodologically inadequate to explain the case of Uruguay.

Norris and Inglehart (2004) is also inadequate to answer the research question because their principal explanatory concept is also rooted in a classical assumption of modernity; namely that modernization is a process of evolutionary development characterized by secularizing tendencies. However, in contrast to Bruce, the researchers do avoid attributing secularization to two classic causes; differentiation and rationalization. Rather, they suggest that the processes of economic growth, socioeconomic equality and human development (measured by literacy, life expectancy and infant mortality) result in long term changes in existential security, which erodes religious values, beliefs and practices. Not only does the concept of existential security preserve classical secularization theory, but it adds two dimensions. First, it establishes a link between economic development and secularization. Second, while it does maintain a
linear understanding it avoids universality of secularization. Existential security remains a characteristic of advanced capitalistic and post-industrial countries which suggests that poverty, high fertility, and inequality pose risks to populations in undeveloped counties which threatens survival thus contributing to religiosity. Since a larger percentage of the global population live in the developing world that is experiencing high fertility, religious populations are actually growing larger than ever.

Because Uruguay has consistently been considered one of the most economically and socially advanced societies in Latin America, it serves as a counterfactual in the author’s analysis. Norris and Inglehart (2004: 46) identify Uruguay in an industrial phase of development although its commodity based economy is derived from pastoral enterprises and has minimal industrial production. Uruguay is positioned 46th on the Human Development Index (HDI, UNDP 2004) in the same year that Norris and Inglehart utilized the World Values Survey data for their study. In a cursory analysis of the Human Development Index, from 1991 to 2006, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Chile and Argentina are the only Latin American countries that are consistently listed by the HDI as “high human development” (HDI, UNDP 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006). From a human development point of view, Uruguay has been misinterpreted and misplaced according to the existential security theory. Because Uruguay is a post-colonial nation and located in the global south, it is not considered among the leading western nations although it shares similar ratings with several European nations on various economic/social indexes (UNDP 2007).

However, the most critical reason why existential security theory inadequately explains Uruguay’s secular society is rooted in positivistic assumptions. The theoretical
approach assumes a successionist theory of causation based upon finding observed regularities between the cause (existential security) and the effect (secularization). The mechanism that can directly link existential security to development and secularization is not clearly explained. This is because “security” remains a non-testable subjective concept. The book’s key variable, “existential security” is actually never directly measured, so that the entire analysis relies on indirect measures and inferences form data generated by Human Development Index. Due to the subjective nature of this concept and its varying interpretation, it seems best to measure it using qualitative approaches in a comparative way to capture the varying cultural interpretations. This is because, as an untestable subjective concept, it is nearly impossible to measure — especially in an international context where cultural differences cannot be adequately controlled for in a statistical model. On the same point, existential insecurity is never conceptually developed other than the absence of the things that supposedly make one secure. Assuming that vulnerability is the opposite of security, the concept is never operationalized and measured. Therefore, the correlation between religious participation and human development is theoretically simplistic. And correlation is not causation. It can be assumed that there is a social psychological and cognitive mechanism that would explain how an increased sense of existential security causes secularization. However, this mechanism is not developed theoretically and it can only be concluded that the author assumes that correlations are sufficient to explain causality.

Last, the hypothesis overemphasizes economics. The book never develops an agency-based explanation for secularization rooted in struggling actors, the balance of power among actors, the winners and losers of social conflict, or the absence of religious
resistance. Neither political nor religious actors play a decisive role in the rise or fall of religiosity or in secularization. In fact, the authors state (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 231), “there is little that religious leaders can do to revive public demand” which leaves religious outcomes to structural determinism, an assumption that this present study seeks to dispute. Furthermore, the authors are very critical of religious economy theory on varying levels. While they may be correct by re-emphasizing the demand side of religion as opposed to the supply side, they fail to see any connection between state interference and religious outcomes. In Uruguay, state regulation is a necessary although insufficient explanation for secularization. Therefore, existential security theory is also theoretically and methodologically ineffective at explaining the case of Uruguay.

Religious economy theory (RET) cannot answer the research question because its principal protagonists have only superficially analyzed liberal republican and Catholic conflict in the democratization of Latin America. They assume that liberal republican reform only moderately constrained the Church whose hegemony continued over the poor and passive masses (Gill 1998; Stark and Finke 2000). Their analysis of Catholicism in Latin America does not recognize the variation of Church-State relationships characterized by varying levels of tension and competition. A principle tenant of RET is that where a religious monopoly exists, practitioners are lazy and inefficient because their firms do nothing to create a religious demand. This notion is predicated on an understanding of religious pluralism whereby deregulation of religion by the state presupposes the entrance of a multiplicity of religious enterprises and denominational

27 See the numerous entries in the edited volumes by Ivereigh (2000) and Jaksić & Carbó (2011) to understand the intense conflict that characterized the Church-State competition associated with the modernization of each Latin American republic.
orientations into the religious market. The problem with this understanding of pluralism is that it locates competition among religious firms, pastoral agents and denominations while overlooking ideological or political competition that activated religious participation.\(^{28}\)

The fact is in the republican state building phase, all political regimes challenged Catholicism with anticlerical legislation that was rooted in the state’s attempt to minimize the Church’s social influence and constrain its temporal power. All emerging states experienced tensions with the Church over the superintendence of certain civil functions which caused the Church to defend its institutional interest, and in some cases, experience institutional and ecclesiastical reform (Ivereigh 2000: 175; Lynch 1984: 535). Some reformers sought to purge the Church of the privileged status of a clerical caste that they perceived as hypocritical, immoral and avaricious (Ardao 1962; Sobrado 1968). Other reformers advocated the independence of the state from clerical interference while still other’s confined their opposition to the merging of political and religious authority. However, in some cases radical liberal reformers sought to eradicate religion from any and all public influence. In these cases, republican liberalism adopted a \textit{Jacobin} bent that viewed the Church as a barrier to social progress and had to be to be diminished if not eradicated institutionally (Rémond 1999; Bantes 2009; Collins 1986:243; Knight 2007). While in some cases, Catholic elites were frequently preoccupied with preserving legal, social and political privileges, religious and secular clergy in other cases gravitated toward maintaining linkage with the popular sectors through devotional and social

\footnote{\(^{28}\) Especially see literature devoted to the \textit{Cristero Rebellión} by Butler (2007; 2006; 2004; 2002; 1999); Purnell (1999); Meyer (1976; 1974), Gilbert and Nugent (1994).}
service engagement (Butler 2007; 2006; 2004; 2002). With institutional interests in doubt, clergy had to modify their pastoral strategies and rethink their commitments to popular religious subjects. Stimulated by challenges from the state, popular religion became the basis for religious and secular clergy to frame social struggles in such a way that were sensible and comprehensible to popular subjects. Critical discourse mediated through a network of social and religious practices became the basis for a popular religious culture that was able to resist anti-religious elites who sought to diminish religion from maintaining a public role in modernizing society.

A second strategy of some republican-liberal reformers was the integration of Protestants and particularly Freemasons into an emerging secular state. The extent of Freemasonry’s influence on the development of post-independent liberalism is still debatable and the radical anti-clerical program attributed to Freemasonry may well have been over-exaggerated by the Catholic Church at the time (Resendez 2005; Fisher 1939; Gudea 1989). However, it is apparent that Freemasonry provided economic and political influence and represented early attempts to form a link between voluntary associations and liberalism thus guiding the democratic process (Rich and Carlos 2002; Smith 2009). The key to understanding Freemason’s influence is regionalism. In Mexico, for example, there is strong evidence that Freemasons were very influential to the processes of post-revolutionary state formation (Smith 2009; Gilbert and Nugent 1994). Freemasons were known, not only for anti-clericalism, but were a vanguard of political emissaries. Whether or not the threat imposed by the Freemasons was real or exaggerated, their participation in political reform motivated Catholic elites to mobilize the laity in campaigns designed to counter Freemason’s influence (Smith 2009:585; Prien 1990).
The second source of competition came from Protestantism. There is no doubt that liberal reformers engaged in state-building, were dependent on a “Eurocentric tradition” that surfaced through economic development and immigration. Both British and North American governments sought to replace Spain as a principal trading partner and applied pressure to open up Latin American markets which led to foreign investment to finance successful trade (Pelso and Tenenbaum 1996; Bushnell and Macauley 1994).

Dependency theorists go so far as suggesting that the timing of modernization emerged in each state when it did due to resources provided by metropolis-stimulated expansion of export production which provided the liberal bourgeoisie the economic and political leverage necessary to undertake liberal reform (Frank 1972). The influx of Protestants provided the motivation for liberal policies of religious tolerance and the separation of church and state which they believed would weaken and punish the Church for supporting Conservatives (Lynch 1984; Gill 1998; Mecham 1966:107). In addition, liberal reformers courted Protestants because they represented the type of social progress and economic development that liberal reformers wanted to emulate (Ivereigh 2000; Stafford 1984; Klaiber 2009). The growing Protestant presence added to Catholic

29 The Barrios regime in Guatemala was perhaps the most aggressive in this tactic to undermine the strength of the Church’s social influence, beginning with the confiscation of Church property thus making it available to foreign investors (Germans and British) for commercial purposes (Yashar 1997: 36). In order to attract more foreigners to Guatemala, Barrios decreed the freedom of worship for “any and all religions (Burnett 1987: 27). In particular, Barrios traveled to New York to meet with a Presbyterian Minister in order to invite the Presbyterian Board of Missions to come to Guatemala (Perdomo 2001: 85; Millett 1973:372). Liberals hoped that religious competition would promote their agenda in two ways. First, that Protestant immigration from developed countries would contribute to transforming the traditional culture into more modern and progressive society. Second, Liberals thought that Protestants would have a secularizing effect on education hence the state provided resources and privileges to promote Protestant educational programs (Burnett 1987:106; Steigenga 1994: 147). Although Protestant converts were few until the 1920s, the Protestant community managed to make its presence known resulting in Catholic-Protestant conflicts, Guatemala, possibly more than any other Latin or Central American country experienced early and open religious competition among competing groups.
indignation. In some cases, the Church became entrenched and resorted to; 1) “high politics” seeking to reinforce ties to conservatives in order to preserve colonial privilege, 2) the formation of Concordats, and 3) in some cases trade Church patronage (patronato nacional) for special position and status in the developing state (Gill 1998). In other cases however, the Church did respond by discarding republican regalism and laxity of the past by reorganizing its ecclesiastic structures with a focus on orthodoxy which invigorated its pastoral work (Lynch 1984; Ivereigh 2000; Furlong 1962).

Through Freemasonry and Protestantism, Catholic elites encountered competition long before RET scholars recognize it existed on the continent. The main intellectual challenge however, came from positivist and utilitarian influence on liberal republicanism that was pervasive among intellectuals in the last decades of the nineteenth century (Ardao 1962; Richard 1987; Negretto and Aguilar-Rivera 2000; Schmitt 1966). Although not as pluralistic as post-war societies which RET scholars address, nonetheless, post-independent Latin American societies were sufficiently pluralistic to cause Catholics to react strategically in order to push back against the collective forces that sought to minimize the Church’s influence and challenge positivistic political suppositions.

A third a common misconception made by RET scholars is that they discount the adaptation that the Church made from the “religious question” to the “social question” in relationship to the modernizing State. They assume that Catholicism had been a monolithic block determined by rigid hierarchal control and divested of self-renewing tendencies in response to out-group tensions and social change. RET advocates overlook the ministerial currents stemming from the development of Catholic social though in
response to papal encyclicals (Rerum Novarum 1891 being the principal document) resulting in numerous associations and confraternities designed to assist the poor and working men and women at the turn of the century. Catholic activism in charitable, social welfare and educational institutions allowed Catholics to define their role in a modernizing society, which in some cases, also led to contestations vis-à-vis the State. In a majority Catholic nation where the Church had to defend its social prerogatives against those who would wish to reduce them, strong commitment to Catholicism required a personal decision and was not imposed by ascription to the group at birth (Valenzuela and Maza Valenzuela 2000). RET scholars have incorrectly assumed that an emergent progressive and militant church, that appeared to be a departure from a conservative disposition of the past, only emerged in the mid-1960s associated with Liberation Theology. Rendering Unto Cesar (1998) is an attempt to apply religious economic theory to the Latin American context and reinforces this notion by stating that:

The Catholic Church, at least in several countries, is now a source of innovation and social change, often at the expense of traditional allies. Whereas secular authorities had initiated conflict between church and state

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30 The majority of the academic world that investigated religious change in Latin America stemming from Vatican II, the emergence of Liberation Theology, and the progressive Church operate under the assumption that the organizational antecedent for this change began with Catholic Action in the 1930s (Levine 1981; Smith 1991; Cleary 1985; McGovern 1989; Fern 1988; Sigmund 1990; Cook 1985; Bidegaín 1985). This assumes that social conditions did not exist that could have presupposed lay participation prior to Catholic Action, as though Catholic Action emerged ex nihilo and laity simply got in line. The enemy to which Catholic Action responded was the threat of Communism; so it targeted workers, students, peasants and other interest groups. Before Communism in the 1930s however, the threat was from the state through positivist anticlericalism. It is logical to assume that popular and middle urban sectors had means of organization, networks, communication links, common sentiments, values and perspectives that not only allowed them to frame the threat but also respond to it. This also assumes that they did not operate under the veil of false consciousness (Marx), mystification (Scott) or misrecognition (Bourdieu) as most accounts portray. They did not however, operate independently form the Institutional Church. One challenge of this study is to clarify the commitment, linkage and affiliation to Institutional Catholicism. Therefore, the evidence that this study seeks to provide is the local histories the urban middle class, the emergent working class, and peasants who collectively, are generally considered the popular sector (Peloso and Tenenbaum 1996).
in the past, it is now the Catholic Church that has challenged governmental authority. These events were surprising to an academic community that predicted the dwindling influence of religious organizations (Gill 1998:18).

It is a mistake to homogenize all state building efforts and assume that the Catholic Church resorted to a neo-Christendom default mode characterized by accommodation to the republican-liberal state in order to rebuild institutional Catholicism in order to preserve a religious hegemony. Religious Economy Theory cannot explain why Uruguay entered modernity as secular society and remains secular to this day because it poses a contradiction to an underlying assumption of the theory. Disestablishment is a critical variable in RET because it presupposes pluralism and religious tolerance which are necessary for religious competition. Uruguay experienced religious disestablishment in 1917, which combined with strong anti-Catholic bias in a context of regular European immigration (attracting Anglican, Moravian and Lutheran communities), should have theoretically produced a society in which Protestantism thrived. Yet that is not the case. Hence, RET is also theoretically and empirically inadequate to explain the case of Uruguay.

Smith and associates (2003) come closest to explaining why Uruguay is a secular society and has resisted religious penetration. The principal thesis of Secular Revolution suggests that secularization is not a natural, inevitable, or abstract product of modernity

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31 Uruguay did not have to wait for disestablishment in 1918, which resulted from a new Constitution, to mandate religious tolerance or freedom of worship (conscience). Article 134 of the Constitution of 1830 consecrated the right of liberty of conscience. Article 141 the free communication of thought on all topics/subjects, and the constitution bore no language prohibiting the respect for nor free exercise of other religions (Algorta del Castillo 1984). Given the regular penetration of British merchants and estancieros who would have supported an Anglican community and the duration of time that John Thompson (Methodist Evangelist) spent in Uruguay pressing Methodism, it is logical to expect that Protestantism would have become better established given the weakness of the Church and the eagerness of the state for foreign investment (Ardao 1962; Ferré 1959; Finch 1981)
but is the outcome of a struggle between contending social groups with conflicting interests seeking to control social knowledge and institutions. The thesis rejects macro-social secularization as over-deterministic, vague and unable to explain how a society becomes secular. Rather, the thesis locates the burden of explanation on anti-religious elites, consisting mostly of academics functioning as secular activists, who seek to marginalize the Protestant establishment’s control over key institutions and social sectors. Elites share a commitment to Enlightenment positivism which bears an anti-religious sentiment. Although an anti-religious elite thesis emphasizes human agency over autonomous macro-social processes, it does recognize the historical specificity of certain macro-social factors including the consolidation of industrial wealth, anti-intellectualism of Protestantism, growth of higher education and professional organizations all of which provide conditions that make secularizing influences possible.

However, the thesis is limited contextually, due in part to the fact that it explores a case that by most accounts is not a secular society. The United States is recognized as the most religious post-industrial and advanced capitalistic society, and in this regard, is religiously exceptional. While the case possibly explains secularization processes, it cannot explain how a secular society came to be. Second, Smith frames the conflict in American public life as a revolution, between the established Protestant regime — which dominated institutional and public life — and aggrieved elite secular activists. The established Protestant regime was toppled and deposed by elites who came to dominate cultural and institutional life (2003: 2). Although this dissertation seeks to extend Smith’s anti-religious elitist thesis — by locating the analytical lens on human agency rather than macro-social processes — the conflictive context in Uruguay was entirely distinct from
the North American conflict. In Uruguay, both the church and the state were undeveloped, institutionally weak, and engaged in consolidating authority in an emergent modernizing Uruguayan society. The Church could not be displaced or toppled because it was never dominate over the state, rather the Church was seeking to establish its role in society and create social space in relationship to a changing state and modernizing society.

However, the most important limitation to Smith’s thesis is that it is incomplete. It only explains one side of the secular equation. It fails to explain the development and execution of strategies developed by the religious elite. When secularization is framed as a loss of institutional and societal authority, marginalization, or even privatization of religion due to elite activism, religious demise may only be a temporary consequence as religious elites regroup and new indigenous leaders emerge in order to adapt or re-contextualize orthodoxy to a new social reality. The fact that the Protestant establishment can experience displacement and yet develop new strategies resulting in the emergence of new social pathways and new modes of social production is an indication of the resilience and durability of religion. In response to Protestantism’s loss of authority in certain public institutions, such as education, Protestant elites simply erected their own schools supported by denominations and local churches (Ahlstrom 1972). When media was colonized by secularizing elites, religious entrepreneurs simply created their own broadcasting networks and alternative forms of media (Finke and Iannaccone 1993). In essence, religion is capable of creating a parallel society or sub-culture that can challenge secular elites’ domination of certain social sectors. Hence, the anti-religious elite thesis is
a necessary but insufficient explanation of secularization in Uruguay because it only explains one side of the conflict.

**Conclusion to the Review of Extant Literature Exercise**

A common limitation shared by the theories discussed above is their theoretical, methodological or empirical inadequacy to explain why Uruguay came to be a secular nation at the end of the nineteenth century. Central to this problem is time orientation; which is the emergent tension between traditions of the past and an orientation toward the future (Therborn 2000:68; Eisenstadt 1992:424). When entry into the modern collides with the traditional, the outcome is usually **conflict and contradiction**. The notion that modernized forms replace the traditional as though one paradigm simply replaces another is not confirmed empirically. A rupture with the past is almost never total due to the plasticity of most traditions (Therborn 2003:294). Rather, the constitutive elements of the past are reconstituted and carried forward embedded in the vehicle of popular culture and both formal and informal institutions (Eisenstadt 2000:2). Tensions between continuity and discontinuity produce paradox and contradiction which emerge in cultural and institutional formations as a result of social actors contending for political, economic, social and intellectual space according to differing views of how the reconstitution should be constructed. Therefore, what this research project needs is a theoretical framework that focuses on conflict and contestation among human agents whose social projects compete in order to decide the outcome of the relationship of religion in modernity.
CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

The previous chapter discussed several inadequacies of extant explanations for Uruguay’s intense secular transition when analyzed theoretically, methodologically and empirically. Why and how did an otherwise Catholic majority become so secularized during republican state building at the end of the nineteenth century leaving Catholicism with minimal social influence and public presence? To this end, this chapter explains why it is necessary to re-conceptualize modernity, how Bourdieu’s field theory is best suited to explain the Uruguayan case, and identifies the social actors and their cultural/social project conforming to Bourdieu’s field theory.

Why Multiple Modernity?

Theories ultimately are judged by their capacity to account for empirical observations in varying contexts over time. Since previous studies have inadequately answered the paradox posed by Uruguay, it may be necessary to re-conceptualize the relationship between religion and modernity and rethink the theoretical approach (Chavez and Gorski 2001:277; Smith 2008: 1571; Gorski 2000:159; Therborn 2000: 69; Casanova 2006:9; Gorski and Altinordu 2008). Reframing of modernity by a handful of scholars has produced a helpful meta-theoretical framework that proposes varying and
differentiated outcomes for modern societies based on the assumption that modernization processes are neither linear nor predictable. Diverse outcomes of modernity are made possible due to varying interpretations of the constitutive cultural programs that make modernity (Eisenstadt 2000:2). The underlying assumption of Multiple Modernity is that the modern world is an “unstable compound” consisting of a configuration of interrelated constituent programs which serve as mechanisms setting in motion emergent social processes that are contextually conditioned and empirically observed. Constitutive properties of modernity are influenced in some way by existential problems associated with the possibility of multiple interpretations of society that can be shaped and re-constituted by conscious human activity (Esienstadt 2000:4-5). This places the emphasis for analysis on the emergence and development of cultural projects by purposive human agents operating under the constraints of concrete social conditions struggling to define normative and institutional parameters of society. It represents an attempt to explain how contextual and contingent processes are responsible for varying social formations and varying outcomes of social order.

Multiple Modernity (MM) is a meta-theoretical frame of reference for understanding and making sense out of the modern world rather than a general theory that can be reduced to testable hypotheses (Therborn 2000: 68; Chaves and Gorski 2001:278). While multiple modernity is not a coherent and well developed theory, it offers an alternative approach to explaining religion in the modern world that avoids a zero-sum relationship associated with classical (Martin 1978; Gorksi 2000) or revised secularization theory (Bruce 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2004) by assuming the centrality of contingency, complexity and context-which themselves reflect deeper assumptions.
about human agency and social production. Thus, MM gains explanatory leverage by explaining how varying modernities are possible and by clearing out theoretical space beyond the totalizing theories of modernization which makes secularization an inevitable outcome. By allowing for contingent configurations of cultural projects, modernity avoids the isomorphic assumption of “modernization theory” which entails the empirical manifestations of a modernizing phase of history associated with a Eurocentric master narrative referenced in the development of capitalism, industrialization, markets, the welfare state, etc. (Taylor 2000; Therborn 2000; Esienstadt 1996; Kaya 2004).

By conceptualizing modernity as a complex collectivity of constitutive relationships that explain its existence, it becomes necessary to identify the correspondent empirical dimensions that make the framework viable. If the assumptions of Multiple Modernity theory are considered, and the modern world is an “unstable compound”—related to tensions between the past and the future—we would expect to make sense of modern life by identifying the conflicts and contentions between opposing designs for constructing social order. Oppositional groups are identified by structure, organization, a program or goal, and a collectivity of members. In sociological terms, interest groups are the real agents of conflict (Dahrendorf 1959:180). Conflict is explained in most cases by the centrality of inequality in the distribution of material, symbolic and political resources with the potential for conflict always present between individuals engaged in face-to-face interaction or between social organizations. Resources tend to be located in political and economic power giving dominate groups a disproportionate influence over the allocation of resources and thus the structure of society. Collins (1974; 1975; 1993) suggests that
the essence of social life is characterized by struggles between individuals and groups with opposing interests competing for scarce resources.

From this discussion, several premises emerge that motivate this study to explain secularization in terms of causes other than abstract and over-deterministic macro-social processes. First, structural influences emanating from conflict are neither impersonal forces nor are they direct; but mediated through agents shaping the context in which they find themselves. Conflict provides actors with situational logic by which to interpret events. Second, conflict provides an objective influence which conditions patterns of action and supplies agents with strategic directional guidance. Third, agents have the capacity to formulate projects and to design strategies to accomplish them, where projects are defined as the attempt to satisfy human needs and are directed at a reconstituting and configuring society. People can either frustrate or foster projects. In sum, structural tendencies associated with conflict shape the situational logic that guides projects which represent the courses of action taken by agents in varying social positions by supplying the reasons and motivation for such action.

Theoretical Considerations

A theoretical framework is necessary that is capable of explaining secularization as an outcome of competing interest groups and world views leading to opposing schemes of social configuration: one that allows analysis to explain secularization as the outcome of human agency embedded in strategic action and concrete historical processes. This can be achieved by theorizing modernizing democratic republican societies in Latin America as an autonomous field— the modernizing state in which continuity is at tension
with discontinuity. Bourdieu’s field theory (1984; 1992; 1985; 1989) provides a conceptual lens to understand how religious and liberal-republican elites contend for resources represented by ‘symbolic capital’.¹

According to Bourdieu (1977; 1988), a field is a site of struggle and competition for position within the field in which the stakes of competition correspond to the distribution of specific capital that defines the field.² Broadly speaking, a field is a domain of social life that has its own rules of organization, generates a set of positions, and supports practices associated with positioning in the field. Like players in a game, participants in social fields have different positions.³ Different positions open different sets of opportunities for group interests and different sets of strategies that groups may take. Bourdieu sees action in the field as the result of contending projects of position-

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¹ At this point, one should recognize correspondence to the study of German colonial empires by George Steinmetz (2007; 2008) where he employs Bourdieu’s theoretical concepts of field and capital to explain varying outcomes among German colonies due to varying native policies. Bourdieu originally theorized fields as narrow areas of society differentiated by practices and capital germane to the particularity of the field (intellectual, artistic, scientific, juridical, see Bourdieu 1994; 1993; 1990; 1977; 1996). Fields are further differentiated by inner logic (doxa) required by agents to position themselves in the field (1977). Steinmetz adapts Bourdieu’s framework to a far larger social context as he conceptualizes the colonial state as a semi-autonomous field in which symbolic capital is defined as ethnographic acuity: the capacity for understanding the colonized which became the basis for native policy. Competition for this form of capital existed between three classes of German actors; members of the German aristocracy, the educated middle class and the propertied bourgeoisie (2008:597). Class influence in the colonial state corresponded to the habitus since class shaped the internalized disposition of actors in the field and how they developed ethnographic sagacity that determined native policy.

² “As a space of potential and active forces, the field is a field of struggles aimed at preserving or transforming the configuration of these forces. Furthermore, as a structure of objective relationships between positions of force undergirds and guides strategies whereby the occupants of these positions seek, individually and collectively, to safeguard or improve their position and to impose the principle of hierarchy most favorable to their own products (Bourdieu1992: 101).”

³ “We can indeed compare a field to a game, although, unlike the later, a field is not the product of a deliberate act of creation, and it follows rules, or better regularities, that are not explicit and codified. Thus we have stakes which are for the most part the products of the competition between players (Bourdieu1992: 98).”
taking. Fields are characterized by struggles to improve a group’s position while the
stakes of completion pertain to the right to define what counts as legitimate social
production.

Possession of different forms of capital provides the basic structure for the
organization of the field, thus the generation of the various habitus and practices
associated with them. A particular form of capital does not exist and function except in
relation to a field. Capital must exist in the field in order for the field to have meaning.
Capital is not only identified by its material form but also by its symbolic and ideational
form. According to Bourdieu (1977) symbolic systems are instruments of knowledge and
domination which make possible a consensus within a community as to the significance
of the social order. The struggle between symbolic systems to impose a view of the social
world defines the social space within which people orient their lives. Hence, Bourdieu
associates symbolic capital with legitimacy and the ability to define social reality in a
way that serves the group’s interest. The group that dominates symbolic capital can
monopolize cultural production and the power to name that which counts as cultural
production in other fields.

Habitus is Bourdieu’s concept that explains how players in the field produce
different postures which have an independent effect on the economics of positions taken
in the field. Simply put, habitus is an internalized system of acquired dispositions that

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4 Though similar theoretical constructs, habitus can be differentiated from world view by marginal
differences. A simplistic definition of worldview comes from N.T. Wright (1992:122); “Worldviews have
to do with the presuppositional, pre-cognitive stage of a culture or society. Wherever we find the ultimate
corns of human beings, we find worldviews. Worldview, in fact, embraces all deep-level human
perceptions of reality, including the question of whether or not a god or gods exist, and if so what he, she, it
or they is or are like, and how such a being, or such beings, might related to the world.” Worldviews
answer the basic questions that determine human existence: who are we, where are we, what is wrong and
are reinforced and reproduced socially (1977: 78). A set of dispositions acquired by actors in their social milieu that generate values, ideas, beliefs and practices that are shared among the members of the social group. It is on the basis of *habitus* that Bourdieu defines social groups since those who occupy similar positions in the social structure tend to have the same habitus. The difficulty in identifying *habitus* in a particular field is that social practices and positions can be observed empirically, but *habitus* must be understood conceptually.

1) Conceptualizing the Modernizing State as a Field of Conflict

What is needed is a more sociological account of the modernizing state as a field in Pierre Bourdieu’s sense—specifically, as a “state field” that is itself located within an emerging nationalistic field of power.⁵ This suggests that Uruguayan elites, both secular

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what is the solution? Wright (1992:124) then summarizes; “Worldviews are thus the basic stuff of human existence, the lens through which the world is seen, the blueprint for how one should live in it, and above all the sense of identity and place which enables human beings to be what they are.” Similar, but differentiated, habitus can include worldview to the degree that external reality is interpreted and categorized by assumptions and can form the basis of certain dispositions. Habitus goes further to include the emergent practices, schemes and strategies that are conditioned by the opportunities and constraints of the field of action where practices and strategies are employed. The main difference is that the concept of habitus requires 12 pages of explanation in the *Logic of Practice* (1990) whereas N. T Wright only requires five pages.

⁵ Bourdieu (1992:104) states that analysis of a field takes place within a larger “field of power”—the product of a historical process of progressive collective creation. Although the field is autonomous and cannot be reduced to another field, the relationship to the “field of power” is homologous and “may be defined as a resemblance within a difference (1992:104).” On one hand, Uruguay represents an autonomous field in that it satisfies the Weberian criterion for stateness based on sovereignty and legitimacy. On the other hand, emergent Nationalism, while uniquely manifested in each modernizing republic, consisted of certain inherent properties (i.e. limited power of government, protected rights of citizens, a constitution, private ownership of assets, the rule of law, free markets, etc.) related in purpose, if not form, to the mother of all socio-political revolutions in France. Thus nationalism and an emergent liberal republicanism was the larger “field of power” in which nations like Uruguay modernized. Thus, it may be more accurate to frame the modernizing state as a semi-autonomous field of power due to the influence of similar contestations in European States which served as antecedents to the Latin Republics. The most salient similarity between Latin American and European State modernization (at least in France,
and religious, are engaged in a competitive struggle with one another in order to determine social and cultural configurations. Social fields are organized around differences—differences of perception, practice and status distinction.\(^6\) It is only possible to speak of social practices and perceptions as arranging themselves into a patterned social field when the “practitioners” recognize the same stakes of competition and the same criteria of distinction or signs of status. A precondition for the existence of a field is that social actors maintain a consensus concerning the definition of its specific symbolic capital.

In sum, the modernizing state in Uruguay represents an autonomous field due to internal dynamics of competition and conflict between secular and religious elites stimulating the production of social projects.\(^7\) Competition and conflict between religious and secular projects generated a specific form of capital: the capacity to represent society’s ultimate concerns and develop strategies to achieve mutually beneficial exchanges and reciprocity.\(^8\) The interest group that can best represent ultimate concerns

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\(^6\) Bourdieu (1992:100-101) is clear that one of the principle characteristics of a field is differentiation of participants, each seeking to assert their group difference in the effort to reduce competition and monopolize the field. The principle dynamic of the field lies in the asymmetry between the specific forces that confront one another because differences produce and define specific capital.

\(^7\) Bourdieu (1992: 96) suggests that the social world of a field requires an analytical shift from structural and conceptual thinking to durable relations, both formal and informal, among individuals and groups as measured by their interaction.

\(^8\) By ultimate concerns, I mean material and non-material; existential and meta-physical. Ultimate concerns of popular actors tend to focus on developing strategies that maximize material and practical benefits in everyday daily life. The concerns of popular actors tend to focus on existential meaning in this life and accounting for life’s contingencies such as the sudden and pre-mature death of a child, prolonged sickness and disability of a family member, success in a harvest or business transaction. Both religious and non-religious life strategies must answer questions about existential security and the constant threat of
controls the exchange and reciprocity among non-elites thus gaining the loyalty, allegiance, and support of popular sectors. At stake for the group able to dominate discursive and representational capital is the opportunity to gain the loyalty, allegiance, and trust of non-elite actors. Hence, Bourdieu’s field theory provides a generalized theoretical framework in which conflict and competition supply the contextual logic that shapes how agents of the Church and state engage in seeking to configure social order in the modern state.  

**Secular Elite Project: The Laicized Society**

Conflict emerged between secular/religious elites and their corresponding cultural project pertaining to the configuration of social and moral order. The project of secular elites did not emerge in a vacuum but was generated by a particular world view and moral orientation that framed social expectations of justice, ordered relationships and random misfortunes. Popular actors can look to religion to provide guidance and ways to discern the unknown or rely on philosophical materialism to explain misfortunes according to physical and social laws.

9 The usefulness of this framework is that it identifies casual mechanisms that can account for the particular outcome in a social field. I disagree with Steinmetz however, over what he has identified as one of the causal mechanisms. Steinmetz identifies “the field” as a mechanism in his study of the colonial state (2008: 602). The field, as the site for struggle and tension over its control, creates the condition or the possibility for a particular outcome. The field, in my mind, allows for the conditions and possibly the pre-conditions that create opportunities for a mechanism to be triggered. But the field is not a mechanism. The actual causal mechanism or causal process that results in varying outcomes is the competition or struggles over symbolic capital in the colonial-state field. The competition to dominate the field, in Steinmetz’s scheme, was rooted in acquiring *ethnographic acuity* which would result in a subdued, stable, yet productive society of colonized subjects in Samoa. The lack of *ethnographic acuity* resulted in genocide and massacre in Southwest Africa. The explanation for varying outcomes was the mechanism of *ethnographic acuity* which served as symbolic capital in the colonial-state field.

10 Once again, Bourdieu summarizes the analytical advantage of conceptualizing the modernizing social world of Uruguay as a field when he writes; “a field may be defined as a network or a configuration of objective relationships between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determination they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation in the structure of distribution of species of capital whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field (1992:97).”
human rights. The cultural tradition supplying the logic that represents secular elite’s assumptions and commitments began as esoteric rationalism. Ardao (1950; 1962; 1971; 1945; 1956) has traced the trajectory of Uruguay’s intellectual transformations beginning in the early 1850s corresponding to the erection of the Major University of the Republic when *principismo* was installed as the official philosophical orientation of the University of the Republic by consecutive rectors Dr. José de la Pena and Dr. Plácido Elluari. Esoteric rationalist convictions and sensibilities were transferred from the halls of the university to the multitude of clubs, societies, and professional organizations such as *El Club Universitario* and *El Ateneo* that emerged in the same time frame and were attended by university professors, students, graduates, and professionals like José Pedro Varella who modernized the national public school system. The editors of the major periodical, *El Siglo* regularly reproduced the discourse and papers presented in colloquiums of intellectual clubs which oriented the liberal members of both the Colorado and Blanco Parties.  

11 *Principismo* was a an eclectic philosophy combining elements of romanticism borrowed from Victor Hugo and Saint-Simon, a reduction of Constant and Tocqueville’s political doctrines espousing individual rights in accord with natural law in which the individual is the arbitrator of liberties, and metaphysics of natural religion (Mariani 1969; Oddone 1956; Ardao 1950). *Principismo* is important to this study because it is the philosophical labyrinth that gave rise to Varella’s educational reform predicated on notion that human reason can ignite great ideas that are the first cause of social progress; a continual preoccupation of liberal reformers.

11 Editors of *El Siglo* became the principle voice of liberalism influencing both political parties and included Pedro Bustamante, José P. Ramírez, José Elluari, Elbio Fernández who would become principle agents in *La Sociedad de Amigos de Educación* and supporters of laical education.
Principistas however were frustrated in their utopian efforts to build a modern state due to the chain of consecutive dictators who, according to Lopez-Alves (1996), inadvertently contributed to the liberal cause by displacing power from rural caudillos and consolidating liberalism in the hands of urban doctors. Through an efficient program of expanding the state infrastructure and making the state bureaucracy military efficient, the urban wings of the political parties benefited when the state converted to civilian rule. It was under the Latorre regime that educational reform began that was consistent with the modernizing impulse of his government although inadvertently, it weakened military rule in favor of civilian liberalism.

In the 1880s the philosophical impulse took a turn toward positivism with the installation of Alfredo Vasquez Acevedo as the rector of the University. In the advent of materialism as a science, the positivism of Spencer replaced the spiritualism of Kant and materialism of Darwin supplanted the metaphysics of Plato (Mariani 1969: 7). Ardao (1962:371) provides a clue regarding the diffusion of positivism:

After 1900, the polemical position (positivism) of the university extended and diversified itself. On one hand, the philosophical point of view enriched itself through the support of the school system, on the other hand, positivism became a significant defining element in the life of the political parties; still yet it became actively incorporated in the social and political ideology of the nascent labor movement.

Positivism shaped the secular elite project that was both utopian and pragmatic by combining a climate of ideas and the formation of particular state policies — a relationship between political action and social infrastructure. Although positivism was not explicitly a political theory, its precepts provided important assumptions for Uruguay’s governing elite. Scientific politics entailed a conviction that methods of
science could be applied to national problems based on observable facts. Governing elites would no longer be guided by abstract theories of liberty and legal formulas which had only led to civil wars and disorder (see López-Alves 1996). In their stead, new emphasis would be placed on established rational and empirical principles related to economic concerns and utilitarian governance. These principles would yield a theory of social structure and change from which a system of social planning could be developed. The political framework was a “soft caudillo” elected by popular consent who, with the aid of technocratic elite, promoted economic progress in an ordered society. Hence, the governing model became “responsible authoritarianism” in which the end of politics is to satisfy the social needs of the republic in order to secure the development of society. In the spirit of the Enlightenment, positivism advocated that the law was the most effective instrument for achieving moral order and happiness in the republic. Positivism resonated with secular elites who were seeking to explain the political and economic backwardness of their country. They saw positivism as a source of renewal and modernization that not only could unlock the door to progress, but would challenge the influence of the Catholic Church over the minds of the masses.

One of the most distinguishing elements of the secular elites modernizing project in Uruguay was the intensity with which they opposed the Catholic Church and sought to restrict its capacity to influence society. While many liberal reformers were simply seeking to reform the state, establish constitutional rule of law and modernize the economy, anti-religious elites went beyond an attempt to establish an autonomous state and citizenry. For these anti-religious state managers, the modern state was a zero-sum game in that the state could only flourish if religion was marginalized. They favored an
all-out attack on the Church because they believed that without the destruction of ecclesiastical power and the death of its accompanying dogma, no real and durable change could be made. According to Rodó (1968), they hated the Church with an intensity born out of frustration to fulfill a utopian vision. Therefore, a more intensified conflict emerged in 1900 corresponding to the Batlle regime. An intensified anticlericalism toward a somewhat renewed Church occurred in a broader context of expanding nationalism, economic growth and social/political change that took place under *batllismo* (Zubillaga and Cayota 1988).

Through the policies of *batllismo*, the modern state began to emerge by means of consolidated bureaucratic intervention. Modernization goals over the next twenty years included: \(^{12}\)

1. Economic reform by nationalizing and promoting industry thru protectionism.
2. Social reform by drafting legislation designed to protect workers and develop the means of solidarity for the most marginal sectors of society.
3. Rural reform thru the progressive elimination of the latifundios and the creation of small agricultural units with greater balance between ranching and agriculture.
4. Fiscal reform by imposing taxes on the wealthy and reducing or eliminating consumption tax with the objective of leveling taxation in order that the state may control social and economic sectors.
5. Moral reform by increasing education and defending a cosmopolitan national identity and radical anticlericalism that seeks the emancipation of women.
6. Political reform by politicizing society and initiating republican reforms thus improving citizenship and institutions; including the collegialization of the executive power.

Compulsory and laical education provided the most secure means of developing a scientific and nationalistic ideology thus displacing what urban doctors considered the anti-modern and anti-scientific influence of Catholicism.

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By 1908, education reformers had achieved Varela’s original goal of laicizing public schools. In the place of religious instruction, state managers realized that a moral void had to be filled. Abel Pérez, National Inspector of Education recognized that the school must develop a functional substitute for religion that had been displaced. In the *Anales de Instrucción Primaria* Pérez submitted an essay entitled; “In Search for a New Morality: Sources of Ideas and Directives” in which he introduces this dilemma (1915:70);

We have previously seen that religious faith maintains an important link to a moral code, although having diminished in this way; irreligion presently invades the sanctuary and religious influence consciously suffers (...). It is necessary to conscientiously look for an enduring source that flows naturally without force, a moral law that replaces that which has been extinguished, with which human discretion offers a wide and secure route to individual and collective existence.

Abel Pérez (1915:57-103) devotes the rest of his lengthy essay to developing a collection of aesthetic virtues which presumably characterize a laical morality and one that should exemplify citizens of the republican; Love, Beauty, Duty, and Solidarity. Laical morality expressed in the Inspector’s essay was couched in terms referencing the public school and its curriculum in terms such as “a new laical temple”, the “dignity of natural religion and its devotion (culto)”, “the irresistible efficacy of its dogma,” thus framing the new morality analogously to the Catholic catechism it replaced. The aesthetic humanism espoused by the National Inspector was implemented in the curriculum essentially as Citizenship Education. Pérez implemented a nationwide program of “School Battalions” designed to “make students healthy and vigorous, well ordered, studious and informed patriots” (Pérez 1908: 159; 173-177). A laical decalogue (*Código de Moral para Niños*)
was introduced to the public schools synthesizing a laical morality characterized by reverence for the school (always appearing in capitalized text), science, expressions of pantheism and natural religion integrated into an overarching concept of love for the homeland.  

Several years later, this program was up-graded and entitled; “El Código del Futuro Ciudadano” which introduces each code (Ley) of the decalogue with the phrase; “Good citizens will (…)” Among the purposes expressed in the decalogue, number four states (Código 1930: 6);

The fulfillment of the laws of this Code will assure individual and social progress and your personal adhesion to the integrating norms that will make feasible your true happiness; thus making you good, just, truthful, well-ordered and useful to the community of your co-citizens and a commendable patriot.

More than one researcher has commented on the state’s obsession with forming, not just an integrated society, but a homogenized and uniform society leaning toward a liberal autocracy supported by education policies with broader political goals (Caetano 2011; Barran et al. 1996; Greising 2000).  

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15 Regarding the laical school, its curriculum, and manner of implementation, a speaker to the 1933 Nationalist Convention addressed the gathering stating; “The laical school, although it says that it is neutral, is a system more dogmatic than the Catholic schools, and more biased. It is more dogmatic because when the Church teaches dogma, it calls it dogma, while the laical school teaches truth in the name of science, dogmatically, that are the source of lies, and the teachers know that they are lies” (as cited in Greising 2000:119)
In sum, the secular elite project was not just laical schools or a laical state (*estado laico*), but a completely laicized society and state education would be the major strategy for achieving such a purpose. Citizens had to be socialized to recognize that their civil status would be regulated and administrated by a paternal state with an aim to produce citizens whose primary loyalty was to the nation and not to the Church or other corporate remnants of colonial society. Urban doctors sought to create a nation state in which cultural and values were uniform and in which a common national destiny was the one absolutized by the state.

**Catholic Elite Project – A Modern *societas christiana***

In the aftermath of the Vera-Berro conflict, Mons. Vera’s project was clear; a national clergy had to be established. It is safe to assume that Vera was acting on the evaluation and recommendations of Jose Ignacio Victor Eyzaguirre who emphasize, among other critiques (see chapter one; note 29), not only the scarcity of clergy but the need to reform the quality of clergy as Vera expressed in a letter to Pius IX in 1863; “Clergy that dedicate themselves to parochial ministry and to teaching by emphasizing the good and virtuous. How does one voice execute this just strategy” (as cited in Pons 1904: 104)? Vera echoed these same concerns in message before the General Assembly of Congress including President Berro in which he outlined the present condition of the Church; “The Church suffers due to a lack of clergy who attend to the needs of the parishes … and the impossibility at this time to establish a seminary where youth can have a vocation and can receive proper instruction” (DSHAG Tomo 3 1861: 302).
At this point, it would be a mistake to interpret the ultramontane tendencies employed by Vera solely by their political ramifications for the Church-State relations. Ultramontanism had a life of its own and must be understood in the socio-political context in which it emerged. Far from being a monolithic phenomenon, ultramontanism was a constellation of circumstances which could be political, social, psychological, historical, liturgical, theological or a combination of several or all of the elements. Uruguay was a constitutional democratic republic; albeit its democratic institutions were weak at the time. However, there was no history of a statist Church as in Josephinism in Austria or a fear of the Restoration of the ancien régime as in France. There was no “priest party” attempting to restore a monarchy nor confessional parties as in Belgium. In contrast to the admonitions of Bilbao (La América en Peligro), Vera did need to, however, reconcile ultramontane impulses to the liberal republican context in which he sought to form a national clergy. For example, he may have been insulted by anticlerical literature and the press, but only went as far as prohibiting it among Catholics (Fernández Techera 2007: 191). Recent historians who have attempted to look critically at Vera found no support for ant-liberal convictions nor a rejection of the political system consecrated by the constitution of 1830 (García Alvarez 1981: 12-20). The struggle for Vera was to define Catholic orthodoxy and identity in a republican-democratic society. It is a fair estimation that Vera was preoccupied with the pastoral mission of what was essentially a frontier Church in the midst of a nation in need of evangelization.  

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16 His first pastoral letter written as Apostolic Vicar addressed the issue of “bad literature” to the faithful (Geymonat 2004: 256)

17 See Pons (1904: 62-3), the earliest biographer of Vera, records a letter Vera composed to Padre José Sato as follows; “I have seen the periodicals that wish to shame me because I was named a
Although Mons. Vera inherited minimal ecclesiastical structures necessary to develop an effective pastoral presence; he gave tremendous energy to the organizational expansion of the Church in a time when strong anticlerical sentiments were emerging from his public dispute with President Berro. Church expansion could not have been accomplished without a narrow and absolute allegiance to Pope Pius IX. However, Vera’s embrace of ultramontanism appears to be more tactical rather than constitutive. The outcome of the Berro conflict was consistent with the ultramontane prerogative of a highly centralized church under papal authority thus reclaiming loyalties of bishops and clergy to the Pope rather than the state (Merlano 2010: 190-91). Also consistent with ultramontanism, Vera sought to Romanize the clergy after touring the entire country, in order to access the status of the national Church (Bazzano 1993: 51; Pons 1904: 86-96). Clergy reform began with the expulsion of Franciscan Mission in 1860. Vera collaborated with President Berro (before the conflict emerged) in the initiative. Although Ardao (1962: 159-60) attributes the expulsion of the Franciscans to their involvement in Masonry, Fernández Techera (2007:198-99) cites several letters detailing accounts of moral lapses and indiscretions as the cause. One of Vera’s most important acts was to send eight novitiates to study in the Universidad Gregoriana and the Colegio Pío Latino Americano in Rome. This would establish strong leadership in the timeframe when the

representative (Congressional). God knows that I want to resign from the Congress where I do not want to be affiliated. You know that it impedes my duties in the Parish of my charge. I am very aware of the consequences that powerful positions can incapacitate a priest who wants to be successful in his ministry.”

18 Detailed accounts shows that Florentino Conde was living publicly with a concubine (Lisero 1972: 79); Juan Domingo Fernandez showed disloyalty to Vera when exiled in Buenos Aires (Lisero 1972: 47, 110); Juan Jose Bird was responsible for scandalous acts in the Curia (Lisero 1972: 193). Francisco Majestre was judged as having problems with character, Lazaro Gadena experienced difficulties managing the Hospital de Caridad (Pons 1904: 26).
Church would engage in virulent anti-religious conflict at the end of the century (Bazanno et al. 1993:47-51). In 1865, Vera petitioned President Venancio Flores to rescind the expulsion of the Jesuits. In 1878, the Jesuits opened Seminario Conciliar in order to train national clergy and in 1881 opened the Centro Apostólico de San Francisco as a mission to the rural areas of Uruguay (Sallaberry 1935; Villegas 2005).

Within the context of Vera’s ultramontane reforms, there is little evidence that the Church in Uruguay sought to control public education which was a norm in the clerical/anticlerical conflicts in Germany (Yonke 1998), Belgium (Witte 2003) and France (Gibson 1989). While it is true that in the early republic, as in most of the emerging institutions, clergy were involved in some leadership capacity. Padre Benito Lamas was director of the Escuela de la Patria initiated by Artigas after the revolution, Mons. Larrañaga was director of the Lancasterian schools during the Portuguese occupation, and Padre Ignacio de Zufriategui served as the first General Director of Public Instruction in 1829 during the founding of the republic (Bralich 1987: 19-32; 1996). However, the real story regarding education is consistent with the overall history of the era; the first four decades after independence (1811-1850) were characterized by political convulsions which led to armed confrontations, economic difficulties, chronic budgetary instability, and educational concern was purely declarative by the government which expressed desire for common education. In the period, good initiatives were met with frustration. According to Bralich (1996; 1987), the early years of chaos and the lack of clear policies allowed private schools to dominate the field. In the mid 1830’s eight

private schools operated in Montevideo and by 1846, 21 private schools existed. At the time of Varela’s reform in 1877, private schools outnumbered public school. Catholic congregations chose to open schools in the private sector because the tradition of private schools made it possible. 20

The fact that ultramontanism is associated with the mobilization of thousands of European Catholics who joined religious orders, engaged in missions and devotional associations over several generations made the movement transnational. Vera exchanged several letters with Don Bosco regarding the collaboration of Salesians in Montevideo (Vener and Martinez 1998: 86; Zubillaga 1992:85; Pons 1904: 258). The Uruguayan Church capitalized on the availability of established and new orders of men and women religious who came to Uruguay in order to found and teach in Catholic schools, found orphanages, work in health care among other service oriented ministries. The arrival of religious congregations served to reinforce Vera’s efforts to establish a pastoral presence in Uruguay. 21

Vera was able to lay the foundation that would bring about unprecedented expansion of the Church. His reforms included the organization of a national clergy, the creation of a national diocese, and establishing a seminary. Historian Eduardo Acevedo (1934 Tomo 5: 254) cites a 1885 census of religious personnel which counted 144 women religious and 35 clergy. By 1900, the numbers had grown to 617 women religious

20 See Vera’s response to President Berro’s question regarding any attempt by the Church to control public instruction in chapter one, page 35.

21 Vera was supported in his consolidation of the Church under his tenure by the arrival of the following teaching orders; Jesuits, Capuchinos, Salesians, Redemptorists, Hermanos de la Sagrada Familia, Dominicanos, Hermanas de Nuestra Señora del Huerto, Hermanas Dominicas, Vicentinas, Compañía del Sagrado Corazón de Jesús, Hermanas Alemanas, Hijas de Caridad, Salesas (Araujo 1911: 536).
and 274 clergy, both regular and secular. When Vera initiated his ministry in 1861, there were 26 parishes; by 1900 the number grew to 46 managed by 116 secular clergy and a seminary consisting of 50 students training to become priests (Bazzano 1993:47; Acevedo 1934 Tomo V: 254). In 1877 when Varela’s reforms began there were three Catholic schools; by the time of the 1908 Census the number expanded to 71.

Disciplining the clergy did not diminish the Church’s acceptance of the democratic republican context in which it had to work as it surfaced in Francisco Bauza and San Martin de Zorilla, who as laymen were able to negotiate and integrate ultramontane Catholicism within the context of the democratic apparatus. Vera restored the first-things, but where did the impetus for change come from? Did it originate in Rome and feed thru the Uruguayan hierarchy via papist orders as religious personnel dutifully obeyed or was the impetus due to local contextual factors?

By 1875, Mons. Soler had become the functional leader of the Church (Mons. Vera past away in 1881) and for the next thirty-five years, Soler adjusted the religious strategy thus formulating a diverse and innovative response to secular elites. Soler’s emphasis was to contextualize Catholicism in response to the modernizing configurations in society. In this regard, practically every social theme was taken up by the Catholic Congresses which sought dialog (and polemic) with the contemporaneous political and ideological currents. Beginning with the creation of the Circles of Catholic Workers, lay leaders would organize and participate in emerging labor conflicts and advocate labor demands from a Catholic perspective. From 1889 to 1911, there were four Catholic Congresses that sought to address social issues emerging from incipient industrialization and proletariatization thus resulting in an expansion of Catholic voluntary associations.
Catholics began to study and embrace, at least in part, the social and religious message contained in Pope Leo XIII encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (1891). Soler produced two works in this time frame which on one hand reflect the continuity of Catholic orthodoxy reaffirmed by ultramontanism; on the other hand Soler indicates a readiness to reconcile Catholicism to modern realities and to place increased emphasis on social themes.  

In *La Sociedad Moderna y el Provenir* (1890) Soler affirms the Church’s capacity to be flexible and accommodate to varying forms of government while at the same time dismissing the notion that the Church can only work within a theocratic and monarchical state (1890:40);

> We abandon these narrow and pessimistic ideas that suggest the Church does not know how to prosper and grow without the reign of certain forms of governments. We greet them with a divine attribute and flexibility with which one accommodates with honor and magnanimity all forms of government and all forms of grand social transformations, because in them God is the foundation and over all the changes in all epochs and all human variations.

Soler was able to embrace the fundamental freedoms that are associated with a free and democratic society recognizing that rights are neutral and ultimately within God’s provenance when he wrote (1890:63); “Of all public liberties that constitute the essence of modern societies, none is evil by itself, and none are contrary to the laws of God.”

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22 Soler first indicated a rethinking of the relationship of the Church in modernity in 1888 when he wrote: “I have realized that the aspiration most cherished in my dreams as a traveler is contemplating humanity under the multiple phases of the social situation which enables me to form an idea of the actual state of the world in its relationship to civilization and progress” (*Memorias de un Viaje por Ambos Mundos* Tomo I, Montevideo, 1888). A clear message regarding a rethinking of the “Roman Question” appeared in *La Semana Religiosa* in 1895 in which Soler expressed favor toward Italian unity and opposition to the Pope’s temporal authority; “I feel compassion for those who celebrate the fall of the Pope’s temporal authority which guarantees the unification of Italy.” The pastoral letter is directed toward those Italians in Uruguay who celebrate September 20 (“El Pontificado y la Unidad italiana.” Septiembre 21, 1895. *La Semana Religiosa*. Pgs. 6361-6373).  

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Soler took umbrage with the notion that only rational liberalism had a monopoly on concepts such as *sovereignty of the people*. Possibly indicating slippage or a reinterpretation of the corporatist strategies of historic Catholicism, Soler appears to embrace a diffusion of authority from the confines of the Church to the people of God such that authority may be derived from God but is expressed by the common people and therefore the state exists as a coordinated outcome of society’s members for maintaining order and justice; 23

Consider the result of the French Revolution, democracy has risen to power and the ascent of the popular classes is consistent with Catholic principles, although power to govern comes from God and no government has a direct and divine delegation before God, rather, the people. Therefore, sovereignty resides in the people among whom sovereignty is necessarily distributed according to the form of government that is adopted.

In 1900 Soler wrote a pastoral letter for the new millennium entitled *El Espíritu Nuevo: Tendencias, Conveniencias y Razones* in which he attempts to reconcile the Uruguayan Church to the modern spirit in its diverse manifestations; philosophical, historical, scientific, and political. It was an optimistic document emphasizing that modern tendencies were providential opportunities preparing the Church for its mission in a democratic, pluralistic, and secular society. Soler’s outline for the future is as follows (1898: 56).

1. The development of human knowledge – How can one exist unless one nourishes the most noble of our faculties; our intelligence.
2. Science – is equally substantial, which forms itself and progresses by investigation of the natural laws and forces of the Creator.

3. Liberty – It is no mistake that the Gospel has taught us all the legitimate liberties; is that not what Lamartine says? The Church has never ceased to make war on slavery and despotism working incessantly to broaden the inheritance of the civil and political liberty of humanity.

4. The progressive condition of the masses. Has the constant objective of Christian charity and its practical application been the doctrine of the Church toward the fraternity of humanity and the paternity of God?

Mons. Soler began to collaborate with lay leaders who initiated alternative organizations, presses, and associations designed to both stimulate the Catholic faithful but also to counteract the network of anticlerical organizations. These lay associations and organizations became the forerunners of the Catholic Congresses in Uruguay (1889-1911) which brought lay Catholics together for the advancement of particular aims in society: especially aims consistent with an incipient Social Catholicism (Brena 1978; Zubillaga and Cayota. 1988). Although Mons. Soler persisted in the use of belligerent language and metaphors in defense of what he saw as a pernicious anti-religious attack on Catholicism, his writings embraced an attempt to reconcile public and civil liberties with religion (Caetano and Geymonat 1997:121-22). His writings emphasized the necessity for a new spirit of dialog and encounter between the Church and the Age, and between a Catholic aggiornamento and a liberal modernity free from Jacobinism. Mons. Soler’s ecclesiastical leadership represented a departure from some of the more rigid forms of ultramontanism of his predecessors yet defended the necessity of religious social space in relation to the modernizing state for the common good of society (Caetano 2000). These efforts led to Catholic Congresses that addressed social issues that had long been neglected by the institutional Church (Espinoza 2009: 453; Barrán 2004, 1998; Brena 1978) and to the formation of Workers’ Circles which emerged in response to the needs of labor (Secco Illa 1946; Zubillaga and Cayota 1988). The most important feature of the
Catholic Congresses of this era was the mobilization of the laity and the formation of innumerable organizations and Catholic social works. The objective of these organizations was to serve as instruments to ignite the social life of Catholics based on a “principled faith” (Bazanno et al. 1993: 103).

In sum, Uruguayan society became a site of conflict and competition between two visions (projects) for society: one in which the secular state was responsible for producing modern citizens who were dependent on the state and provided allegiance to the state. The state sought to secure citizen loyalty by monopolizing education. The project of the Church was to provide a moral compass in order to orient citizens toward a moral framework based on allegiance to the principals and precepts emanating from its institutional authority. The Church sought a symbiotic relationship with the state and with society by establishing a paternal order in which the Church managed faith and morals (Caetano and Geymonat 1997:126).

2) Symbolic Capital

According to Bourdieu (1977:171-183; 1990: 112-121), symbolic capital is the capacity to define reality in such a way that serves one’s owns interest and to offer the correct and legitimate definition of the social world. Hence, competition between modernizing projects means that each group of elites (secular and clerical) has to articulate and communicate their project stemming from a profound understanding of the non-elte culture and character. Maintaining the capacity for communicating a project to

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24 The awakened laity of this generation included: Juan Zorrilla de San Matín, Francisco Bauzá, Jacinto Durán, Eduardo Cayota, Francisco García Santos, Luis P. Lenguas, Miguel Perea (Bazzano et al. 1993:102).
non-elites was the dominant currency of the modernizing state in Uruguay. The modernizing state came to be characterized by competition for a particular form of symbolic capital; the capacity to contextualize the elite project—a reciprocally recognized talent for communicating values, beliefs, ideas and practices (social representations) to non-elites in order to affirm the project’s relevance and legitimacy in accordance with the confluence of ideological propositions.\textsuperscript{25} Non-elites ensured the success of the project by either buying into the project sensing their needs would be met or by opposing the other project: at least not cooperating with it. Both groups of elites recognized the stakes of the competition; the loyalty, allegiance and trust of the non-elites. Hence, the interest group that dominates symbolic capital can monopolize cultural production and gain the loyalty, allegiance and trust of the non-elite sectors.\textsuperscript{26}

The capacity to contextualize the meaning and relevance of the elite program using discursive language and representational mediums is the key to dominating the modernizing field. This means that secular and religious elites must be able to not only...
legitimate their position to their followers, but also to a wider audience. This involves appealing to certain principles consonant with the interests that the group represents. Legitimating claims in the face of competition from an oppositional ideology or worldview often requires critical contextualization of their own ideological commitments in order to make the interest group’s ideology relevant in a changing social context. Elite elaboration of a social project involves the capacity to communicate systems of values, ideas and practices with a twofold function. First, to establish a logical order which will enable individuals to orient themselves in their material and social world; second, to enable communication to take place according to a code of social exchange enabling constituents to codify, name and classify unambiguously the various aspects of their world within the identity of their social group’s history.

In order to understand how religious and secular elites may differ in contextualizing their social project, I find the work of Serge Moscovici helpful. In a study exploring social representation theory (2008), Moscovici investigates how elites of certain social groups in France engage in communication strategies concerning new ideas and transmitting them to constituents and the non-elite public. Moscovici found that the Catholic segment used well-ordered didactic styles of communication with the intention to make a limited number of subgroups of Catholics with divergent affinities to new ideas and simultaneously to set limits to the acceptance of new ideas within the established orthodoxy of the Church. He refers to this communicative strategy as propagation. Catholic communication tends not to incite specific behaviors but to create norms or a convergence around an acceptable doctrine or dogma. Such convergence implies that the object of change can be integrated into an established frame of reference (2008:259). On
the other hand, Moscovici found that groups with interests in the State and political power generally use *propaganda* as a most common means of communication where by communication is ordered systematically emphasizing incompatibility and conflict. The purpose is to generate negative stereotypes of oppositional ideologies and practices. One of the principal differences between *propagation* and *propaganda* is the demand for uniformity. The goal of propagative communication is to give actual or likely behaviors a meaning that they did not possess previously in lieu of social change. The emphasis is not uniformity but relevance. The purpose of propaganda, on the other hand, is to incite unified behavior or action resulting from the instrumental elaboration of the group’s representations pertaining to the social change that it seeks to impose (2008: 314). Since all forms of modernization involve cultural, political and psychological pressures due to social change, both religious and secular elites were pressured to compel non-elites that a society configured according their respective program would provide a more stable and favorable social order.

3) A Religious Habitus

From Bourdieu’s various writings, it is possible to construct a more robust understanding of *habitus* than simply the standard definitions of “an internalized system of acquired dispositions” (1977:72). First, *habitus* must correspond to the structural conditions of the field in which it emerges.27 In other words, actors pursue actions and

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27 Bourdieu (1992:105) makes it clear that analysis of the *habitus* is one of the essential elements of the field, especially in relation to the “field of power”. Analysis is directed toward the *habitus* of the agents represented by the various systems of dispositions they have acquired by internalizing a determinate type of social, philosophical or economic condition which produces a definite trajectory and becomes actualized with in the field under study.
strategies that are conditioned by the opportunities and constraints of the field in which they act. Although *habitus* is relatively stable, it can and does change by adjusting to structural changes over time. Second, *habitus* is not necessarily class based but can be group specific (Bourdieu uses the term “fraction”) and corresponds to the position the group occupies in the field of production. Third, field specific forms of capital are derived by *habitus* which means that *habitus* is linked intimately to capital in that some *habitus* (those dominate in social and cultural fractions) act as multipliers of various kinds of capital. Last, although practices and positions can be observed empirically, *habitus* can and must be understood theoretically. Therefore, in order to identify the dispositions and categories of understanding that generate and organize action in the field of conflict, it is necessary to first reconstruct the contending elite groups that strive to shape social order in Uruguay’s modernizing society. This description is not meant to be exhaustive but serves as a provisional over-simplified account in order to understand the *habitus* of both contending groups. 

**Habitus of Secular Elites:**

According to da Silveira and Monreal (2003:21), elites in Uruguay are identified as two groups; the *orthodox* liberals who wanted economic freedom without interference

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28 The purpose here is to differentiate actors and groups engaged in the field of struggles by their principle political, organizational and tactical dispositions followings Bourdieu’s schema (1992:100-101) in which participants in a field are understood as rivals competing to monopolize capital and eventually sub-sectors of the field. Therefore analysis of *habitus* focuses on the ideational (dispositional) and empirical associations (practices) of field actors and groups, as opposed to the earlier exposition of the field itself; which focused on the projects and aims of the competing groups. Both field and *habitus* however emphasize the asymmetry and relevant difference between projects, groups and actors which confront one another over capital and stakes.

29 The identification of actors and groups in their structured space is consistent with Bourdieu’s insistence that the relationship between actors and institutions which compete for legitimacy and authority be mapped out by their relative position, practices and expressions (1992:105).
of the state and the *progressive* liberals who believed that social good imposes certain limits on personal liberties and the state had the responsibility to guarantee progress. Education, the economy and social legislation are the areas in which the *progressive* state sought to stimulate action. While *orthodox* elites were generally religiously oriented who believed in the existence of God and in the immortality of the soul, *progressives* held to positivist ideas and evolution, inclined toward philosophical materialism and agnosticism. Most progressives were passionately anticlerical (2003:22). Progressive elites coalesced around the University of the Republic where students were schooled heavily in Quinet; *Genio de las Religiones, Cristianismo y la Revolución Francesa; La Creación, Examen de la Vida de Jesús, El Espíritu Nuevo*. What they knew about ultramontanism and the Jesuits; came from Quinet’s *El Ultramontanismo* and *Contra los Jesuitas*. They were “men of letters” who professionally became lawyers, editors, journalists, educators, literary artists and politicians. They were members of the bourgeoisie yet not necessarily tied to industry or agriculture.\(^{30}\) Their principal venue for developing their collective agenda was the formation of clubs and fraternities such as the *Club Universito, El Ateneo, La Liga Liberal, El Club Liberal Francisco Bilbao, La Unión Liberal and El Centro Liberal y la Asociación de Propaganda Liberal*. Dissertations, debates and discussions centered on literature by Renan (*The Life of Jesus*) and Bilbao (*America in Danger*) or the latest continental ideas from Comte and Spencer. Supporting the fraternities were Masonic lodges and societies of free thinkers which served as laboratories for the discussion and refinement of great liberal ideas and corresponding

\(^{30}\) Unlike many states where the land holding class converted its capital from land to the capacity to rule, this was not the case in Montevideo. State managers came from among urban doctors – except during the dictator phase. Neither agrarian interests nor industrial capitalists were the background for the bureaucratic field.
documents such as *Statutes and the Declaration of Principles* which outlined the legal formulas and policies to be implemented in the context of political reform (Aradao 1962: 346-365; Silveira and Monreal 2003:36). Ideas were disseminated thru daily periodicals: *The Aurora, La Idea Liberal, La Antorcha, El Intransigente, El Radical, La Razón, y El Día*. Above all else, the organizations and presses were active and ardent promoters of irreligious anticlericalism and used the press to misinform public discourse. Clericalism served as a convenient label that conflated all things Catholic into a concept that played on a variety of prejudices appearing in the press and other media. One reason why anticlerical elites came to hate Catholicism is because it threatened a unified national identity and naive nationalism. For many anticlericals who also became state managers, state power became the most effective means of constraining the Church’s cultural influence. Compulsory and laical state education became an effective means of shaping an ignorant and apathetic population into respectable and patriotic citizens. The unified mission of the secular elites was to emancipate society from the myths and ignorance of traditional religion and establish secular modernism.

Evidence suggests that secular elites in Uruguay did not necessarily abandon religious thought altogether, but simply modified a historical religious framework (Catholicism, Protestantism, natural religion) resulting in a quasi-esoteric religious worldview that amounted to a syncretistic form of natural religion. Hence, the *habitus* of secular elites was framed by an eclectic rationalism that had a spiritualistic ethos that manifested in a universalistic and deistic cosmology. An esoteric and syncretistic form of religiositas was evidenced in the *Profession of Faith* produced by members of the *Club Racionalista* in 1872 which consisted of canons characterized by a combination of
theistic language employed to express utopian and aesthetic themes (Ardao 1962: 305-310; Bazanno et al. 1993:68). Such deistic rationalism extended and broaden beyond the University Clubs and University elites to influence politicians and political parties. The brand of liberalism developed in Montevideo was heavily infused with free-thinking rationalism, hence was strongly anticlerical. Because liberals controlled much of the media (the press), free-thinking rationalism infused the national conscience. The outcome was a militant liberalism that was hostile to traditional religion (Catholicism and Protestantism), well organized, and saturated the public media in order to produce evangelistic-like campaigns to spread their vision among the general populace (Silveira and Monreal 2003; Ardao 1962:375). Ramon Diaz, who became known as Rodó’s adversary because of Rodó’s objection to the removal of crucifixes from hospitals, captures the eclectic spirituality of the secular elites in an article that appeared in the periodical *El Liberal* March 22, 1900.31

The liberal ideal is not and has never been a fight with the religious sentiment; freethinkers, positivists, materialists, deists, or those affiliated with a positivist religion, we are co-religious: a great thought and a great idea that serves us as a flag. We want liberty of conscience and liberty of thought. We all hate the Catholic Church and we look upon the Catholic Church as a common enemy because the Church condemns every liberty, because the Church burns down houses in order to drown the voices of free-thought and free conscience.

The secular elites of this era came to embrace the very intolerance—toward traditional religion—that they attributed to the Catholic Church (Rodó 1968:72).

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Habitus of Religious Elites:

According to Morse (1954; 1965), the social configuration of the Spanish-American Church was based on a Thomistic-Aristotelian synthesis consisting of a functional social hierarchy of social groups held together by common law, which became the basis for Spanish America’s political heritage known as Las Partidas. The Partidas assumed a nuclear element of society – not Lockean atomistic man, but religious, societal man: a man with a save-able soul — in relationship to God — and man in a station in life such that having mutual obligations with fellow humans determinable by principals of Christian justice. Rulers were bound thru conscience and were deemed to be the instrument of Gods immutable and publicly ascertainable law (Morse 1954: 71).

An example of Latin American intellectuals who attempted to reframe the Catholic corporatist model was Francisco de Paula Gonzáles Vigil, a Peruvian priest and lay jurist Manuel Lorenzo de Vidaurre. According to Klaiber (1977:7-18) Vigil and Vidaurre rejected the corporatist bureaucracy represented by the Roman Curia due to the centralized authority in the hands of bureaucratic councils, yet favored the local ecclesiastical structures designed to shape the moral order of society — which essentially reflected a working framework for the Catholic vision for society in Latin America.  

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32 According to Morse (1954:72), Las Partidas have their basis in Isabella’s political and administrative reforms that centralized her government in Castile in 1260. Las Partidas became the common law and rules for conduct which became the basis for a paternalistic social-minded political framework.

33 While recognizing that both Vigil and Vidaurre were rejected by the Institutional Church (Vigil was excommunicated by Pius IX and many of Vidaurre’s writings were condemned by the Archbishop of Lima for challenging the authority and power of the Holy See as well as abuses they saw by local clergy, their writings embraced Catholic orthodoxy in terms of the role that they saw for the Church in an emergent republican social order. Both Vigil and Vidaurre embraced the view that religion provided the principle order in society, was the source of public morality, and necessary to end despotism in favor of a republic. While their ecclesiastical reforms, informed by Enlightened Gallicanism, regalism and Jansenism, were
Klaiber explains that Vigil, like Vidaurre believed religion to be a foundation for a well-ordered society. Vigil suggested that a religious society accorded with divine will, and that religion is a powerful element of order and tranquility; an ineffable stimulus to love and justice, and provides respect for the highest authorities. Vigil stresses the function of religion in society — religion provides freedom of thought and the inviolability of conscience. Virgil defined conscience as the religious sentiment in the heart of every individual by which he/she is led to know the moral order set down by the creator therefore, the state should respect the rights of consciousness because it should be pleased that its citizens have religious sentiments (1977:15). Vigil saw religion as the “only brake capable of restraining a man when he acts or thinks evil in private” thus a man’s private domain is beyond the legitimate reach of the state (as cited in Klaiber 1977: 15). Even the Church, though it may be more properly constituted to deal with men’s conscience, may never use coercion to influence conscience. Vigil argued that Christian confession led to good public order as long as it respects the rights of others. The point here is that Catholics, at least in Peru, had a functional answer to the “religious question” represented in the social framework composed by Vigil and Vidaurre.

The example of Vigil and Vidaurre are important to this discussion because their ideas encase the possibility for the Church to reconcile to democratic-republican ideals in which the state is free to govern and the Church is able to fulfill its moral and spiritual mission. While ultramontanism and the Romanization of the Latin Church were obviously interpreted as liberal Catholicism by ultramontane ecclesiastical leaders, anticlericalism in general was never strong in Peru compared to other Latin American republics (cf. Klaiber 1977:7-18; Klaiber 2009).
impulses did in fact contribute to stimulating and reinforcing the social project of the Church as seen in the revitalization of Catholic intellectualism, creation of new religious orders, growth of existing social orders, missionary zeal, growth of lay organizations, and other entrepreneurial forms of religious organization (Anderson 1995; Lynch 1984; Paul 1969; McMillan 2000; Clark 2003). Yet the appearance of the *Syllabus of Errors* in 1864 and its accompanying encyclical *Quanta cura* left leaders like Mariano Soler to contextualize the *Syllabus* in such a way as to reconcile Pius IX’s’ war on modernity with the temporal reality of the republican context of Uruguay. Although one could argue the sequence of Uruguay’s first Bishops, Mons. Vera and Mons. Yéregui (1859-1890), embraced a combative position based upon an intransigent ultramontanism, Mons. Soler was far more progressive. Mons. Soler became the *de facto* and effective leader of the Church in the mid-1870s and embraced a functional and pragmatic view of religion in society consistent with the cultural project described by Vigil and Vidaurre thru the integration of a national and religious culture. Soler, as we have seen from his writings, was intent on making sure that the Church had a social and cultural role in modernity. To this end Soler wrote; 34

> Neither the nation nor patriotism can exist without the concept of God. Without “Him”, there can be neither social justice nor patriotic faith nor respect for institutions. And without God and without religion, not only do we lack a basis for the law and the sanctioning of duties, and the motive for sacrifice, but also we lack the capacity to restrain passion and to nurture the nation thru her heartbreaks and suffering.

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In his work entitled *Church and State* (1879), Soler argues for the role of the Church and religion to complement state prerogatives. Writing on the notion that the modern state requires the presence of a strong spiritual authority to avoid the excesses and aimlessness of materialism associated with industrialization and scientific progress, the Church served as the conscience of the nation and the cement that holds social classes together (1879:25);

The society is in complete dissolution without either a public conscience or a universal moral. There is only anarchy of opinions and widespread corruption in the social classes. Why is this? Society cannot govern itself with only the assistance of human resources but needs to situate itself in the arms of religion, as the solid and true support for its existence because only religion dominates the conscience and passions which are the destructive elements in the social. When a nation loses its conscience, will it subject itself to the laws?

Sentiments of moral order attached to the role of the Church in society were the topic in Congress when a coalition of Catholic and conservative legislators proposed the establishment of the office of Archbishop in April 1895. In a posture of support for the project, President Juan Idiarte Borda reinforced the paternalistic role of the Church in society as a promoter of moral order when he posed the following question before Congress (DSCR Tomo 151; 289-90).

Do we agree that the state religion organizes itself fundamentally in harmony with the purposes of the state? This commission believes this because our society, as with all societies of the world, need religion as a social element in order to disseminate moral doctrines that form the moral base for families and which are the foundation for civil society. Atheist nations do not exist nor do atheists understand this.

Thus the disposition of Soler was far more conciliatory than his predecessors. Soler represented the defensive posture of the Church in response to relentless attacks by
anticlerical elites, both in the press and among state managers intent on using the law to constrain the Church. Readiness among Catholic associations to respond to the emerging “social question” among the working class provided Soler and the Church a platform to authoritatively insert themselves into popular culture, which was reinforced by Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical *Rerum Novarum* in 1891. The previous twenty-five years of Church expansion and consolidation made Soler optimistic toward the future and the Church’s capacity to remain relevant in Uruguayan society.

**Common Habitus of Secular and Religious Elites:**

The *habitus* that shaped the both secular and religious elites is essentially a religious habitus (see Figure 3.1 below). The ideology that guided secular elites can be understood as a syncretistic amalgam consisting of spiritualized metaphysical beliefs, philosophical romanticism combined with positivistic concepts based upon a critique of traditional religion resulted in an ideological *bricolage* that developed over time (Ardao 1962:249). This corresponds to Bourdieu’s notion of an esoteric spiritual product that became the basis of an elite *habitus*. By virtue of its idiosyncratic genealogy, esoteric religion is difficult to access thus restricting availability by social, educational and economic status thus increasing its value among those privileged to have access. The difficulty for secular elites was to communicate an esoteric and syncretic system of beliefs to a wider public audience. Ideas about a Supreme Being, serving as a source of divine reason, capable of guiding social and political perfection was not going to capture the attention of a popular audience. Hence, secular elites had to contextualize their vision for society in terms of popular science that would be palatable to non-elite sectors. We
will see this very relationship played out in the empirical section of this study. Secular elites framed themselves as holders of modern science that was essential for not only constructing a modern society, but to inform daily living in such areas as hygiene, health and psychological fitness (Barrán 1992). In contrast, the Church was anti-science, anti-intellectual and steeped in irrational superstitions.

The religious *habitus* of Catholic elites (see Figure 3.1 below) was shaped by Tridentine Theology constructed on a foundation of Thomism (*Summa Theologica*) affirming the nature of grace and justification, the sacrifice of the Mass, the priesthood, the sacramental system and ecclesiastical authority. Orthodox Catholicism in Uruguay was assured by the participation of no less than eight seminarians trained in the *Colegio Pío Latino Americano* in the Gregorian University in Rome as a part of Pope Pius IX’s Romanization of the Church as an extension of the *Syllabus of Errors* campaign. Orthodox Catholicism had an advantage over esoteric religion due to the legacy of popular religion. Conveying theological principles has traditionally been achieved thru popular rituals, processions, sacramental life and cults of Saints. Popular Catholicism was aided by new forms of “ultramontane piety” that were emotional, extrovert and of course, anti-intellectual; seen for example in the devotion to the Virgin of Luján — the patron Saint of Uruguay. The challenge for the religious elites was to convince the broader public, the nominal and cultural Catholics, that Catholicism had an important role in modern society serving not only as the conscience of the nation and bearer of moral standards, but played an instrumental role in the provision of social service be it education, care of the sick, poor and destitute, and injustice directed at the wage earner.

In sum, religious elites had to contextualize Catholicism as something more than simply
clerical institutions and irrational piety, but a Christian social order necessary for a culture of sociability and social services.

![Diagram of Political Power](image)

**FIGURE 3.1 Adaptation of Bourdieu’s Concept of Spiritual Capital**  

Figure 3.1 above offers a schematic diagram showing how the religious *habitus* is connected to a larger field of cultural production. Both traditional and esoteric religions are autonomous with respect to each other yet they are connected by popular forms to popular subjects and able to influence culture and society. While popular expressions of the religious *habitus* are relevant for cultural production, there is a distinctive difference in the type of production that each religious *habitus* seeks to achieve. The field of large
scale production consists of consumers of cultural goods operating under the laws of
domination seeking the domination of the largest possible market. Traditional religion is
focused on large scale cultural production and only indirectly influences political power
vicariously thru consumers of their goods. Esoteric religion on the other hand, while also
focused on competing in large scale cultural production, is simultaneously engaged in the
field of restricted cultural production. The field of restricted cultural production produces
its own sub-culture, consisting of privileged clients and consumers, and thus an
autonomous value system capable of influencing political power directly as one of its
intentional and collective goals.

By framing elite competition in this way, I am able to explain how *habitus*, an
essential component of Bourdieu’s field theory, is consistent with Bourdieu’s conceptual
understanding of religion, and consistent with the empirical and existential data that
shapes the elite conflict in Uruguay.

**Conclusion**

The modernizing state in Uruguay became an autonomous field due to internal
dynamics of competition and conflict between anti-religious and religious elites
stimulating the production of social projects. Competition and conflict between religious
and secular projects generated a specific form of capital. At stake for the group able to
dominate discursive and representational capital is the opportunity to gain the loyalty,
allegiance and trust of popular sectors. Because both secular and religious elites engage
in discursive practices, the analytical focus of this study is on the discursive language,
symbolic representation and strategic action that emerged in the sub-field of education.
Analytical Framework

One value of Bourdieu’s field theory as a means of explaining secularization in Uruguay is that it shapes the analytical agenda. Habitus and capital shift the analysis from abstract and mechanistic macro-social forces to the dispositions and intentionality of actors: their interests, grievances, authority, knowledge, culture and moral order. However, elite actors and their habitus have to be reconfigured in ways that make their projects comprehensible and intelligible to non-elite actors and suitable for social/cultural production. It is necessary for actor’s dispositions to work in order to make specific capital transferable to other sub-structures. To understand how this transposition of actors, capitals and habitus operated in the Uruguayan modernizing state, it is necessary to identify and analyze areas of public life which are critical to facilitating the transmission of the secular elites’ project to the public. Dobelaere captures this concept best when he writes:

The studies of Martin, Fenn and my colleagues and myself clearly demonstrate that laicization is not a mechanical process to be imputed to impersonal and abstract forces. It is on one hand carried out by people and groups who manifestly want to laicize society and its sub-structures (...). Once we have accepted that secularization as a process of laicization is the result of opposing interest groups, then the outcome is clearly a non-linear process (1981:69).

35 Bourdieu (1992:102) points out that “struggles are historical”. Dispositions, practices and position in fields are among agents, groups, organizations and institutions struggling according to the regularities and rules constitutive to the “space of play” with various degrees of strength and therefore diverse outcomes in order to appropriate the specific cultural products at stake in the field of contest. As we will see in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation, the project and group that dominated the field will be in a position to make it function according to their advantage and yet contend with the resistance, claims and contention of the dominated.
Thus, such notions as field, capital and habitus can be defined but only within the theoretical system they constitute, not in isolation because they are open concepts (rejecting positivism) that have no definition other than systemic ones. They must be put to work empirically in a systemic and analytical fashion. Conflict is historic and must be analyzed in its historic context. The school system, the Church, political parties, labor unions, media organizations, etc., represent sites where contention is played out according to the regularities and rules constitutive of the field. Thus the educational field in the Uruguayan social world has been selected for analysis as a site of action where the contentious projects between elites can be studied empirically as microcosms of the larger field thus representing a critical social sector in relation to the modernizing state.

**Why Education?**

Education tends to be a principal mechanism of social control and socialization in a society such that reproduction of religion depends on two principal institutions: the family and the school. By monopolizing education, secular elites are able to control the dissemination of knowledge production which influences and constrains values, beliefs, ideas and ultimately social practices. Hence, by controlling the school, secular elites in Uruguay sought not just to implement a deliberate policy of laicization of the public school system, but to impede Catholic participation in the educational marketplace where Catholics sought to develop their own competing educational system. However, the product of an educational system can be understood in part as a function of group interest. Bourdieu outlines this notion when he states, “Intellectual, artistic and scientific stances are the conquest or semi-conscience strategies in a game where stakes are the
conquest of cultural legitimation or in other terms for the monopoly of legitimate production, reproduction and manipulation of symbolic goods and the correlative legitimating power” (Bourdieu 1971:118). Monopolizing the educational system in Uruguay allowed secular elites to pursue their interests through the control of knowledge.

Summary

At the beginning of this chapter, I introduced the concept of Multiple Modernity as a meta-theoretical framework postulating that diverse outcomes of modernity are possible and conditioned by existential problems resulting in tensions over varying interpretations of society shaped by conscious human activity. A Multiple Modernity meta-analysis serves as an alternative way of understanding modern societies by allowing for diverse outcomes rooted in local contingencies and avoids isomorphism and inevitability associated with conventional interpretations; especially concerning the relationship between modernity and religion. José Barrán (1988:5), a great Uruguayan scholar, reflects the conventional view of religion in modernity in the following statement; “the secularization of mentalities, customs, instruction and the educational system are precisely the cultural symptoms of modernity, which have taken place in Uruguay.” Multiple Modernity therefore provides theoretical space to consider an alternative explanation to a conventional understanding of religion in modernity. Second, Multiple Modernity places the locus of multiple outcomes squarely in the hands of agents and groups existentially engaged in conflict regarding the configuration and constitution of society. These suppositions lead us to Bourdieu’s field theory which allows elite conflict to be understood theoretically and relationally through the lens of a field of
conflict in which agents and groups, guided by *habitus*, contend for symbolic capital which serves as a mechanism thus providing the ability to control the field; in this case — the modernizing state.

Stated in the most general terms, the thesis of this dissertation suggests that; *in an era of republican state building, a minority of well-educated and influential secular elites were able to use social and political resources to distort Catholicism in public discourse, reduce the authority and relevance of religion in society, and convince the majority of citizens in a Catholic majority society that religion was unnecessary in a modern paternal state.* This work does not attempt to prove this claim, rather what it does attempt to show is that modernizing the state, following a liberal republican blueprint, led to an expansion of possible ways to reconfigure the state, thus allowing for the consideration and prioritization of the constitutive properties that make up the modern state. More specifically this study seeks to provide clarity regarding how we understand secularization; not as an axiomatic and macro-social function of modernity, but as the purposeful and intentional work of elite activists who use institutional resources to monopolize certain spheres of public life that represent the constitutive properties of the modern state. By shaping those constitutive spheres and pressing a particular vision of reason and social progress, secular elites were able to determine the outcome of the modern state in such a way that excluded religion.
CHAPTER FOUR

UNDERSTANDING THE HABITUS OF ANTICLERICAL AND RELIGIOUS ELITES

The next three chapters reconstruct the conflict between state managers and a collectivity of religious communities—supported by Church hierarchy—in the sub-field of education. The purpose of these three chapters is to investigate how urban doctors monopolized the educational field by using the law to create market imbalances that hampered the development of Catholic education thus putting Catholic schools at a competitive disadvantage. Since Catholic education and schooling is a principal mechanism of socialization and social reproduction, monopolizing the educational field became a vehicle to purposefully and intentionally secularize an otherwise Catholic majority population (see Tables A.7 and A.8). By monopolizing the educational field, urban doctors were able to dominate symbolic capital and legitimize their project among popular sectors thus controlling the collectivity of popular loyalty and allegiance. It is important to begin by explaining how urban doctors came to have cultural and material domination over the sub-field of education. The point of departure requires an explanation of *habitus*, the distinctive beliefs and ideologies of urban doctors and religious actors that shaped social practices as they relate to the educational field. The principal question is; what were the key historical incidences and intellectual formations
that socialized urban doctors who became state managers and established policies that regulated social functions such as education? More generically stated; how do we account for the state manager’s orientation to the ‘social question’ of which education was the state’s first attempt to create a centralized bureaucratic response to social need.

One must keep in mind the unique Uruguayan social and historical context described in chapter one. In the latter half of the 19th century, neither industrial capitalism nor agrarian aristocracies were a factor in state configuration or public policy as they were in European states. The ‘laws in motion’ in Uruguay were simply the necessity to overcome obstacles that impeded stability in order to configure a functional and autonomous republic.¹ In the meantime, urban doctors operated in the ideational domain, refined their political ideologies and suffered through political and economic instability over which they had little control.² The second half of the 19th century in Uruguay was characterized by shifting social and political alliances between rural caudillos against urban political factions; a single port-city against its hinterland. The elites in Montevideo consisted of a fragile alliance between men of letters, merchants, bureaucrats, military leaders, and bankers representing what Real de Azua (1969) referred to as “new men”.³

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¹ It was not until the Batlle regime that urban doctors had the capacity to formulate their own goals, to perceive of themselves as a unique institutional personality, and to construct a specialized political culture which was able to implement its agenda against the wishes of other powerful social actors.

² On one hand, the military era was probably the only organic and effective force that could oppose and confront the rural caudillismo which paid little respect to civil discipline. On the other hand, it was a lamentable era not only because of the suppression of democratic progress, but the generals and cornels, who were illiterate, enriched themselves at the expense of the state. That said, urban doctors were not idle but congregated principally in a special-interest associations, El Ateneo and Club Racionalista, where they refined their political ideologies (Zum Felde 1967 Vol.1:165).

³ These consisted of the capable class upon whom national formation is dependent and who pursued bourgeois virtues, developed cosmopolitan ideas, and maintained high-brow life styles thus
One would think given the dependence on an export economy, that controlling trade in the city-port would result in control of institutional development and emerging state apparatus. Yet the failure of urban elites to organize stable institutions as pillars necessary for state formation exacerbated by insecurity and anarchy fomented by constant civil wars led to an extended period of authoritarian regimes in order to assuage years of political chaos (Barrán and Nahúm 1967 Vol.1:155). The central state apparatus in Montevideo was so weak that it was unable to impose efficient taxation on varying sectors of the economy. The state relied on revenue from customs duties such that in 1872, over seven million pesos of the state’s income of 8,099,554 pesos came from customs duties on a robust export-led economy based on the products from latifundios (Barrán and Nahúm 1967 Vol.1: 84-85). The pastoral economy in the hands of large land owners on one hand was necessary for the national economy, on the other, the Rural Association functioned like a political interest group preserving the privileges and advantages of latifundio owners who resisted economic reform: hence a stagnant pastoral economy was a drag on the rooting of liberal reform and the power of urban elites. Urban doctors particularly resented not only the dictatorial era because it was antithetical to republicanism, but they also resented caudillo authority and culture because it represented the very “barbarism” they believed suppressed social, economic and political progress.4

4 Reducing political factions to two disparate groups over simplifies the complexity of political interests in this era. For a good explanation of multiple factions within political cleavages and polity development, see López-Alves (1993:17-24; 1996: 117-127).
This context created both opportunities and constraints that shaped the intellectual environment.

In this context, urban doctors experienced political ferment and were motivated to develop an ideological platform that could move society forward. The task here is to capture distinct lines of intellectual and cultural influence represented by actual schools of thought and individuals who carried them. The religious habitus outlined in chapter three (see Figure 3.1) provides an abstract but accurate framework for understanding the intellectual structure that shaped an ideological socialization of elites who regarded themselves as civilizers of society. From approximately mid-century to the 1880s, the dominant ideology operative in the University as well as circles of public intellectuals and elite professionals has been labeled *Principismo* by Ardao and others (Ardao 1950, 1962, 1945; Oddone 1956; Barrán and Nahúm 1967 Vol.1; Pivel Devoto 1994 Vol.2; Mariani 1968). *Principismo* emerged from a brief period of romanticism corresponding to a fusion of classical literature and utopian themes generated by the French Revolution giving rise to an esoteric morality and cult of fraternity that influenced principally literature and the arts (Ardao 1950: 50-51). In the realm of philosophy, romanticism was integrated with esoteric spiritualism whereby idealism was conditioned by humanitarian liberalism, a metaphysical understanding regarding the immortality of the soul, and the supremacy and infinite providence of a divine being (Ardao 1950: 51). *Principismo*, or eclectic spiritualism as it was also known, was essentially a heterogeneous assembly of spiritualistic ideas supporting a philosophical dogma that replaced naturalism with reason leading to a metaphysic determined by first causes (Mariani 1968: 7-8; Oddone 1956). Eclectic spiritualism became the dominant philosophy of the University under José Luis
de la Peña in 1849 and continued under his successor Plácido Elluari— who was the mentor and professor of an entire generation of principistas. The systematization and consolidation of principismo gave rise to civic expression that became the impetus for political theory for that generation. Serving as intellectual antecedents, both Benjamin Constant and Alex de Tocqueville attracted a coterie of Uruguayan doctors due to an emphasis on constitutional rights of the individual independent of arbitrary authority. Oddone (1956) cites principles derived from Constant’s notion of “sovereignty of reason” that are essentially civil liberties of classic liberalism, namely: limited power of government, freedom of the press and public opinion, religious liberty, liberty of education, decentralized administration and the inviolability of property rights (1956:102). Tocqueville is referenced for notions of equality and self-governance. Uruguayan parliamentarians and academics applied natural law and reason in order to justify republican ideas. Public good was characterized by liberty in all of its expressions; political, social economic, religious and educational while evil was associated with authoritarianism and despotism— thus kindling the resentment of urban doctors toward the militaristic rule of Latorre (1876-80), Santos (1882-86), and Tajes (1886-90). In regard to religion, there was a direct link between philosophical spiritualism and “free-thinking” (librepensamiento) in which rationalism displaced traditional mysticism. This is not to say that rationalism was disembodied from metaphysics. The Profession of a Rationalistic Faith, a declaration of rationalists doctrines produced by members of the Rationalist Club in 1872, embraces “rationalist deism”. According to Ardao, the

\[5\] However it is interesting to note that while these concepts may have been the source of abstract discussion in the University and among special-interest associations in regard to republicanism, tenets of classic liberalism were only selectively actualized in state’s modernization, even under Batlismo.
document crystalizes the belief structure and world view under which principistas operated and which dominated the University and special-interest associations (Ardao 1950: 57; Oddone 1956: 96-99). Ardao summarizes the document this way;

> It is the most significant document reflecting the philosophical conscience, theory, and practice of that generation’s University. Imbued with a spiritualistic metaphysic, which animated the philosophy’s influence in politics and literature; it is clearly romanticism… The declaration is outlined by seven fundamental dogmas—1) god; 2) reason; 3) liberty; 4) moral sentiment; 5) civic duty; 6) divine sanction; and 7) immortality (Ardao 1962: 57).

The document represents a bricolage of concepts consisting of natural religion, pantheism, Gnosticism, unrestricted liberties, natural goodness and an indefinite perfectibility of humanity. The ideas of principismo were diffused from the University to the literate society by the founding of El Siglo (1863) and La Paz (1869); periodicals which became the principle voice of liberal dogmatism. Within the University, new departments were established such as Constitutional Law and Jurisprudence hence it is logical that the majority of graduates of this era were lawyers who served the commercial interests of merchants, latifundio owners who frequently lived in Montevideo, or became professional politicians (Barran and Nahûm Vol.1 1967: 128; Ardao 1950:60, 81).

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6 Esoteric spiritualism ignored such concepts of traditional Catholicism such as the incarnation, revelation, miracles, supernatural order inaccessible to reason, the Gospel accounts, original sin and eternal punishment (Ardao 1950: 56).

7 Founders included Juan Carlos Gomez, Pedro Bustamante, Jose Pedro Ramirez, Carlos Maria Ramirez, Juan Carlos Blanco, Julio Herrera y Obes, and Pablo de Maria, all of whom were influential in their professional ambits (Oddone 1956: 11; Ardao 1950:52; González Albistur 1997:172; Acevedo 1933 Vol.2: 750-51)

8 Departments of medicine and natural sciences were not added until 1880s due to the influence of positivism (Ardao 1950:60).
Outside of the university, special-interest associations were formed consisting of urban doctors who represented a select community of elites whose abstract debates over rational liberalism and its dissenters served to further refine ideological boundaries of their worldview.⁹ A culture of esoteric and eclectic spiritualism was the antecedent for an Uruguayan rational liberalism (as opposed to classic liberalism) whose impact has been debated. According to Ardao (1950; 1960; 1945: 18-19), principismo was suppressed with Elluari in 1877 when President Latorre closed the University during his dictatorship. In the interim, positivism had gained sufficient support among urban doctors such that when the university was re-opened in 1883, positivism eventually displaced principismo as the dominant philosophy impacting social and political theory for the next forty years. ¹⁰ Oddone (1956: 166-67) concludes that principismo left a legacy in regard to foundational principles of individual liberties that became firmly planted in the national consciousness and planted the seeds for a more robust democratic republic when the dictatorial era ended. More recently, Lopez-Alves (1996; 1993) argues that principista associations did not survive the era of militarism but that principista doctors had infiltrated both traditional political parties (Colorados and Blancos) and were able to

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⁹ The University Club was formed in 1866; Club Ateneo was formed in 1877; Rationalist Club was formed in 1872.

¹⁰ In a message to the General assembly in February 1891, President Herrera y Obes expressed concern over the establishment of positivism in the University system and the effect that positivism would have on all stages of education; “The Government has been alarmed by materialistic philosophy which for some years has been dominating higher education; from methods of teaching, official textbooks, doctrines, morality, educators and university departments. From the University of the Republic to every primary school has experienced the abandonment of spiritualist ideas and the complete and methodical enthronement of materialism which has no place in the official curriculum.” Herrera y Obes warned that “the influence of positivism would form an egotistical and discredited generation.” As a solution the President proposed that “the government has declared spiritualism to be the official doctrine and to be found alone in the textbooks in the public schools” (CLAC Tomo XIV 1891: 54).
impose their dominance over time thus displacing what had been caudillo authority within the old party structure. What emerged on the other side of the dictatorial era were modern party machines grounded in liberal dogmatism, as opposed to patronage, and benefited from a more defined state structure and centralized bureaucracy resulting from fifteen years of military rule (Lopez-Alves 1996: 128-29). The intellectual formation that socialized urban doctors who became state managers may be best understood as it was represented in Jose Pedro Varela; the most influential intellectual of the latter half of the 19th century. He was considered the originator of modernization in Uruguay and the architect of educational reform which became the centerpiece of the state modernization project.

Social historians debate whether or not Varela was a principista or a positivist. Ardao argues that Varela was among the first intellectuals who promoted positivism in intellectual circles in Montevideo. Ardao (1950) bases his estimation on three points. First, corresponding to Varela’s trip to Europe and the United States in 1867-68 in order to survey educational models, Varela attributed the advanced educational system in those countries to the influence of positivism (Oddone 1956: 155). Second, Varela’s discontentment with the ideological system of his peers resulted in an open debate between Varela and Carlos María Ramírez pitting rational spiritualism against positivism which had a contagion effect in the press, the university, and special-interest associations (González Albistur 1997:214-19). Third, Varela’s two principle works, La Educación del

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11 This was an important debate because positivism is antithetical to rational spiritualism that was the dominant ideology for the third-quarter of the 19th century and beyond. The debate conceptually pits metaphysics against science and methodologically pits empiricism against speculation and subjectivity.
*Pueblo* and *La Legislación Escolar*, made several references to Comte, Darwin, and Spencer as a basis for a scientific framework. In contrast, González Albistur (1997: 337) argues that Varela spent most of his influential years associated with the principles of rational spiritualism and that Varela’s attraction to at least some fundamental aspects of Spencer’s version of positivism came later but was a gradual and pensive transition.

Possibly Rama’s interpretation (1957) is most congruent. Rama points to the fact that positivism in Uruguay matured in the 1880s when it was installed in the University as the dominant philosophy under Rector Vásquez Acevedo corresponding to the re-opening of the University in 1883. Varela experienced an untimely death at the age of 34 in 1879. Rather Rama interprets Varela as a pragmatist rather than a positivist who borrowed from eclectic sources in order to engineer a national education system designed to civilize the masses and lead the way toward national progress. I will limit my discussion of Varela to three points which reflect the *habitus* under which Varela and the majority of urban doctors operated as well as the outcomes that their class-based disposition produced. These three are; 1) hatred for traditional forms –caudillos and Catholicism; 2) utopianism principally derived from impressions of the republican-based education system in the United States; and 3) Varela’s omission of religion.

The biggest social problem for Varela and the urban doctors was governability of the fragmented masses.¹² Civilizing the “barbarians” became an important first step in

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¹² By the end of the century, social fragmentation was at an extreme in Uruguay. Besides urban doctors and urban professionals, there was a small but growing urban proletariat and petite bourgeoisie infused with Italian and Spanish immigrants, a small group of industrialists, a growing lumpenproletariat as indicated by the burgeoning penal system, large and wealthy land owners surrounded by laborers of modest means (Rial 1981:16-17; Rama 1969: 116).
constructing a modern and patrimonial state; hence, education became the centerpiece of a modernizing program. Varela devoted almost half of his blueprint for educational reform, *La Legislación Escolar* (1876), to diagnosing the crises confronting the Uruguayan society. \(^{13}\) Much of the blame was attributed to rural caudillos who urban doctors viewed as emblematic of the rudimentary past and the lack of progress that extended into the present. Reinforcing this image, Varela wrote:

> In autocracy of the past, we find our caudillo. A fellow countryman when he wants to obtain something or when he needs to protect it yet cannot remember the constitution, or the laws, or the authorities. But the caudillo finds himself in power following his own personal aspirations without bothering to inquire from those who have a mountain of books and who expound and clarify the doctrines of government. In spite of contact with the centers of advanced civilization one has been made to feel, as with the economy and political life, that caudillos have become gilded yet ignore the heavy-handedness of their forbearers in the government. Concluding this, one associates caudillos with the art of roping, which is why we call ourselves doctors. That is to say that instruction, guided by false principles, joins the centuries-old ignorance of our countryside in order to continue the unending disgrace (1964a: 111-12).

Urban doctors held contemptuous views of the rural sector whom they viewed as unreliable for the democratic republic they wished to construct. Mass education represented a mechanism by which the rural element could be controlled and inculcated with values espoused by urban doctors. \(^{14}\) Elsewhere, in terms of caudillo political influence and socio-economic intransigence, Varela added;

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\(^{13}\) Varela elaborates on three crises confronting the republic; economic, political and financial (*La Legislación Escolar* 1964a: 61-147)

\(^{14}\) In chapter one pages 28-29, I explain the four factions within the rural sector. The entire rural sector was not targeted by urban doctors, but the faction that had historic ties to the colonial era, which in
The caudillo leadership is the permanent evil of the republic that causes gangrene by their political affiliation. They take part with us in our struggles and infuriate and corrupt our cause. The caudillo leadership is the barbarian that besets our civilization and the rust and virus of the Spanish colonization that runs thru the veins of the political body (as cited in González Albistur 1997: 189).

In the mind of Varela and urban doctors, the traditional estanciero-caudillo were responsible for social, political and economic stagnation however they blamed Catholicism for intellectual regress. They cited the Enlightenment argument that traditional Catholicism suffered from doctrinaire obscurantism; responsible for darkened ideas regarding human existence. In contrast, their esoteric spiritualism generated an idealism that exalted the psychological and moral conscience of humanity. Principismo rejected orthodox theology based on an *a priori* knowledge of God and a free will that conferred an overriding and transcendent sense of human personality (Ardao 1950: 53). Hence, doctors created their own syncretistic profession of faith based on rational spiritualism. Varela’s inspiration for religious ideas came from Renan (*Life of Jesus* 1863), the works of Lamennais after his apostasy (*Words of a Believer*), the Chilean

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15 Urban doctor’s angst against caudillo leadership can be traced to the formation of the Rural Association in 1873 by a nucleus of traditional latifundio owners north of the Rio Negro whose families had been raising cattle since the colonial period. In the 1870s under the Latorre modernization schemes, the Rural Association developed a capitalistic model of agro-exportation that encouraged diversification of production according to demands for exportation (principally Britain). The model failed because the traditional ranchers not only refused to diversify their production but did not reinvest capital in the national infrastructure but on ostensive luxury, acquisition of new lands and market speculation (Zubillaga 1988 Vol.3: 11-12). In addition, in order to diversify production, the Association initiated an enclosure movement thus causing thousands of landless rancheros to flood Montevideo and precipitated a social crisis. Politically, the traditional estanciero-caudillo sector of creole origin dominated both political parties thru a strong client network among the rural masses (López-Alves 1996:124). Historically, they distrusted urban elites and found liberal programs undermining to their authority and traditions. Hence, they resisted reform on any level.
lawyer Bilbao (America in Peril) all whom attempted to capture “pure religion” from the life of Jesus and a “pure morality” from the Gospels but while denying orthodox tenets such as the fall of man, the Divinity of Christ, eternal punishment, and the supernatural order. Varela’s criticism was not limited to only Catholicism, but Christianity in general and impugned it regularly thru the periodical La Revista Literaria (1865-66). For example, in an article entitled Religious Liberty (No. 4; May 28, 1865) Varela argues that the freedom of religion is emblematic of all personal liberties while religious tyranny impedes human progress. The integration between religion and politics is very clear when Varela wrote; “The pure Gospel in which we find the true spirit of Christ, not the Gospels of factions and oppression that the Catholic Church and priest show us. The true Gospel is the republican code that Jesus taught to humanity.” In an article entitled Catholicism on the March (No. 21: September 24, 1865) Varela attributed social intransigence to the organizational structure of the Church. He wrote “The organization extends itself into every Catholic community in which religion is nothing more than an obstacle to progress and a backward element.” In an article entitled The Jesuit Yankees Varela compares Uruguayan society to an over-idealized North American society and concludes;

The tyranny of the people is as grave an offense as the tyranny of the government. In this sense, our political ideas are bound with our religious ideas. Catholicism is a monarchy. In spite of our enthusiasm for liberty and the profound inspiration from the United States as a model of republicanism, we are neither Republicans nor Democrats. Our religious ideas [referring to Catholicism] do not allow us to be republicans (No. 23: October 8, 1865).
It is easy to see why Varela, as the architect of educational reform—a charge given to him by President Latorre in 1877—designed public schools to be laical. If education was to be the motor of national progress designed to modernize the state then Varela did not want education to be burdened by vestiges of the past that he held responsible for the nation’s primitive status. Varela’s understanding of laical however was qualified. On one hand he was opposed to providing instruction of positive religion, such as Catholicism, for reasons of dogmatism (1964b: 147-49). However, he left door open for metaphysic rationalism, as encouraged by fellow principistas, especially those in the Society of Friends of Popular Education.\footnote{\textit{La Sociedad de Amigos de la Educación Popular} (S.A.E.P.) was an important professional organization inaugurated in September of 1868 and dedicated to the formation of popular education. The association consisted of Montevideo’s principle urban doctors (Elbio Fernández, the first president, Eduardo Brito del Pino, Carlos Ambrosio Lerena, José Pedro Varela y Carlos María Ramírez, José Arechavaleta, Juan Carlos Blanco Fernández, Eliseo Outes y Alfredo Vásquez Acevedo) who agreed that popular education was the driver of progress and the basis for a democratic republic. When Elbio Fernández died in 1869, Varela was installed as president (Ardao 1950: 59-60; González Albistur 1997: 225-228).}

We seek to be just by not teaching dogmas of whatever religion in the public schools, therefore, we reject the unjust accusation by our adversaries who suggest that we wish to establish an anti-religious sentiment in our schools. This is not true, as the Americans say; schools are non-sectarian but not godless. For this reason, public schools are not atheistic because atheism is also a religious doctrine (1964a: 97).

The reference to the United States in the quote above provides a segue to the second point; Varela was utopian (Acosta 2010:16-18). He returned from his trip to the United States on one hand with a grand vision of a functional republic. Varela actually surveyed both European nations and the United States. He devoted an entire chapter in \textit{La}
Educación del Pueblo (1874) to which he expressed preference for the U.S. model of education for the following reasons;

Without a doubt, one can find fertile sources among European authors but for my part, I have depended on the great North American authors as they are more profitable and more adaptable to our country such that the ideas are responsible for exercising influence over a population of Democrats and Republicans compared to those that operate over the aristocratic nations of Europe (1964c: 67. Also see La Legislación Escolar 1964a: 26-27).

There is no doubt that the vast majority of urban doctors assumed that configuring a democratic republic would create conditions necessary to civilize society and experience national progress and that education was the building block to achieve that goal. Varela’s trip to the United States reinforced the correlation between education and the configuration of democracy, hence he wrote;

In order to establish a republic, first it is necessary to form republicans. In order to create a government of the people, it is necessary to wake-up and call the people to action. In order to make public opinion sovereign, first it is necessary to form public opinion. All the great necessities that a republic demands will be possible to realize if we educate, educate, and always educate (1964c: 71).

He understood a significant dynamic in republic building when he stated that “a republic is an organism, not a mechanism and it must be planted and grow because it does not make itself (1964c: 72). He was not only aware that configuring a republic was a process that required time, but that it required a causal chain of events in order to reach maturity. This made it necessary for the state to intervene as was consistent with developments in Europe and the United States since the state was the only institution sufficient to achieve
universal education.\textsuperscript{17} Hence, in Uruguay, education was the first nationwide attempt by the state to address the “social question.”

The intervention of the state is indispensable in order to give the people the means to be educated. In this way, we confirm the fact that where the state has abstained from supplying education, the people remain in ignorance (1964c: 78).

Varela understood that the school, as an intermediate institution, was critical in a democratic republican configuration. It was the point of contact between the state’s intervention and the formation of actors necessary to participate in a democratic republic;

The school is the base of the republic and the indispensable condition for citizenship. It is self-evident and in this way one proclaims the fundamental law of the republic; the exercise of citizenship is suspended for those who do not read or write (1964c: 72).

In addition, Varela recognized that beyond an organizational structure, a subjective dimension existed whereby actors had to take ownership of the republic manifested in patriotic duty and nationalism instilled thru education. Varela saw the school as a site whereby the inculcation of republican values emphasizing a unifying nationalism could produce an equalitarian effect and rectify the fragmentation that had characterized Uruguay; to this end he wrote;

The primary school, affirmed by the North Americans, is the base and the foundation of their powerful republic. Free to all, open to all, and receives all social class of children from all walks of life having forgotten distinctions among them, suspending religious animosities and destroying antipathies in order to inspire one another to love the common homeland and have respect for free institutions. \textit{[The school]} is an admirable

\textsuperscript{17} Varela used the term “universal education” to mean free, compulsory and laical; see 1964c: 79.
institution and explains the success of democracy in the United States (1964c: 79).\footnote{Never mind that his trip to the United States occurred in the winter of 1868, less than three years since the Civil War ended which almost spilt the republic asunder.}

Varela however was not without his critics who responded to La Educación del Pueblo (1874). Within the Society of Friends of Popular Education, Diógenes Di Giorgi and Julio Herrera y Obes suggested that Varela’s reforms saw the school as a panacea for transforming the national ills of Uruguay into a paradise (Vazquez Romero 1978: 16; González Albistur 1997: 196). Varela responded to his critics in this way;

> The common school is the general panacea because it combats inherent evil; because it leads new generations to the pathway of good; because it reforms evil tendencies of man; because it raises the intellectual and moral level of our population; because it increases the development of wealth; and because it activates the intelligent and useful forces in society. To educate is to improve the conditions of the people and it is only possible to educate all social classes by means of the common school (Vazquez Romero 1978: 17).

Varela does provide some evidence that his interpretation of the public school system in the United States and the degree to which it contributed to republican outcomes is over exaggerated when he wrote; “In America, the first service of the state is public instruction and deputies of the state never hesitate to vote for the investment the system requires (1964c:78).\footnote{Similar inflated impressions and idealistic characterization of education in the United States were repeated by state mangers of education after Varela which appear in the Anales de Instrucción Primaria; see Fournier 1903: 279 and Roge 1904: 35.}
Varela’s Omission

While it is true that Varela identified many significant dimensions of a democratic republic resulting from his study of democracy in United States, there are several properties that he missed. One such omission was the role of religion. As the architect of educational reform, Varela may have assembled an eclectic plan based on multiple sources however; it is obvious that he was especially dependent on Ira Mahew; the Superintendent of Public Instruction in the state of Michigan. In 1849, Mahew presented a plan for developing the public school system in the state of Michigan which he presented to the Senate and the House of Representatives in Michigan. The plan was approved by both houses in 1850 resulting in the publication and distribution of his manual which became the blueprint for popular education in the state of Michigan.

Mayhew’s manual is significant to this narrative because Dr. Juan Villegas published The Influence of Ira Mahew on the Education of a Nation by Jose Pedro Varela (1989) in which Villegas constructs parallel columns to show the numerous passages of Varela’s foundational work (La Educación del Pueblo, 1874) that were translated from English.

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20 Methodologically, is there justification for comparative analysis between Uruguayan and North American societies? The field of nations to which Uruguay belongs is characterized by Catholic majority nations that became republics with liberal-democratic constitutions by revolution against a Catholic colonial monarchy. The reason why I believe the comparison is justified is because urban doctors made it abundantly clear in their writings that they sought to pattern a modernization project based upon impressions they held of the United States. It was common to find references in the Anales de Instrucción Primaria which idealized the North American society in which the educational context is described as “religious neutrality and an a-religious attitude are self-imposed as a matter of necessity” (La Rue 1909:294). Urban doctors wished to emulate the “prosperity and progress” associated with the “diffusion of the North American educational system” which was attributed, rightly or wrongly, to the power and intervention of the state (Roge 1904: 35; Fournier 1903: 279). Hence, comparative analysis is warranted because it is the urban doctors who repeatedly make references to various dimensions of American society and express desires for similar outcomes while not necessarily understanding the social processes and cultural antecedents which produced specified outcomes. Because urban doctors were, at the core of their ideology, utopian and idealistic, selective properties associated with the historic development of the United States— of which they were acquainted thru literature— served to reinforce their modernization project more than any other source.
into Spanish and left unattributed to Mahew. In Villegas’ analysis, he utilizes three enumerated columns in order to construct a line by line comparison of Mahew’s original text in English, the corresponding translation by Varela, and a third column where Varela showed originality. Villegas (1989:116) draws three conclusions from his analysis; 1) that entire passages in Varela’s first seven chapters of *Education of a Nation* were literal translations from Mahew; 2) Varela synthesized or modified various passages from Mayhew in order to reduce the length of his text; and 3) in spite of large literal translated passages, Varela does weave some originality into the text. Villegas states that the most telling aspect of his analysis is Varela’s omissions or modifications. Mahew’s work was lauded by the Michigan Congress and stimulated this response; “In the opinion of this congress regarding the *Popular Education Manual*, (...) the political, social, moral and religious point of view will obtain for every child within our borders an excellent common education” (Villegas 1989:9). Mayhew’s plan for common education represented an educational philosophy inspired by religious values incorporated in a holistic pedagogy which were abundantly clear in Mayhew’s text. It is obvious to Villegas that Varela, as a rationalist, omitted numerous references to religion and ignored the religious dimension that infused Mayhew’s manual. Villegas’ analysis resulted in two observations; 1) Varela was dependent on and committed to developing an educational infrastructure based upon a model observed in the United States; and 2) Varela only understood the culture and society that produced the educational model he wished to emulate superficially (Villegas 1989:119).

The purpose of this exercise is to establish a causal relationship between the habitus of Varela and the urban doctors and education policy that will be even more
evident in the next two chapters. Habitus explains why state managers created an educational field that was hegemonic, monopolistic and decidedly anti-religious. 21 We know that urban doctors linked aspiration for governance and education as a means of obtaining political objectives, hence educational policies were developed with wider political goals. Is it possible that education for democratic citizenship, or as Varela phrased it, “making republicans”, and a predominance of liberal notions of rights and democracy are capable of manifesting certain autocratic tendencies? What has been accomplished here is to show how urban doctors tried to define their own class habitus as a necessary pre-condition of effective governance and necessary for constructing the modern state. Although the habitus of urban doctors was religiously based (evidenced by the Profession of a Rationalistic Faith), it was in conflict and competition with the habitus of religious elites to whom we will now consider.

Religious Elites

Identifying with specificity the source of habitus among Catholics elites in this era is difficult due to differentiation between ecclesiastic leaders and laity, however, there is a commonality that bound them together beyond orthodoxy and that was the impact of the Syllabus of Errors in 1864 which was embedded in a larger encyclical Quanta Cura issued by Pope Pius IX. There were at least three points in the Syllabus that specifically

21 If we accept Bourdieu’s short definition of habitus; “The principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an expressed mastery of the operations necessary to obtain them.” The inner logic of urban doctors reviewed in this chapter that contributed to the organizing practices within the sub-field of education which had bearing on the larger field of the modernizing state include (but are not exclusively limited to; 1) the perception that rural traditions and Catholicism were to blame for the lack of Uruguayan progress; 2) a utopian vision that Uruguayan society could become a functional democratic republic through the development of public schools; 3) religion had no role in public education.
correlated to education (45, 47, and 48) and further elaboration on education in the body of the *Quanta Cura* (paragraph 4). The timing of the document corresponded to the emergence of Mons. Soler and Francisco Bauzá who became the principle voices for Catholics whose project was liberty of education in Uruguay. The orientation by Catholic elites to the social question was in some ways similar but in other ways significantly differentiated from the orientation of urban doctors. Both Mons. Soler and Francisco Bauzá understood the relationship between national progress and education. Early in Bauzá’s political career, he wrote;

> Education should adjust itself to the necessities and characteristics of our population in order to satisfy the demands for national progress. We need to disseminate true and useful education that national progress demands. We need to develop industrial capacity and the productive power of our people, while at the same time, develops our intelligence in diverse streams of human knowledge (as cited in Pivel Devoto 1968 Vol.1: 121).

Bauzá was able to differentiate himself from the normative factions contesting for political ascendancy at the time. He was elected to the House of Representatives in 1876; representing Soriano. Although he came from a rural area, he was not an advocate for the Rural Association. He was a classmate of Varela in the University and arrived there, like Varela, as one who was self-taught (Castellanos 1949: 31). Bauzá, along with Varela, were among the principle founders of the *Society of Friends of Popular Education* (Monreal 2000: 74; Acevedo 1934 Vol.3:750-51). Politically, Bauzá was a Colorado, yet ideologically, he was anti-romantic and rejected principismo on the basis that it was idealistic and utopian and would not provide emancipation from society’s ills (Castellanos 1949: 30-3; Zum Felde 1967 Vol.1: 197-98). He refused to endorse the *Profession of Rational Faith* although he considered himself a rationalist. In the positive,
a biographer wrote; “Over his anti-romanticism was seated a solid base of cultural and classic humanism and nationalism that affirmed a hereditary devotion to the tradition and earnest study of the national reality (Castellanos 1949: 31).  

Bauzá’s differentiation from urban doctors, even though he was one, can be understood by his commitments to an orthodox Catholic worldview (Pivel Devoto 1968 Vol.1: 254). In 1883, he penned an essay entitled El Syllabus y La Soberanía in which he defends the Syllabus by Pope Pius IX arguing that the document suggests the type of social order necessary for a republican state to succeed (1953b: 97). In his thesis Bauzá states;

The Syllabus of Pope Pius IX is a manner of code that formulates definitions and rules of conduct for men and societies. If one examines the propositions of political order in light of republican principles, they impose themselves as a necessity, such that the beliefs and values of millions of people should be regulated by the precepts and council of these statutes (1953b: 97).  

Bauzá argues that there is no tension between the doctrines contained in the Syllabus in relation to political authority and the doctrine of popular sovereignty.  

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22 Bauzá’s most famous and influential works was entitled Historia de la Dominación Española en el Uruguay (1882) in which he analyzes the independence movement from a Nationalist perspective and reinforces the role of Catholicism in national development and shaping a national conscience.

23 There is no hint that Bauzá interpreted the Syllabus as a document encouraging the National Church to insist on a monopoly of all educational establishments or that civil law must conform to cannon law leaving the church above the state in terms of its authority over civil life. To the contrary, in his essay entitled El Syllabus y la Soberanía, Bauzá attempted to integrate and reconcile emerging democratic republicanism with Catholicism in order to arrive at a social order in which Catholicism provided a foundational value system upon which the modernizing state could be built (1953:97-98). Within the totality of Church operations, Bauzá saw a pluralism that was conducive to popular democracy because ultimately, Church authority protected “natural and inalienable rights” (1953:130-31). At the same time, Bauzá was very aware of the criticism levied against the Syllabus by urban doctors (153:98).
departure is a critique of Rousseau’s notion of Social Contract. Bauzá criticizes the concept because it can result in abuses by free riders who opt out of societies duties (1953b: 110-111) yet he finds the concept laudable in that it theoretically constructs society following a familial social ecology whereby civil society can regenerate human potentialities (1953b: 110-111). Bauzá approves of reducing the efficacious society to a simplistic relationship between duties and rights as he affirms; “First, Rousseau declares that existent society is admirable and second, discounting the abuses, Rousseau declares concerning the contract between men, there are pre-existent rights and duties; we do not need to know more” (1953b: 113). On the basis that rights and duties are distributed among responsive members in society Bauzá advocated for a social order based on popular sovereignty and that those in authority recognize that the origins of authority are divine (1953b: 128). The Syllabus, in Bauzá’s mind, provides a framework for configuring society in which those that govern recognize the “nature, traditions and necessities of the people they govern” (1953b: 128). With regard to republicanism, Bauzá wrote; “There is no disagreement at all between what the Syllabus proposes with relation to political authority or to republican constitutions” (1953b: 130). Hence, Bauzá regarded the Syllabus as a reinforcement of divine order which was the source of natural, inalienable, and divine rights that are “congenial to the human subject” and a social contract which “demands obedience to the constituted powers in which the powers do not exceed the power delegated to them by the governed” (1953b: 130).

Whereas Varela and associates believed that the ultimate end of education was to produce model citizens supportive of the republican state, Bauzá had a sociological sense in that he recognized the present educational system was producing lawyers but not much
else and the imbalance contributed to instability (1953a: 200). The thesis of his article entitled *Essay about the Formation of the Middle Class* (1876) states that the source of political chaos in Uruguay is attributed to the absence of a middle class;

> After forty years of revolutions the nation has lost liberty of social order such that no one can deny and no one can predict [the future], given that social order requires political stability and among us, stability does not exist. It should be attributed to, in my opinion to the lack of a middle class (1965: 1).

While his essay predated *Rerum Novarum* (1891) by fifteen years, it was harmonious with emerging Catholic social teaching and in response to the growing industrial sector and proletariat in Montevideo. Like the urban doctors, Bauzá placed the blame on ignorance and despotism for the resulting social order. In doing so, Bauzá was expressing the Church's long-standing teaching regarding the crucial importance of social justice in order to teach correct social principles that would ensure class harmony. Catholic social teaching suggests that the role of the state is to promote social justice through the protection of individual rights. For this reason, Bauzá was critical of the state when he wrote; “Enough of extreme divisions disputing for power; let come an intermediate social class that puts all things in order and gives to each one the things that will make them complete” (1965: 2). Bauzá explains that he is referring to material welfare consisting of adequate housing that would bring tranquility and social equilibrium due to the means of just work as a basis for human progress. In sum, Bauzá’s project (1965) was humanitarian and holistic (*proceso orgánico*) as the task of the Church was to form and activate people's conscience and advocate for rights of common people while it was the state’s responsibility to create laws establishing conditions for a just society.
Collectively, Bauzá’s writings indicate a purposeful and determined effort to develop a national conscience for which it was necessary to consolidate the political and social order and to promote economic progress in order to overcome traditional obstacles that debilitated and weakened national sentiment. For this reason, development and progress was impeded by limited educational opportunities available at the time to which Bauzá recognized:

Although the population grows, its logical development stops because it finds a limited education in the new necessities which requires the submission of intellectual faculties and physical capacities of the individual (1972: 152-53).

Soler was at the Pontificio Colegio Pio Latino Americano in Rome shortly after the Syllabus was written (1864). He was ordained a priest while in Rome in 1872 and did not return to Uruguay until 1874. Hence, there is no doubt that he fell under the influence of the spirit behind the context, exposition, and dissemination of the Syllabus to every Catholic dioceses in the world. However, the papal condemnations contained in the Syllabus could not be interpreted in universal terms in which they were drafted but as applied to the concrete circumstances in which the Church received them. Uruguay, as has been pointed out, was a functioning republic with a democratic tradition and it was not the form of government that threatened Church leadership, rather a Jacobin element within Uruguayan liberalism that was found to be pernicious. Clark (2003: 28-29) points out that the Syllabus was a composite and improvised document amended by many hands and hurried to the press without the pope’s final editing. No guidelines were issued regarding how the troublesome document should be interpreted by the clergy and presented to the public. It required adept Church leaders to interpret and contextualize the
Syllabus in order for the document to make sense in varying socio-political contexts. It appears reasonable to assume that the Pope had the republican-royalists, clerical-anticlerical conflicts of Europe in view when the Syllabus was composed; not necessarily consolidated republics like Uruguay. Bauzá’s essay (El Syllabus y la Soberanía) was able to contextualize the Syllabus favorably and in such a way that reinforced his concept of the republic because the Syllabus warned of vulnerabilities and excesses associated with the modern state. Soler appeared to have greater concern regarding the state’s trajectory in education and penned three principal works on education; 1) Ensayos de una pluma; a collection of articles corresponding to conferences presented to the Catholic Club (1877); 2) El problema de la educación en sus relaciones con la religión, el derecho y la libertad de enseñanza (1880); and 3) Refutación-protesta a las erróneas apreciaciones del inspector nacional sobre la enseñanza religiosa (1881).  

Soler’s concerns regarding the relationship between an expanding laical state and encroachment on the liberty of education appear throughout his writings. His concern appears to be less driven by the three Articles (45, 47, and 48) of the Syllabus that apply to education for two reasons. First, Article 47 hardly applied to the Church’s relationship to public education in Uruguay since the Church did not seek to control the sphere of public education. Second, the greater concern appears to be the right to found and

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24 Refutación-protesta..... will be discussed in chapter five as it was written in direct response to the Varelan reforms and provides a framework as to why Catholics were opposed to such reforms.

25 As with Bauzá, there is no hint in Soler’s writings that the Syllabus gave license to the Uruguayan Church to demand a monopoly of all educational establishments or that civil law must conform to cannon law subordinating the state to the church in terms of its authority over civil life (see chapter 1 page 35). Like Bauzá, Soler appears to have come to terms with modernizing democratic republicanism and argues for the Church’s role in the emerging social order as an arbitrator and advocate of moral order (see
maintain Catholic schools based on the principle of educational liberty. Soler’s concern over the state monopolization of education or banning Catholic schools all together, as would be the case in France (see Gibson 1989:129; McManners 1972:131-32), appear more congruent with statements regarding education that appear in the body of the encyclical, *Quanta Cura*. When considered in this light, one can see a parallel to the *Quanta Cura* as it also was a document with an eye toward future developments recognizing a relationship between new philosophies of the state emerging as blind nationalism where certain rights were lost under the absolute power of the state representing the collective of elite interests. For this reason, Soler became a defender of the liberty of education, as did Bauzá, on the basis of natural rights;

Concerning the question of liberty of education, there is an essential point that contributes a false principle by which friends of the god-state shield themselves, proclaiming as an incontestable public right; that education by the state is a necessity for social order. There is nothing more false or pernicious than this principle. There are pre-existing rights to every law independent of social order. Education is a natural right as is religion and private property without which individual rights cannot be exercised but would be an illusion (1880: 67).

Soler identified the state to be the greatest existential threat to Catholic education. He recognized the possibility that the state could become authoritarian and coercively

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Soler’s works *La Sociedad Moderna y el Provenir* (1890) and *El Espíritu Nuevo: La Iglesia y El Siglo* (1898).

26 *Quanta Cura* (paragraph 4) reads; “Moreover, not content with removing religion from public society, they wish to banish it also from private families. For teaching and professing the most fatal error of Communism and Socialism, they assert that domestic society or the family derives the whole principle of its existence from the civil law alone, and consequently all rights of parents over their children, and especially that for education. By which impious opinions and machinations these most deceitful men aim at this result, viz., that the salutary teaching and influence of the Catholic Church may be entirely banished from the instruction of youth and that the tender and flexible minds of young men [*and women*] may be infected and depraved by every most pernicious error and vice.
obviate the Church from any role in education or the public square. Soler locates the liberty of education among private rather than public rights as a first principle—corresponding to freedom of association, freedom of the press—according to a natural order and is therefore worthy of protection before the law. These rights belong to society, not to governments although they should be protected by the state rather than substituted by state initiatives (1880: 70);

What is the duty of the state before the natural and private right of educational liberty that belongs to the family and its kin? This duty should not be substituted tyrannically for the parents of families thru the confiscation of their natural right; rather, they should be defended against abuses committed against the exercise of these rights. In this way, the state has the duty to repress fraud and violence committed by citizens against others.

Soler recognized two compounding and concurrent social properties of Catholicism; one that “education is important to Catholicism because the regeneration of religion is inextricably bound to social regeneration” (1877: 5), and two, that “the liberty of education is the maxim that will save our beliefs from the tyranny and authoritarianism that wants to root itself in the conscience and institutions of our nation” (1877: 18). Soler was deeply concerned about civilizing Uruguayan society and social progress as much as Varela and any urban doctor. As with the urban doctors, Soler’s discourse contains numerous references to themes of progress and civilizing “barbarism”, and like Bauzá, envisions a differentiated configuration of progress and civilization. Soler was only concerned about state formation to the degree that it created conditions necessary for religion to be influential. His principal interest was the moral status of society and for this reason, religion was the source of good and virtue; “Religion is the first social need for
progress and civilization because it is fundamental for the morality of the nation” (1877: 20). He reinforced this notion from classical literature citing Plato, Plutarch, and Socrates and he defends this thesis by referencing the Church’s influence in Western Civilization. The Church had converted the barbarians, preserved ancient knowledge, created the glories of the Renaissance, and generated the art, architecture, education, philosophy, and ideals that defined Europe (1877: 54-67). Therefore, not only does the Church have the capacity to civilize barbarism, but civilization is synonymous with education; as the purpose of Catholic education is to produce “intellectual, moral and physical perfection” (1877: 79, 82-84). Because human progress is measured by moral perfection, religion is at odds with science. While Soler is very aware of material progress made by science, and devotes several articles (1877: 53-77; 1890) to the influence of Catholicism on scientific progress, his concern is that science in contrast to religion cannot produce moral people. Science is sterile in regard to the production of virtue and material progress did not save empires from falling (1877:117-22). Given that science cannot produce morality and virtue, Soler asks a relevant question; “If a society grows corrupt, and when the sacrosanct laws and morality disappear, can the light of intelligence keep them from going over the edge (1877:122)? Collectively, Soler’s interest in progress and modernization of the nation can be summed up; “the first concern of a well-ordered republic should be to establish true religion” (1880: 47). Soler’s position toward science was consistent with the Syllabus to the degree that he expressed concern over the idealization of science which asserted that there was no truth outside of scientific fact and that science could replace religious belief as the sole arbiter of the human condition (1877: 68).
Numerous texts of Soler have been cited (see chapter three) which indicate an openness to dialog with the modernization of society. Without abandoning Catholic orthodoxy or principles, but as a pragmatist, Soler recognizes that Catholics in Uruguay are living in a pluralistic society among varying ideas and that the liberties advocated by democracy can be advantageous for both Catholics and liberals. Concern is raised however over the duplicity of anticlerical state managers who do not respect the liberty of conscience of Catholics and manifest intolerance toward Catholic education. Soler cites this problem; “In this way, modern anticlericalism proclaims liberty of conscience, of teaching, and of association; but continues to persecute the Church with laicization and the abolition of religious associations”. 27 Although centralized and bureaucratic state education was in its infancy, but Soler warns of the monopolization of education when he writes, “the monopolization of education by the state is the greatest form of despotism and liberty, without state interference, is the best guarantee in order to have education without imposition” (1881: 66). Liberty of education is reinforced by striking an analogy emphasizing the advantages government-run businesses would have in commerce; “We reject government interference because such interference makes the liberty of education an illusion just as it would in industry and commerce where government competition thru state-run shops and stores confronts private enterprise” (1881: 66-67). Soler was not only warning of a tyrannical and authoritarian possibility within the modernizing state, but in contrast, he was able to differentiate civil society from the state and it is within the domain of civil society to which the liberty of education belongs (1880: 68);

The word “state” and that which the concept covers, is not mysterious except for the simple minded. In the general disposition of the spirit behind the concept, that such sophist have formed, allows one to be disposed to confuse the society with the government and to attribute to the government what belongs exclusively to the society.

His argument reflects an understanding of civil society not found among urban doctors.

Soler’s concern goes beyond simply the establishment of guaranteed civil liberties rather he is concerned that the boundaries of civil society be clearly demarcated from the state such that, in order for an active citizenry to have opportunity for real success, it must be conscientious of its role in juxtaposition to the state. He states; “In effect, education is a necessity for social order but here one should question; should that be done by the state? This confuses government with society and with individual initiative” (1880: 69). A strong civil society would favor liberty in education because it animates innovation and entrepreneurialism resulting from competition among education providers. The recognition that liberty of education in an active civil society can result in competition which is necessary in order to stimulate better products and service appears to be understood by Soler when he wrote;

Perhaps education by the state is favorable in order to develop the light of humanity (...). Civilization develops and consolidates itself with a diversity of studies and a variety of methods. The claim that it is necessary to establish a uniform and centralized system that dumps citizens into the same mold of instruction is an absurd communist contradiction by the fact that it assumes infallibility and absolute competence of the state in education; a ridiculous idea (1880: 70).

Is it necessary that the lovers of progress strive to crown democracy with its newest victory; the liberty of education, because liberty promotes ambition and competition among the private schools with great and evident advantages for the advancement and progress of the sciences. Liberty of education is the only guarantee to the people the direct
management of education which belongs to the parents of each family (1880: 70).

How did Varela’s utopian vision, derived from interaction with educational systems of the United States and Europe, miss important properties originating in the concept of educational liberty? Soler appears to understand the relationship between educational liberty and productive outcomes when he stated; “In Germany, the independent university system has plainly realized and is an evident fact that scientific studies have progressed in that land under a liberty of education as in the United States and Belgium” (1880: 74). Last, Soler recognizes that civil society is strengthened by educational liberty when it is a protected right of parents and families. He states; “The rights of parents concerning the education of their children are inalienable and parents have a sacred duty to protest against a system of education eminently immoral” (1877:56). The context to which Soler was conferring “immoral” was mixed classes which were introduced as a part of the Varelan reforms.28 However while the object of his grievance may have been miscalculated, he raises a fundamental question regarding the inviolable rights of parents. Consistent with a concept of a strong and active civil society and an open educational market, Soler reinforces the belief that education is a right of families and parents.

Finally, the liberty of education is a duty that the state must respect as the natural right of the family and one that cannot be abdicated to the state; that is the intellectual and moral formation of the youth. In fact, the

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28 Soler’s concern regarding mixed classes, a product of school reform, were that “young men and young women are psychologically different and therefore should be provided with an education that recognizes this differentiation” (1891: 69)
mission of the state is to guarantee the free right to exercise individual rights of its citizens and families (1880: 75).

With respect to the teaching of religion, Soler expressed that it should be left in the hands of the family and religious ministers because; “governments exist for the people and the people do not exist for the government. If a nation is Catholic it is the duty of the government to teach religion independently from the individual ideas of the members of the government. And for this reason, it would not be significant to establish a religion of the state because it was not the state that created such a religion” (1880: 33).

The modernizing state was structured like a field. Education became a principle site of competition and conflict within the modernizing state where urban doctors and Catholic elites pursued their projects designed to capture the loyalty of popular sectors. Conflict and competition created both opportunities and constraints. Urban doctors were able to set in motion the construction of autonomous identities, goals and political culture among a class of state managers. The educational policies that emerged in this narrative were a function of cultural autonomy of elite state managers. Policies were not the function of an impartial and neutral state bureaucracy but by virtue of a socialization pattern among state bureaucrats following a very specific and partisan ideological framework. State managers were socialized in institutions, exclusive special-interest associations, and professional disciplines that were increasingly associated with a new and elite knowledge class. Urban doctors engaged in discursive practices designed to associate religion with the uncultivated and ignorant masses of ordinary people against whom the knowledge producers cultivated distinctions which served to reinforce their own class position and identity as enlightened and superior. Eclectic enlightenment
ideologies (discussed above) contributed to their habitus that constituted a moral vision which reinforced and justified their interests—to enhance their group status, gain cultural authority and create an alternative public discourse which would diminish religious legitimacy.

Catholic elites on the other hand entered the conflict prepared to contextualize their institutional and cultural patterns to a modernizing society. Papal documents such as such as *The Syllabus of Errors* and the accompanying encyclical *Quanta Cura* were in fact abstract statements of principle in which there was no effort at differentiation of national contexts or genuine engagement with an authentically historical sensibility. They were troublesome for Catholics to interpret and produced ammunition for anticlericals to further their accusations of obscurantism, censorship, repression, narrowness and intransigence; all of which offended the Catholic elite sensibilities and interests. Yet both Francisco Bauzá and Mariano Soler were able to interpret these documents in such a way that enabled them to identify inherent weaknesses in the modernizing state which emerge in their writings. As expressed in their own writings, both Bauzá and Soler in many ways had a clearer understanding of civil society and its role in democracy than their persecutors. Representing the Church’s leadership in Uruguay, they came to operate from a habitus shaped by centuries of Catholic social teachings, traditions and ministerial practices corresponding to the “social question” which were redemptive rather than punitive and based on a soteriology of good works. A tradition of social action received further impetus by the renewal dimension of the ultramontane movement; which according to McMillan (2000:49), “pioneered Social Catholicism while liberalism
remained oblivious to social concerns.”

Thus it was thru an education project that Catholic elites sought to ‘regenerate the social’ and provide a moral base in a modernizing society susceptible to extremes of indifferentism, agnosticism, and esoteric rationalism.

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29 Respective of criticism of intransigence and entrenchment, Catholic sodalities have historically showed remarkable capacities to modify apostolic strategies by modifying religious forms without necessarily modifying Catholic orthodoxy and thus adapt Catholicism to new cultural and historical contexts; i.e., see Post-Trident Catholicism (Bireley 1999; Murphy 1999); Catholic welfare in Europe (Grell and Cunningham 1999; Cavallo 1995; Martz 1983); revivalism and enlargement of foreign missions (Latourette 1975; Schmidlin 1933). Ultramontanism, when viewed as a social movement rather than a political one, can be viewed as a contemporary iteration of Catholic revivalism resulting in a resurgence of religious orders dedicated to social ministries giving rise to different configurations of ideas, actors, and associations (see Clark 2003: 11-46; Gorski 2003: 136-37).
CHAPTER FIVE

EDUCATION AS A SITE OF CONFLICT AND COMPETITION

It can be argued that educational reform in Uruguay represents the emergence of a social infrastructure located between the economy and civil society in response to the “the social question”. Before educational reform, the concept of the social represented a general phenomenon that was greater than both individuals and families and that escaped state control. The social was inherently crisis-ridden and problematic as social concern was related to pauperism and various forms of social disorder. Because the social was neither a branch of the state nor governed by the invisible hand of economics, it was a site of intermediate institutions consisting of voluntary corporations that served as counterweights to the power of the state. Responses to social concern were primarily managed by private initiatives in collaboration with religious orders (Rial 1983: 37; Bianchi 2001). For example, prior to social reform, the Hospital of Charity was superintended and administratively in the hands of the Hermanas del Huerto (Vener and Martinez 1998: 19,49-51; Rial 1983: 37). In 1861, the first school exclusively for young girls was established by the same group of religious women (Monreal 2005: 75). Catholic workers directed Homes of Orphans, Maternity Homes, Sanctuaries for Beggars, founded schools and multiple social assistance projects among the poor (Acevedo 1934 Vol.4: 476).
The Common Law of Education represents the first systematic regulation of the social through public intervention. Previous state actions such as secularizing the civil registry and cemeteries did not necessarily affect civil society. Educational reform represents a point of departure for the state because the perceptions and mentalities of fundamental structure, culture and social geography began to change among those who held political power and those whose views were regularly expressed in printed media and government records. Hence, the state’s response to social concerns, which education reform addressed, can be analyzed both as a material force and as discursive elaborations. A social infrastructure came to be associated with disruptive and problematic forces that were irreducible to either the individual or to the collective. However, it was the instability of the social realm that raised the “social question” which demanded stabilizing social-policy interventions. Until this time, with regard to the social domain, the Uruguayan state had limited itself to pension plans for the surviving members of the military (Zubillaga 1996:130). Industrialization was yet in the distant future so social revolution associated with the emergent working class was not yet a concern. Rather, urban doctors were disturbed by what they thought was the source of Uruguayan backwardness: 1) The climate of constant uncertainty created by the caudillos and resultant civil wars; 2) the Rural Association’s rejection of the liberal democratic project, which includes recognizing the viability of the minority party in order to create a true pluralistic political environment; and 3) clericalism which was blamed for inhibiting the development of science-based progress (Zubilaga 1982: 172). Urban Doctors were anxious to see political order replace anarchy associated with post-revolution society. Universal education was necessary for national survival and growth, for the development
of national production, the unification of the country, and the maintenance of the political order. There was a doctrinal belief that education could improve the status of the country. The idea was to use the school to transform behavioral patterns in order to effect economic and political modernization. When considering how social regulation emerged in Uruguay, it is important to remember that education reform was a formulation in response to a dimension of the social question, and defined not only by specific themes but by a specific location vis-à-vis civil society and the individual, by its disruptive and conflictive nature, and by an orientation to civilize society in order to avoid the reproduction of the status quo or return to a former condition.

To understand the anxiety of urban doctors one must begin with the status of education in Uruguay prior to reform. In 1875, state schools were left to the good will of the teacher who managed the school’s operation. Rural schools were painfully isolated and emerged only when a teacher was obtained and willing to live and serve in the hinterland. There were 196 functioning schools (62 in Montevideo) with a student population of 9,070. In Montevideo, several urban doctors came together to form the Comisión de Instrucción Pública del Departamento de Montevideo in order to find new pathways to improve the capital’s education system. The commission adopted a series of measures such as an increase in teacher wages, attempted to standardize the functioning schools, and established the office of Inspector of Education for the province. Seeking to extend these reforms to the rest of the country, the Commission eliminated the Institute of

1 All information on the pre-modern history of education in Uruguay comes from the classic text by Orestes Araujo, Historia de la escuela Uruguaya (1911).

2 This commission consisted of Placido Ellauri, Isidoro de María, Pedro Giralt, Manuel Bonifa and José María Montero.
Public Instruction and committed to the new Commission the charge to centralize education (Arujo 1911). This is significant because it marks one of the first attempts of state intervention directed at the social arena in order to develop a national social infrastructure that would eventually regulate all of Uruguayan education.

More important for long-term reform was the policy framework developed by Jose Pedro Varela. In 1867-68, Varela’s spent time in Europe and the United States observing educational problems and the resulting policies developed by Horace Mann. He returned to Uruguay and presented his ideas to the University Club; a site where the most significant urban doctors congregated. Varela helped to form the Society of Friends of Popular Education whose purpose was to promote develop a national plan of education. Many of the concepts developed by Varela were implemented in an experimental school sponsored by members of the society. In 1874, Varela published La Educación del Pueblo in which he outlined his measures for reform which emphasized; 1) the relationship between democracy and the school; 2) general teaching methods; 3) systems of school organization; 4) discipline; 5) the physical school plant; 6) school furniture; 7) school textbooks; 8) libraries; 9) teacher education and preparation; and university training for women. Varela’s work was not only significant because it demonstrated the need for reform and explained the plausibility of reform, but because it was first instance in Uruguay’s intellectual history where statistical data on the national population was used to support his thesis (Acevedo 1934 Vol.4: 98; Rama 1957). The reforms put public education on a long term trajectory to develop a free, compulsory, and laical education in 1876 and became the basis of the Law of Common Education adopted
in 1877. Varela was made the Director of Public Instruction by Latorre in 1876; a charge he occupied until he died an untimely death in 1879 at age 34.

How then did Varela’s reforms affect Catholic education? An underlying purpose of the reform project was the formation of citizens who would consolidate the fragile republic. Public education was viewed as political institution whose end was to incorporate the civilian population in a modernizing republican democracy – at least the republican version constructed by the urban doctors. To achieve this, one objective of reform was to establish a laical education. In Varela’s words, “The laical school firmly holds to the principle of the separation of the Church and State” (1964c: 97). It is clear from Varela’s initial writings that his intent was to make state schools absolutely laical.\footnote{Varela’s intention to laicize public schools was ill-timed because disestablishment did not occur until 1918. Catholics, as could be expected, objected to the laical school because Article 5 of the Constitution recognized Cathchicism as the national religion. It is important to note that regardless of nature of the conflict that emerged between the Church and the State, Catholic leadership – neither clergy nor laity— appealed to the authority of the Syllabus or to Papal prerogatives as a justification of their project. There was no insistence that the Church sought to maintain a monopoly of all educational establishments or that public schools must conform to Church authority. In the case of school reform, Catholics in general perceived encroachment by the state and appealed to Article five and Article 76 of the 1830 Constitution in which the state’s role was to protect and defend the national religion. Bauza (1953: 230) wrote; “The Uruguayan family is Catholic. One does not need much evidence to demonstrate it. Our history and the constitution verify this testimony, declaring that the national religion is Catholic demanding that the president of the republic solemnly swear to protect it.” Bauza’s statement is representative of appeals to constitutional authority and not to ecclesiastical bodies or Papal documents.}

Besides a civilizing influence in order to achieve social progress, urban doctors viewed educational reform as a vehicle for marginalizing religion. The intellectual justification for their position was to avoid violating the conscience of the child or the parents who may ascribe to a variant belief system. This position was addressed by Varela;

How does one oblige the student to attend a school and receive religious instruction contrary to the beliefs of their parents thus violating the liberty of conscience? In both cases the solution is contrary to the principles of democracy and the ends of society. In this case religious beliefs would be
imposed by force mutilating the conscience, depriving the liberty to judge and decide for their selves thus democracy is impossible and social order is fundamentally altered (1964c: 99).

As much as urban doctors would have liked to remove any and all vestiges of religion in the public schools, the policy that did emerged from reform did not stipulate the complete elimination of religion from the curriculum but required that; 1) religious instruction must take place outside of the normal school hours, either before or after school; 2) parents who object to religious instruction for their children can solicit an exclusion by writing to the District Commissioner to be dismissed (1964b: 110-11). Given the hostility that urban doctors had toward positive religion, why did the reformers stop short of establishing an absolute laical education? Varela realized that, at least for now, an absolute laical system was a bridge too far and would have provoked strong resistance by Catholics (Varela 1964b: 147). Urban doctors saw this resistance a few years earlier (1873) when a member of the House of Representative, Agustin de Vedia, attempted to pass a law prohibiting the teaching of any positive religion in public schools linked to the state. Resistance on behalf of Catholics, both in the legislature and civil society, was sufficient to defeat Vedia’s legislative initiative. Possibly with this incident in mind,

4 Article 73 of Vedia’s proposal read; “No one will give nor tolerate religious instruction in any of the public schools informed by this law” (“La Enseñanza Religiosa.” May 16, 1873. El Siglo. pg 1).

5 Reflecting on the Vedia incident a few years prior to the Law of Common Education, it was not the hierarchy that policy makers feared but the Catholic populace. Varela writes; “It was good legislation in its purest form, but this one Article provoked a tempest among those religiously committed and was enough to cause lawmakers to take refuge in fear regarding the efficacy with which people rose up against a law with such resistance when it had barely been published” (164b, Vol.2: 149). When Varela compromised Article 59 of the Law of Education which called for the absolute laicization of public education, Varela concedes once again that it was popular sentiment of the Catholic population and not the Church hierarchy that motivated him to allow Catholic catechism to be taught— albeit under certain limitations, he wrote; “Our rationalization has been this; the majority of habitants of the republic profess Catholicism and believe that the school would be heretical if catechism was not taught. If we had established a prohibition on the
Varela made concessions to the Law of Common Education in regard to the laicization of schools;

For us and it does not wear us out to repeat it, the law cannot adjust itself strictly to the theoretical principles to which the law professes and is written or by those who sanction it. It is necessary in order to be efficacious, possible, and attainable to take into account the state of society depends on legislation and the action that the society produces. Before the laical system in its genuine and full expression can be legally implemented, it is necessary that the concept be formed in the consciousness of the nation in order to convince the nation that the school system should be laical (1964b: 148).

It is evident that Varela realized the idea of establishing an absolute laical educational system would require time to work on the public sentiment and implement incremental policy changes that would eventually eliminate religious instruction in the public educational system (1964b: 147). In its final form, the Law of Common Education had profound implications for Catholic education which benefited by earlier policies making Catholic catechism a standard part of the school curriculum. On one level, Article 18 of the Law of Common Education conceded to popular demand and made Catholic catechism “obligatory in state schools”, on the other hand it was relegated to after-hours instruction and those who opposed Catholic teachings could opt out. Nonetheless,

catechism in the public schools, we would have found, without a doubt, a great resistance among Catholics toward establishing the system of popular education. Meanwhile, on the contrary, if we allow the District Commissions to facilitate the teaching of catechism with certain restrictions [the opt out clause] then Catholics would not have a reason to reject the common school” (La Legislación Escolar; 1964b: 147). It is obvious that Varela was pragmatic enough to recognize that he did not want the common school to alienate a large percentage of the Uruguayan population. The point here is that it was not the hierarchy that Varela feared because the hierarchy did not control the public education. Rather it was the popular sector and popular sentiment that motivated Varela to compromise his original proposal.
Catholic leadership considered the law an attack on the tradition of teaching morality and Christian doctrine in the public schools since 1834.  

**Refutation and Protest**

In 1881, Mariano Soler wrote *Refutación-Protesta: A Las Erróneas Apreciaciones del Inspector Nacional* in which Soler critically responds to Varela’s reforms. As one could expect, Soler used demagoguery and hyperbole to describe the reform as despotism, tyranny, imposition; he described state schools as places of perdition; and accused Varela of defending the “centralization of a laical school without God (1881: 70-71).” Although he may have been reacting to a slippery-slope set in incremental motion more than the actual outcome of the law, his main thesis was to point out the inherent contradiction to the law. Soler’s logic follows that; 1) the law discriminates against the teaching of Catholic catechism in the state schools; 2) public schools are paid by the state; 3) the state’s official religion is Catholicism, according to Article five of the 1830 Constitution (1881:3-4). Soler writes “it is an insult to the right most sacred regarding the paternity of the constitution. What guarantee can parents of Catholic families have when

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6 The tradition of teaching religion in the public schools began when Apostolic Vicar Larrañaga commissioned Luis J. de la Peña to organize a plan to teach morality and Christian doctrine in the public schools in 1834. This plan was approved by government decree and religion became a standard subject in the public school curriculum, beginning with the Lancasterian schools. Article one of the plan stated; “To satisfy the need to form a public and universal morality, providing a knowledge of principles and general maxims robust with precepts pertaining to the Christian religion” (Araújo 1911:187-189). Hence, the teaching of religion in public schools became a legal tradition established by juridical means but in no way implies that public schools were under Church authority.
the constitutional obligation to respect and endorse Catholicism, is considered a *flagrant contradiction* by the Inspector of Education.”^{7}

It is obvious why Catholic leadership would take exception with the Varelan reforms as the Church interpreted the state’s intent regarding religious instruction as one more attack on ecclesial prerogatives—consistent with the civil registry, secularization of cemeteries, civil matrimony precluding religious ceremony, and now laical education. However, beyond the state’s attempt to circumscribe the civil mission of the Church, there were specific policy changes associated with Varela’s reforms that disturbed Catholic educators for which Soler makes valid points. First, Soler points out that this policy is not the result of “*el voto libre del pueblo*” rather it is obvious that educational reform was born from an autocratic system seeking to centralize and bureaucratize education.^{8} The manner in which reform was imposed was both tyrannical and anti-constitutional, running over the rights of the people of the nation. He accuses Varela of being Machiavellian and alludes to the influence of Masonry, of which Varela and many of his associates in the Society of Friends of Education were members (1881: 6-7). Soler points to the hypocrisy of the urban doctors, who demonstrate an “overwhelming despotism” by making education compulsory and mandatory, and for whom the majority of children have no choice but the state school (1881:12). However, in Montevideo, the urban doctors sent their own children to elite private schools abundantly located in the city—schools which the popular sectors in Montevideo could not afford due to high

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^{7} Soler was turning Varela’s logic on himself because Varela had written; “The education given by the State is a *flagrant contradiction* if it presents the teachings of a positive religion.”

^{8} Varelan reforms were initiated during the dictatorial era under Latorre, an era characterized by autocratic rule (Zum Felde 1967 Vol.1: 165).
costs. Second, Soler finds the attack on foreign priests to be baseless. Soler’s response was precipitated by Varela who wrote;

> On the other hand, if the national sentiment, if the love of country are valued at the foundation of its institutions, then how can it be developed, reinforced, and converted as the corner stone of an educational system if it depends on the clergy in the countryside, who predominately are foreigners, without civil preparation and obedient to certain corporations which have their centers and interests, not only outside of the country, but are hostile in all the world toward the traditions of free institutions (as cited in Soler 1881: 8).

Soler is quick to point out that the purpose of religious orders is the propagation of the faith and has no political engagement. Unlike Masons, members of religious orders take no secret oaths and Soler reminds readers that Masons are also an international organization bent on achieving political outcomes thru local chapters. Soler defended the foreign origins of men and women religious citing the demand for religious brothers because of the orderliness and discipline they exercise in the classroom and for the reputation of the teaching classic literature. Third, and possibly Soler’s most salient and empirical point, he presents the following question;

> But the system of Varela is not capable of experiencing legal competition. Would Mr. Varela be willing to place the two systems [public and Catholic] alongside each other in order to evaluate which school produces the best results and which produces the better educated student (1881: 13)?

Soler points out that for half the public school budget, although the public school is free to its constituency due to state subsidies, the Catholic school can perform better.9

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9 Soler alludes to an unintended consequence of a robust Catholic school system, such as existed in many western European societies, which did in fact lower the state expense of providing compulsory education (c.f. see Gibson 1989: 12). Soler made this point in an earlier work (1880:71). See Table A.6 which tabulates the reduction in public expenditures for primary education due to the Catholic school system.
Francisco Bauzá, as a Catholic layman and congressional representative, was more diplomatic than Soler in his opposition to Article 18 in the Law of Common Education. Bauzá’s principle dispute was that the law gave preference to the minority (dissenters). He questions the functioning of democracy when the will of the majority is undermined by the will of the minority (1953a:202). Bauzá was concerned about the secularization impulse behind educational reform suggesting that “an education without God is demoralizing for families and the society” (1953a: 230). In 1879, Bauzá presented a modification to Article 18 which was approved in the Lower House but failed in the Senate (Geymonat 2004:265; González Albistur 1997: 309-12). The justification of his proposal was based on the logic of the majority;

In the first place, it is certain that the nation is Catholic by its people’s own volition and by historic tradition by an absolute majority. What had been called “capacity of the clergy” is nothing more than the capacity of public opinion. Second, it should be said that the constitution declares the Catholic religion to be the official religion and it is not strange therefore that this religion has certain preeminence above the others that coexist alongside of it (1953a: 232).

Bauzá describes the laicization policy of Varela’s reform as one of “discretional and arbitrary absolutism” resulting from political militancy (1953a:203).

The refutation by Soler and Bauzá was representative of Catholics’ concern and opposition to Varela’s reforms. The Church was not opposed to the notion of improving education.\(^\text{10}\) The Catholic schools were diverse—frequently working with poor families ignored by the state—they imposed their own standards of academic rigor and

\(^{10}\) Catholic elites recognized the need for educational reform and did not object to the Law of Common Education on the basis of pedagogy, methodology, or organization. Rather it was the attempt to marginalize religious instruction to which Catholics objected based on constitutional grounds (Zum Felde 1967 Vol.1:176).
educational demands, and they had mechanisms in place to discipline their own in order to perfect their work (Vener and Martínez 1998; Monreal 2005, 2010). What alarmed the ecclesiastical leaders were the policy changes imposed by the state that were at variance with the Catholic educational traditions which were proven to work in Europe and the United States. The following institutional characteristics were used continuously as wedge issues by the state against congregational schools; 1) foreign origins of religious men and women; 2) clergy and priests in the classroom; 3) mixed classes.\(^\text{11}\)

\(^{11}\)One of the principle grievances of urban doctors against the inflow of foreign-born religious men and women from France and Italy was that they did not speak Castilian-Spanish (Monreal 2005: 90). This was still an issue as late as 1932 (Genovese 1933: 38). Urban doctors assumed that foreign-born teachers could not teach effectively if they did not master Castilian-Spanish. This problem was not an isolated case in Uruguay; the same was true in the United States (Finke and Stark 1992: 134; Burns 1937:218; Coburn and Smith 1999:141). Newland (1994:465) also cites the pervasiveness of this dilemma in other Latin American Republics but addresses the advantage of foreign-born teachers who provide foreign language instruction in their native tongue. This dilemma was easily resolved thru a variety of solutions such as pairing the foreign-born teacher with a bi-lingual teacher who translated, capitalizing on the foreign-born teacher to teach their native tongue as a foreign language, and place foreign born-teachers in classes with immigrant students of the same language (Coburn and Smith 1999:141; Burns 1937:218). In most cases, foreign born teachers were encouraged to learn the indigenous language as quickly as possible and did so (Monreal 2005:90; Burns 1912: 23). Second, Urban doctors were highly suspicious the presence of clergy and priests in the classroom because urban doctors had convinced themselves that clergy and priests were surreptitious and subversive to the republic and wanted to re-establish a Catholic monarchy. Much of urban doctor’s paranoia can be attributed to reading Bilbao’s *America in Danger* (1862) in which Bilbao suggested that Catholics would vanquish their opponents and establish a theocracy under a Catholic monarchy (Lipp 1975: 31). However, Burns (1937: 177) points out that “the loyalty of the Catholic school and Catholic teachers to the [host] nation is a matter of obligation in the teaching of the Church.” Rather, the accusation by urban doctors was but one more example of propaganda and demagoguery toward clergy and priests. Last, mixed classes (coeducation) was stipulated in the Law of Common Education (Article 61: 1964b: 112) although there is no explanation or justification for the policy (Acevedo 1934 Vol.4: 109). Varela does dedicate an entire chapter in *La Educación del Pueblo* (1964d: 209-22) to education and women, but does not elaborate on a justification for mixed classes. Araújo (1911: 450) acknowledges resistance to coeducation but does not explain its justification in educational reform. González Albistur (1997:157-164) discusses the impression made on Varela by the independence of American teenage girls when visiting New York. Varela became enamored with what he interpreted as the lack of presumption and candor of American female teenagers to which he attributed to the mother of the family. Hence, this may explain why he valued education for girls. But Catholic schools already excelled at schools for girls and were in high demand (Hornsby-Smith 1996; Gibson 1996; Monreal 2010: 163; Vener and Martinez 1998:29). What irritated Catholics elites with regard to mixed classes is that it broke with Catholic
Liberty of Education Project

Bauzá became an immediate critic of Varela's reforms and used his position in congress to create legal and social space for a Catholic alternative to state education whereby Catholics in Uruguay could legitimize their dissent. First, Bauzá laid out his opposition in a lucid exposition in *La Escuela Común* (1879) in which he bases his arguments pedagogically, legally and philosophically. In 1879 Bauzá together with collaborating Senators presented legislation to modify the Law of Common Education. Administratively, Bauzá saw Varela reform as dangerously top-heavy and centralized. His legislation sought to decentralize the structure by creating a Council General of Education to function in concert with the National Inspector. Similarly, the proposal sought to establish Departmental Commissions to which Departmental Inspectors would answer. Bauzá was concerned that districts might be forced to accept the tyranny of Departmental Inspectors and wanted the office’s power to be diffused by local participation and of parents (Pivel Devoto 1968 Vol.1:255; González Albistur 1997:311). Beyond the administrative structure the legislation sought to annul specific provisions of the Law of Education such as mixed classes; a property tax imposed on school sites under the threat of confiscation for non-payment, and a modification to the curriculum traditions creating single-sex schools, especially for secondary schools (Burns 1912: 97; Gibson 1989:122-23; Gibson 1996:109).

12 Bauzá expounded on six reasons for opposing Varela’s reforms: 1) he viewed the reforms as a concerted effort by lawyers (urban doctors) promoting an agenda; 2) reforms were rooted in a rationalist-principistas framework which would take society in a dangerous direction; 3) the rights of the majority were subject to the rights of the minority in regard to Article 18; 4) it violated Article Five of the Constitution; 5) the legal process by which the law was promulgated was capricious since it was conducted under a dictatorship (Latorre); and 6) the concept of compulsory education was contrary to natural law (1964a: 200-206).
(Acevedo 1934 Vol.4: 110; González Albistur 1997: 309-11; Pivel Devoto 1968 Vol.1: 255-56). With regard to religion, Bauzá was concerned that under the conditions imposed by the Law of Education, religion would be relegated to an after-thought at the end of the school day. The disposition of the bureaucratic chain emanating from the National Inspector to Departmental Inspectors to School Directors was decidedly and collectively laical. This was evident in newspaper articles, conferences and public acts. Hence, Bauzá was concerned that religion would be taught as a perfunctory exercise by personnel propagandized by laical dispositions if not by Varela himself (Pivel Devoto 1968 Vol.1: 256). The disposition of Bauzá and Catholics in general was that the state had a constitutional duty to protect and defend the integrity of Catholicism as the national religion (1964: 229-30).

The legislation entered discussion in the Senate in 1880 and was approved but then shelved for three years in the Legislative Commission (González Albistur 1997:331; Pivel Devoto 1968 Vol.1: 257). After Jose Pedro Varela died in October 1879, his brother Jacobo Varela was appoint to succeed him as Inspector General de Public Instruction by President Santos in January 1980. Jacobo Varela experienced a conflict with teachers in Montevideo over a salary dispute. The episode appeared in the press and Varela lost public support leading to resignation from office (Araújo 1911:477). While Varela’s conflict was emerging, Catholic women organized themselves into a special interest group, Las Damas Católicas, and presented a petition to President Santos signed by 5,000 Catholic women to reestablish religious instruction in public schools. Santos was apparently moved by the display of solidarity and, after discussing the matter face-to-face with Bauzá, appointed Bauzá to the vacant office of Inspector General of Public
Instruction in order to enact the petition by *Las Damas Católicas* (Pivel Devoto 1968 Vol.1: 261; Greising 2000:76). According to Pivel Devoto (1969 Vol.1: 259-261), Santos and his counselors misinterpreted Bauzá’s self-deprecation and humility in Bauzá’s letter to Santos in response to the position. Santos then offered the position to Jorge Ballesteros in December 1882.\(^\text{13}\)

Santo’s dismissal of Bauzá did not deter the *Damas Católicas* or Bauzá in their efforts to modify the Law of Common Education. In 1883, *Damas Católicas* presented a new petition to Santos containing 25,000 signatures entitled *La Exposición-Protesta* in which the group petitioned Santos not only to reestablish religious instruction in public schools but to elevate Bauzá’s legislative initiative of 1979 (González Albiurst 1997:311; Pivel Devoto 1968 Vol.1: 257-261). Santos sent the *Exposición-Protesta* to Congress where it was read and a commission was appointed to study the petition (CLAC 1883 Tomo IX: 135-141). Bauzá for his part modified his original legislative proposal and resubmitted a new legislative project in March, 1885, which would give Catholics in Uruguay the liberty to establish private educational institutions in the Republic. This may have appeared unnecessary because at the time religious congregations already operated over 50 schools. However, Bauzá grew skeptical of a state that used the Law of Common Education as a means to insert itself into civil society in such a way that offended Catholic sensibilities. Furthermore, he was suspicious of the alliance among the press, the University and the state due to the power and the means that the alliance possessed for the purpose of exerting influence on society. Regarding the trifecta of power he wrote;

\(^{\text{13}}\) Devoto (1969 Vol.1: 259-261) gave considerable attention to the dialogue between Santos and Bauzá over the appointment to the Inspector’s office including extended quotations from Bauzá’s letter to Santos.
You should test what I say with a significant reaction in spirit with the purpose to gain lost ground. The public powers, the University and the press find themselves in alliance with the purpose to diffuse state education and have reopened entire dimensions of primary education, where state action is ineffective and immediately substitutes itself for private action; that is the [private] founding of schools and secondary schools whose variety of programs promote a solid instruction (1953a:198)

Bauzá had two primary concerns which he developed in *La Educación Común* (1879).

First he expressed concern that the state may try to monopolize education when he wrote;

The legal situation of public instruction in the nation is a monopoly encroaching to methodically destroy private initiatives. The state reserves for itself, in secondary and higher education, the right to recognize academic degrees in these two branches through the University in a manner that the University determines; from the beginning to the end the order of studies in which one must graduate. And what is the University but, by its new organization, a mere dependence on the Executive President that names and dismisses its employees through all its hierarchy, since the monopoly of education joins itself to the imposition of ideas without control at the will of the government; exactly what occurred in Russia (1953a:221-22).

Bauzá had grievances regarding the monopolization of primary education on two counts as well. He was critical of the compulsory component of the Law of Education because it imposed a demand that Bauzá believed was contrary to natural rights (1953a:230).

Second, because the law gave exclusive rights to the state to impose a general property tax of two percent on all privately owned property. Property taxes were delegated to each Department to impose and collect for the general education budget (Varela 1964b: 38-39,119-21). Bauzá’s grievance was that the entire nation would pay a considerable sum in order to sustain state schools. Bauzá cites two problems with this arrangement. First, private schools could not compete with the economic advantage the state would have. Second, the arrangement was insensible to Catholics who comprised the majority of the
population yet would pay taxes and be obliged to send their children to a state school where liberty of education is usurped; especially in regard to their religion. Beside the monopolization of education by the state, Bauzá’s second primary concern with regard to the Law of Common Education was the state’s encroachment on the sovereignty of families. Bauzá had in mind the domain of individual and inalienable rights extended to the familial domain when he wrote; “We forget that among inalienable rights, it is the parents of families that constitute a code within civil society and humankind in a state of reason; which constitutes the guarantee of personal liberty” (1953a:225). The liberty of education would only be relevant if there were an alternative form of education to the state and one which families reserved the right to access. Establishing the second point, Bauzá wrote;

Varela, by proposing compulsory education, is contrary to natural rights which are beyond legislation. Considering that the responsibility of children is exclusively of the parent, considering that the family is the foundation of the society, the state has taken previous action and has interfered in domestic life and has indisputably attacked the sphere of the family’s authority (1953a:205).

Given the laical impulse of state education embedded in the bureaucratic chain, Bauzá saw a clear and present threat to educational choices that Catholics might have if the state used its power to constrain the establishment and operation of Catholic schools or an attempt to laicize private schools. For this reason, Bauzá sought to enshrine the concept of educational liberty in law which would guaranteed an alternative program to state schools and protect the rights of parents to socialize children according to their prerogative; especially if they wanted Catholic schools as an option.
It was thru a liberty of education legislative initiative that Bauzá sought to codify a fundamental human right as one of the most transcendent of all liberties. In the proposal, he defines liberty of education in this way:

The Law Project, proclaims the least of which is the sacred principle of the liberty of education. In effect, the liberty of education is an individual right, as is the individual right the liberty of industry, and those rights that tend to fulfill the destiny of man. This includes the right to teach and at the same time the right to learn. The merit is that the individual can exercise this right that is nothing more than the right to work authorized by this Law Project; sent to the Executive President, to freely teach in the entire Republic (DSCR 1985 Tomo 73: 176-77).

Liberty of education in principle has three applications; 1) the right to teach meaning that capable and qualified individuals should be authorized to teach. This component defended priests and clergy in the classroom against the state’s constant attack as well as on foreign-born members of religious orders who came to Uruguay with teaching communities whom both Bauzá (1953a: 198, 231-33) and Soler (1881: 8-11) vigorously defended. In addition, the right to teach implies configuring the curriculum and supportive textbooks of which provoked extreme consternation from Bauzá in regard to the constraints imposed on such judgments by Varela’s reforms (1953a: 213); 2) the right to learn which implies that the educational curriculum and continuum will adequately prepare students in favorable ways in order to contribute to their personal development and society. Bauzá was adamant not only that the educational system be practical in order to develop a middle class (1965), but that education impart an ethic and morality that contribute to a national conscience; hence the need to teach the national religion (1953a:229-33); and 3) the right to select a school, curriculum and teachers. Liberty of education more than any other component implies that parents have the right to choose
the socialization process that guides their children. This was the fundamental right of education based on the principle of *loco parentis* whereby parents are imbued with the duty based on natural and common law of which the state has no right to intervene, unless the parent abdicates their duty (1953a: 205, 230).

As a matter of legislative strategy, Bauzá’s legislative project in 1885 focused on the liberty of secondary and higher education (the National University). The proposal’s major article read:

**Article 1**: Secondary instruction and higher education *[National University]*, and in the same way primary instruction, is free in the entire territory of the Republic. All persons of natural and legal status can found secondary and higher education establishments, and teach publicly or privately, which ever science or liberal art without being subject to any preventative means, or to special methods or textbooks. Public authorities will have the right to inspect such establishments of instruction and can only impede if it finds to the contrary prescriptions of hygiene, morality and fundamental dogmas of the Constitution as determined by this law (DSCR 1885 Tomo 73: 175-76).

While the legislation called for the liberty to establish alternative educational establishments, the sticking point was over the acquisition of an academic or professional degree since a student must pass a national exam in that discipline which was only offered by the National University. At the time, Bauzá was teaching in the Catholic University established by Soler in 1882, however, Bauzá’s students were excluded from the national exam because they did not take courses at the National University (Monreal 2000:80). Bauzá argued that this arrangement was a violation of the liberty to learn and affected otherwise adequately prepared students. In the discourse before the Senate, Bauzá stated; “The current regime has enshrined a monopoly that has been producing a aristocracy of caps and gowns and one that believes that only in Montevideo can one
think” (as cited in Pivel Devoto 1968 Vol.2: 60). After heated debate, the proposal was approved by the House on July 14, 1885 and provided legal status to students studying Law, Social Sciences and Mathematics at Free Universities to gain admission to national exams proctored by the National University. In 1887, Bauzá sought to amplify the law passed in 1885 by amending the law to ways. First, to expand the definition of liberty of education to include the subject matter taught. Article three in the 1887 amendment read;

The programs of free establishments can adapt themselves, in order to validate these courses before the National University, without bias of the amplifications that are judged to be advisable, but in this adaptation will take into account the system and doctrine that the free establishments have adopted, as a guarantee of the liberty and education and of opinions (DSCR 1887 Tomo 86: 61).

The second modification was to extend the rights associated with the Liberty of Education of the 1885 law to primary and secondary schools (DSCR 1877 Tomo 86: 63). Bauzá points out that the extension could be inferred from Article nine in the 1885 law, however, the purpose of the amendment was to absolutize the concept of educational liberty for all levels of education. The legislation was passed by the Senate in December of 1887 and by the House in January of 1888 but was vetoed by president Santos. In his exposition before the Assembly, Santos cited the relationship between the National University and free establishments would affect the decorum of the University (DSHA 1988 Tomo 6: 279-80). In addition, Santos mentioned complications associated with proctoring exams of students from free Universities. However, the veto was overcome by a 42-3 margin in the House and the entire law and amendments were promulgated on January 25, 1888. Bauzá’s response was tempered by Santo’s veto and soberly prophesized; “Due the observations by the Executive President, based on a pretense of
educational liberty, the concept is subject to profound and radical violations” (as cited in Pivel Devoto 1968 Vol.2: 73). Indeed the conflict with urban doctors, who in practice promoted a state monopolization of education against religious congregations operating under educational liberty, became exacerbated.

**Catholic Education and Growth of Religious Communities**

Were concerns expressed by Soler and Bauzá valid? Did educational reform undermine the Catholic capacity to educate and socialize popular sectors through the catechism and reproduce Catholic faith in Uruguayan society? The reality is that other than move religion to a voluntary class at the end of the school day and give dissenters a pass, catechism was still available and taught in public schools. Outside of public schools, educational reform had virtually no effects on the capacity of teaching congregations to operate in Uruguayan society— at least for the first quarter century since its promulgation. In spite of Varela’s reforms and anti-clerical dispositions inherent in the law’s relationship to religion, how did the Catholic schools fare in light of the Law of Common Education? What do we know about the Catholic congregational activity in this period?

The Catholic revival in Europe as a post-Revolution phenomenon is well documented (Anderson 1995; Paul 1969; Gibson 1989; 1996; Torre 1987; Campbell 1991; Clark 2003). In spite of subsequent revolutions in 1830 and 1848 giving rise to new anticlerical impulses, the birth of industrialization and subsequent urbanization, a renewed Catholicism emerged that led to the diffusion of patron feasts, local processions, and popular religious literature promoting, for example, the devotion of the Sacred Heart.
With the support of Rome, pastoral action expanded driven by a new spirit of social service linked with manifestations of popular religiosity. Possibly the most significant development was the resurgence of older religious orders (Jesuits, Franciscans, Benedictines, Dominicans, Carmelites, Visitandines, Clarisses and Ursulines) but more importantly, new orders dedicated to social work and education. Religious congregations manifested a dynamism and energy resulting in an entrepreneurial missionary force outside of Europe. Since the 1830s, Uruguay received several waves of religious congregations, principally of Italian and French origin, that fit this missionary profile and complemented by an intense focus on education and social work (Vener and Martínez 1998; Monreal 2005, 2010; visita ad limina 1888, 1896; Cada 1979: 43; Kennelly 1984: 96-97; Clear 1987: 112; Wittberg 1994: 117; Gordon 1989). Because religious life in Uruguay was relatively undeveloped—due to the absence of a colonial period—Mons. Vera (Apostolic Vicar) solicited and encouraged the arrival of European congregations as a strategy for amplifying the life of the Church (Pons 1904: 181-191; Vener and Martínez 1998: 86). It is the congregations that arrived in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and which had a prodigious impact on education that are of particular interest here (see Table A.3).

14 By 1850, there were over 600 new religious communities founded in Catholicism worldwide; over 200 religious congregations in Europe sent missionaries to the new world (Wittberg 1994: 39; Cada 1979: 39). McMillan (1991: 57) references the work of Cluade Langlois who studied the massive expansion in female religious orders between 1800 to 1880 and found approximately 400 religious orders emerged in that time frame with some 200,000 women entering religious life.

15 For example, by 1900 in the USA, American sisters ran 3,811 parochial schools, 633 girls academies, 645 orphanages, and at least 500 hospitals (Wittberg 1994: 39 and Finke and Stark 1992: 134).

16 Data on these religious communities come from the following sources; Vener and Martinez 1998: 19-75; Pons 1904: 181-191; Monreal 2010; Monreal 2005; and visita ad limina 1888 and 1896.
Among the later waves of congregations included Las Hermanas del Huerto. Although the first wave of Hermanas came in the 1850s to work with the Hospital de Caridad, later waves initiated new schools in 1876 (San Luis), 1878 (San Jose de Mayo), 1878 (Minas), 1878 (Florida), 1882 (Mercedes), 1884 (Paysandú), 1888 (Pando) and 1889 (Rosario Oriental). In most cases, these schools were dedicated to teaching young girls characterized by poverty including the minority population of Montevideo; “They opened a free school for black girls and in a short time had 80 girls and another school for girls of white race that reached 300 girls” (Vener and Martinez 1998:51). Las Hermanas Sales inaugural school opened in 1859 with 70 students. Las Capuchinas founded the Colegio San Antonio (1898), the Congregación de la Inmaculada Concepción (1899) and el Colegio Nuevo País (1899). Los Salesians inaugurated Colegio Pio (1877), el Colegio Sagrado Corazón de Jesús (1889) and el Instituto Mons. Lasaña (1905). Following the pattern of trade schools developed by Don Bosco, the Salesians in 1891 found a school in the barrio of Estanzuela (Montevideo), Cordon (1893), and an agriculture school on the perimeter of Montevideo (1897). The Colegio San Francisco de Sales was opened by the Salesian brothers in 1906 and added the Escuela San Miguel in 1911. In the interior of the country the Salesians opened several schools including el Colegio San Isidro in 1881, two schools in Paysandú, Nuestra Señora del Rosario (1885) and Don Bosco (1888), and el Colegio San Miguel in Mercedes (1908). Las Hijas de María Auxiliadora established a Colegio María Auxiliadora (1891) for children of laborers, el Colegio San José (1906) in Colon and el Colegio Villa Muñzo (1907). In the interior of Uruguay the same Hijas de María Auxiliadora opened el Colegio San José (1879) in las Piedras, el Colegio María Auxiliadora (1887) in Paysandú, another Colegio María Auxiliadora in Canelones in 1905.
1889, and in Santa Isabel, the sisters opened El Colegio María Auxiliadora in 1908. In most cases, these schools were the product of an invitation by the local *Society of Damas Católicas* consisting of principal families in the area who also financed the construction and maintenance of each school (see Table A.2). These works were supported by a continuous flow of European based religious personnel who came to Uruguay in fulfilment of an apostolic mission. For example, between 1865 and 1871, Las Hermanas del Huerto received 59 women religious from Europe. From 1876 to 1896, 64 Salesian brothers came to Uruguay under the leadership of Father Luis Lasagna. Following the male Salesians, 48 Hijas de María Auxiliadora (Salesianas) arrived to Uruguay between 1877 and 1895. Las Hermanas Capuchinas sent 45 women religious between 1892 and 1898 (see Table A.3).

The point of this historical record referring to the growth and mission of religious congregations is to demonstrate that religious education became a positive and significant force in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Collectively, the Catholic program of education was robust and made a contribution to the national goal of educating the Uruguayan population in spite of a hostile disposition of urban doctors and the subsequent sentiments embedded in educational reform (Monreal 2010: 174; 2005: 95). The expansion of Catholic education in the initial years of the Law of Common Education is confirmed by historian Eduardo Acevedo (1934 Vol.4: 458). In 1878, at the time that the Law of Common Education was implemented, there were 199 public schools and 225 private schools of which, only three were religious. After 10 years, by 1887, the public schools grew to 366 schools (45 percent), an 84 percent increase, with a student population of 30,572 (58 percent). But private schools increased from 225 to
441 (55 percent), a 96 percent increase, with a collective student body of 21,810 (42 percent). Of the private schools, 74 were Catholic with 8,144 students. Of the total student population in 1887, 16 percent were inscribed in Catholic schools. Data drawn from the *visita ad límina* 17 of the era provide corroborating evidence and suggest a similar pattern of expansion. According to the *visita ad límina* of 1888 under Yéregui, there were a total of 65 Catholic schools with a population of 10,767 students. Under Soler in 1896 there were a total of 59 Catholic schools with a population of 10,802 students. Table A.4 provides further data drawn from the *Anuario Estadístico* that shows a pattern of growth or decline among Catholic schools. 18

What these statistics show is that over time (1908-1932), the number of Catholic schools and the Catholic student population remained stagnant. The impulse and energy brought by new congregations may have peaked in the first decade of the twentieth century; however, the overall student population did not begin to increase consistently until after 1932. By comparison, from 1900 to 1950, public schools show stable upward growth in both the absolute number of school sites and student population. Within the private school domain, we know that Catholic schools maintained their institutional

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17 The *visita ad límina* is a document corresponding to the obligation of certain members of a national Church hierarchy to visit Rome in order to present themselves before the Pope to give an account of the state of their dioceses. The object of the visit is to acknowledge the Pope’s universal jurisdiction by giving an account of the condition of particular churches, to receive his admonitions and counsels, and thus bind more closely the members of the Church to its divinely appointed head. Bishop Yéregui made the trip to Rome in 1888 while Mariano Soler went to Rome in 1896 as the first Archbishop of Montevideo. Mariano Soler composed both documents; first as the Vicar General of Dioceses under Bishop Yéregui and the second as the Archbishop of Montevideo. The original documents are preserved in the archive of the Archdiocese of Montevideo and are useful documents regarding the status of the Church in the era.

18 The *Anuario Estadístico* is a collection of yearly statistics produced by the Dirección General de Estadística in Uruguay which, since 1885, have compiled national data reflecting the economic, social and demographic reality in a quantitative format.
numbers. The greatest loss occurred in what the Inspector of Education refers to the *laical domain*; private schools for profit. One reason for the state’s strict inspection policy was to clamp down on these types of schools that were ubiquitous, small, operated out of houses or shops, and many were clandestine (Pérez 1906: 18-22). By 1908, although the number of private laical schools were three-times the number of congregational schools (222 to 71), the number of religious teachers equaled the number of laical school teachers (375 to 364) and religious schools had a 10 percent larger student population (10674 to 9774) (See Table A.9; see also Pérez 1908: 307, 316).

**Educational Need**

What do these statistics of expansion and contraction in the educational field mean? Is there a broader narrative behind the steady growth of state schools that explains why an otherwise robust and effective Catholic school system that was capable of achieving a quality product did not continue to grow as well? These questions correspond to the central thesis of this dissertation and can be explained by examining the action of the state managers. First, the urban doctors and legislators who had developed and promoted the state system interpreted the incremental growth as the cornerstone of social progress. Although in the first ten years of reform, public schools under preformed private schools, yet from 1887 to 1900 both the public school centers and the public school population nearly doubled and from 1900 to 1915, both centers and student population did double in size. In 1904, the School Inspector of Montevideo, Eduardo Roge, affirms the fulfillment of the original goal set out by the Varelan reforms. He wrote in the *Anales de Instrucción Primaria* (1904);
The reformer of our schools, Jose Pedro Varela, demonstrated 30 years ago in his important work entitled *The Education of the Nation* (1874) that the ‘education destroys ignorance, increases the fortune of the individual, prolongs the life, expands and invigorates happiness, improves the general condition of society, lessens crime and vice, and contributes to the prosperity, fortune and power of a nation’ (Roge 1904: 35).

State managers accepted credit for educational progress. Appearing in the *Annals of Primary Education* Emilio Fournier (1903: 279) wrote; “The intervention of the state in education (...) has been considered necessary in order to develop instruction, guaranteeing the growth of the nation and at the same time, the right of the child to be educated.” By the early 1900s, the progress of state education was a source of national pride. The *Annals of Primary Education* are replete with self-congratulatory and petulant statements such as one referring to the efforts of the National Inspector of Public Instruction’s work on compiling the *Anales*; “The reference work is evidence that education in Uruguay is directed by capable and active men” (Pérez 1910: 301). The pride of state managers regarding their achievement is further indicated in data pertaining to the national literacy rate in 1908 (Pérez 1910: 127). Table A.10 show illiteracy rates among major Latin American republics.\(^{19}\) While I cannot comment on the illiteracy rate in other republics, I can empirically show that the illiteracy rate for Uruguay is fallacious. The 42.4 percent illiteracy figure came from a report filed by Abel Pérez, Inspector National of Education (1900-1916), in the *Memoria Correspondiente a los Años 1909 y 1910* (124-131). This data is problematic because Pérez defines literacy as “school attendance”. Conversely, the school aged children who are who are not inscribed in school represent the illiterate population. The report is extremely flawed resulting in

\(^{19}\) Same data Table appears in Araújo (1911:526).
inflated literacy percentages attributable to an errant ratio between the total school aged population and the population of inscribed students. In Pérez’s report on literacy, the school aged population, ages six to fourteen years of age— that is those eligible to be educated in public schools— is reported as 218,938 (Pérez 1910: 124).\(^{20}\) The report used 1908 data to tabulate the school population, defined as those children who receive instruction in public and private schools (126,104 children). Both of these figures are inconsistent with data appearing in the *Anuario Estadístico*.\(^{21}\) First, as indicated above, the only national census data available which could possibly identify the national population of school aged children (6-14 years of age) would have been the 1908 National Census. That figure according to the *Anuario Estadístico* is 225,262 (Tomo II: Parte III: 845; see Table A.11) and the actual matriculated student population data, confirmed by updated and more reliable analysis by Benjamín Nahúm and his team of researchers, in both private and public schools in 1908 was 89,582.\(^{22}\) Hence, using these figures and the definition of literacy adopted by Abel Pérez, the **literacy rate** in 1908 was

\(^{20}\) According to Pérez (1910: 127) and confirmed by *Anuario Estadístico* (1890: 1240), the official school age in this period in Uruguay was six to fourteen years of age.

\(^{21}\) Benjamín Nahúm, Director of Economic History at the University of the Republic (Uruguay), conducted a recent study (2007) in which he and his research team went back to original sources and attempted to reconstruct quantitative analysis of economic, demographic and social data in order to produce useful data tables reflecting up-dated and more accurate analysis. In the introduction to his five-volume work, he makes the following observation regarding the reliability of data collection in the era under study. “In many occasions, as historians we find ourselves with modern technical analysis, which is naturally scientific, and so different than what we find in the past such that those statistics in many cases fade away. That said, we do not want to say that the original statistics are totally reliable nor that actual studies using them are dispensable. To the contrary, the official statistics of the past at least until 1930s, were above all “Uruguayan”; that is to say, imprecise, approximations, ‘more-or-less’ and pertain to topics so important such as the population, education, and budgets” (Nahúm 2007 Vol.1: 5).

\(^{22}\) See Table A.4 (Nahúm 2007:99), which used up-dated education data reported in the *Anuario Estadístico*. 
39 percent (89,582 / 225,262); conversely the illiteracy rate was 61 percent, not 42.4 percent as reported by the General Director. To be more accurate, in Table A.10, Uruguay would have been situated below Argentina and above Chile. The report is even more disconcerting because, regarding the validity of the report, General Director Pérez states;

In order to avoid doubt— that this information may have its origins in presumption— this could be a legitimate claim, except that these data are of scientific origin. Therefore, it is necessary to proceed in this way, when one makes comparisons to other countries, one must accept the authority of these facts without discussion (1910: 131).

We know then that literacy calculations in this era are fallacious due to; 1) the definition of literacy; 2) miscalculations of the school aged population; and 3) miscalculations of the student inscription data. This revelation is important because it sheds much light on the overall status of education in Uruguay in the era being studied. In addition, it shows a discrepancy between what urban doctors convinced themselves had been achieved and the unmet need. Based on the intent to make public education laical, free and compulsory, the state did not experience success with respect to the third point. We know that;

1. Table A.4 represents the growth of the Total Student Population and indicates approximately a three percent increase of the student population each year from 1900-1950.
2. Taken at face value, the growth of the Total Student Population each year in absolute numbers (principally, the growth of the public school population since

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23 This evaluation is corroborated by related data. Apart from the demographic data associated with the national census of 1908, an educational census the same year reveals that there were 233,107 school aged children between the ages of six and fourteen years. This figure indicates that 37.6 percent (87,757 / 233,107) of school aged children were inscribed in primary school (Anuario Estadístico Tomo II, Part III: Censo de Educación: 938). Nahum’s (2007: 38) research based on 1908 census data identifies 237,263 school aged children between six to fourteen years of age which corresponds to a 36.9 percent of school aged children were inscribed in primary school.
the private school population was stagnant if not reduced) appears to support the notion that the public schools were moving toward universal matriculation. 3. Since reliable school aged population statistics are only available in 1908 (corresponding to the national census), the ratio capable of revealing relative growth of the state’s compulsory education objective is the ratio between the matriculated population to the total population over time. When the total population is compared to matriculated students, the resultant ratio shows that there was never more than a two-percentage point change between 1900 and 1950.

This is significant because if compulsory education was achieved over time, one would expect to see the ratio of matriculated students increase each year in comparison to the overall population. However, this is not the case. What these figures show is that the population was increasing each year due to natural (vegetative) growth, the student population increased as well, but the ratio of matriculated students compared to the overall population was relatively stable. In 1908, the population of eligible students (225,262; Anuario Estadístico 1908: Tomo II: Parte III: 845) was 21.3 percent of the total population, but only 8.49 percent were matriculated. This means that almost twice the number of eligible school-aged children was excluded from the educational system compared to the matriculated population. Several thousand eligible children each year were not being educated suggesting that even by 1920, forty years after reforms were enacted; the state was not close to achieving universal matriculation and literacy. The narrative supported by the data above suggest that national literacy could not have been nearly as high as reported in the Memoria Correspondiente a los Años 1909 y 1910 by General Director Pérez. Rather literacy was achieved by a small percentage of the national population; those that had been schooled. The need to increase the volume of matriculated students should have encouraged the state to look for collaborators in achieving their compulsory goals. The supply of schools and teachers was significantly
disproportionate to the demand of the eligible students, as created by the state policy of compulsory education. This should have led the state to view Catholic schools, the principle competitor to the state schools, as an ally and collaborator in achieving a common end. Yet the state did all it could to limit, impede and restrict Catholic schools thru legislation and regulation as we will see below.

On one level, state managers gloated over the growth of a centralized and bureaucratic education system. They convinced themselves that reforms had been successful. While reforms did achieve considerable expansion, it was nowhere as extensive as they had convinced themselves.24 In comparison to other Latin American republics, relying on fallacious estimates of literacy, Uruguay’s public school system appeared to excel. However, when comparing Uruguay’s educational metrics to European states, state managers expressed concern over the lack of progress and rekindled the notion that Uruguay was a backward and uncivilized society to which centralized state

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24 Table A.5 considers the total student, teacher and school site population of both private and public schools between 1900 and 1950. Table A.5 reveals certain ambiguities regarding the expansion of these populations. Yes, there was numerical increase of the total student population between 1900 and 1950 in relation to every 1000 habitants. However, the total student population only grew by roughly 10 percent between 1900 and 1930. It peaked at 20 percent by 1940 and then began an annual decrease. By comparison, state records indicate that in 1872 there were 37 students for every 1000 habitants (Ferretjans 2008:177). This means that between 1872 and 1900, the total student population grew 116 percent. The ratio between the total population and the number of school sites is worse. In 1872, there was one school for every 1,837 habitants (Ferretjans 2008:177). By 1900 there was one school per 1,023 habitants indicating a 45 percent decrease in the number of habitants per school site. However, from 1900 to 1950, this positive trend reversed resulting in a 25 percent increase in the ratio between the total population per school site. The ratio between the teacher population and the total population shows broad fluctuations in the trend. Between 1900 and 1920, the ratio actually increased. From 1920 to 1940, the ratio fluctuated but overall shows a moderate decrease, however, it was not until 1940 that there was a consistent decrease in the number of habitants per teacher. What these trends reveal is that initial growth associated with school reforms between 1872 and 1900 were significant. When researchers reference the significant effects of school reform in Uruguay, their claim is supported by figures from the last quarter of the 19th century (Newland 1994: 452; Ehrick 2005: 35). However as Table A.5 indicates, in relation to the general population, growth of the student population was only moderate between 1900 and 1950, school site development worsened, and teacher population per general population did not grow consistently until 1940. Under batllismo, when multiple administrations made substantial investments in education (1900-1930), the metrics in Table A.5 indicate moderate growth (Nahum 2007:222). For investment in education under batllismo, see Note No. 27.
education was the answer (see Table A.12). After 32 years of reform, Daniel Wolford la Rue (1909: 298) was still writing about the relationship between education and civilizing society;

In a word: the school is prepared to be an efficacious element of progress and civilization, because the student, with their compañeros, will realize in the coming years, an elevated social mission; to convert the deserts into a nation, towns into cities and all into a nation. The primary school is the first and indispensable element in the formation of the collective and civilized life.

The obsession with progress and civilizing society associated with education was a constant theme in the General Director’s reports (*Memoria Correspondiente* and *Annals of Primary Education*) as evidenced by the multitude of cross-national comparisons that emphasize Uruguay’s status comparatively to developed nations (see Table A.12; see other cross-national comparisons in *Anales* 1904 Tomo II: 32,33 and Pérez 1910: 132).

The comparative charts served as benchmarks of national progress. The publication of these comparative tables in the official state records served as reminders to urban doctors, who read such literature, of the on-going need to reform, improve and expand the centralized education system. Urban doctors and state managers, although having achieved measurable progress since 1877, regarded educational programs in developed and “civilized nations” as a model they wished to emulate. Emulation is reinforced by Edward Roge (1904: 35) who wrote,

Consider the amazing growth of the United States, the unyielding force that has achieved much in barely one century of existence, its fortunes and prosperity, presenting the example of miracles that operates thru the diffusion of education, that has woken up the sleeping activity of the entire nation (…). In all the nations, education is the power, the fortune and the source of prosperity.
Up to now, I have used data from the historical record to show:

1. Through the last quarter of the nineteenth century, motivated by the Law of Common Education, both the congregational and the state schools grew significantly when measured by school sites, number of professional personnel and by the student population served (see Note No. 24).
2. The state managers on one level gloated in their progress, especially when comparing their achievement to other Latin American republics; however, when comparing their achievement to western European republics, they realized that their education project was less impressive.
3. Data from the Anuario Estadísticos reveal that the perceived growth and effectiveness of the state schools was inflated. Only two-fifths of the available school-aged population was receiving an education which indicates that the objective to achieve a universal compulsory education was far from complete.
4. How do we explain why a robust and effective Catholic school system that was capable of achieving a quality product did not continue to grow?

In economic terms, these developments suggest that there was an unmet demand for education due to a vast supply of eligible candidates. Yet the supply of schools, administrators and teachers were insufficient to satisfy the demand (see Tables A.4 and A.5). Efforts to construct more schools, especially in 1907 and 1910 could only keep up with the natural population growth rather than diminish the proportion of unschooled children.\(^{25}\) At this point, the state managers should have recognized the market conditions of the educational economy. There was a demand for education far greater than the supply offered by the educational infrastructure. It was apparent that congregational schools were successful at marketing a product, targeting a market niche and attracting

\(^{25}\) The General Director’s report of 1910 shows an increase of 181 new public schools built in 1907 (Pérez 1910: 123-130). The same report, actually composed in 1909, refers to the construction of 210 new schools proposed for academic year 1910 speculating that the public schools would increase by 20,000 new students. Construction of 210 new schools was in accordance with the Law of Public Instruction No. 3156 and approved on April 20, 1907 (Pérez 1908: 94; Ugon 1907 Vol. 27: 444). Both Pérez (1910: 129) and Araújo (1911:526) speculated there would be 1,310 total schools (private and public) and 137,000 private and public students by 1911. However, data from Nahúm (2007: 99-100) show that the combined number of public and private schools did not cross the 1,300 plateau until 1927 and a total student population of 137,000 was not achieved until 1924. See Table A.5 (also see Pérez 1910; graph No.4 on page 129).
and maintaining a constituency thus creating a market culture that wanted what the congregational schools offered. Religious practitioners, at least the foreign ones, were willing to forsake their homeland, risk a trans-Atlantic crossing, and take further risk required to adapt and flourish in a foreign land and culture. This profile embodies a natural selection mechanism in that those religious workers who did make the transition successfully comprised a healthy, bright and dedicated labor force (Turcati and Sansón 2005). The fact that Catholic workers had to overcome numerous obstacles and pay a price for their vocation, least of which was a hostile state, meant that they needed little motivation to pursue their mission. The enterprising religious men and women in Uruguay embodied the type of work ethic and determination that the labor force in a developing country needed.\(^ {26}\) That congregational schools duplicated a service offered by the state and were able to capitalize on a receptive niche is proof that there was space in the educational market to offer an alternative product to the state.

One would think that enlightened state managers would have recognized the asset of having an alternative system that was productively engaged in educating Uruguayans and helping the state achieve its objective of universal schooling. Both institutions, the Church and the State, were highly motivated to produce an educated and patriotic citizenry and were working toward a common goal. In addition, congregational schools

\(^ {26}\) Even Varela (1964a: 187) adulates the sacrificial and exemplary devotion demonstrated by Catholic missionaries as a model for Uruguayan teachers to emulate when he wrote; “The truth is that in modern times, one sees much of the teaching profession desiring to become like a missionary, an apostle gifted with exceptional qualities and generous with continual sacrifice and superior to the general effort of ordinary people.”
significantly lowered the costs of education for the state (see Table A.6; and see Gordon 1989: 122; Kennelly 1984: 90). 27

Wolford la Rue makes an allusion toward this common goal in the *Anales de Instrucción Primaria*:

> The Church should be partially listened to. One of the more general affirmations that suggests a possible harmony between the Church and the State in terms of working together, are the spheres of religion and morality. Even when it appears sufficiently simple, we should remember that the public school is an institution of the state and belongs separate from the Church; with distinct zones. If one were to contemplate some type of alliance, such a union is not only impossible, but is not desirable (1909: 301).

Yet instead of creating a free educational marketplace — which would have had profound implications for the pluralistic society urban doctors sought to create— and maximize a benefit from the labors of congregational schools, state managers decided to develop a strategy of hindering, harassing, and discrediting congregational schools. In an extreme form, state hostility was expressed thru police repression (CLAC 1985 Tomo X: 52-54, 214-15) while milder forms were manifested in the refusal of entry-visas to...
foreign-born religious workers (CLAC 1903 Tomo XXVI: 91). However day-to-day
government bureaucratic interference in school operations through inspections and the
threat of non-compliance to irrational demands derived from anticlerical dispositions also
had a deleterious effect. When the state chooses to stigmatize and expresses official
disapproval for a robust enterprise like religious school, and the media further
exacerbates the state’s denunciation, public antagonism easily emerges (DSCR Tomo
257: 296-97). The media, as we will see, also joined in the attack on religious education
and portrayed congregations as deviant and illegitimate which contributed to shaping
public impression of Catholic education; especially in Batlle’s second term (1911-1915).
Urban doctor’s disposition toward congregational schools will be presented in discursive
analysis that follows. First I will present specific criticism that frequently appeared in
official documents recorded by state managers. Most frequently, criticism appears as
anticlerical discourse that reinforces ideological representations held unanimously by
urban doctors and members of the anticlerical press. Discursive images and tropes reveal
an internalized anticlericalism that found its way into multiple levels of the educational
system and popular sectors. Second, I will evaluate whether or not criticism by urban
doctors was warranted or if it was simply anticlerical demagoguery. Third, in chapter six
I will show how state managers used legislative regulation to disable competition
represented by Catholic congregations. State bureaucrats had unlimited discretion to use
parliamentary processes to impose sanctions and restrictive policies for which Catholics
had little effective recourse and constitutive protections.
Discursive Anticlericalism

Anticlerical discourse is framed within two primary sources of state literature; *Anales de Educación Primaria* were a compiled annually by the National Inspector of Education and contained a collection of district reports on the status of education in each particular geographic district, summaries of the year’s amendments to education laws, commentary and analysis on pressing issues germane to education that year. Second is the *Memoria Correspondiente Anual por Abel Pérez*, National Inspector from 1900-1916 who annually compiled statistics, commentary and analysis supplementary to the *Anales*. Together, this collection of literature represents the best source of data from which to understand and reconstruct the intellectual currents of the day corresponding to the field of education. These collections reveal recurrent anticlerical dispositions toward the Catholic educational enterprise in all its dimensions.

There were numerous instances in which the author simply demagogued religious schools. For example, it was not uncommon to find congregational schools denigrated and considered repositories for students for whom there was no space in the public schools due to an insufficient number of schools. One such case was cited by a Trustee of the Inspector’s office (*Anales* 1903: 280) who speculated that the literacy rate would not increase that year because these students attended private schools “where students will not be taught to read or write, nor speak in the Castilian tongue as established in the Law of 1878.” He states that these schools “constitute a real danger and consequently, deserve serious concern if one is interested in the education of the nation” (*Anales* 1905: 281).28

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28 The term “private school” appears regularly in the state records and can refer to the domain of private laical schools or to confessional schools or both. The context usually determines exactly which type
In one of the more polemical essays against confessional schools, Hipólito Coirolo (1931: 56-57) accused confessional schools of “enslaving the souls of children” in comparison to laical schools which are “moral and liberating”. He suggests that confessional schools “impose ideas that should be accepted without discussion” while “violating the conscience of the child”. He accuses religious schools of being materialistic to the degree that “many religious practices are external rituals lacking idealism.” He reiterates possibly the most widespread critique that religious schools were “undemocratic and unscientific.” These critiques were unanimously held by urban doctors and, although I will present counterfactuals below, it is sufficient at this point to remind the reader that Coirolo was addressing primary education which targeted students between the ages six to fourteen years old of whom the vast majority of students in Uruguay who did attend school (90 percent), only attended three years of school and for only six months of the calendar year (Roge 1904: 34; Varela 1964b: 110). When put into perspective, the principle objective of primary education was to produce literacy, not to produce philosophers. Hence, Coirolo’s critiques must be understood in the context of educational objectives constrained to three years of elementary education. Not only were religious schools disparaged, but parents were frequently treated with acrimonious language because they opted not to place their children in state schools. For example, the National Inspector writes; “Those schools [private schools] arise out of the ignorance and stupidity of many parents who are uncomfortable with their children in the home” (Pérez 1906: 40). Of school the author is referring to. The textual material used in this section of analysis was chosen because the authors were directing their comments specifically at religious schools.
18). In a similar attack on parents who would place their children in religious schools, Coirolo (1931: 54) writes:

Many children can be, in effect, deformed and damaged by parents that are ignorant and stupid for believing that they know something about what a human being should be and that they cannot correct anything in their determination to oblige their children to follow the same route as they have.

Statements like these reflected an elitist disposition among state managers. It is clear from these writing that the urban doctors believed in the superiority of state schools. The state records imply that urban doctors viewed a two-tiered educational system in which the state schools were deemed preeminent.

In rigor, there does not exist another school, apart from those funded by the state, an education completely mental, clearly distinguished in all of its circles, and with a single mission; to form free men and consciences, capable of contributing effectively to the enlargement of the nation (Pérez 1906: 22).

Meanwhile society authorizes in its bosom, the formation of two distinct mentalities that are always opposite, one which exists in the private schools and one in state schools; yet primary education does not fulfill the true function of imposing civilization. When a state is ideally socializing, the private does not exist, everything is public, popular and laical. Morality becomes integrated into a political morality. Private morality does not ever serve to find, sustain, enlarge and perpetuate civilization; it is sterile and scrupulous, manic and subjective (Coirolo 1931: 54).

While referring to the socializing function of schools in theoretical and abstract terms, several urban doctors evaluated Catholic socializing pejoratively and contemptuously. The author above indicates that a laical society is the product of the educational system and the laical school is merely a step toward that outcome. In the same paragraph, Coirolo challenges the notion that parents have a vested interest and right to make educational choices for their children in lieu of the state’s project.
In contrast to the family which maintains the presumptuous right to educate their children, society is the only educator such that society is the end of education which is repeated in the legislative applications and cements the fundamental idea of social pedagogy (1931: 54).

One of the sources cited most frequently by urban doctors because of its ideological content was a monograph composed by Grauert and Crosa (Los Dogmas, la Enseñanza y el Estado 1927). Approved by the Council of Primary and Normal Education, the work became standard reading in the teacher training school as a social theory of education (Caetano 2013: 168). In their introduction, they cite that the biggest obstacle in education is religious instruction. Referring to the socializing aspect of education, the authors suggest; “We believe in the merit of flattening the field for the sake of combat, where, without a doubt, we have clearly advanced the notion that the state should replace all the domains of private education” (1927: 14).

Elitism and exclusivity that framed the discourse of state managers emboldened the notion that the state’s intervention in education was not only their right, but their duty. Coirolo wrote, “It is due to the right and interest of the society to oblige the state to intervene broadly and decisively in primary education” (1931: 54). Convinced that civilized states owe their progress to state intervention, Emilio Fournier (1903: 279) writes “The history of the development of education in civilized countries is signaled by a major advance due to the intervention of the state, thus making it an obligation.” Furthermore, elitism took on a paternalistic hubris suggesting that the state needed to go so far as to liberate children from religious schools assuming that the state knew what was better for children.

We will not complete our duty as educators if we do not call public attention and the men in governance with regard to the sad situation and
unjust intelligence that the children who affiliate with religious schools suffer. It is necessary to uproot the slavery these children are under (Coirolo 1931: 57).

In closing his essay, the author suggests the idea that all institutions of education should be dependent on the state and thus derive their inspiration and institutional program from the state model. The author suggests; “The teaching that is imparted in primary schools, be they public or private, should be laical and confide in the state” (Coirolo 1931: 57).

Biases of urban doctors can be attributed for three specific grievances; congregational schools were inadequate, anti-scientific and anti-democratic. First, grievances include insufficient personnel that placed schools in violation of the General Regulation;

Renting a house, they even lack teacher helpers (*maestras auxiliares*) that attend dutifully their students. The General Regulation of Schools accords to school directors the right to a teacher helper when student inscription exceeds seventy students, and one for each forty students beyond (Pérez 1910: 129).

Although this reference is not made to a specific case that appeared on the Inspector’s ledger, rather it references a generalized claim. Similar, and more severe if true, critics suggest that Catholic schools were deficient pedagogically and operationally. A national inspection policy was in place—resulting from reforms stemming from the Law of Common Education (Articles 25 and 26) — for the purpose of conformity. It is within the duty and right of the state to legislate lawful means in order to secure its permanence and self-preservation by furnishing young children under its jurisdiction an elementary education. School inspection was an attempt to provide quality control over the total educational system in order to use the state’s surveillance powers to assure some degree of regularity, standards and excellence in education (Burns 1912: 228). That said, school
inspection was an art perfected over time. By early 1900s the inspection apparatus and process was well developed. While inspection policy could be used to shut down or improve non-compliant schools; it was also capable of being abused. The state literature reveals legitimate concerns over clandestine private schools (Pérez 1906: 18-22), however, the literature frequently does not distinguish between illegitimate and legitimate private schools that operate equal to or excel state standards. At the same time, inspection policies can be used as a hammer to harass and intimidate schools the state wished to target. How the state used inspection policy to harass will be shown below as well as Catholic school compliance and excellence. It is sufficient to say here that in numerous accounts in the state’s record, collaborators accused Catholic schools of inadequacy due to unenlightened pedagogy, as reinforced by Wolford la Rue; “The Church [and by extension the school] in its instruction is anti-pedagogical and disorganized about everything in its mission to impose mature ideas and habits on the conduct of children” (1909: 302).

It was obvious from the state literature that the Inspector’s office felt compelled to provide close surveillance of religious schools in order to assure compliance. The educational model and expectation however was so rigid that it barely allowed for differentiation and autonomous identity.29 Between 1908 and 1932, there were numerous attempts by the state to suppress religious instruction in religious schools and thus

29 The danger in conformity is that under the guise of standards and school expectations, differentiation is suppressed in the name of standardization. Gabriela Mistral observed the homogenization effect Argentinian schools and in her prolog to the work ¿Como Educa el Estado a tu Hijo? she wrote; “The state should conduct a census of its population by creed and finance 100, 80 or 50 schools for each confession. It is necessary to serve the heterogeneous masses but instead, [the state] facilitates homogeneity” (prolog to Barcos 2013(1927): 266).
remove the comparative advantage that differentiated religious schools. Abel Pérez, during his tenure as National Inspector reflects this imposition when he wrote:

According to the policy of primary education, decreed by the state as one of the manifestations of its supreme mission, derives the imperative need to be vigilant over the private centers of education. In the name of this organized mission, vigilance includes; normal instruction, decreed programs, fixed methods, established schedules; therefore, it is logical that vigilance for these procedures be regulated in private instruction (Pérez 1906: 17).

When General Inspector Blas Genovese wrote what would be a failed legislative justification for updating the inspection policy of religious schools, he specifically cited the pedagogical dimension. The proposal states; “The communities, congregations, associations, societies, etc., each one governs a small number of schools that function independently with regard to their administration; with regard to their pedagogical practices, they are not worth mentioning” (1933: 29).

The second principle grievance of urban doctors suggests that congregational schools were anti-scientific. The charge is made because Catholic orthodoxy accepts revelation as an epistemological source of knowledge which, when reduced to dogmas of the Church, are the basis of catechism memorized by school children.

The Church [and by extension the school] is guided by Revelation in order to arrive at definitive truth; at least religious truth. It does not favor the development of scientific methods of experimentation or laboratories in order to form its base of knowledge. Religious schools maintain an attitude of stagnation, fossilization and in plain determination has submitted to imperfection (Wolford la Rue 1909: 302).

The religious school is antiscientific and subordinates science to dogma and presents in its classrooms a political-religious struggle which only has resulted in precocious perversion of social sentiments (Coirolo 1931: 56).
In most instances, a critique is made contrasting religious dogmas and science. However, the dogmatic label is frequently applied to all instruction occurring inside religious schools as if all school subjects are taught as a matter of absolute speculation. Because doctors glorify science they claim epistemological higher ground and hence assume that a religious oriented education is incapable of attaining intellectual merit.

I do not know to what point, speaking of dogmas, there is a right to call a ‘dogma’ scientific when in reality, if science is characterized by anything, it does not allow dogma, because science is the combination of intellectual disciplines that contain a hypothesis verified by experimentation (Grauert and Crosa 1927: 8).

It is evident that behind all science there is a sum of cognitive knowledge referred to as ‘If God wills it’; so it is not necessary to use astronomy but God’s revelation in order to predict an eclipse (Wolford la Rue 1909: 306).

Third, urban doctors accused congregational schools of being antidemocratic. Urban doctors believed that the highest good that could be achieved by education was the preservation of the state by an active political class. This notion is reinforced by the Inspector when he wrote, “Nonetheless, it is admissibly true that the child should know the relationships that unite him/her to the homeland. A child should first feel the impulse of patriotism in order to select a political party by reflection, once they have reached a mature age” (Pérez 1906). Patriotism, political participation and civic idealism were the long-term return on the state’s investment in education and the laical school was the embodiment of these ideals;

Regarding the formation of good citizens, it is beyond a doubt and is verifiable that the vast majority of those who personify civic idealism in the country have passed thru the public schools. Within our form of governance, the exposition of a true democracy constitutes a civic lesson most important, and no other institution inspires the child in democratic and patriotic ideals as the state school (Wolford la Rue 1909: 306).
In contrast to laical schools, religious schools were apparently incapable of producing students who were patriotically engaged in civil society. Pérez (1906: 19) expresses these doubts when he wrote; “Between similar professors and parents that support private schools; how can they form students to fulfill the grand destiny of citizenship in an active democracy?” And Coirolo (1931: 56) adds that “the religious school is incompatible with democracy and unnatural to the essential purpose of education.”

Taken at face value, arguments against congregational schools might be plausible, however, most of the complaints were conjectural, based on subjective analysis, innuendo and antidotal evidence. When considering the doctor’s pejorative discourse based on quantitative analysis, the weakness of their arguments and biases becomes more apparent. For example, *asistencia media* is a category of students who are inscribed but do not attend school fulltime. This practice and status was discouraged because it was associated with arbitrary and unstable school management. The National Inspector suggested that *asistencia media* translates to a school that is “chaotic, disorganized and lacking in a vision” (Genovese 1933: 29). This association was ascribed to religious schools in several reports that appeared in the state record (Pérez 1908: 85; 1906: 16, 28; 1910:112). The statistical category was first introduced in a circular distributed to all schools written by Pedro Stagnero, the Adjunct National Inspector, on October 21 of 1903 (*Anales* 1904: 691). The category *asistencia media* was specified in an up-dated form used to record data on students, teachers, schools, etc.. After 1904, *asistencia media* data began to appear as a regular statistical category in the *Anuario Estadístico*. Data from state records show that from 1906-1908, *asistencia media* in public schools varied from 71.9 percent to 72.4 (Pérez 1908: 91). In contrast, private schools in 1906 are reported with an
asistencia media of 80.89 percent and in 1908 at 77.9 percent (Pérez 1908: 84). There are two important aspects to note that appear in the record. First, assistance media in public schools was trending upward, while in private schools, it was trending downward. In 1923, public school’s rate was 75.1 percent while private schools were 78.1 percent (Breve Evolución Histórica 1958: 4). However, the year that really counts was 1908 because that was the year of the national census and in the National Inspector’s own account;

In the Memoria of the previous years, a lack of confidence in the statistics characterizes the data realized in outdated methods, (...) however, in the year 1908 the data have a presumptively better preciseness because data had been controlled by those responsible for the national census (Pérez 1908: 85).

In 1908, when the data is most reliable, asistencia media in public schools was 72.4 percent nationally and 78.8 percent in Montevideo (Pérez 1908: 27) while in private schools asistencia media was 77.9 (Pérez 1908: 84). The point here is that the difference in asistencia media between public and private schools is marginal. Yet on more than one occasion, the National Inspector used the discrepancy in asistencia media figures to justify vigilance and inspections of the private school sector but no mention in regard to the public schools. After reviewing asistencia media figures in 1906, the National Inspector wrote; “The creation of this responsibility that one would entrust to a competent inspector, would permit the correction of many grave defects and compensate for deplorable omissions in private schools” (Pérez 1906: 17). The case of asistencia media serves as a good example of the biases held by state managers toward the private sector in general and Catholic schools in particular.
Were the grievances of the state managers toward religious schools warranted?

Demagoguery and innuendo aside, were the accusations against Catholic schooling substantive? This is an important question to resolve. If the schools were weak institutionally then organizational causes could explain their failure to grow and remain influential and relevant in Uruguayan society. Were Catholic schools organized effectively to achieve a high level of education? Did they employ archaic and outmoded pedagogy relying on dogmatic approaches to learning? Was the content of their instruction constrained by religious discourse? Was instruction anti-scientific and surreptitious to democracy as urban doctors claimed? These questions are representative of the more substantive critiques among urban doctors who convinced themselves that Catholic schools were neither adequate, efficacious for progress, nor a civilizing force in Uruguayan society. This section seeks to present counterfactuals which demonstrate that critiques by urban doctors were without substance and represented nothing more than anticlerical bias, prejudice and malice.

1. Organizationally:

Organizationally, we know Catholic corporations were organized in such a way that gave them several advantages over top down, bureaucratic, and centralized state structures. First, although ultimately under the authority of the Pope and bishops, the teaching congregations that came to Uruguay were small and flexible units enabling leaders to enhance organizational performance by emphasizing apostolic community life, stressing organizational simplicity which was streamlined, focused and able to emphasize a few achievable goals thus avoiding excessive diversification that that can lead to
inefficient management of resources (Budros 2002: 313). Historically, teaching congregations were semi-autonomous communities driven by the goal of establishing high quality education (Kennelly: 1984: 87, 89). Organizationally, religious congregations were; 1) decentralized houses dependent on a common central establishment bound by a common rule; or 2) houses of men and women religious which were independent in governance but living under a common rule (Burns 1912: 21, 24). This organizational form meant that there was great diversity among the local houses of sisters and brothers. Some were more closely aligned to the central governance and others were not. The teaching communities inherently had internal governance that emphasized a collective and participatory approach to achieving goals. As a unit of organization, communal structure was designed to solve practical problems such as sponsorship, land acquisitions, buildings, school management, etc. (Burns 1912: 20). This organizational form had a long standing tradition among religious orders and was emblematic of the Hermanas de Caridad, Las Hermanas Capuchinas, Las Hijas de María Auxiliadora, Salesian Brothers, and other communities that operated in Uruguay (Vener and Martínez 1998; Monreal 2005, 2010). The result of strategic structuring gave religious congregations a comparative advantage by focusing on the quality of a limited number of products. By establishing a market niche, congregations concentrated efforts on product design (teaching structure, delivery, production) geared to satisfy constituency that resulted in a consolidation of market shares, and also led to expansion through

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30 By singularity I mean that teaching congregations were devoted to the task of education and differentiated from cloister and other duties.
reproduction of its organizational units.\textsuperscript{31} With such a diverse field of religious orders – each with vocational traditions, objectives and specializations — meant that varying religious orders could diversify and target specific demographics (young men, young women, the poor, working class children, orphans, etc.). As a result of the organizational structure, teaching and religious communities functioned more democratically than the top-down, bureaucratic and centralized state education system that imposed a one-size-fits all educational system on the Uruguayan population.\textsuperscript{32} The state operated by coercion utilizing legal means to enact polices which were enforced by surveillance and police power as we will see below. Organizational research has shown that in competitive markets, firms do better by relinquishing overly diversified assets and decentralizing by encouraging the autonomous development of smaller divisions that gain greater control in decision making, organizational development and planning apart from the corporate center (Budros 2000: 313). In contrast to congregational schools, the only way that state education could grow was to eliminate competition and increase market shares thru monopolization of the educational field. Open competition could have been an impetus to structure the state’s organization in such a way that would have led to greater organizational efficiency. Instead, the state opted for hegemony.

\section*{2. Capable and Competent Teachers}

\textsuperscript{31} See pages 194-196 above where I show the expansion of schools by teaching congregations in Uruguay.

\textsuperscript{32} Many of the foreign men and women religious came from emerging democratic states and systems in the nineteenth century and were accustomed to the human values introduced by Jansenism (Lozano 1989: 125).
The charge that religious schools were inadequate was fueled in part to inflated hubris among urban doctors based on ignorance and prejudice toward religious personnel. State managers failed to understand the European cultural context that produced a shift in religious orders that gave rise to teaching congregations and the significant assets that teaching congregations represented. Religious congregations were structured as sodalities – that is religious orders consisted of religious virtuosos (Wittenberg 1994). Sodalities are effective when they can construct a niche among motivated persons who will resonate with the collective emotions, beliefs, and practices of the sodality that in effect, represent an alternative to the status quo. Whether the sodality is conscientious of its efforts or not, success depends on a “marketing strategy” that can attract resources and personnel who are able to orient production of a specific service or product to particular types of consumers and clients (Wittenberg 1994: 48). One aspect of niche construction is developing a common and collective discourse of meaning that attracts support among sympathizers. Religious orders derived their identity from the specific work in which they were engaged. Each particular religious order, especially during the Catholic revival in Europe (1810-1880), maintained a particular ministerial emphasis, be it education,

33 A sodality, by definition, screened applicants from the Catholic modality who wished to affiliate with religious orders by establishing certain criteria for affiliation. Criteria varied by religious community. The novitiate period was a provisional timeframe to further evaluate the fit between novitiate and the charisms of the order. Hence, novitiates who achieved entrance and an assignment had gone thru a supervised process of personal development. Even if novitiates entered the sodality with ulterior reasons, they were trained and professionalized according to the charisms, specializations and demands of the religious orders (Gibson 1989: 120; Kennelly 1984:88; Cada 1979: 72).

34 As opposed to seeking spiritual perfection or seeking the grace of others, 19th century religious virtuosos frequently affiliated with religious orders as a protest against church laxity or abuses – one of the many grievances that urban doctors held about Catholicism in general (Wittenberg 1994: 14-15).
paramedical care or social work among orphans, the elderly and the poor. Novitiates who joined a teaching congregation did so with the expectation to teach.

The social class of novitiates and their subsequent professionalization goes a long way in explaining why they were more than adequate to teach. Most researchers suggest that the class background of religious community members in the 19th century varied from community to community and decade to decade making it difficult to suggest that seminarians and novitiates came from one particular social class (Wittenberg 1994; Gibson 1989; Coburn and Smith 1999: 85-6). That said, we know that; 1) older communities (i.e., Jesuits, Benedictines, Carmelites, Visitandines) recruited from aristocratic classes and old landed families (Gibson 1989: 116; Wittenberg 1994: 68); 2) nineteenth century foundresses of new orders tended to come from higher socioeconomic backgrounds (Wittenberg 1994: 68; Gibson 1989: 118); 3) newer and socially oriented orders such as St. Vincent de Paul changed the recruiting landscape by accepting members from plebian classes such that orders dedicated to serving the poor and sick did recruit among peasants and working classes (Burns 1912: 117; Wittenberg 1994: 68); and 4) one of the distinctions among teaching congregations that emerged in the 19th century is that communities were economically self-sufficient. A dowry still drove teaching orders to prefer recruits from more affluent segments of society, however, it became less of a demand over time (Clear 1987: 88; Wittenberg 1994: 69; Burns 1912: 117). Religious life in this era often provided a means of obtaining an education, ecclesial power or social status and was the only expression of virtuoso spirituality permitted to the non-ordained (Wittenberg 1994: 70). Gibson explains that many women were motivated to enter a novitiate because it offered sociability and a career. Men had numerous options
for sociability, most of which was the workplace. Association with a congregation gave women a function in life, security in old age, in some cases, dowry money was retained by the family (Colburn and Smith 1999: 71). In many cases religious congregations adopted a self-sustaining model thus eliminating the demand of a dowry as a requirement upon entry (Clear 1987: 88-90). Congregations had an appeal to women who essentially wanted to engage in social work and have a career.

The point here is that members of the teaching orders were also members of the educated class. Novitiates and seminarians came to their orders with a foundational education sufficient for further pedagogical training. According to Burns (Burns 1912: 211) regarding the training of novitiates, “every novitiate phase of a teaching order was a normal school.”\(^\text{35}\) The average novitiate lasted about a year, and much of this time was given up to religious exercises, however, previous to the novitiate, young candidates, according to the rules of the various religious institutes, were to be given several years, two at least, of instruction and vocational / professional training for their work (Burns 1912: 212). Kennelly (1984: 91) found that the novitiate lasted two years with the second year dedicated to part-time teaching. Carol and Smith (1999:74) found that the second year was a “House of Study” in which novitiates engaged in a curriculum consisting of Christian Doctrine, Reading, Rhetoric, Grammar, Mathematics, Astronomy, Philosophy, Physics and Music, Writing and Drama. The science of pedagogy was only slightly available in the communities’ training-schools. The adage extant in the communities was; (…) “anyone could teach well any subject that they had mastered themselves”

\(^{35}\) Two-thirds of religious congregations in this era consisted of religious women (Kennelly 1984: 88; Finke and Stark 1992: 134).
(Burns 1912: 212). While it is true, that the teaching congregations were primarily a spiritual body whose principle objective was the spiritual advancement of its members, however, it was also an “organization of teachers.” As an organization of teachers, Burns (1912: 210-11) cites that religious women were committed professionals; they were committed to continual progress, better equipment and better methods of instruction. The point is that seminarians and novitiates came to Uruguay with social and cultural capital and were well positioned to teach primary school, and for the few who aspired, to teach secondary school.36

3. Pedagogy

When urban doctors embrace such statements as “…therefore on behalf of the majority of the nation, as for those many who dedicate themselves to teaching [in private schools], they have absolutely no knowledge of pedagogy” (Fournier 1903: 281). It is obvious urban doctors must not have read the pedagogical literature developed by Francisco Bauzá. Bauzá as a Catholic layman and intellectual was responsible for developing the pedagogical principles applied in the confessional schools. Bauzá was a recognized educational specialist to the degree that he was considered for the position of National Inspector by President Máximo Santos when Jacobo Varela renounced his position in 1882 (see pages 186-187). Santos appointed Jorge Ballesteros instead. Hence, Bauzá moved on and founded the Instituto Pedagógico; a pedagogical institute designed

36 There were only 320 public secondary students nationwide in 1900 and the secondary population did not reach 1,000 until 1910 (Nahúm 2007: 119). By 1920, there were only 5,989 secondary students nationwide in a total of 24 secondary y preparatory schools. Hence, secondary education was very slow to develop in Uruguay and was an exception rather than a norm (see Nahúm 2007: 119 and Breve Evolución Histórica del Sistema Educativo 1958: 3).
to provide teacher training to teachers in Catholic schools. Uruguay did not have a Third Plenary Council (1884) as they did in the United States which established expectations and provisions for normal school training for Catholic educators. However, Catholic educators in Uruguay did have the Asociación de Enseñanza Católica established in 1882 by the collaboration of Bishop Yéregui, Pbro. Luquese, and the Superior of the Hermanas Vicentinas. The purpose of the association was to promote superior studies for Catholic young people as a strategy to counteract various elements of The Law of Common Education that Catholics found egregious. The association created a Liceo Universitario that eventually became the Universidad Católica. The University offered a bachillerato in sciences and letters; law and jurisprudence; philosophy; literature; history and fine arts.

According to Pivel Devoto (1968: 262) the influence of this center of studies was considerable in the history of national thought, whose statute read;

> The primary objective of the Universidad Libre is to integrate a spiritual emphasis within the field of science in order to guide the conscience of young students to expose positivists systems and doctrines guaranteeing a scientific instruction consistent with the highest levels of human knowledge and in harmony with the progress and civilization rooted in a Catholic perspective (as cited in Pivel Devoto 1968 Vol.1: 262).

A significant aspect of the Asociación de Enseñanza Católica was its mobilization of Catholic lay leaders. The ecclesiastical leadership may have contributed spiritual guidance; however, the real leadership was in the hands of lay intellectuals and professionals in the area of education who used their status to promote Catholic education at every level. Their most important initiative was the establishment of the Instituto Pedagógico in 1884. Article one of the Institute’s Constitution reads:

> In order to promote the propagation of Christian instruction, it is necessary to multiply the number of schools directed by teachers who are
theoretically and practically Catholic, thus creating, with a purpose to fulfill both missions, a Pedagogical Institute under the auspices and legal protection of the *Asociación de Enseñanza Católica* (*Instituto Pedagógico: Memoria Anual* 1886: 4).

The Catholic Pedagogical Institute paralleled the Normal Institute initiated by Jacobo Varela, the second National Inspector of Public Education, in 1882.

### TABLE 5.1

**COMPARISON OF CATHOLIC PEDAGOGICAL INSTITUTE AND NORMAL SCHOOL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Catholic Pedagogical Institute</th>
<th>Normal Institute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership</strong></td>
<td>Dr. Francisco Bauzá</td>
<td>María Stagnero de Munar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Curriculum</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Literature</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Drawing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Geography</td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Zoology and Botany</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Sacred History</td>
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<td>5. French</td>
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<td>7. Rights and Duties of Citizens</td>
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<td>7. Geography and History</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Geometry</td>
<td></td>
<td>8. Psychology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Pedagogy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Catechism &amp; Christian Doctrine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Levels of Training</strong></td>
<td>Superior, Intermediate and Elementary</td>
<td>1st, 2nd, 3rd years of study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patronage</strong></td>
<td>Society of Free Catholic Education</td>
<td>General Direction of Public Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Districts</strong></td>
<td>Ten</td>
<td>Nineteen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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37 *Instituto Pedagógico: Memoria Anual*. 1886: 20

38 Pérez 1906: 122-123
The Catholic Pedagogical Institute, in addition to creating a normal school to prepare educators, founded primary schools. Similar to the state educational system, territory was divided geographically into sub-units (comisiones) under local leadership which managed schools locally. By 1885, the Institute had initiated four schools in Montevideo, three in Canelones, three in San Jose, one in Rocha, one in San Vicente de Castillos, and one in Thirty-three (Pivel Devoto 1968: 265-6: Monreal 2000: 83). In 1887 two schools were founded, in San Ramona and Carmelo, and ten geographic districts had been achieved (Pivel Devoto 1968: 279). The educational continuum of the Catholic normal school consisted of three years of preparation (elementary, intermediate, superior) such that after one year, a student achieved the title auxiliary, after completing two years, ayudante — only after completing the three year program did a student receive the title of maestro. Teachers in training could participate professionally in schools under the limits of their achieved title (Instituto Pedagógico: Memoria Annual 1886: 5). Schools linked with the Pedagogical Institute were encouraged to accept children of poor families as the constitution stipulates that “for every 50 pesos of monthly liquid income [by inscribed students] the school must admit 10 students of poor families (Instituto Pedagógico: Memoria Annual 1886: 31; Article 29; Pivel Devoto 1968: 271). An indication of the Institute’s autonomy is that Bauzá and other Catholic intellectuals developed their own textbooks to use in the Catholic schools. He saw problems with the public school books, particularly social studies literature, and redacted them with facts and features he acquired while writing Historia de la Dominación Española en el Uruguay (Pivel Devoto 39

This should have eliminated criticism that Catholic schools did not have teacher helpers as suggested by some urban doctors (see page 213).
Historian Pivel Devoto summarizes the achievements of the Instituto Pedagógico this way; “The creation of a Normal School; the redaction and publication of textbooks for instruction (…) with the objective that under one common direction has standardized the educational processes and texts and can help school directors make a rigorous program” (1968: 280).

Urban doctors viewed the Institute contemptuously by suggesting the Instituto Pedagógico produced a system that suffered from “a lack of discipline, an absence of manners, utilized knowledge acquired without a base of logic, teachings of others that require an advanced level of education in order to understand them” (Pivel Devoto 1968: 281). Generalizations noted above were consistent with the demagogic discourse of urban doctors which lacked substance. For example, why would a pedagogic program designed to train third grade teachers require a capacity to access advanced philosophy? This was the very complaint made by Stagnero de Munmar, Director of the Normal Institute, to Vaz Ferreira, the chief educational consultant to the National Inspector in 1909 (Ferreira 1910: 555-59). Stagnero de Munmar complained that the training program of the Normal Institute was excessively theoretical and compromised praxis to theory. In the course of responding, Vaz Ferreira points to the absurdity of demanding that a first grade teacher be required to know the compounds of the Periodic Table (as many as were known in 1910). The response by Ferreira was to give the Director of the Normal school more flexibility to adjust the curriculum to complement and emphasize the practical over theory (1910: 559). The point here is that the Instituto Pedagógico developed by Bauzá

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40 Bauza also wrote Compendio Histórico (1885), Deberes del Ciudadano (1885) and Nociones de Geografía Uruguaya (1886) to be used as textbooks for social studies.
should have ameliorated concerns expressed in the state record regarding pedagogical
efficacy of Catholic schools.

4. Anti-science

Possibly the most misleading grievance by urban doctors is that Catholic education
was anti-science.\textsuperscript{41} This criticism is directed at a Catholic worldview which, beyond
conventional science, supports extra-empirical explanations of social and natural
phenomenon. The basis of this criticism is not that Catholics reject science, but that
explanations of reality are not exclusively limited to empirical science. From an
analytical perspective, urban doctors espoused a mechanistic worldview (naturalistic,
materialistic, humanistic based on human reason) whereas Catholicism, both orthodox
and popular Catholicism maintained an organic world view to the degree that
assumptions of reality and explanations of empirical phenomenon are relational in that
theistic and cosmological relationships are the ultimate cause of observable
phenomenon— which can be analyzed both scientifically and theologically
(integrationists).\textsuperscript{42} It is probably more accurate to suggest that urban doctors generalized

\textsuperscript{41} As an advocate of science education, Soler wrote to his students; “Dear friends how you honor
our homeland and cooperate in the work of regeneration thru the means of a good education and in the
sciences! Do you not feel favorably toward the progress of our homeland? I trust that you will be diligent
and enthusiastic in these studies if you want to be wise. Be slaves to science and you will be crowned with
glory. Do you want to be free and true citizens? Be lovers of the truth and order as wise men say; honor
your homeland” (1877:76).

\textsuperscript{42} Keep in mind that at this time, although controversial, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin was engaged
in producing works, \textit{The Phenomenon of Man} (finished in 1930s, was published posthumously in 1955) and
\textit{The Divine Milieu} (finished in 1929, published posthumously in 1957) that integrated his scientific work
(paleontology and geology) with his theological and philosophical training. Although his works were not
appreciated by Church officials or the Jesuit Superior General at the time, he did demonstrate a pathway for
the reconciliation of Catholic theology and modern science that would eventually become recognized by
the Church and incorporated into Catholic Theology.
all of Catholicism based upon their criticism of popular Catholicism, which they saw as superstitious and folkloric. Catholic schools negated this criticism however since Catholic schools taught a full range of science classes in the third year of primary school that include physiology, anatomy, physics and chemistry (*Instituto Pedagógico: Memoria Anual*. 1886: 29; *visita ad limina* 1888: 14); in secondary schools (Liceos) the curriculum included astronomy, physics, chemistry, botany, zoology, mineralogy and geology; the Catholic University offered degrees in astronomy, physics and chemistry supported by a physics and chemistry laboratory (*visita ad limina* 1888: 14). However, the strongest counterfactual to this charge lies in the contributions made by Uruguayan Catholics in the area of science on the national level (Vener and Martinez 1998: 68-70).

1. In 1882, Pbro. Luis Lasaña, founder of the Colegio Salesian Pio Villa Colón, installed the first meteorological and climatological observatory in Uruguay used to study atmospheric phenomena (Vener and Martínez 1998).
2. Instrumentation consisted of an anemograph to measure the wind speed and direction, ozone meter to measure ozone concentrations in the air, psychrometer to measure relative humidity, a nephoscope which measures the altitude, direction, and velocity of movement of clouds. Instrumentation was brought by the brothers from Italy.
3. The findings were employed to assist navigation in the Montevideo harbor by predicting the climate thus facilitating trade and commerce thru a phone line covering 10 miles between the observatory and the national post office.
4. In 1886, Padre Luis Morandi superintended the observatory which became the National Meteorological Observatory, establishing a network of state offices in key maritime positions to inform navigation of daily developments (Morandi 1900; Morandi 1911).
5. In 1888, a second observatory was established at Nuestra Señora del Rosario in Paysandú. It became a site for the development of an astronomy laboratory.
6. In 1905, the observatory was nationalized as the National Physics Institute of Climatology (Morandi 1911). Under the direction of Padre Luis Morandi, the Institute developed a study of seismology, earth magnetism, and average rainfall (*media pluviométrica*) (Morandi 1905).

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43 Precedence for contributions by Uruguayan Catholics to science began with Padre Dámaso Antonio Larrañaga who is still recognized for his contributions as a first class botanist (Camusso 1922).
In addition to the observatories that became national scientific resources, in 1882, Prbo. Lasaña founded the Museum of Natural History which became centers for physics and chemistry research using first class instrumentation brought from Italy. Students at Colegio Pio Villa Colón were the first to benefit from the scientific contributions and in turn, became an impulse for further scientific development in Uruguay (Venner and Martinez 1998: 69). Prbo. Lasagna and the Salesian utilized knowledge about the climate produced by the observatory to improve the agriculture industry in Uruguay which had profound economic implications. As Colegio Pio’s agriculture and horticulture advances increased, it resulted in awards for it wines, honeys and liquors. The biographer of Monsignor Luis Lasaña wrote in regard to the agriculture advances;

The success was brilliant! The grapevines, be they Italian or French, that were cultivated according to the Guiot system, produced on average 14-15 kilograms more per vine and the wine was excellent, winning exhibitions in Genoa, Chicago, and Montevideo (Albera 1906:173).

The Salesian contribution to science continued. In 1889 Padre Nicolás Juvenal, professor of physics at the Salesian school in Paysandú created the first radiotelephone in Uruguay and began to transmit thru the stations CX1 ID and later CX1 IH (Vener and Martinez 1998: 70). Although the Uruguayan economy was driven by cattle breeding and agriculture commodities, there was no agriculture school. Many affluent families of Montevideo sent their children to Europe to study agriculture. In 1897, the Jackson and Buxareo families donated 150 hectares of land to the Salesian Society for the establishment of an agricultural and industrial colony in order to develop a Superior School of Agriculture (Albera 1906: 382; Vener and Martinez 1998: 66-67). The site
became a basis for integrating the climatological data generated by the Salesian observatory to develop better and more productive agriculture methods.

The summation of contributions by certain Catholic orders serves as a counterfactual to the urban doctor’s criticism that Catholic schools were anti-scientific. Not only were certain religious orders at the forefront of scientific development, but their contributions were significant both nationally and internationally. When the Trustee of the National Inspector’s office (Wolford la Rue 1909: 306) generalized; “It is evident that behind all science there is a sum of cognitive knowledge referred to as ‘If God Wills it’; so it is not necessary to use astronomy but Gods revelation in order to predict an eclipse,” it is obvious that he had no understanding of these scientific contributions made by religious orders in Uruguay. Besides the textbooks developed by Bauzá as a function of the Instituto Pedagógico, brothers with Hermanos de la Sagrada Familia were prolific textbook writers for both primary and secondary schools. Most noteworthy is Hermano Damasceno (known as H.D.) whose textbook *Ensayo de Historia Patria* was the standard history text not only for Catholic schools but was used by public schools as well (Gresling 2000: 85; Weinstein 1975: 38). First published in 1903, it went thru eighteen editions and was still the standard history text when Uruguay celebrated its first *Centenario* in 1930. In addition he published a Castilian grammar and a catechism contextualized to the national history of Uruguay.\(^{44}\) Brothers of the Sacred Family published standard texts for; arithmetic (Hermano Arsenio); geography (H.D); accounting, French composition-grammar, calligraphy (Hermano Gerásimo); and algebra

\(^{44}\) Other textbooks published by Hermano Damasceno include *Historia Americana, Compendio de Historia Nacional, Lecciones de Gramática Española*, and *Las Lecciones de Composición y Estilo.*
In all, the brothers knew how to systematize education and did so through a series of widely used school textbooks.

Thus, Catholics in Uruguay were able to achieve a quality school system (both primary and secondary) that negated criticism by urban doctors. Using any comparable metric—teacher training, textbooks, pedagogy, instructional content, student outcomes, contribution to society, etc.—Catholic schools were a viable, productive, and positive socializing force in Uruguay. The Catholic’s schools achieved a separate school system that was financially independent and solvent from the state; relying principally on the munificence of generous donors (see Table A.2). Decentralized sodalities had many organizational advantages to achieve educational objectives because they consisted of motivated and innovative actors. Although many of the religious men and women who came to Uruguay had to overcome difficulties such as the language, state generated anticlerical hostility, and ethnic variability, they were able to achieve a parallel institution that served the bourgeoisie as well as the emerging working class, the socially marginalized and the rural *llaneros* (Monreal 2005, 2010). The total impact of the Catholic system is best summed up by its chief architect, Francisco Bauzá in which he addressed the overall need for education in Uruguay;

> Our program of instruction has been adjusted to the most urgent necessities of a primary education. We are far from adhering to the exaggerations in vogue, that expect to transform each student in a program of atrophying intelligence with regard to knowledge foreign to their age, repulsive to their natural curiosity, and inappropriate for their station in life. As we educate the majority of children we attempt to imbue instruction that is useful for the practice of everyday life while preparing them to earn a living (as cited in Pivel Devoto 1968 Vol.1: 268).
CHAPTER SIX

REGULATION AND MONOPOLIZATION BY THE STATE

How then could the state be a defining feature in social policy? The state had to seize the initiative from private actors thru social policy. Consider the decentralized and private education initiatives managed by private corporations. Since the state could not bring private funds and resources under its control, it did so by regulation. The State had a set of distinct advantages over private organizations including coercive power, material resources, and a more extensive reach enabling the state to draw larger numbers of people into its ambit. In order for private institutions to operate, it must do so by becoming involved in social policy making and discovering that the right to distribute social beneficence could be granted or imposed on by the state. In spite of the verifiable need and shortcomings of state education, rather than collaborate with the Church to overcome the need to extend mass education, the state sought to monopolize education. ¹ Reform set in motion a long trajectory in which the state began to chip away at the Church’s capacity to maintain a strong educational program; thru legislation, regulation and policy (inspections), and eventually the popular media. Educational reform in the hands of urban

¹ By “verifiable need” I refer to the supply of school aged students beyond the educational apparatus of the public system and by “shortcomings of state education” I refer to the challenge to achieve universal and compulsory education.
doctors resulted in a centralized, bureaucratic, coercive system, ideologically driven that sought to monopolize education thus eliminating competition.

In order to claim monopolization of the educational market, it is incumbent to demonstrate the following: 1) the conduct of the monopolist caused harm resulting in a restraint of social exchanges and productive activity (Peritz 1996; Gellhorn 1976); 2) regulation of the monopolist was unreasonable (Shenefield 2001: 16; Peritz 1996); 3) legislation or social policy imposed restraints on competition rather than promote competition among firms; or 4) an imbalance or inequality was created against competitors such that social conditions have been manipulated by a handful of power-brokers who were able to use political prejudice, coercion or caprice to enact social policy (Shenefield 2001:18-19; Sullivan 1991: 18).

Although they did not have a direct effect on Catholic education per se, two episodes took place that are indicative of what was to come and a portent of how the state could use its leverage against Catholic interests. Prior to the Law of Common Education, in 1873, representative Agustín de Vedia presented the Proyecto de Ley de Instrucción Pública that sought to remove any religious instruction in public schools. Article 73 read; “One will not offer nor tolerate religious instruction in any of the primary or secondary schools created by this law”.

The reaction by Bishop Vera was immediate and viewed the legislation more than a threat to the school curriculum, but to the Constitution of 1830 which legitimized Catholicism as the national religion (Article five). Vera wrote the following to legislators;

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2 “La Enseñanza Religiosa”, May 16, 1873. *El Siglo*. pg. 1
I believe it would offend the enlightenment of the honorable members of the legislation if I stop to demonstrate that the sanction of this piece of legislation would be a direct and unjust attack on the revitalizing principles of our sacrosanct religion, and for this reason it would destroy the bases of the fundamental articles of the Constitution. In effect, if one deprives the nation of religious instruction, if one negates even more, as one expressly prohibits those who provide religious instruction, to which all the nation has the sacred and inviolable right, from where will the respect and the commitment to constitutional principles come from? In what sense can one say that the state religion is Roman Apostolic Catholic?  

The project ignited a debate carried out in the newspapers. The newspaper of the day, *El Siglo*, not only supported the Vedia project, but advocated changing the constitution thus editorializing:

In the present situation, that which beseeches and that which is important, is returning the conscience to its rightful place, under the covering of state intervention. And for this, it is necessary to eliminate Article five of the Constitution and approve Article 73; the project of Vedia.

In response *El Mensajero del Pueblo*, the Catholic daily, responded with hyperbole;

“Alert the nation that one expects to root out the heart of your children at the price of religion. One expects to make the nation atheist!” A month later, the editors of *El Siglo* moderated their position conceding that;

How much more do we meditate over the serious and transcendental question brought to our attention by Legislation 73 of the projected law over public instruction presented by Señor Vedia? More and more we are persuaded that it is prudent to silence our scruples, to disarm our resistance and to buffer the law which modifies the constitution; which is the radical reform of Legislation 73.

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The legislation was not passed by the Congress; however, the incident had two implications. First, in 1877, when Varela introduced the Law of Common Education, his original intent was to establish an absolute laical school system based on criteria he had written previously in *La Legislación Escolar*;

> As a principle, we believe that they are erroneous who advocate dogmatic instruction or catechism in schools, of which ever positive religion, and consequently, we do not accept doctrines nor do we modify Article 59 which has served as a base for our opinions on the matter (1964b: 147).

However, when the articles were discussed in congress, legislation was finalized thus making; “the teaching of the Catholic religion obligatory in state schools, except for those students who profess other religions or whose parents, tutors or guardians oppose to receive it” (Article 18; as cited in Monreal 2000: 77). Possibly Varela had the Vedia incident in view when he explained;

> How do we achieve it? If we suppress Article 59 of our project, what result will we obtain? We can suggest it, remembering the Law of Education project presented to the House of Representatives by Agustín de Vedia in 1873. (...) But also this law gave rise to such a storm among those religiously committed and those who appeared to be upset, such that it was sufficient to hide themselves in fear with respect to the confidence they should have had, deriving their response to a law that gave rise to deep resistance when scarcely it had been published (1964b: 148).

Varella conceded to the popular will and to the influence of the Church thus allowing religious instruction (although with conditions for dissenters) and postponing an absolute laical school system for another day. Varela gave further justification for this concession in *La Legislación Escolar* (1964b: 147) when he wrote, “Our rationalization has been this; the majority of habitants of the Republic profess Catholicism and believe that the school would be heretical if catechism was not taught.”
The second implication from the Vedia incident is that proponents of Catholic education were served notice that they would have to struggle against the state in order to maintain the concept; liberty of education. The intensity of this struggle was reinforced a few years later in 1885. The Ministry of Government authorized the chiefs of police to imprison any priest or clergy who criticized political authorities or the laws.

Therefore, as ordered to the Chief of Police, that if a priest in your department, from the pulpit or in public meetings, produces subversive language toward the authorities and laws, the Chief of Police must imprison them with legal protocol, and render them to the disposition of the judge (CLAC 1885 Tomo X: 52-54).

It is important to note this action because it reveals a disposition of state managers toward dissidents and the law stigmatized religious workers as subversive to the state. It is indicative of how state managers used the law and legislation to harass and discriminate religious personnel (and schools by extension) whom were viewed contemptuously by urban doctors.

With regard to unreasonable state policies that imposed undue restraints on Catholic schools, the Law of Convents was the most egregious policy because it was broadly applied as a legal basis to interfere and harass the operations of Catholic schools. The Law of Convents originated as a Presidential decree by Máximo Santos on January 16, 1885 and was sent to the General Assembly for legislative consideration. The original decree by Santos was to prohibit the establishment of new convents or houses dedicated for a contemplative life (CLAC 1885 Tomo X: 12-13). Santos based his decree on the consideration that “such establishments are not expressly authorized by legislation of the Republic nor are they regulated in order to verify a utility to the state religion and society” (CLAC 1885 Tomo X: 12). Later that year, Santos presented an extended
proposal to the House of Representatives that included specific articles to be debated (DSCR 1885 Tomo 72). In the proposal, Santos suggests that religious orders should be “(...) suppressed in order to avoid their dangerous development; religious orders are associations without sense or practical function” (DSCR 1885 Tomo 72: 12). ⁷

Throughout the proposal, Santos’ language represents religious communities as surreptitious, subversive and a threat to “national sovereignty”. He suggests that the religious communities are antithetical to the “state’s mission to conserve public order” and that they “represent an obstacle to a democratic society like ours” (DSCR 1885 Tomo 72: 9). This last comment is humorous because Santos was a military dictator whose presidency corresponded to the authoritarian era of governance, 1875-1890 and included Lattore (1876-80), Santos (1882-86) and Tajes (1886-90). ⁸ The proposal to congress consists of ten pages of hyperbole and paranoia serving as rhetorical devices to summarize the history of monastic orders and convents referring to dates and historical references that are archaic. To support his position, Santos refers to; the fourth century when religious personnel “multiplied rapidly”; Austria’s Emperor Fernando (1365); Abad de Clairvaux (1763); the Council of Trent (1545); Saint Alphonsus Maria de Liguori (1816); Pope Clemet XIV (1773). The most relevant evidence Santos used to reinforce.....

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⁷ Santos and Cuestas write that “the society is alarmed by the invasion of religious personnel without permission of the state authorities, without control or regulation” (DSCR 1885 Tomo72: 7). At the time that Mons. Soler composed the visita ad limina in 1888, there were a total of 1,609 religious personnel consisting of members of regular and secular clergy, religious men and women of religious communities all under the authority of the Bishop (visita ad limina 1888: 2). In 1896, the same population of religious personnel had increased to 2,421 representing a 50 percent increase in eight years (visita ad limina 1896: 2).

⁸ Colonel General Máximo Santos was appointed president in 1882 by a General Assembly elected under his pressure, and his political entourage named him leader of the Colorado Party.
his proposal was a critique of the *Syllabus of Errors* (1864), which amounted to one sentence (DSCR 1885 Tomo 72: 13).

The Law of Convents was approved Congress in July 1885 who were evidently oblivious to the significant contribution made by religious congregations in the area of education and social services. Santos and Cuestas framed an argument against images of the Medieval Church, not the contemporary Uruguayan Church. Barran (1988:28) points out that at the time the Law of Convents was promulgated, there was only one contemplative convent in Uruguay; Monastery of Visitation run by Salesian nuns. It was established in 1856 by five religious women from France (Vener and Martinez 1998: 21-24; Monreal 2005: 79-81). In 1885, there were 41 nuns or one nun for every 10,000 Uruguayans. In Barran’s (1988:28) analysis, he compares the paranoia expressed by the law’s advocates to Don Quixote fighting windmills under the illusion that they were giants. The proposal by Santos however reveals a more subtle but common concern; that religious congregations were somehow antithetical to progress. Santos writes; “The activity of modern progress requires a turn to industry, work, to the arts, and to science. In the convents, physical strength and intelligence are stationary, sterile, and isolated. Instead of movement and change; properties are under dead hands” (DSCR 1885 Tomo 72: 7). Santos complained that convents and religious houses in general provided no useful purpose to national development and in fact fomented idleness (*holganza*). Cuestas told congress that religious congregations are supported by society and that the investment is withheld from productive ends (DSCR 1885 Tomo 72: 123). This last statement by Cuestas is clearly false. Religious congregations existed due to the sponsorship of generous donors and patrons. Abundant evidence exists that religious
congregations in Uruguay were financially independent from the state (see Table A.2). Advocates of the Law were unacquainted with the contribution religious congregations were making to the national objective of educating the Uruguayan population. I will remind the reader that according to historian Acevedo (1934 Vol.4: 458) in 1887 there were 74 Catholic schools with 8,144 students representing 16 percent of the total school population. According to Acevedo (1934 Vol.4: 459), the cost per inscribed public school student to the state in 1887 was 15.85 pesos. This means that the Catholic schools saved the state (8,144 students x 15.85 pesos = 129,082 pesos) 129,082 pesos which was 26% of the total cost of Public Instruction in 1887 (Also see Table A.6).

The Law of Convents legislation is an important event because it reveals how unaware urban doctors were of the shift that had occurred in religious communities in the nineteenth century. Gibson (1989: 105-106) references the shift citing the dramatic growth of the congréganistes over the traditional religieuses who were characterized by contemplative orders such as the female Cistercians and Carmelites. Gibson states that at the beginning of the eighteenth century, 11 percent of the female clergy were congréganistes, yet grew to 21 percent by the time of the Revolution such that by 1880, more than four-fifths of all women religious were congréganistes (Gibson 106-7).\(^9\) In comparison to the contemplative nuns who usually maintained a sedentary existence in a

\(^9\)Mills (1991: 44) discusses the feminization of the Church in France citing that prior to the Revolution, male personnel of the Church outnumbered female personnel by two to one. By 1878, a century later, religious women in France were 58 percent of the religious personnel in the Church. Both Mills and McMillan (1991:57) reference the work of Claude Langlois who studied the massive expansion in female religious orders between 1800 to 1880 and found approximately 400 religious orders emerged in that time frame with some 200,000 women entering religious life. See also; Susan O'Brien, “French Nuns in Nineteenth-Century England.” Past & Present. 1997: No. 154:142-180.
community with strict enclosure defined by spirituality and rules for communal life, the *congréganistes* were an active, mobile and an autonomous unit under the control of a superior-general (rather than male regular clergy) and whose dominant activity was teaching, nursing or other social service. Vows of congregational women were simplified consisting of celibacy, although poverty may have been implied, as opposed to solemn vows of chastity, poverty, obedience and enclosure (Gibson 1989: 106; Clear 1987: 78). One of the principle reasons for exponential growth of women religious in the nineteenth century was the possibility for sociability and collective action. Religious orders offered women a real vocation in life apart from obligatory motherhood. To those who became superiors, community life offered a career and the opportunity to provide leadership for bands of women directed at a major enterprise (Gibson 1989: 118). In France, Italy, Ireland and Spain, and the United States, religious congregations were the best if not the only possibility of a real professional career that an able woman of the nineteenth century had.

The result is that religious activity clearly became socially useful. The model of the cloistered convent and “rejection of the world” had been replaced by socially active women religious who dedicated themselves to apostolic service. Hence, teaching, paramedical care, and working with the poor superseded time consuming religious exercises and enclosure. The demand to educate young girls only created a stronger demand for the teaching services of women religious, especially since Catholic school tended to separate the sexes in contrast to mixed classrooms under Varela’s reforms. Bourgeoisie families desirous of secondary education for their daughters especially
valued schools such as Colegio María Auxiliadora, Colegio de la Inmaculada Concepción, and Colegio Sagrada Familia for young girls (Monreal 2005, 2010).

On the basis that religious congregations had no useful purpose and were a threat to society, the Law of Convents was approved by congress and became law on July 14, 1885. Religious teaching congregations were affected directly by two articles of the law. Article three states; “In case that existing men or women continue to conduct a contemplative life, the House under no circumstance, can add to the number of isolated residents nor add novitiates, even with the objective of opening primary or secondary schools” (DSCR 1885 Tomo 72: 8). This article precludes retiring brothers or sisters who, by virtue of their station in life, cannot retire in a community house. Novitiates desirous to enter a teaching congregation cannot take residence in a facility providing residence to the teaching staff. Article five was written broadly enough to include all religious schools; “All religious establishments, without exception, will be under the Office of the President in regard to all aspects that are related to hygiene and public order (DSCR 1885 Tomo 72: 8). This gave broad power and authority over every religious ministry, including the operation of schools, thus granting the state license to intervene legitimately or capriciously.

An example of the abuse of the Law of Convents occurred two weeks (July 30, 1885) after it was approved by Congress. The Hermanas de Buen Pastor, a community of Chilean nuns, founded a House in Montevideo dedicated to work with wayward women and in collaboration with the Hermanas de Visitación (Monreal 2005: 78-80). In 1874, the project was approved by Mons. Vera of Montevideo and by Chilean Archbishop Rafael Valdivieso. Seven sisters were named to initiate the project under Hermana Marí
de la Inmaculada Concepción Sánchez adding eight more in 1875. By 1876, the community installed its residence in Montevideo and in 1881, opened a school for impoverished girls. The school began with twenty students helped by the economic sponsorship of the Jackson Family. After the Law of Convents was passed on July 14, the Convent of Buen Pastor was the first convent to be inspected by government authorities. The sisters resisted the inspection resulting in a decree by Santos and Cuestas calling for the removal of the sisters. The decree on July 30, 1885 read; “The President has authorized the closing of the House of Exercises and Discipline, taking the measures necessary to fulfill the Law, resulting that the establishment named Buen Pastor has incurred the act of resistance and rebellion foretold by the law” (CLAC 1885 Tomo X: 214). The sisters went to Buenos Aires until there was a change in the Presidency. In April of 1886, the sisters returned to their convent in Montevideo and reinstated their school when President Tajes abolished the law. According to historian Acevedo (1934 Vol.4: 484), President Tajes cited the problem of an increasing number of underage women emerging among the underclass (lupanares) making it necessary to create a shelter for young girls and a prison for women patterned after a professional school. President Tajes placed the project under the auspices of the Hermanas de Buen Pastor who created three levels of social work; 1) an apprenticeship for girls under the age of ten; 2) apprenticeship and correction for underage women at risk of crime; and 3) correction of adult women (Acevedo 1934 Vol.4: 485).

What this account demonstrates is the unreasonableness and capricious use of the law by state managers designed to hassle, discriminate and impede the work of Catholic congregations. Because the Law of Convents could be interpreted broadly it could be
invoked at the whim of nefarious leadership wishing to penalize religious congregations or it could be ignored as was the case of President Tajes who abolished the entire law on November 30 1887 (Geymonat 2004: 275; Bauzá, *Law of Convents*, 1888).

The next time the Law was invoked punitively was by Juan Lindoflo Cuestas who became President in March 1899. In April of 1901, he decreed the absolute prohibition of entrance to Uruguay by persons with religious community affiliation who would emigrate from Europe (CLAC 1903 Tomo XXVI: 91). This was an overt attempt to cut-off the supply of religious workers who were stimulating Catholic service projects. In a Pastoral Exhortation, Soler called the action a “declaration of religious war” and “a threat to religious liberty” (as cited in Gemonat 2004: 287). The Presidential decree was the law of the land until it was abrogated by the Minister of Exterior Relations and Religion on April 8, 1903 (under President Batlle). In the abrogation document, Minster Romeu wrote; “The resolution is, not only contrary to the disposition of the law which was invoked, but that which is more grave, a violation of the constitutional precepts that protect equally all habitants of the country, guaranteeing the free ingress and egress of the national territory” (CLAC 1903 Tomo XXVI: 91). The Catholic daily, *El Bien* commented; “President Batlle y Ordoñez has demonstrated evidence that he is not an intransigent partisan nor is a governor lacking administrative capacities, and is not a despotic dictator full of passion and rancor.”

The Law of Convents did not go away. Thirteen days later (April 21, 1903), Representative Pereda attempted to reinvigorate the Law (DSCR 1903 Tomo 171: 233-36). Before the House of Representatives, he presented a list of religious congregations in

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Montevideo, supposed convents—although each was attached to a school and housed teaching staff. Pereda attempted to convince law makers that they should regulate these religious establishments under the authority of the Law of Convents. Pereda’s exposition to the lower house concluded by alluding that since the original decree by Cuestas and Santos, there has been no inspection of religious establishments, hence, he argued for the activation and enforcement (*cumplimiento*) of the Law. Although Pereda’s initiative in congress was not successful, the incident confirms that the Law was a menace to be used retributively and arbitrarily against religious congregations.

Batlle’s repeal of the Cuestas decree noted above is a curious event because the repeal occurred during Batlle’s first term in office (1903–1907) when he was diplomatic toward the Church. However, during his second term in office (1911–1915), President Batlle capriciously decreed the constitutionality and the advantage the Law of Convents which he used to harass and threaten religious orders resulting in a restraint of social exchanges and productive activity by religious congregations (RNLD 1911: 463-66). On May 15, 1911 (the 20th anniversary of Rerum Novarum), Batlle and his principle Minister Pedro Manini defended the broad application of the Law; including “monasteries, convents, hospices, and other religious institutions” (RNLD 1911: 464). They empowered a Commission of Inspections within the Ministry of the Interior and Religion (RNLD 1911: Article 1, 466).11 The Commission had the power to deputize state officials in rural areas outside of Montevideo in order to carry out such inspections. The decree states that “it is absolutely necessary to oversee a formal investigation in

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11 The group of inspectors consisted of urban doctors Abel Pinto, Jose Scoseria, Jacobo Varela, Eugenio Lagarmilla and Americo Riccaldoni. The Commission had the power to enter any house utilized by religious congregations including domestic residences (RNLD 1911: Article 2: 466).
fulfillment of the dispositions of the 1885 Law” however, the decree does not state a particular incident, cause or reason that warranted such inspections other than to “preserve the public order” (RNLD 1911: 463, 465). In the explanation of motives, Batlle invoked the “inalienable right of the Patronato” derived by Article 81 of the Constitution giving the state exclusive authority to intervene in matters of the Church. Once again, the Law of Convents was invoked to give license to irrational and unreasonable inspections of religious entities.

In response to the decree, Apostolic Administrator Isasa (Mons. Soler’s passed away in 1908) wrote to the Ministry of the Interior that the Law mistakenly referred to Houses of Contemplation and Exercise, none of which existed in Uruguay. Rather, all the houses in Uruguay provided residence for religious personnel engaged in teaching, paramedical care and auxiliary support for the priestly ministry. Isasa’s communique presented the following arguments; 12

1. After a quarter century, it was inappropriate to reactivate a law that was contrary to the spirit of national goodwill, contrary to the religious sentiments of a majority of the population, and one that was abrogated by previous administrations as an inescapable conciliatory measure [The Tajes administration repealed the law in 1888].
2. The official argument is inconsistent with the state’s obligation to uphold laws that have not been abrogated, thus contributing to the welfare of the social body.
3. The Law represents a contradiction of the government which should call into question the application of the Law of Convents given the Constitutional protection and rights ascribed to the National Religion.

*El Bien*, the Catholic daily, editorialized that, “without a doubt, the ill-fated Law of Convents, in contradiction to its noble antecedents, one could have expected Señor Batlle

12 Folder No. 8, fs. 68/72: Ricardo Isasa. May 27 1911 entitled; Note from the Apostolic Administrator of the Archdiocese of Montevideo, Ricardo Isasa to the Minister of the Interior and Cult, Pedro Manini Rios, Montevideo, March 24, 1911.
to elevate the unused and discredited law from twenty six years ago."  

The daily reiterates what appears to have been public knowledge, that “the law has no possible legal application in the Republic where there are no convents or houses of contemplation (religious exercises).” After more than a year the commission of inspectors experienced meager findings among the hundreds of religious establishments in Uruguay. On August 24, 1912, Batlle issued a decree containing the findings which were limited to two infractions of the law (RNLD 1913: 736-37); 1) The Convent of Salesas violated Article three because several sisters had entered the House after the promulgation of the Law in 1885; and 2) The Colegio de San Antonio was guilty of hygiene deficiencies. Furthermore, Batlle decreed that the Salesas sisters who entered after July of 1885 must vacate the establishment for a period of six months. In an article entitled “The Victims of Liberalism”, the editor identifies the fundamental problem behind the capricious use of the Law of Convents;

The regulation of the Law of Convents suppresses individual liberties, denies the right of association, insults human personality, and usurps the rights of the family making the line disappear that separates the sanctuary of the family and the state.  

The use of the Law as a unilateral Presidential decree imposed restraints on competition. Rather than promote competition among Catholic and public schools, the law contributed to social conditions which created an imbalance and inequality undermining competitors. One measurable effect of the law’s periodic enforcement, under Cuestas and Batlle, was that it effectively impeded the recruiting efforts to bring in new novitiates. It was

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important for the continuity of Catholic social works to engage new recruits. While the flow of European personnel from Europe helped to initiate and stimulate new works, it was not an effective strategy for long term development. At some point, the congregations had to be able to replace European born personnel who aged and retired with locally recruited novitiates. The Law, when imposed, threatened that effort. For example, Vener and Martinez (1998:40) cite that the Hijas de María Auxiliadora, operative in Uruguay since 1878, maintained a novitiate house in Villa Colón where new recruits were socialized into the religious order. Due to the spurious enforcement of the Law of Convents by Batlle, the five novitiates living in the house had to relocate to Buenos Aires until 1923 when they were reintegrated in Villa Colón. The effects of the law hanging over the head of all congregational activities are correlated with the difference between \textit{visita ad limina} 1888 and 1896; both documents were composed by Mons. Soler. The number of novitiates listed in these two documents dropped from 43 novitiates in 1888 to 29 novitiates in 1896; a span of eight years.

At the turn of the century, under the context of Batlle reforms, we have seen that the state had measured success in extending educational reform. In spite of efforts to achieve universal education and high levels of literacy, the majority of the school aged children were not receiving formal education nor were they literate; in spite of claims to the contrary. The un-met demand represented an open market in the educational field. Urban doctors envisioned a secular, republican and capitalistic society guided by a strong central state in which economic individualism /free trade were imperative for economic development. Batlle’s reforms placed emphasis on rational and empirical principles related to economic concerns and utilitarian governance by enlightened bureaucrats. One
of the economic limitations Batlle inherited as President was an economy that historically was not centered in manufacturing and production but in commodities—some agricultural but mostly pastoral—which were vulnerable to market fluctuations. One of Batlle’s economic reforms was to diversify the Uruguayan economy (Zubillaga 1982:178). One would think that the principles driving economic development might transfer to the field of education since the two were inexorably linked to national progress. But instead of diversification, competitive markets and entrepreneurism, the state’s attempts to incrementally monopolize education intensified such that social conditions were manipulated by a handful of urban doctors who were able to use political prejudice to regulate Catholic education thus minimizing competition and enterprise.

The first attempt under the Batlle regime to regulate the functioning of private schools came in April of 1902 by Representative Ricardo Areco. New regulation was presented with three stipulations;\(^{15}\)

1. Private school teachers must possess a teacher diploma expedited by the national or departmental authorities (Normal School diploma), subject to the current Law of Common Education.
2. Instructors must teach in Castilian Spanish.
3. Every school must register with the Commission of Education the school’s purpose, its location, the name and qualifications of teaching personnel including the director of the school.

The explanation of motives written in the legislation stated; \(^{16}\)

The effect of this law is to control and regulate private schools once and for all. If the private schools teach subjects and courses contrary to republican dogma, by reason of morality and hygiene, without exception they are subject to an official inspection and whose directors are obligated to submit reports and data to authorities.

\(^{15}\) “Por las Oficinas Públicas.” April 23 1902. Tribuna Popular. pg. 1-2.

\(^{16}\) “Por las Oficinas Públicas.” April 23 1902. Tribuna Popular. pg. 2
The Areco legislation was overtly directed at Catholics schools and was an attempt to limit those who taught in Catholic schools in two ways. First, the proposal reiterated the state’s enduring complaint and over-reaction to the use of foreign-born teachers whose first language was other than Castilian Spanish. This complaint persisted as a straw man however as argued above. Language differences were easily compensated for in the classroom. Second, it has been shown that the Instituto Pedagógico trained catholic school teachers and was more than equal to the Instituto Normal. It would have been an untenable position for the state to deny accreditation to the Instituto Pedagógico and hence withhold recognition of the institute’s graduates. The proposed law simply added an extra set burden requiring teachers to register with the state. However, the capricious nature of the state made that transaction unpredictable given the tendency of the state to use the law as a lever against religious entities it sought to control. The proposal’s motivation reflects a second persistent straw man created by the state; that congregation schools were subversive and surreptitious toward the state. This mischaracterization was exploited more frequently during the Batlle administration. Congregations supposedly represented a threat to nationalism because many members of religious orders were foreign-born and loyal to the Pope first, and the republican state second. It was easy for urban doctors to harbor conspiracy theories suggesting that religious schools were socializing a new and anti-republican Catholic elite who would assume control over key positions in the professional class, the bureaucracy and organize an attempt to undermine

17 See Chapter five: note No. 11.
the republic. In addition, urban doctors resented that religious congregation functioned with too much independence from the state; that is a state within a state. Therefore, urban doctors wished to assert the state’s right to control activities of religious corporations. It is important to note that under Batllismo, the centralized state expanded more rapidly than any time in Uruguay’s previous history. It was within the context of state expansion that explains why the state sought to exercise greater control over religious schools. Leading up to disestablishment in 1919, the state under Batlle regarded the Church as a department within the state apparatus which meant that the Church was absolutely subservient to the state and must be divorced entirely from civil life. The Areco project of 1902 did not prosper in congress but it was a clear indication of the hostility by certain legislators toward religious education.

In April 1908, the Gilbert project was initiated to fulfill Varela’s original intent of making the public school laical. Legislative discussion was predated by Dr. Ramasso (June 1908), a vocal to the National Inspector, who submitted a proposal to the General Office of Primary Instruction suggesting that, “both public and private schools should be laicized” (Memoria del Inspector del Inspector Nacional de Instrucción Primaria 1908: 172). Arguments in the General Assembly over the proposed law to suppress religious instruction and practice in public schools can be summarized in this way (DSCR 1908 Tomo 195: 128-141);

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18 Burns (1937: 177) cites that “The loyalty of the Catholic school and Catholic teachers to the [host] nation is a matter of obligation in the teaching of the Church.”

19 The increase of the state budget for the five year period before Batlle (1887-1902) was 14 percent. The increase of the state budget for the first five year period of Batlismo (1903-1909) was 28 percent (compare Anuario Estadístico 1902-03: Vol. II: 509 and Anuario Estadístico 1907-08 Tomo I: 912).
(Representative Vidal) – The proposed law is a contradiction because Article five of the constitution establishes Catholicism as the national religion, yet the law imposes punitive action (Article two: suspension and destitution) against teachers who violate the law.

(Representative Ponce de Leon) – Reiterates Article five of the constitution, and adds that the function of the state is to protect the constitutional religion of the state. He presented the same question as Vidal; namely; what protection does the state give to religion of the state by banishing it from the public schools? The constitution does not demand an oath to the religion, but the constitution demands the defense and protection of the state religion. Therefore, why would the state not preserve the instruction of religion in public schools? Twice he reminds the assembly that the majority of the habitants are Catholic. Furthermore, he reminds the assembly of the exclusion and exemption clause of the Common Law of Education giving dissident parents an opt-out, thus elevating the rights of the minority above the rights of the majority.

(Representative Manini) – Argued that members of the Nationalist party support the Catholic position however, the Colorado Party, the dominant party, favored the absolute laical school. When Representative Ponce de Leon pointed out that the founder and early patriarchs of the Colorado Party (General Rivera, Lorenzo Fernandez) supported Catholic schools, Manini responded by suggesting the Colorado party had evolved (DSCR 1908 Tomo 195: 134).

(Representative Oneto y Viana) - Argued that the contradiction between religious dogma and science should be enough to suppress religious instruction in public schools.

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20 This was confirmed by the 1908 National Census (Anuario Estadístico 1908 Tomo II: 948-49). See Tables A.6 and A.7.
Science and reason are elevated as “the supreme cult of truth and wellbeing” whereas religion is “antiscientific”, “dangerous” and “absurd” (DSCR 1908 Tomo 195: 134, 136). Religion imposes contradictions in the mind of children however, the purpose of education is to liberate the “conscience of children” and to “develop cognitive capacities” (DSCR 1908 Tomo 195: 138). In regard to the constitutional argument, Oneto y Viana points to the state’s efforts to secularize cemeteries, civil registry, civil marriage laws. The absolute laicization of public schools is but one more domain of society that the state wishes to control (1908: 139).

After a vigorous debate by both sides, the proposed law was approved by the lower house (July 4, 1908) and by the Senate on March 3, 1909 (DSCS 1909 Tomo 94: 201-02 and RNLD 1909: 302). The official record of the Senate shows that there was no debate over the proposal (DSCS 1909 Tomo 94: 201-02) which provokes reflection on Representative Manini’s statement regarding the super majority of the Colorado party. The editor of Semana Religiosa was very aware of this political context when in response to the law he wrote; “(…) Because in a terrible hour of stubborn sectarianism occurring among figures in the political scene who have initiated a fatal campaign. … The immense disgrace has occurred in our homeland in the heart of our legislatures igniting an explosion of hateful sectarianism never before heard.”

The Catholic daily, El Bien, also editorialized the political leverage behind the law;

The law found a most favorable welcome in the liberal environment of our legislature for approving a project that is in absolute harmony with the

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21 “Un Remedio Oportuno al más Grave de los Males.” May 1, 1909. Semana Religiosa. pg. 8911
ideas and with the predominate purposes at the heart of the Legislative Assembly.\textsuperscript{22}

Possibly the more egregious dimension to the law corresponded to Article two which declared that public school personnel could be penalized with suspension and destitution for violating the law. A society with a Catholic majority of citizens means that a disproportionate number of educators in public schools were self-identified Catholics.\textsuperscript{23}

Teachers do not divest themselves of worldviews and personal values in the classroom. Hence, the penalty provision inserts ambiguity and subjectivity in to the enforcement of the law as well as provides opportunity for abuse of by administrators.

Although the Laicization Law pertained only to public schools, it raises the question; was there a spillover effect on other civil action? This legislative action can best be understood that when the state chooses to stigmatize and express official disapproval of religious influence in one social sphere, antagonism easily emerges in other social spheres. For example, antagonism was very apparent in the legislature of 1909. Emboldened by the Laicization Law, a hostile congress attempted to approve several other laws that same year that also undermined Catholic social influence; 1) attempt to suppress religious ceremony which was a traditional component in bestowing military honors (DSCS 1910 Tomo 98: 496-98); 2) suppression of the teaching of Latin in public

\textsuperscript{22} “La Ley de Gilbert.” September 21, 1909. El Bien. pg.1.

\textsuperscript{23} Prior to the law, on at least three recorded instances, the Office of the Inspector General released circulars to remind public school instructors and administrators that; 1) prayer was a religious practice and must be relegated to the last period of the day when religion was taught (Pérez 1903: 593-95); 2) that teaching religion outside of the prescribed hour was not allowed (Pérez 1901: 333-34); and that religious feast days could not be recognized (Pérez 1904: 315). The regularity of these circulars that appear in the state record is reflective of a context in which teachers who were practicing Catholics clashed with the laicization of the schools.
schools; 3) nationalization of social services most of which had historically operated in a

With the laicization of state run schools complete, one would assume that the state
would be satisfied to respect the autonomy of congregational schools. But this is not the
case. Already analyzed above, the Law of Convents was used by the Batlle
administration in 1911 in order to exclusively harass religious schools. The unreasonable
inspections took place over a two year period and yielded precious little. Also in 1911,
Representative Gilbert attempted to introduce legislation allowing the state to control
hiring decisions and curriculum decisions in congregational schools.24 In the Exposition
of Motives to the legislature, Gilbert stated; “the liberty of education had been improperly
interpreted and that each private school represents an impenetrable bastion fomenting
foreign perspectives, even against the state”.25 He proposed that religious schools must
open their doors to the authority of the state and, among other modifications, must
establish a “Cult of the Homeland”, in which schools were obligated to celebrate official
state holidays, sing national anthems, and place a national shield in each classroom
(Geymonat 2004: 300). Although the proposed law was not approved, it represents the
disposition of the political powers to use the law to intervene in order to unnecessarily
regulate Catholic schools, when the state already had an inspection policy in place.


25 “Mas Sobre el Proyecto Gilbert.” January 10, 1912. El Libre Pensamiento. Pg. 836
Possibly the most radical project was proposed by Senators Ricardo Areco and Francisco Simón in 1918. The proposal sought to eliminate religious instruction in Catholic schools. Article one was a re-interpretation of the concept “liberty of education” previously defined by Francisco Bauzá (DSCR 1985 Tomo 73: 176-77; DSCR 1887 Tomo 86: 61). In place of the concept which affirmed parental rights to educate their children in a free market place of educational options, the concept was inverted to give the state more power to regulate the schools. Article one read;

Liberty of education is guaranteed for all habitants of the nation with the restrictions imposed by legal dispositions in order to safeguard the public order, good customs, the national interest, public health and the rights of children (DSCS 1918 Tomo 114: 755).

The phrase “with the restrictions imposed by legal dispositions in order to safeguard the public order” is not only the exact antithesis of Bauzá’s concept which intended to give parents the right to choose alternatives to state schools, but once again, implies that religious schools are subversive and surreptitious to the state. The state had already demonstrated how broadly and arbitrarily the term “safeguard the public order” could be interpreted as it was the legal basis for the Law of Convents (DSCR 1885 Tomo 212: 8). More significantly, a concept appears for the first time in proposed legislation which was a growing theme used as a wedge by urban doctors in order to stigmatize Catholic socialization. The concept ‘a child’s liberty of conscience’ in this article is expressed as the “right of children”. The concept “child’s liberty of conscience” was used several times by Representative Oneto y Viana when arguing for the absolute suppression of religion in public schools in 1908; although he did not elaborate the concept in his discourse. In the context of the debate, Oneto y Viana stated that “Parents should not
teach their children religion” (DSCR 1908 Tomo 195: 137). Over time, urban doctors absolutized the concept when arguing against the socializing role of Catholicism. In the Exposition of Motives for their legislative project, Areco and Simón wrote;

The teaching of positive religion is the antithesis of the notions that are advisable to be transmitted to children. A child is in no condition to judge the value of religious ideas which include; it is necessary to believe, it is a sin to doubt, and to believe in a faith of those who teach that terror is the consequence of what they portray (DSCS 1918 Tomo 114: 850).

The argument and concept (a child’s liberty of conscience) originated in pedagogical principles associated with Rousseau, Condorcet, Pestalozzi and other enlightenment reformers. Enlightenment pedagogy replaced the notion that a child was a receptacle to be filled with complex knowledge with a new concept – that a child is an active agent in the learning process and should be allowed to learn by discovery as opposed to learning by maxims or general rules of conduct (Rothschild 1998:215). This educational approach proposed an inductive method based on spontaneity and self-activity as opposed to a rigid teacher-centered curriculum (Boyd and Rawson 1965; Rorty 1998). On one hand, the urban doctors were critical of teaching religious doctrines because the methodology violated pedagogical concepts that urban doctors sought to promote. One the other hand, the pedagogical concepts valued by urban doctors were abstract and philosophical and were violated within the confines of the state schools. State schools were based on mass education; an attempt to educate large numbers of children in a single classroom. In the public schools, the teacher-student ratio averaged 48:1 between 1900 and 1920 (see Table A.13). The ratio began to drop in 1920 but the teacher-student ratio still averaged 39:1 between 1920 to 1949. A mass education approach of public schools nullified the
possibility of employing an ‘enlightenment pedagogy’ which was contingent upon direct student to teacher interaction in a far smaller teacher-student ratio.\textsuperscript{26} In the absence of a Catholic morality, state schools imposed a nationalistic moral dogma which was delivered much in the same way as the very “Catholic dogma” urban doctors criticized.\textsuperscript{27} Hence, the “conscience of the child” argument became nothing more than a convenient abstraction used to criticize religious instruction— although it had no corresponding empirical application within the reality of the state’s own school system.\textsuperscript{28}

The most radical nature of the proposed law however appeared in Articles 10 and 11. These articles sought to not only suppress any and all religious instruction in religious schools but to banish priests and male clergy from teaching in religious schools (DSCS 1918 Tomo 114: 755);

Article 10: “Religion cannot be taught in any private primary school.”
Article 11: “No male who has or is in the process of making a vow of chastity may teach in a private school.”

\textsuperscript{26} Newland (1994: 461) agrees that the greatest impediment to implementing a ‘reformed pedagogy’ was the student to teacher ratio which was very high; not just in Uruguay but throughout Latin America. The principle aim of a scientific pedagogy was to transform the passive student in to an active learner and to engage the student’s curiosity and natural desire to learn. A scientific pedagogy shifts the emphasis from teacher centered to a student centered approach. However Bralich (1987) found that in the Uruguayan classroom— in practice— teachers continued to play an authoritarian role while relying on memorization and repetition as methods of instruction; attributable to the high student to teacher ratio.

\textsuperscript{27} See pages 108-109; notes 13, 14, and 15.

\textsuperscript{28} Two studies focusing on educational systems in Latin America reinforce this assessment. Barcos (1928) differentiates between theory and practice in the Argentinian school system where in theory, teachers were trained according to enlightened pedagogies following Pestalozzi and Rousseau and were expected to create an environment where personal attention was given to students. However in practice, teachers remained strict disciplinarians thus emphasizing utility over theory making passivity the norm. Second, a UNESCO report (1976) that studied school systems in Latin America including Uruguay found authoritarianism and passivity to be the rule and not the exception in the classroom. In spite of urban doctor’s pretentious references to a scientific pedagogy employed in the Normal School, state schools in practice functioned according to utilitarian methods out of necessity more than likely due to high student to teacher ratios.
The larger question pertained to whose responsibility it was to educate Uruguayans? Did the state have the legal right to intervene in religious schools in order to eliminate religious instruction? At stake was the liberty of parents to choose how they wish to educate and socialize their children. In response, Ricardo Isasa, the Apostolic Administrator send a letter to the President to be read in the General Assembly defending the institutional rights of the Church to sponsor religious schools and the parental rights to select an alternative form of education—one which corresponds to their religious convictions. At the same time, Isasa affirmed the role of priests and male clergy in the national development citing historic contributions to culture and science. The legislative project touched off a firestorm of debate carried out in the major press. El Bien Público, La Tribuna Popular and La Idea supported the Catholic position thru editorials while El Día, still managed by Batlle, supported and campaigned for the project, thus editorializing:

We can affirm for our part that the suppression of the teaching of religion imposed by our country (...) will be a victory of Uruguayan liberalism and a new badge of honor for the national culture. This project is a foresight and is patriotic in that it impedes the schools that conspire against the liberty of thought and the conscience of the child, deforms mentality, and denigrates the spirit of the new generations.

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29 As with previous Church-State conflicts, when Catholic leaders perceive that the state is abusing its authority to constrain religious activity, ecclesiastic leaders appeal, not to the Syllabus but to Article five of the 1830 constitution, which suggests the state’s role is to serve as protector of the established religion: Roman Catholicism. In this instance, Ricardo Isasa wrote to the President and to the General Assembly; “According to my character as Prelate and leader of the Church, actually united to the state by the current constitution of 1830, I consider it to be an imperative duty that I formulate my observations of this proposed law which violates the sacred rights of parents and especially violates the protection and duty of the state to the ministers and institutions of the National Church; notoriously denigrated by the exclusionary disposition of this law” (“Proyecto Sobre Enseñanza Primaria.” April 18, 1918. El Bien. pg. 1).

30 “Escuelas Confesionales.” April 9, 1918. El Día. pg.4.
Among the periodicals opposed to the project, *El Bien* was the leading voice in expressing outrage on behalf of Catholics everywhere. The lead editorial was entitled “The Abuse” and described the project in this way; “This project takes our political environment backwards decades. Only Russian dictators in the most ominous and obscure times can compare to this incredible and rash attempt of suppression; of a blow of force to a liberty most sacred and supreme.” 31 The most substantive critique of the article identifies a distorted understanding of democracy inherent in the law that disregards the heart of democratic self-governance and individual liberties;

But democracy is not to be blamed for these excesses. Who is responsible, without shame, but those of a new democratic pattern who neither possesses wisdom nor is imbued with a true democratic spirit (…). No one can be more opposed to democracy, nor to the preeminent disgrace of legitimate norms of liberty and individual autonomy. Democracy has come to be a cloak that disguises the autocratic and self-absorbing persona that desires to impose itself without measure on the nation.32

The polemic that ensued can be reduced to the issue of rights and liberties; parents’ right of educational liberty vs. the child’s right to a freedom of conscience. In reality, children did not express this grievance, rather the state superimposed the concept of a child’s liberty of conscience on all children in Uruguay and then became a self-appointed advocate to prosecute the case on behalf of all children. Catholics saw a contradiction in the state’s interpretation of liberty which was essentially a zero-sum relationship expressed by the editor of *El Bien* in an article entitled *Jacobins of Law*; “One could never conceive that in the name of liberty one would defend an alien life nor in the name


of liberty demand the rights of others, without imparting an undeniable premise that violating any liberty of some effects the heritage that belongs to all.” 33 Catholics saw the state as a self-imposed custodian of liberty and bestowed it on children by assuming a patrimonial stewardship while disregarding the liberty of parents. Doctors such as Santin Carlos Rossi had no problem limiting certain liberties if the state deemed them detrimental; “For the good and in the social interest, liberties can and should be limited by the state if the measure is taking on considerable importance to the social mission [of the state]. In the case of education, the state should affirm its right to organize primary education.” 34

In metaphorical language Rossi expresses pedagogical nuance that characterizes the urban doctors’ disposition which justifies their custodial claim to the nation’s children in an article entitled “The Rights of Children;”

The child is an independent being devoted to a free life of his/her movements, that possesses an intellect all its own and a heart all its own. [A child] Is a man or woman in formation, in change; an irresponsible thing that we mold to our pleasure like inert clay. 35

In contrast to the Catholic position, Rossi elaborates further;

The right of parents appears as an inaccessible fetish defined by a mysterious taboo. In reality it attempts to counteract an unjustifiable right. But those who reason this way will be exposed, not the least forgetting the object of the debate and that which without no question would exist; the child. All educational problems do not refer to the parents. Why would we refer to the parent! Rather the child is the one who receives education. Out of this simple yet heinous confusion errors arise. 36

34 Libertad de Enseñar.” June 3, 1918. El Día. pg.1
Advocates of the state were coming close to breaching what could be considered the inviolability of the private realm of family life. The history and culture of Western civilization reflects a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. In most cases, family law rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. At the heart of the concept of “liberty of education” is the parent’s right to associate freely with a socialization pattern involving the transmission of values and worldview which the parents embrace. The school is generally considered the extension of the home and teachers serve as surrogate parents (loco parentis). The statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority by eradicating the very distinctives that parents seek in an educational program for their primary aged children is and has been associated with autocratic regimes, not with fledgling democracies. Hence, in response to the perceived threat of parent rights, *La Tribuna Popular* expressed this concern.

Through this proposed law one does not recognize the liberty of education, which has been incorporated in our national institutions since we gave rise to independence, one expects to strip away from parents the indisputable right that allows them to choose the persons that provide an education, and form the intellect and heart of their children.37

In the minds of Catholics, the confessional school is a primordial and fundamental right of the parents who see community closure between the home, the church, and the school.

In support of this concept, Isasa framed the following argument;

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37 “La Libertad de Enseñanza.” April 11, 1918: *La Tribuna Popular*. pg. 1
What is the School? The school is the same instruction and education as in the home, the school is the continuation of the home that is a substitute teacher with a great duty to educate our children, and also is the principle wheel in the social apparatus. Therefore, if we have the right and obligation to teach and develop our children, we must assure that our schools follow our mission; the mission begun in the home.38

Because the polemic was publically debated in the press of the day, by May and June, public figures not directly connected to the debate became engaged. Hugo Antuña, director of the Catholic daily *El Bien* solicited opinions of the Areco and Simón project. To the surprise of both sides, three urban doctors, of high prestige and known for their liberal affiliations, came out publicly on the side of confessional schools and sent letters to *El Bien*.39 Dr. Vásquez Acevedo argued that the liberty of thought, the right to teach without restrictions, and the freedom of speech would be compromised if the project was approved by the legislature.40 He pointed to the anti-constitutional character of the project because it violated Article five of the newly ratified constitution (of 1918) which officially declared the separation of Church and State.41 He states that “the achievement of the separation of Church and State has been inspired by the noble end of assuring the


39 In the article, Dr. Alfredo Vásquez Acevedo identifies himself this way; “I am a liberal, very liberal, accordingly I have demonstrated this on multiple occasions, and precisely for this I can only consider with great antipathy the proposed project and law that has been presented by the President to the congress” (“El Proyecto Sobre Enseñanza.” April 30, 1918. *El Bien.* pg. 1).


41 On January 13, 1918, a reformed Constitution was promulgated resulting in the official separation of Church and State. The new Constitution took effect on March 1, 1919. Article five was modified such that the state showed no partiality toward any religious confession or institution. On the other hand, members of the *batillistas* and nationalists who shaped the new constitution did not write into Article five language limiting the state’s encroachment into religious affairs (Castillo 1984: 504-06).
broadest liberty of conscience in all of its manifestations."  

Acevedo was equally critical of Article nine which prohibited priests and male clergy from teaching in confessional schools on the basis that it was a violation of their right to work. Dr. J. Campisteguy, while also alluding to the violation of the character of the constitution, expresses concern that if the project were approved, it could constitute a precedence in which other civil liberties might be violated. He states “If today one restrains or prohibits the right to learn and to teach, tomorrow invoking whatever motive; the liberty of speech, of the press or to pray publically may be restricted or prohibited.”  

Lastly, Dr. Regules condemned the project on the basis that he found it to contradict liberal principles and accuses the authors of the project of maintaining a double standard. He writes; “Bad liberals are those who deny to others that which they affirm for themselves. Without a doubt, liberties should be for everyone and not exclusively for those who follow Montesquieu; ‘for those who would think that they are patterning society after a foreign model’.”  

The daily paper El Día took exception to the positions expressed by doctors who were compatriots of certain liberal fraternities such as Club Bilbao. Rather than argue on the basis of principles, the editor attacked the liberal credentials of the doctors suggesting they were disingenuous to liberal causes by opposing the Areco and Simón project. In doing so, the editor revealed an extreme bias and intolerance that characterized urban doctor’s version of liberalism;


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If they were liberals [referring to Acevedo and Campisteguy] they would oppose all religion; because religion is bad. How can they negatively judge a project that combats religiosity in the schools when they know that religion is dangerous? Being a liberal means that it is necessary to not be religious, to not desire the success of religion, rather to impede religion’s dominance in the social conscience. 45

The debate over education was essentially a bipolar conflict in which distinctively Catholic communities defended their rights against Batlistas with an irreligious agenda. There was however a third interest group; Protestant communities. Protestants in Uruguay represent an enigma. Upon their arrival to Uruguay, Protestant groups were immigrant churches whose focus was to consolidate their ethnic community.46 Each group typically founded schools in order to socialize subsequent generations in the ethnic language, customs and culture; although over time ethnic schools admitted students from outside the ethnic enclave (Greising 2006; Geymonat 2008). As a religious minority, they identified with the anticlerical polemic in the name of religious liberty, supported the laicization of public schools, and favored the separation of Church and State. Protestants were in hearty agreement with anticlerical state managers and press. However, as anticlerical animus intensified under ballismo, Protestants realized that all religious interests and liberties were threatened by antireligious state policies (Geymonat 2004; Lapadjian 1994: 33; Gresing 2000: 94-95). For example, as Protestant groups established schools to maintain linguistic and cultural distinctives, they largely fell under the state’s radar and were not compelled to conform to the state’s regulation and inspection the same


46 A British Anglican church was established in 1869, an Italian Waldensians colony was established in 1856, North American Methodists established a church in 1867, and German Lutherans established a church in 1857.
way that Catholic schools did. However, in the early 1900s, that began to change. Protestant-backed schools fell under state surveillance and conformity to state regulation thus initiating tension among various schools which had to decide to retain their confessional orientation or laicize (Greising 2006: 118). When the Areco and Simón project emerged, the Methodists rejected it absolutely. A series of articles published in *La Idea*, the principal newspaper of Methodists in Uruguay, expressed opposition to Article 11 which prohibited priests and male clergy from teaching in Catholic schools because Methodists feared that article of the law could be extended to their ministers as well;

> Assuming that a Roman Priest, due to certain vows, should represent and constitute a social abuse, this would give a bad example to the youth and affect by the same token, the home. We ask; would the evangelical minister, of whatever denomination, not be placed under the same Law? Do they not establish and maintain their home as any advanced society demands? 47

The Waldensians paper, *El Mensajero Valdense*, though with limited distribution, referred to the project as a “relentless war against religion” which dictated restrictive laws designed to “destroy the soul of the nation and every religious sentiment” (as cited in Geymonat 2004: 122). In the same paper, the editor wrote; “It is lamentable that religious education could be excluded from educational programs because such instruction expands the horizon of knowledge among students” (as cited in Geymonat 2004: 122).

In spite of marked differences, between Catholics and Protestants, both groups perceived a threat to their religious convictions and liberties stemming from an overreaching state. The questionable constitutionality of the proposed law, the liberty of

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education, the laical school, the rights of parents to educate their children in a manner of their choosing were decisively debated in the polemic that emerged from the project proposed by Senators Areco and Simón in 1918. It is the best example of the means by which batallistas attempted to use the power of the law to intervene and establish their concept of a state monopoly in education. Striping religious instruction from the confessional schools and discriminating against priests and male clergy (and Protestant ministers) is tantamount to neutralizing the distinctives that makes confessional schools an alternative to the state system. The comparative advantage of confessional schools is their religious heritage and traditions rooted in a theistic oriented worldview taught in most cases by a member of a religious community. The state, behind the power of the Presidency and Colorado Party, which was a de facto one party rule, used its power in a menacing way to limit the educational marketplace.\textsuperscript{48} Without a comparative advantage confessional schools lose market leverage.\textsuperscript{49} While the state may have been covert in its attempts to monopolize education, advocates of state action were overt in their support of such action. For example, Santín Carlos Rossi, in his prolog to a popular pedagogical textbook used in the Normal school entitled \textit{Los Dogmas, la Enseñanza y el Estado}, fully endorsed state monopolization of schools;\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{48} In truth, the Colorado party was a heterogeneous group consisting of Masons, positivists, liberals, anarchists, and socialists who were united under the Colorado banner (Caetano 2011).

\textsuperscript{49} Following Bourdieu’s concept of \textit{distinction}; teaching religion is what gave Catholic schools distinction and differentiated Catholic schools from state schools leading to a market niche of constituents who valued that distinction (Bourdieu 1984).

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Los Dogmas, la Enseñanza y el Estado} was written by Julio Grauert and Pedro Ceruti Crosa and was cited many times in the \textit{Anales de Educación Primaria} (see Coirolo: 1931: 54 in \textit{Anales de Instrucción Primaria}).
It is necessary that future citizens of a society are not obstacles to the harmonious collective march nor that they be a source of instability. And how will the same suffering society reject such instability? To avoid this risk it should assume a monopoly of general education because of what experience has demonstrated – as young students have proven with a formidable defense – that private education has as a final end squalid interests and fanatic dogmatism (1927: 10).

According to Rossi’s prolog, the first duty of the state is the wellbeing of its citizens by safeguarding the common good and thus is obligated and justified to maintain a monopoly of education (1927: 10-11). From the perspective of Catholics, monopolization was an abuse of liberty and the point of defense against absolute state control. That Rossi specifically advocated for a monopoly of education in order to impede the development of confessional schools is made clear when he wrote;

In this regard, it is correct to indicate that those who are opposed to the monopoly of general education on behalf of the state are the religious, those devoted to a metaphysical dogma; although they do it in the name of liberty. For this reason, it is necessary to argue valiantly in the name of [social] hygiene, let alone in the name of progress, and denounce it as a ‘liberty to do damage’, no more and no less than other liberties that also deform the mentality of an individual in society; the liberty of an alcoholic, the liberty of a gambler, the liberty of a slumlord. All these antisocial liberties should be abolished in the name of the social interest (1927: 10-11).

As it was, confessional schools may have won the battle but were losing the war. Although Areco and Simón’s project was not approved by congress, it revealed the unrelenting and coercive intention of the state to marginalize confessional schools and particularly those of Catholics. Over the next fifteen years Catholic schools were under constant pressure due to capricious legislative measures that were menacing rather than constructive to the educational market place. According to Pereira (2010: 777), the nature of disestablishment promulgated in the new constitution of 1919 followed a “two
“separate spheres” model between the Church and State. As a consequence, religious communities and churches were not recognized as interlocutors at the same level of the state. Conversely, under Article five, it was assumed that public authorities could not intervene in the life or organization of religious communities due to a lack of jurisdiction over religious groups to whom they are neutral. The ensuing secular law made no provisions on bilateral formal relations between the state and religious communities hence, religious communities were autonomous and self-governing and could act freely in the secular sphere provided that public or common interest was not challenged.

However, while the debate over disestablishment and the new constitution was raging, simultaneously the state was egregiously seeking to intervene in confessional schools thru Areco and Simón’s project to eliminate religious instruction in confessional schools. The following incidents were clear violations of the religious autonomy of religious communities and such measures created conditions of uncertainty and intimidation under which Catholic schools conducted business. These include:

1. On October 24, 1921 Representative Italo Perotti proposed another law that would prohibit priests and male clergy from teaching. In the Explanation of Motives Perotti made normative accusations against religious schools by stating;

   The state has laicized the state schools and at its side religious institutes linger with a student population unfortunately substantial under the right that grants to parents a false concept of the liberty of education, and due to selfishness and narrow mindedness, the results are fatally antisocial. In the interest of both public and private order, the school should be genuinely neutral (DSCR 1921 Tomo 296: 89).

   The legislation was not approved.
2. On April 10, 1923, the Minister of Instruction was called to the Senate in order to discuss regulations of Primary Education. The purpose was to make arrangements such that private schools should teach at least 25 poor children in order to remain exempt from property taxes (contribución inmobiliaria). The imposition was objectionable on two grounds. First, numerous Catholic schools, especially those in Montevideo, specifically targeted poor families (Don Bosco, La Familia Sagrada, etc.) while others, for every predetermined number of paying families, received children whose family lacked financial means. Second, according to Article 69 of the Constitution, “Private education institutions and cultural institutions of the same nature are exempted of national and provincial taxes, as subsidy for the services they provide” (Pereira 2010: 784). Rather, the case is but one more example of an unreasonable and coercive measure framed by anticlerical members of congress in their quest to harass and impede Catholic education.

3. On August 4, 1926 Senator Carlos Sorín asked for reports from the Minister of Public Instruction describing the context of public education in the department of Salto. Apparently concern was raised due to “the number and importance of religious teaching establishments due to their growth over the last few years” (as cited in Geymonat 2004: 314).

4. In 1930, corresponding to the first Centennial of the Constitution, university students organized a National Congress. The first proposal among others was a call for the state monopolization of education.  

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51 The constitution of the Instituto Pedagógico established by Bauzá indicated that for every “for every 50 pesos of monthly liquid income (by inscribed students) the school must admit 10 students of poor families (Memoria Anual 1886: 31; Article 29; see also Devoto 1968 Vol.1: 271).

The students of the Republic aspire through the first National Congress;

1. The creation of a monopoly of education by the state and the establishment of the neutral school determined by its curriculum.
2. That the monopoly corresponds to the primary, secondary and preparatory schools.
3. The necessity that experimental schools are constituted by the monopolizing regime of the state, in which they can practice under the vigilance and direct control, methods and pedagogical systems created under private initiative that can signify a beneficial function utilized by the state.

As with Santín Carlos Rossi, the students who organized the National Congress had no problem advocating the state monopolization of education; expressing overtly what had been tacitly sought by Batllistas through legislative action. The editorial of El Día, wholeheartedly embraced the concept by affirming; “Concretely, the Congress sustains the construction of this monopoly, the most favorable means to protect the student in the free and original state; disentangled in his/her spirit facing the deforming influences of a dogmatic education.”

5. In 1932, the Inspector of Private Education, Blas Genovese, inspired a legislative project submitted to the National Council of Primary Education and Normal School regarding private schools. Article four of the law demands that teachers in private schools must be native-born to Uruguay or have resided in the country since their birth and the law prohibited religious instruction from being offered during regular school hours (Genovese 1933: 25). In addition, the law would give authority to the Inspector General of Private Instruction to intervene and evaluate the private school curriculum, evaluate

personnel, and to enforce penalties due to the lack of compliance. In the *Explanation of Motives*, Blas Genovese justified the necessity of the legislation for the following reason:

> It would not be possible, except out of good will, to employ the term organization, and in every case, without vacillation, one should speak of a state absolutely disconnected. These institutes exercise pedagogy and administration of private corporations that are autonomous and lack understanding. A great many of them, those that are Catholic, appear at first disciplined and follow a general and uniform plan. However, they are not what they seem, with a precedence of spiritual and philosophical speculation common to all and no other positive link that unites them (1933: 28).

The proposal represented the resumption of attempts to control private schools, but specifically targeted Catholic schools. The Inspector employed not only similar arguments that had been tried by *Batlistas* in earlier times, but Genovese went so far as to suggest that the state nationalize private schools (1933: 31). As it was, it was the last radical attempt to establish a state monopoly of education. The debate over the liberty of education was finally resolved in the 1934 Constitution in which Article 59 established the liberty of education. It was no small victory for Catholics; however, much damage was done in the process of defending their rights against the powers of a state regime determined to marginalize and malign confessional schools.

**Evidence that the State Attempted to Create a Monopoly in Education**

The discursive text of Rossi and the students who organized a National Congress in 1930 did not conceal their advocacy for a state monopolization education. Their discourse made explicit and overt what had been implicit and covert in legislative

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54 By 1932, private laical schools had diminished to 2,930 students and 145 teachers compared to 16,483 Catholic students and 589 Catholic teachers (Nahúm 2007: 114-115 and see Table A.14).
initiatives, discourse that appeared in the *Explanation of Motives* accompanying each proposal, as well as the legislative discussion that followed. From the beginning, Catholics saw thru the rhetoric, demagoguery, and misguided legalese and interpreted each state initiative as an incremental attempt to monopolize education.

When Bauzá wrote *La Educación Común* in 1879—written as a critique to Varelan reforms—he warned of the state’s intent to monopolize education;

> The legal situation of public education in the nation is a monopoly on track to methodically destroy all private initiatives (…). The new organization is a mere dependence on executive power to name and dismiss employees of the hierarchy thus producing a monopoly of education linking the imposition of ideas without control except that of the will of the government. Exactly the same as has happened in Russia (1953a: 221-22).

The phrase “monopoly of education” appeared in reference to President Santo’s veto of Francisco Bauzá’s liberty of education project; although approved by the legislature (DSHAG 1890 Tomo 6: 282). However, by a 42 to 3 vote, the same legislative body overrode the veto by President Santos. In expressing his vote (and was repeated by six other representatives), Representative Estrázulas y Lamas stated, “Yes, I vote to rescind the veto, because it is the first step against a *monopoly of education*” (DSHAG 1890 Tomo 6: 282). In a conference entitled “The Right to Teach”, Jesuit Juan Sallaberry S.J. wrote regarding the state’s attempt to monopolize education;

> The state no less than society and the Church are interested in education and it is indisputable that the state has the perfect right to install centers of education. But it is not logical that one is obligated to accept such instruction, much less than the right to monopolize instruction nor oblige that parents send their children to such determined centers of education against their will and against their conscience.\(^{55}\)

The daily *La Demócrata*, while not a Catholic newspaper, was conservative, represented rural interests, and sympathetic to Catholic causes carried several articles against the monopolization of education such as “The Monopolization of Education in History and Experience” (January 5, 1918) and “Against the Monopoly of Education” (February 5, 1918) in which the editor associates the monopolization of education with communism.

From August 18 to October 7 of 1931, *La Demócrata* ran a series of 12 articles under the title “The Slavery of Education: Plan Batllista-Communist” which made comparisons between Batllistas’ strategies to monopolize education and Lenin’s activity in Russia with a corresponding group of anti-religious party members. The daily editorialized that; “The Russian state has monopolized education and is the same here as batllismo with the same determination to suppress the liberty of education” (September 1, 1931: pg. 1). The series of articles were especially critical of the work by Grauert and Ceruti Crosa (*Las Dogmas y la Enseñanza*: 1927) and refuted the book’s concepts one-by-one by exposing their application in Soviet Russia. The dual purpose of the articles was not only to defend against the state monopoly of education but to draw parallels between batllismo and communism.

Assertions made by allies of the state and perceptions of religious leaders and their sympathizers are necessary but insufficient to prove that the state was attempting to monopolize education. In order to be objectively considered a monopolizing entity, it must be shown that conduct by the state caused harm by a “restraint of trade.” That is, the real test of monopolization is this; did legislation impose restraints on competition or promote competition (Peritz 1996; Gelhorn 1976)? In 1908, before a wave of legislative initiatives hostile to confessional schools emerged, there were 71 Catholic schools. By
1915 the number of schools declined to 58 (Anuario Estadístico 1915: 381). The best data available is the total Catholic student population distributed by academic year (See Table A.15). Until 1908, the ratio of Catholic to public school students was approximately 15 percent. From 1908 to 1918 the ratio declined from 15 percent to approximately 10.5 percent. From 1918 to 1933, it stabilized at about 9-10 percent. After Article 59 in the 1934 Constitution which established the liberty of education, the ratio increased annually due to incremental growth of Catholic students until 1950 when it was back up to 15%. It can be inferred by these ratios, that when the state was most assertive in its harassment and menacing conduct, between 1908 and 1932, Catholic schools either lost students or were stagnant. It was not until after the constitutional protection guaranteeing the liberty of education (1934) that growth significantly increased each year. Competition in this case can be seen as a set of social conditions – when those conditions are manipulated such that competitors are hurt, then competition is negatively affected. Catholic schools were paralyzed operationally due to constant pressures and tensions resulting from defending their rights against a hostile state resulting in no growth in absolute numbers while public schools benefited immensely and grew each academic year. Hence, during the era of battlismo (1908-1933), the competitive field was diminished significantly.\footnote{Incidentally, the political context changed dramatically in in 1933 due to a golpe de estado and battlismo was discredited losing considerable influence (Taylor 1952).} How else can this pause in growth be explained except by the duress and intimidation exerted by the state thru legislative initiatives designed to marginalize confessional schools?
A second criterion for objectively analyzing a monopoly is the reasonableness of the regulation (Shenefield 2001; Peritz 1996). The Law of Convents proved to be nothing more than a means to “shakedown” Catholic residential facilities that housed religious communities engaged in social service, but especially education. It was a back door menace that did not affect educational operations directly but indirectly as a means to disrupt and harass teaching personnel. The original house targeted by the law, *El Instituto Religioso de las Hermanas del Buen Pastor*, was reopened one year later and authorized by congress in 1887; “to continue exercising the functions connected to the institute”; which was teaching (CLAC 1887 Tomo X Vol. 2: 248). The entire law was abolished in on November 30 1887. Yet the Law was invoked again by President Cuestas in 1901 to outlaw and target emigrating religious personnel. Cuestas’ use of the law violated Uruguay’s “open” immigration policy according to the Immigration Law promulgated in in 1890 (*Anuario Estadístico* 1889: 711-17). The xenophobic policy targeting strictly religious personnel was an egregious violation of the Immigration Law. A rebuke of the Law of Convents by Batlle in 1903 did not dissuade Representative Pereda in 1903 or Batlle in 1911 to reverse the government’s disposition and to invoke the Law as a government overreach into the operations of Catholic schools. The law served no national purpose or nation interest toward economic or social progress. The Law of Convents was an instrument to discriminate, harass and bludgeon Catholic school operations.

Inspection of schools is a normative function of the State to assure a standard and quality of education. The inspection process was originated as part of the Common Law

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57 See Bauza –*Ley de Conventos – Discurso en la Cámara de Representantes* (1888).
of Education in 1877 under Article 26 (Varela 1964a: 164; 1964b: 95-96) and it was the responsibility of the Departmental Inspector to “visit each school at least once a year” in his jurisdiction. The inspection process itself was modified and improved over the years by; 1) extending power and authority of Inspectors (CLAC 1885 Tomo X: 2-6); 2) expanding statistical categories to gain relevant information (Pérez 1904 Tomo II: 690-95); and 3) increase data collection on a trimestral basis (from once a year see Pérez 1904 Tomo II: 637-38). Each academic year, circulars were distributed to remind parties in the bureaucratic chain of impending inspections and adherence to state standards (Pérez 1904 Tomo II: 637-38, 340-44, 670-71, 333-34). On January 12, 1885, the Law of Common Education was modified in order to expand school inspections to include all teaching establishments “without exception”. Article 47 suggests that the modification was to inform the General Director “of instruction that was contrary to the Constitution of the Republic; its laws, and morality” (CLAC 1885 Tomo X: 2-6). The disappearance of private laical schools between 1902 and 1933 can only be attributed to the state’s aggressive effort to close down sub-standard schools through inspections as indicated by the Inspector General’s record (See Table A.14; Pérez 1906: 18-22). Many of these schools were considered clandestine. However, that was not true of the Catholic schools. The editor of the Semana Religiosa, in an article citing the increasing number of Catholic schools in Montevideo, tells the readers that; “There is no reason to prefer the state school to the Catholic school for any reason when both schools teach the same subjects and teachers are equally competent in one school as the other”. 58 Yet with regularity there were both legislative initiatives and petitions in the state record justifying the need

to inspect principally religious schools. On May 5, 1886, Representative Gazón proposed increased inspections of Catholic schools citing that these schools; 1) did not teach in Castilian Spanish; 2) exalted the monarchal system of governance; and 3) abused the Constitution (as cited in Geymonat 2004: 274). There were numerous legislative initiatives which in one way or another proposed varying motives for Catholic school inspections including; 1894 - conformity (CLAC Tomo 1984 XVII: 372-74); 1902 - regulation and control (Geymonat 2004: 289), 1903 - subversion (DSCR 1903 Tomo 171: 233-36), 1908 - conformity (RNLD 1908: 126-27); 1911 – imposition of civil religion (Geymonat 2004: 300); 1919 - health (Geymonat 2004: 308). In 1906, Inspector General Abel Pérez (1906: 15-17) called for greater control of religious schools thru inspections while in 1932 National Inspector Genovese Blas project called for random, arbitrary inspections of religious schools “any time and without preview” (Article eight; 1933: 26). While benevolent state authority can lead to improved levels of education via inspections, policies of inspection can also be abused by state authorities. Given the parity between Catholic and state schools, one must ask if the inspections were necessary or if they were simply used to harass and intimidate Catholic schools? Official records of the state indicate that those in power had convinced themselves that Catholic education was entirely dogmatic, antiscientific, unpatriotic, subversive, dangerous, backwards, anti-modern, etc. Agents of the state were looking for looking for straw men that did not exist. There is not a single entry in the state records which indicate that a Catholic operated school was cited for a lack of conformity to state standards, incompetence, or poor performance (demagogy was common but not factual incidents). Hence, the inspection
policy was unreasonable to the degree that it was used coercively by the state as a constant threat to harass religious schools thus putting a competitor at a disadvantage.

The social conditions under *batllismo* created a culture of capricious and arbitrary exercises displaying political prejudice and malice of a few powerful state agents who had had sufficient power and influence to define a market for its products and services while using the power of legislation and policy to disrupt, harass and impose upon the operations of Catholic schools thus creating an imbalance in the educational market.

### Monopolization as a Causal Mechanism

In closing this chapter, it is important to explain how a monopoly acted as a casual mechanism contributing to a specific outcome; the marginalization of religion in Uruguayan society.\(^{59}\) The explanation of a monopoly as a casual mechanism is facilitated by Stinchcombe (1998) who has devoted considerable study to the relationship.\(^{60}\) Because the conflict between urban doctors and religious elites spilled into the sub-field of education, it is helpful to consider the educational sub-field as a competitive market between firms vying for constituents representing market shares. Firms, according to

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\(^{59}\) Discussion of casual mechanisms should be conditioned by a consensus among theorists who have looked closely at causation (etiology) and recognized that most observable phenomena result from multiple mechanisms working conjunctively; that is outcomes can rarely if ever attributed to a single mechanism (Dannemark, Ekstom, Jackobsen and Karlsson 2002; Gorski 2008; Hedström and Swedberg 1998; Mahoney 2001; Ragin 2000; Steinmetz 1998). Therefore, as this chapter argues that an educational monopoly contributed to religious indifference and secularization of Uruguayan society, the monopolization of education is only one mechanism in a larger casual chain.

\(^{60}\) My use of Stinchcombe’s theoretical concepts will be an adaptation to the empirical case laid out in this chapter. Stinchcombe’s concepts are helpful because they are generated thru abductive logic which is a useful tool for identifying relationships among constitutive and necessary properties and how they interact in order to produce a specific outcome. Furthermore, Stinchcombe’s concepts provide the vocabulary necessary to flush–out and make sense of human action embedded in a social and historical context.
Stinchcombe (1998: 281) are really corporate groups that form a network that can work together and can do together the activities that bring benefits from the opportunities that exist in the market. Opportunities that exist in the market correspond to the market niche consisting of consumers of certain products or services offered by the corporate group. Niche construction depends on the corporate group’s capacity to incentivize consumers to maximize a benefit from the firm’s product or service in order to make them constituents. Stinchcombe introduces three concepts that are helpful in explaining the educational market. First, is competence among corporate groups; that is firms must be competent to produce the benefits that make them successful in order to maintain their position in the market (1998: 271). The second is innovation, a concept borrowed from Schumpeter (1964) who points to the relationship between innovations and profits (1998:272). Innovation increases opportunity in the market because one firm can produce a good or service that others cannot produce. Third, Stinchcombe defines competition as “a special type of appropriation or property that gives a corporate body rights to benefits that result from certain legitimate activities and freedom from liability for whatever damage is caused by its legitimate pursuit of those advantages” (1998: 269). Incorporating these three concepts into the educational market in Uruguay clarifies the context. In regard to competence, one of the major points to this chapter has been to establish the competence of confessional schools in spite of criticism and insistence of superiority by urban doctors on behalf of the state schools they created. Assuming that the baseline outcome of a primary education in that era was to produce a literate student qualified to get a job in the burgeoning public sector as a postman, minor clerk, on the railways, or even a place in a teacher training college; Catholic schools were equal to the task (Gibson 1989:121).
Innovation is more complex, however, in the marketplace; innovation can be interpreted as comparative advantage. If innovation and comparative advantage are narrowly defined as the capacity of a corporate group to produce a particular good or service at a lower marginal and opportunity cost over another enabling it to dominate market shares; then public school obviously had that advantage since public education was free. If however the definition of innovation and comparative advantage is expanded to include a unique product or service attributable to the organization allowing it to capitalize on opportunities within a niche that values that unique product or service, then one can understand how confessional schools were able to build a constituency among consumers (Stinchcombe 1998: 273).\textsuperscript{61} Hence, competence being equal, free education at a cost to the state was both a comparative advantage and unique property of public schools which could not be duplicated by confessional schools. On the other hand, Catholic schools, after 1908 were able to uniquely position themselves in the market by offering an education integrated with a Catholic worldview and offer catechism in the curriculum; a product the public schools eliminated in 1908. Since the network of Catholic schools was not designed organizationally to dominate the market, Catholic elites were content to capitalize on their sphere of influence and operate within the market niche of constituents who wanted their product and service. This market strategy had both advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is that it eliminated problems associated with free riders. The cost of a Catholic education was a selective mechanism that sanctioned constituents not willing to pay for that service. This was an advantage because it theoretically led to

\textsuperscript{61} The expanded definition of uniqueness implies offering a product or service that the competition cannot produce due to its organizational attributes.
organizational efficiency and to a high-tension constituency who were sufficiently committed to Catholicism that they were willing to pay the opportunity cost associated with confessional schools. A high-tension constituency tends to be participatory, committed and engaged in the activities of the organization because they have a higher value and personal stake in that product or service (Iannaccone 1994, 1991; Starke and Finke 2000: 143-155). The disadvantage is what Stinchcombe (1998: 282, 295) refers to as the granular structure of the market (1998: 282, 295). The granular structure of the market is defined as “the niches or opportunities of individual corporate groups that can be identified within which they have one or another sort of competitive advantage; one or more innovation can create a granule in the market” (1998:282). However, competition depends on the elasticity of substitution of a firm’s production at various points in the corporate group’s niche. Hence, niches are vulnerable to a granular effect whereby constituents are sometimes lost around the edges of a niche when a perceived advantage or benefit is diminished. This raises the question in Stinchcombe’s analysis, namely, what are the perceived benefits and assets in the educational market? They are not the same as for-profit firms whose bottom-line is objectively measured by profits or income. In the educational market, assets are measured by status and reputation; in the Bourdieu (1984) sense of distinction (Stinchcombe 1998:293). Reputational capital is the principle asset in the educational field because it determines status which, like fungible assets, serve as a pressure or control mechanism within a corporate group to the degree that a threat of diminished profits associated with dissatisfied constituents that can lead to reduced market shares; hence, firms are motivated to provide quality services and products for an affordable cost in order to remain viable.
This now raises Stinchcombe’s third concept that helps to explain the educational market. *Competition* is defined as “a special type of appropriation or property that gives a corporate body rights to the benefits that result from legitimate activities and freedom from liability for whatever damage is caused by its legitimate pursuit of those advantages” (Stinchcombe 1998: 269). Here lies the casual mechanism that explains how a monopoly can diminish the market shares of another firm. Within a free market system, certain assumptions apply when considering competition. For example, in a free and competitive system, markets are open to newcomers which provide an important check and balance on a monopoly of power. Second, monopoly is often seeing correlated with political influence, hence open competitive markets are seen as a corollary of democracy (Jorde 1992: 5). Third and most importantly, competition needs to be fair to the degree that market forces and rules are applied equally not giving an unfair advantage to one firm over another and that a fair return and just compensation commensurate to production costs is a reasonable expectation. These assumptions are the basis for the concept “legitimate competition” which is the objective of free-markets based on Common Law.\(^{62}\) These assumptions are inherently embedded in Stinchcombe’s definition of competition and are useful in order to differentiate legitimate from illegitimate competition. Legitimate competition and free-markets assume certain liberties such as the right to develop organizational characteristics that differentiate firms, to develop patterns of production, activities and products that other firms cannot do and

\(^{62}\) Common Law suggests that the condition necessary for competition is liberty of contract. Rooted in natural law as its moral foundation, freedom of contract is the legal basis for a generalized understanding of competition, or its antithesis, monopolization. Hence a monopoly or other source of outside interference that affects competition is understood as a violation of liberty rooted in natural law (Gellhorn 1976: 12-13; Peritz 1996: 21; Sullivan 1991: 16).
this makes their firms uniquely advantaged and thus increases their flow of benefits. This is what Stinchcombe means by “rights to the benefits that result from legitimate activities”. However, the second half of the definition explains the imbalance in the market resulting from the state’s education policies resulting in illegitimate competition thus allowing the state schools to benefit from imbalances in the educational market. The state was “free from liability for whatever damage is caused by its legitimate pursuit of those advantages” (Stinchcombe 1998: 269). The advantages of the state is its capacity to make legislation, unilateral decrees, policies and take coercive action that the state calls legitimate; by its own standards. According to Stinchcombe, monopolization is a legitimate pursuit of advantages because the state is simply using its liberties as an opportunity to do what no competitor can;

Competitors can use their liberties to produce competitive pressure that can destroy the revenues, prestige or national power of the concern. One is not free to destroy a competitor’s property, faculty or sovereignty; one is free to destroy by competition the economic value, prestige value, or the power value of that property, faculty or sovereignty (1998:289).

Hence, state managers in Montevideo, motivated by the habitus of their corporate group, used liberties associated with their office and position to craft legislation and make decrees resulting in either promulgated laws or proposed laws that tilted competition in their favor and, although ruinous to the confessional schools, the state was simply doing what no other competitor could do to gain a competitive advantage. The law could have been used to either add value to the market as liberty or as rule, that is to either create fair competition or to create imbalanced competition; state managers chose the latter. The last point made by Stinchcombe refers to contingencies (1998:284). He suggests that firms must be prepared to rapidly mobilize in order to seize opportunities in order to expand
market shares. Modernization was not a contingency that entrenched confessional schools. Catholic congregations were well suited for modernization because; 1) they had a leader in Soler who was moving the Uruguayan Church into a modernization modality (Soler 1890); 2) as smaller flexible units, teaching congregations were suited to adapt their organizations, strategies and activities to respond to new challenges; and 3) the missionary and apostolic ethos of teaching communities was accustomed to contextualizing their production to new and changing social contexts. The contingency they were not prepared to respond to were the unreasonable and excessive rules and regulation that the state imposed on Catholic communities. This created an imbalance in the market. State initiatives including; 1) Law of Convents (1885); 2) Denying entry to religious personnel (1901); 3) Law of Convents used to regulate religious establishments (1903); 4) Law of Convents used to inspect all religious establishments (1911); 5) the Proposal by Areco to regulate Catholic schools(1902); 6) Gilbert’s project of regulation (1911); 7) Areco and Simón’s project to prohibit religious instruction in religious schools and to prohibit clergy from teaching in religious schools (1918); 8) Private schools must pay property taxes from which they were exempt (1923); 9) Minister of Public Instruction request for a report due to growth of religious schools (1926); 10) National Congress petition to the state to monopolize education (1930); and 11) attempts by the Inspector of Private Education to impose controls on private schools (1932) collectively compelled the network of Catholic congregations out of what Stinchcombe calls “callable routines”; the set of routines that are run automatically that corporate groups do in order to bring a flow of benefits from opportunities in the market. The regular intervention and threats of intervention were injurious to confessional schools because they negatively
affected the schools prestige capital and status since religious communities continually
found themselves defending schools against a hostile congress and in the case of Batlle, a
hostile president. When the Catholic education appeared in the dailies, *El Siglo* or *El Día*,
it was cast in a pejorative light. And last, confessional schools experienced a granular
effect; that is the state was able to peel-off the granule consisting of low-tension
Catholics on the edge of the niche and drew them into state schools; not because they
were better, but because they were free. Hence, the socialization capacities of
confessional schools were marginalized, made less efficacious, and made less productive.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION: SCHOOL CONFLICT AND THE POPULAR SECTORS

The purpose of this study has been three fold. First, to locate secularization in the activities and practices of human agency and purposeful design rather than impersonal and inexorable forces associated with modernity (i.e., industrialization, urbanization, institutional and differentiation). Second, given that education represents a critical contingency in configuring the modern state due to linkage between elites and popular sectors and that education represents a means to socialize popular sectors in order to gain the loyalty of those sectors—in terms of accepting a particular narrative, set of beliefs or value system—hence, in the Church-State conflict, dominating the sub-field of education was an important strategy toward establishing a master cultural narrative. Therefore, this study set out to understand the dynamics of the ‘school-war’ in Uruguay and the resulting capacity to influence broader society. A third purpose has been to understand the casual relationship between secularization and sub-fields such as education. Monopolizing education represents but one casual mechanism in a possible causal chain or a conjunction of mechanisms which, when acting together, have the capacity to produce a highly secular society. Multiple modernity theory suggests that outcomes are predicated on how varying constituent factors or contingencies are collectively configured in order to make differentiated societal outcomes possible. Education is only one variable in the
configuration of the modern state, but an important variable because of its capacity to shape a cultural environment.

What can be learned by this study? First, school reform initiated by Varela and promulgated by the Law of Common Education sought to make public education a universal, compulsory, free, and laical public service to all Uruguayan children between six to fourteen years of age subsidized by the state. State managers believed that public education was necessary in order to achieve national progress and overcome years of underdevelopment characterized by chaos, internal anarchy and foreign influence of the British and French. In the face of economic stagnation, mounting foreign debt and the centrifugal tendency of regionalism achieved by rural oligarchs, the Law of Common Education appeared to be the best strategy of achieving national unification, social order and economic growth. Public education made rapid gains in the domains of the republic in the first twenty-five years of reform when measured by an increasing school population and the number of school sites. However, growth slowed considerably from 1900 to 1950 (see chapter five, note 24 and Table A.5). In 1908, a National Census year, only two-fifths of all eligible school aged children were actually matriculated in schools. The universal and compulsory component of the Law of Education was hardly achieved. Recently, researchers who have commented on the economic and political reform under batllismo that led to a comprehensive modernization project have attributed such gains to the success of compulsory education; and specifically to the growth in school enrollment (Newland 1994: 452; Ehrick 2005: 35). However, even doubling the educational budget under batllismo, public schools could only keep pace with the natural population growth and not achieve the goal of universal education.
Parallel to the growth to public education, Catholic schools increased substantially in the last quarter of the 19th century as well. The mobilization of European Catholics associated with the revitalization of the European Church resulted in transnational movement of religious personnel to all corners of the globe. Uruguay benefitted from the European increase in confessional commitments, proliferation of new religious orders and the growth of missions and devotional associations as religious personnel in Uruguay increased by a factor of five between 1885 and 1901; principally attributed to the arrival of foreign-born religious workers (Acevedo 1934, Tomo V: 254-55). The vast majority were religious men and women from Italy, France and Spain who came as members of a teaching community dedicated to founding new schools. By 1908, Census data shows that there were 71 Catholic schools with approximately 15 percent of the school population (Anuario Estadístico 1908: 307). Catholics had organized a professional association (Asociación de Enseñanza Católica), a Liceo, and a Free University. Instituto Pedagógico was founded by Bauzá to serve as a Normal School and to initiate new Catholic schools. Instituto Pedagógico was administered and financed by lay professionals and thus served as a means to mobilize non-clergy in education. The expansion of Catholic institutions in this era can be traced to the formation of Club Católico founded in 1875. Club Católico was formed as a Catholic response to the special-interest organizations, Club Ateneo and Club Bilbao; founded by anticlerical urban doctors in order to promote liberal causes. Club Católico functioned as the center for academic Catholicism, a social and cultural center, and the center for Catholic resistance to anticlericalism. As a site were resources were concentrated, Club Católico gave rise to all the Catholic lay initiatives than emerged in the last half of the 19th century.
such as the *Liceo de Estudios Universitarios*, the Catholic press *El Bien Publico*, The Catholic Worker’s Circle, and the Catholic National Congresses, such that Juan Zorrilla de San Martin and Francisco Bauzá named it “the mother house of all Catholic lay institutions” (Monreal 2005: 49). Lay associational life was active and vibrant to complement the work of religious orders. Contrary to anticlerical charges of resisting modernization and science, Catholics institutions not only integrated a full range of sciences in their curriculum, but were at the forefront of scientific development in the areas that mattered to an agro-pastoral economy; botany, agronomy and climatic sciences. All told, Catholics had extensive lay and clerical networks and an infrastructure committed to responding to the “social question” of which education was a critical component.

When complete laicization of the public schools was achieved in 1908 — consistent with the Vareal’s original platform for school reform— one would think that; 1) enlightened state managers would recognize the significant contribution Catholic schools made toward fulfilling universal education— also an objective of Varela’s reforms— and encourage the collaboration of Catholic education in order to achieve broader outreach; and 2) given the democratic nature of the republic, Catholic schools would be left to their jurisdiction of pursuing faith and morals in society and allowed to operate independently as long as they operated under the Constitutional framework to “Safeguard public order, good customs, national interest and public health” (Section XI: *General Dispositions of the Constitution*; 1830). This study has shown that the concerns raised in the literature of both Francisco Bauzá and Mariano Soler in the 1880s regarding
an overreaching state were realized. The state record contained in this study (chapter six) has demonstrated an overt attempt by anticlerical state managers to discredit and to monopolize Catholic schools thru the imposition of unreasonable legislation and policies designed to impede and constrain the operation of Catholic schools thus minimizing competition. The effects were deleterious for Catholic schools which, paradoxically, defended their rights to educational liberty against capricious and arbitrary state policies.

The puzzle that remains unresolved is the impact that the state’s posture and policies had on the sentiments of popular sectors. Just how much did contestation between the monopolization and the liberty of education enter the minds of the popular sectors? How did members of the popular sector hear and interpret the conflict between anticlerical state managers and Catholic leaders; both clergy and lay? How did anticlerical elites in Uruguay build a critical mass among popular sectors receptive to their project? What conditions were created that favorably enabled elites steeped in philosophical debates to make their projects intelligible and comprehensible among popular sectors? How did elites control concepts, symbols and words that ultimately allowed their project to dominate and determine popular reality thus allowing one elite interest-group to claim cultural authority over the opposition? These questions represent the theoretical core of this study. Dominating cultural authority in the public square and gaining the loyalty of the popular majority corresponds to symbolic capital discussed in Bourdieu’s field theory. In this case, symbolic capitalism is defined in chapter three as; “the capacity to contextualize the elite project—a reciprocally recognized talent for

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1 La Escuela Común, 1887; Ensayos de Una Pluma: Artículos y Discursos, 1877; El Problema de la Educación en sus Relaciones con la Religión, el Derecho y la Libertad de Enseñanza, 1880.
communicating values, beliefs, ideas and practices (social representations) to non-elites in order to affirm the project’s relevance and legitimacy in accordance with the confluence of ideological propositions”. At stake is the loyalty, allegiance and trust of non-elites. Hence, the interest group that dominates symbolic capital can monopolize cultural production and gain the loyalty, allegiance and trust of the non-elite sectors. Two plausible explanations will be discussed here.

The Influence of Batlle and Batllismo

First, it is necessary to consider the effects that a state may have when state managers officially disapprove of and stigmatize Catholicism in general and confessional schools in particular. We know how urban doctors framed Catholic education in official records, but their literature was only read by educational professionals. The face of modernization was José Batlle y Ordóñez, the inspiration for the Colorado party’s political domination from 1904-1933 and the progenitor of the modernization project in Uruguay’ known as batllismo. Batlle was an enigmatic figure, a populist and “soft caudillo” who created the first welfare state in the western hemisphere (Pendle 1952). Batllismo led to the control of the economy thru state sponsored monopolies of public services and to the creation of a wide range of social reform. 2 Batlle was able to garner

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2 One can read about Batlle’s reforms in an extensive corpus of literature which, listed here, frame Batlle and batllismo favorably. Domingo Arena, Batllismo y Sociedad: la Cuestión Obrera en el Uruguay (Montevideo, 1986); Julio Louis, Batlle y Ordoñez: Apogeo de la Democracia Burguesa (Montevideo, 2011); Ricardo Martínez Ces, El Uruguay Batlista (Montevideo, 1962); Antonio Grompone, La Ideología de Batlle (Montevideo, 1962); Antonio Grompone, Batlle: Sus Artículos y Concepto Democrático (Montevideo, 1938); Domingo Arena, Batlle y los Problemas Sociales (Montevideo, 1939); Francisco Pintos, Batlle y el Proceso Histórico del Uruguay (Montevideo, 1938); Julio Louis, Batlle y Ordoñez: Apogeo y Muerte de la Democracia Burguesa (Montevideo, 1918); Goran Lindahl, Batlle Fundador de La Democracia en el Uruguay (Montevideo, 1971); Washington Abdala, Crónicas del Batllismo Histórico (Montevideo, 1992); Milton I. Vanger, José Batlle y Ordoñez: el Creador de su Época, (Montevideo, 1962).
wide support among popular sectors for his positions on labor reform; a position he held while still the editor of *El Día*;³

Here we have a numerous and therefore powerful social class that until now, had vegetated among us without being collectively concerned with its interests or showing signs of life, that suddenly was awakened by the murmur of the struggle that sustains this same class in almost all the nations of the civilized world and is disposed to make its aspirations and rights count in an intelligent and able manner. We salute them.

Although it took nine years from inception to fulfillment, Batlle was able to achieve an eight-hour work day for all workers among other legislative initiatives such as unemployment compensation for industrial accidents and old age pensions. Batlle’s concept of social justice required an activist and interventionist state as only the state could insure the protection of the collective interest. The state, according to Batlle, could act indirectly thru regulatory legislation, as it did with labor, or directly as the provider of essential services and owner operator of key commercial and industrial activities.⁴

Another group sympathetic to Batlle was public employees who benefitted from the expansion and bureaucratization of government social programs and economic nationalism. The number of public employees grew from approximately 20,000 in 1900 to 35,876 in 1920 of which 77 percent worked in the central administration; by 1930 there were 46,309 public functionaries with 68 percent working in the central

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administration (Faraone, Paris de Oddone and Oddone 1997: 98; Nahúm 2007 Tomo I: 228). Martinez (1964: 65) references the capacity that public employees had to influence elections in favor of issues and candidates supportive of *batllismo.* This had an effect of reinforcing the dominate party which Finch (1971:189) suggests was more effective at advancing working-class interests than trade union activity had been since the route to a bureaucratic position lay exclusively thru loyalty to the Colorado party. Zubillaga (1996:133-34) adds that social benefits such as old age pensions (*Jubilaciones y Pensiones*) were made available to government functionaries years before social legislation in 1919 made social security available to other occupational groups thus confirming the role of clientism in the central administration and consolidating a political hegemony. Batlle had created a groundswell of popular support for his reforms and influenced popular sectors with an aura of magnanimity due to the flow of social and economic benefits.

At the same time, Batlle expressed untold animosity toward the Church. It would appear that Batlle entered his first term as President at least willing to appear neutral toward the Church; he did lift the prior administration’s ban on religious workers entering Uruguay in 1903 (CLAC 1903 Tomo XXVI:91). More than one commentator has suggested that Batlle pivoted in 1904 over a dispute with the International Red Cross (Lapadjian 1994: 39; Zubillaga and Cayota 1988: 301; Geymonat 2004: 291). Batlle issued a Presidential decree annulling the juridical standing of the Red Cross in Uruguay during the civil war with Aparicio Saravia because Batlle objected to the Red Cross

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5 Barrán and Nahum estimate that 40 percent of the electorate were public employees in the 1916 elections (see José Barran and Benjamín Nahúm *Batlle, Los Estancieros y el Imperio Británico*, Tomo 8. (Montevideo, 1987).
aiding the revolutionaries and because it was managed by the *Sociedad de Damas Católicas*. Battle took umbrage with the symbol of the cross and the motto of the organization which read; “the compassion of Christ urges us.” When announcing his decree before the General Assembly Batlle commented (CLAC 1905 Tomo XXVII; 90); “The emblem gives demonstration of a callous proselytism in an open dispute between the sentiments of justice and of brotherly love with the fundamental principles of the modern Right of People whose benefits commonly extend to all races and all beliefs.”

This dispute signaled the beginning of Batlle’s confrontation with religious symbols culminating with the withdrawal of all crucifixes from public hospitals under the National Commission of Charity in June of 1906. This incident provoked José Enrique Rodó, arguably one of Uruguay’s most esteemed intellectuals, to write an open letter to Juan Antonio Zubillaga, director of the periodical *La Razón*, in which Rodó questioned the measure and declared it to be “Jacobinism,” of which he wrote;  

Liberalism? No, better stated, Jacobinism! If one understands effectively, it is an act of frank intolerance and narrow minded moral and historical incomprehension. Absolutely irreconcilable with the elevated notion of equality and of the broad generosity associated with liberalism, whatever the epithet is that reinforces or maximizes the meaning of this word.

Pedro Diaz, well-known for anticlerical writings, refuted Rodó setting off a polemic that polarized not just the intellectual and religious world, but the popular sectors were informed of the debate thru the major periodicals (da Silveira and Monreal 2003). What

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made this polemic captivating is that Rodó was a known liberal and agnostic yet he took a position in favor of retaining the crucifixes.  

Indicative of the scorn that Batlle felt toward religion, he penned the following essay that appeared in his newspaper, El Día, on Easter Sunday of 1906 mocking the event;

Today, Catholics [*all Christians*] commemorate with thunderous jubilation, the resurrection of Christ. For them the birth of the Messiah is miraculous; a miracle in which only the good Joseph could believe. And his death, or better stated, his resurrection is also a miracle. With respect to the birth, it would not have taken much effort in order for the town to gossip about Mary’s marital fidelity. With respect to the resurrection, when children and old women still believe in ghosts, reasonable men would conclude that those who leave the grave after death must have suffered from fainting or lethargy. 

In an act of contempt for the religious tradition underlying the constitutional oath of office, Batlle changed the oath of office presided by the General Assembly. He ignored the constitutional oath “I swear by God, Our Lord, and these Holy Gospels” and stated;  

Permit me, fulfilling the constitutional requirement for me does not have value, rather I will complete the oath by expressing myself in an alternative solemn commitment that I have brought for this instance. I swear by my honor as a man and citizen that for justice, progress, and the common good of the republic, realized within the strict fulfillment of the

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7 Rodó’s series of articles that appeared in La Razón, were compiled in the book Liberalismo y Jacobinismo (México, 1968) in which Rodó laid out his paradoxical angst toward the removal of the crucifixes.

8 “La Resurrección.” April 17, 1906. El Día. pg.1. One has to question the character of a President in a democracy who would openly mock the most important religious observance in a world-wide religion, knowing that a large segment of his constituency are affiliated with that particular religious faith?

9 Artículo 76. El Presidente electo, antes de entrar a desempeñar el cargo, prestará en manos del Presidente del Senado, y a presencia de las dos Cámaras reunidas, el siguiente juramento: "Yo (N.) juro por Dios N. S. y estos Santos Evangelios, que desempeñaré debidamente el cargo de Presidente que se me confía; que protegeré la religión del Estado, conservaré la integridad e independencia de la República, observaré, y haré observar fielmente la Constitución".
law, it is the law which has inspired my greatest and perennial desire to govern (DSHAG Tomo XII 1911: 169).

Batlle set the tone for his second term in office (1911-1914) with a speech to the General Assembly in which he outlined his anticlerical objectives declaring that the state has not exhausted its courses of action;¹⁰

This President is firmly resolved to guarantee a reconsideration of the state’s relationship to the Church in the broadest and most liberal manner possible (...). Nevertheless, it is my opinion that within the constitutional restrictions that have been sustained by Article five of our fundamental code, the laical objectives have not yet been exhausted and remain open for public powers to take action.

In his second term, Batlle made good on his promise beginning with the repeal of military honors seen as a religious function and a traditional protocol. In the exposition of motives appearing before the legislation, Batlle explains; “Nearing the occasion which recognizes the solemnity of Corpus Cristi, the military is obliged to bow their arms and lower their flags before a supreme symbol of the official religion. I frankly confess to you of the Assembly General that I do not desire to impose this violence on your conscience nor to those afar” (DSCS Tomo XCVIII 1911: 498).¹¹ Article three of the legislation suppressed military chaplains (RNLD 1910: 484). The same year, Batlle proposed a resolution to confiscate and expropriate all Church properties claiming they are “goods of the state” (RNLD 1911: 560). The editor of La Semana Santa protested by stating; “The purposes of the President expressed by decree represent a cruel exploitation that would


¹¹ Claudio Williman, who served as President in between Batlle’s terms in office vetoed legislation to suppress military honors involving religious symbols and protocol in 1909. Williman vetoed the legislation because the vote in the General Assembly was split, 37 to 36 (DSHAG Tomo II, 1910: 3-35).
effect, not only Catholics, but all impartial consciences who should feel threatened and alarmed at the advances of sectarianism without precedence, and should conclude that all rights are subject to a distorted concept of social order.”  

Although an act by congress to revive the Law of Convents (discussed in chapter six) was vetoed by his predecessor (Williman), Batlle reinvigorated the Law in 1911 serving as a witch hunt in order to harass all Catholic schools and institutions. Zubillaga (1988:303) adds that Batlle packed the commission conducting the inspections “with the most notorious anticlerical cronies in order to apply the disposition of the law.”

Two of Batlle’s proposals had a broader impact on Uruguayan culture. A divorce law had first been introduced to congress by Oneto y Viana in 1905 during Batlle’s first term in office. The language of the proposal expressed clearly that the judgment of divorce would be under the authority of civil law without participation of ecclesiastic authorities. The proposal initiated discussions in congress without resolution. On November 12, 1905 deputies were presented with a petition signed by 93,000 Damas Católicas expressing their opposition to any legislation that would sanction divorce (DSCR Tomo 183 1905: 404-05). In 1907, a divorce law for “whatever reason by either spouse” was approved after extensive debate in congress (DSCS Tomo 90 1907:139-181; 240-249; 262-276; 356-392; 431-439; 444-480; 515-533; 569-589; Tomo 91: 84-119; 147-164; 167-200). In Batlle’s second term, in 1912, the law was amended to allow divorce “on the simple will of the woman” (DSCS Tomo 101 1912: 367-388). It is not clear for which constituency the law was passed. The Asociación de Damas Liberales emerged in 1906, however other than generating a few pressers in the periodical El

12 “La Iglesia y sus Bienes.”July 22, 1911. La Semana Religiosa; pg. 10810.
Liberal, the association passed away hardly noticed. 13 Zubillaga and Cayota (1988: 303) suggest the law was enumerated and defended for political reasons on behalf of Batlle’s most immediate collaborators. In reality, the law was symbolic rather than substantive and the law did not correspond to an aggrieved constituency as only one divorce occurred in the law’s first year (Nahum 2007: 33). Over the next twenty years (1907-1927) the divorce rate vacillated between one and three percent of all marriages.14 It is clear however that the law was intended to be a stick in the eye of Catholics who opposed the law vociferously on moral grounds.15

The second law that had profound cultural implications was the secularization of religious holidays. Although the legislation took place after Batlle’s second term ended, the law was promoted by batllista Jose Arias.16 The principle motive for the legislation

13 In her study of feminism in Uruguay, Christine Ehrick (2005: 54-55;229) references the Asociación de Damas Liberales and her conclusions concur with my research in the Biblioteca Nacional and other archival sites; that no statutes or paper trail of the association has been left other than a few brief references in the periodical El Liberal. Ehrick cites errant secondary sources regarding the density of women who identify themselves as “Liberal” in the 1908 national Census. Ehrick reports that the 15 percent of the national population were self-identified “liberal women” thus there was a “sufficient base available to mobilize women around liberal causes (2005:54).” According to the Census, the percentage of self-identifying liberal women was 5.8 percent in the republic and 7.4 percent in Montevideo; a small minority (Anuario Estadístico 1908: XXVI).

14 If Batlle and his administration were seriously concerned about granting full citizenship to women then one would expect to see woman’s suffrage promoted under his regime. Electoral laws were changed in 1916 and institutionalized in the new constitution of 1919 resulting in a significantly expanded electorate. However, women did not achieve suffrage until 1932 and did not vote for the first time until the 1938 elections (Caetano 2011: 28).

15 It is interesting to note that in 1915, of the 2,141 marriages recorded by the Civil Registry, 56 percent were a combined civil-religious ceremony as opposed to simply a civil marriage. Thirty years after the Civil Marriage Law took effect (1885), a strong majority of marriages were still conducted in the Church (Montevideo, Anuario Estadístico 1915: 29)

16 After Batlle’s second term, he became the undisputed party leader of the Colorados, shaped the party platform for subsequent elections, and continued to influence society thru his periodical; El Día, which was the nation’s leading daily.
was to avoid “retaining the date of the religious holiday and change the name which would imply an imitation thus planting two absurdities: first, a moral connection between the Church and the state in contradiction with real and legal facts, and second, the orientation of our customs toward a festival system that originated in the European region.” 17 After months of deliberation the final law was passed which annulled Holy Week, Christmas was changed to “Day of the Family,” the Immaculate Conception was changed to “Day of the Beaches,” and Epiphany was changed to “Day of the Child.”

The point of this expose on Batlle is to confirm his social influence. As a leader of Uruguay’s modernization project, he was larger than life. In 1911, he was elected to a second term while absent from the country and did not campaign personally (Caetano 2011: 52). It is impossible to quantitatively measure the impact that Batlle’s persona had on the culture and the degree to which his posture and disposition toward the Church influenced popular sectors. From an analytical view, there are two social historians whose analysis is worth noting. Regarding Batlle’s influence as a reformer, Carlos Real de Azúa (who was actually critical of batllismo) offers the following analysis of (1964: 36); 18

All of this [Batlle’s accomplishments] inescapably resulted from a man that was in charge of his work. A man that was politically skilled while having an authentic aura of an apostle, missionary, and Messiah. He was a man capable of evoking popular spontaneity thru the influence of his


18 A corpus of academic studies critical of Batlle and batllismo has begun to emerge after decades of sympathetic literature which extoled the virtues of the era. See Carlos Real de Azúa, El Impulso y su Freno: Tres Décadas de Batllismo y las Raíces de la Crisis Uruguaya (Montevideo, 1964); Carlos Real de Azúa, Uruguay: ¿Una Sociedad Amortiguadora? (Montevideo, 1984); Gerardo Caetano, La Republica Batllista, (Montevideo, 2011); José Pedro Barrán, Uruguay, Una Sociedad Hedonista, (Montevideo, 2001).
personality which radiated a caudillo like political leadership; coherent and authoritative.

Regarding his anticlerical dispositions, Batlle was able to diffuse his sentiments among the popular sectors thru daily editorials of his newspaper El Día, which according to Zubillaga (1988:303);

Batlle redacted editorials personally in which he unleashed a persistent campaign to discredit the Church, make personal attacks on religious leaders, and mock the Church’s dogmas. Batlle successfully encouraged the process of desacralization in society in the name of reform. He established a disrespectful and excessive tone in the official press— which reflected the personal opinions of the president— and expressed radical views for free thus become a patrimonial figure to the rest of the liberal press.

It is the influence of the press to which we will now consider.

**The Anticlerical Press**

In Latin America, by most accounts, the press increased in significance due to its relation to independence movements. In the post revolution era, most presses were dominated by liberal reformers who used the press as organs of their interest group in order to promote political reform by exalting republican virtue and denouncing their political enemies. Over time, as divergent interest groups emerged, the press became a site for open partisanship reflecting narrow views of competing interests and outrageous allegations against opponents. In his epic history of the press in Uruguay, Ferretjans (2008: 398) observes that;

Toward the end of the 19th century, political propaganda thru the press had begun to influence directly the popular sectors. The consequence of literacy and pathway by which the private sectors politicized immigration and unionization, both led to the trend of a new style of journalism; the political actor based on mass communication.
It is important to note that the anticlerical press did not emerge spontaneously; rather each press was an “organ” of a special-interest association. These organizations facilitated communication patterns and genre that emerged in the anticlerical press which were used as sites to transmit the culture, ideologies and values of their special interest organization. There was an almost continuous chain of anticlerical special interest associations beginning with the Club Universitario in 1868 under the auspices of the National University and the inspiration of Placido Ellauri; Chairman of the Philosophy Department. It was founded in order to promote “laws of progress” (Ardao 1962: 235; 1950:58). Club Universitario existed in solidarity with Club Racionalista until 1873 when Club Racionalista shut down leaving Club Universitario to function alone until it fused with other institutions and formed the El Ateneo in 1877. It was members of the Club Racionalista that contributed to the founding of the daily El Siglo also in 1872 (Oddone 1956: 99). Principal members of El Ateneo formed the periodical La Razón on October 13, 1878; a daily dedicated to liberal causes. El Ateneo carried the day for the development of the school of Deism and Natural Religion which helped give rise to a new and invigorated form of rationalism that transpired during the administration of Latorre regime (El Ateneo exists to this day). La Razón was founded to promote philosophical views of the day and made religion its target rather than the political context as Ardao (1960:286) cites; “There was not one aspect of Catholicism that La Razón did not criticize; the history of Catholicism, its Mass, all practices, the acts of the Church, its dogmas, and its doctrines.”
A comparative summary of the major anticlerical newspapers can be viewed in Appendix B. Table B.1 presents a time line revealing an almost continuous succession of anticlerical press beginning with the *Idea Liberal* from 1893 until 1919 corresponding to the last issue of *El Libre Pensamiento*. The first editorial of each newly released press typically is dedicated to expressing the purpose and objective of each respective press.

An example from *El Libre Pensamiento* reads:

> Our colleagues wish that the *Propaganda Liberal* profusely proclaim that, without cultural reticence as the valiant protector of free-thinking, our action is not limited to the struggle against superstition and against fanaticism that the ultramontane Catholic exploiters preach, but that it also extends its liberty campaign against all superstitions and all fanaticism from which ever positive religion. Such alterations are in effect the oppression of the fullness of human intelligence and of the growing development of essential liberties, represented by Catholic superstitions founded as predominate among religions which impose dogmas and devotion restricting the exercise of reason and free-will.

Anticlerical press sought to promote and disseminate ideas associated with liberalism of the era, although one can learn very little about the core principles and properties of the version of liberalism which urban doctors ascribed to. In the anticlerical press, liberalism is more commonly identified by its animus for Catholicism while liberals are presented as guardians of the truth and therefore able to expose the deception of Catholicism. Some anticlerical press went beyond simply disparaging Catholicism but targeted all positive religions; which in the Uruguayan context was limited to Protestantism. In place of religious commitments, certain press promoted “freethinking” as editors advocated that

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19 These summaries are based on field notes taken in the summers of 2012 and 2013 in the Biblioteca Nacional and the archives of the Archdiocese of Montevideo.

20 “A los Miembros de la Asociación de Propaganda Liberal.” December 10, 1905. *El Libre Pensamiento*. pg.1. Editorial samples of other leading anticlerical newspapers can be found in Appendix B.
free-thought represented the best alternative to undermine religious claims and moral
dictates based on Christian revelation, to reject dogmatic teaching based religious
authority, and substitute beliefs and findings based on unfettered reason alone (*El Libre
Pensamiento*).

Education was among the more common themes presented in the anticlerical
press. Much of the same criticism presented by urban doctors who contributed to *Anales
de Educación Primeria* and the *Memoria Correspondiente Anual por Abel Pérez* also
appear in the anticlerical press; although in a popular genre. One common technique of
the anticlerical press was to appeal to fears and prejudices by over-exaggerating and
misleading the reader to believe that Catholic personnel were overwhelming society.
Xenophobia toward foreign-born religious workers was the motive that caused President
Cuestas to suspend entrance of foreign religious orders in 1901. As we saw in chapter six,
the presence of Italian, French and Spanish men and women religious was used
continuously as a wedge issue leading to numerous attempts by the state to prohibit their
work in the schools. The state however, only discriminated against European immigrants
when they were religious workers;

The point of departure is this; in every corner clergy establish a Catholic
school and in every barrio there is a clerical house of instruction and our
country is being invaded by individuals of both genders of distinct
religious communities who come as immigrants without connections to
any custom of our society, lacking our native Castilian tongue, and these
fortune hunters of the cloth are those who take as their charge the
education of children and youth dragging them down the road of seduction
and errors of ignorance and superstitions such that in a short time many
harms have befallen Uruguayan households.\(^{21}\)

\(^{21}\)“El Clero y la Instrucción Pública.” November 22, 1900. *La Antorcha 2a época*. Pg. 1.
Clericalism in Uruguay came to mean anything Catholic. As explained in chapter three, after the revolution, Uruguay never experienced conflict similar to the throne-altar issue as in France, Italy or Spain. No back and forth struggles between the republic and monarchy as in France and Italy. There was no “party of priests” as in France. The Church was born simultaneously to the republic and both entities build their institutions in tandem. Ultramontanism was missiological and not a means for the lower clergy to resist bishops and adhere to the Pope as in France; because in Uruguay there was no bishop. Catholic teachers were not paid by the state neither were Catholic schools subsidized by the state. Much of what was construed as clericalism in Uruguay was a straw man and this was very evident in the anticlerical press. It is more common to find reprints of sections from Victor Hugo, Voltaire, or Renan in the anticlerical press than to find references to the Uruguayan Church involved in political entanglements or as recipients of privilege. In a similar pattern, La Idea Liberal printed sections of the book entitled Consejos del Diablo a los Jesuitas originating from Spain because the Jesuits in Uruguay gave the press little to no scandal. It was easier to use third-party technique to discredit the Church based on European anticlericalism than to identify authentically historical events that had taken place in Uruguay. There is a noticeable absence in the anticlerical press of specific cases of avarice, gluttony, sexual indiscretions and other

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22 Soler explains how religious teaching orders were sustained financially in visita ad limina (1896); “[Teachers] receive nothing from the government, they are sustained by tithes offered by the faithful and by matriculation fees from families who send their children to Catholic schools.”

23 Zubilla and Cayota (1988: 305) refer to the framing of clericalism by urban doctors as “artificial.”

24 “Gacetillas.” October 1, 1893. La Idea Liberal. Sections appeared in multiple editions thereafter.
hypocritical acts that one reads about the clergy of France.  

For example in an article entitled “Los Grandes Crímenes del Catolicismo” that appeared in La Antorcha 2ª época (Octubre 30, 1900) the reader finds no criminal acts, only glittering generalities and typical demagoguery in which Catholics are guilty of barbarism; the lack of reason and intelligence. When clergy are featured in the anticlerical press for misconduct, it is because they were jailed for baptizing an infant prior to civil registry or for marrying a bride and groom prior to the civil marriage. Anticlericals in Uruguay were vicariously fighting the clerical/anticlerical battles of Europe because their battle at home was against a straw man of their own construct. This is self-evident in the article appearing in La Antorcha (2a época) in which the authors first cites hearsay from abroad;

There are real examples that occur in some of the famous Catholic schools in the world. We cite daily acts which accuse not only religious brothers of corruption but also the cruelty and inquisitions that produce immoral crimes.

When the same author turns his attention to the Uruguayan context, he states; “We do not know if in our country the same instances occur, but given the irrational and regressive system that exists in all Catholic schools, we can suppose that corporal punishment is


\[\text{\footnotesize 26 “El Padre de Minas.” October 8, 1899. La Antorcha pg. 1; “¡Justicia! ¡Libertad!” November 10, 1906. La Semana Religiosa. pg. 6317.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 27 “Las Escuelas Religiosas.” July 30, 1901. La Antorcha. Pg.1.}\]
common in the programs of discipline.”  

The volume of articles that originated in Spain, France or Italy, and that appeared as translated reprints in the anticlerical press is evidence that Uruguayan elites benefitted from transnational contacts. It is clear that a certain percentage of Uruguay anticlericalism was driven transnationally, of European origin, and that the European public square was pervasive the Uruguayan anticlerical press.

Catholic pedagogy was an ever present theme in anticlerical press. A Catholic education was represented by imagery of a doctrinaire and regressive curriculum holding students in a condition of ignorance that hindered societal modernization. Laicization of public schools by contrast was intended to make education neutral and to emphasize a “reformed pedagogy” thus producing free-thinkers consistent with the free-thinking special interests societies to which urban doctors belonged;

Pedagogy should be inspired by respect for the reason of a child. That which provokes the wrath of the enemy of the laical school [Catholics] is that which we know they do not respect; that which is respectful and dignified. We are not inclined toward any belief, whatever it is, if it is judged irrational. We want the child to see clearly, to observe, and to judge by means of reason.

28 The observations of the Argentinian schools in 1927 by school inspector Julio Barcos (1927) are noteworthy here. In an environment where corporal punishment is prohibited (in Uruguay, corporal punishment was prohibited by the Law of Common Education in 1877), teachers still must command order by demanding obedience in a classroom averaging forty students or more. There was a disconnection between the pedagogy of Perstalozzi, Decroly, and Montessori taught to teachers in the Normal school and the reality of the classroom. Educators in this era typically converted themselves into “jail wardens” (1927:159). The notion of “working for the affection of the child” was soon displaced by an arsenal of methods designed to instil discipline in the minds of students which included; shouting, threats, insults, blows with the teacher’s pointer, suspensions, expulsions from the classroom, and poor grades. Barcos observed that two-thirds of the teacher’s energy was consumed by maintaining order while one-third was spent engaging in the educational process. See Julio Barcos, ¿Cómo Educa el Estado a tu Hijo? y otros Escritos pgs. 147-158, (Buenos Aires, 1927).

Laical education, as presented in this study, was neither neutral nor pedagogically superior. 30 The free intellectual development of every child was nullified by a narrow doctrine of citizenship education imposed on students in the public school schools designed to supplant loyalties to religious sentiments with loyalty to the state. 31 By emphasizing homogenous citizenry thru educational outcomes in order to achieve national unification paradoxically violated norms of a pluralistic democracy urban doctors sought to achieve.

A discursive strategy commonly employed in anticlerical press was designed to demonize Catholic instruction especially corresponding to religious personnel. Readers are provided with ad nausam imagery of priests and nuns as blind guides, as task masters and students are viewed as sheepishly and ignorantly subservient. The message implies an “us versus them” mentality in which the laical public school is always superior. To the reading public, the message is; “either you are for us or against us” thus reinforcing an inevitable superiority and promoting a bandwagon effect that would persuade readers to

30 See chapter six, notes 26 and 28 on the reality of “reformed pedagogy.” See chapter five on the Instituto Pedagógico initiated by Francisco Bauza. See chapter three on the development of a moral laica and Citizen Education that replaced a Catholic morality in the public schools. For an in-depth study on the subject of moral laica developed as an objective of batllismo, see Gerardo Caetano, La Republica Batllista, pgs. 189-234. (Montevideo, 2013)

31 In her essay entitled “The State Teacher” Gabriela Mistral (1927) debunks the concept of the “neutral school.” Citing French laical education as an example, she cites that Catholic doctrine has simply been replaced by radical Spencerian and socialist dogma. One ‘ism’ has simply been replaced by another. She observed that French schools operated under a utopian pedagogy suggesting that students are a “blank slate” and their “prodigious soul is to be respected” however the same schools violated the pedagogical ideal by installing a curriculum that was decidedly oriented toward a statist agenda. She points to the pluralism that existed in French society characterized by varying social, economic, political and religious creeds. She suggests that a remedy to the disingenuous myth of neutrality in the laical school would be to survey the general population to determine the variability of creeds, and to offer state education that caters to the reality of heterogeneity in place of a laical education that operates on the principle of homogeneity.
the side of anticlericals. A sense of superiority comes at the expense of disparaging and disapproving of the action by Catholic educators who are viewed with disdain and contempt by the authors.

The child of Catholic parents, of indifferent parents, or the child of the compliant husband who pulls his woman by the nose should be protected by the state in the same manner that the child who receives support from parents that understand their duty and place their child in a laical school thus rooting the child out from the lethal environment that entangles the instruction given by the Jesuits, brothers, nuns, Sisters of Charity and the rest of the personnel considered teachers in the combinations of clericalism.  

There is not one child who leaves the palaces of Catholic instruction that knows absolutely anything that can be profitable regarding the fate of life; except to pray, to believe in miracles, the saints, and to be superstitiously hypocritical. All the poor children have learned is paternal stupidity that religious instruction has delivered and have placed themselves under the patronage of foreign men and women who are ignorant and full of ideas contrary to the principles and beliefs that the nation desires for our future citizens.  

The anticlerical press used disinformation either by omitting positive characteristics regarding the function and efficacy of Catholic schools and their personnel or by creating a false narrative tantamount to false accusations. The press used dysphemism as an art to discredit and diminish the perceived quality of a Catholic education by creating labels that stereotype all things Catholic thus decreasing the creditability of confessional schools and their personnel. Defamation was the mainstay of the anticlerical press.

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We have a society full, not only the capital but also the countryside, of schools managed by a swarm of Sisters of Charity among all the orders that come to us from god knows where, Jesuit nuns who capture an infinity of creatures of both sexes and educate them in Papist principles, which requires a certificate of capacity, or exam which they cannot present. The most grave is that they summarize in order to make comprehensible by memory, prayers that they themselves do not understand.  

The school is the first source of intelligence and is the awakening of the active forces of talent, the intimate manifestation of human sociability, and yet the Christian brothers are the enemy of intelligence because they have moronic brains in order to give eager pasture to their superstitious doctrines. They are the enemy of reason and guides to the religion that does not want to know by rational thought. Rather all of them are a plague of absurd contrapositions that makes a gifted student that can judge sincerely fall into the ridiculous.

The press in Uruguay played a significant role in the secularization process by serving as a principal mechanism of popularizing, sensationalizing and disseminating the ideas of secular elites, university professors, members of the anti-clerical clubs and professional associations. Ideas were consistent with anticlerical ideology but made intelligible and comprehensible to popular sectors of non-elites. Secularizers created new vocabulary for discussing social events of which they had mastered and appeared as experts resulting in a new discursive strategy. Themes that popular subjects understood were the misrepresentation of traditional religion, inflammatory discourse and demagogic rhetoric designed to provoke a visceral response against traditional religion (Valenzuela and Maza Valenzuela 2000:202; da Silveira and Monreal 2003: 49-54; Lisiero 1971:59).

The press was directly and intentionally responsible for indoctrinating the public in

34 “El Estado y la Iglesia.” May 7, 1900. El Liberal. pg. 1.

several ways. First, by bestowing legitimacy on demagogy and hyperbole published in an otherwise professional journalistic forum. The press was assumed to have an air of authority and professional status upon which readers could rely for accurate information regarding their social world. Second, the press further substantiated its authority by spreading ideas adopted from other institutional spheres of knowledge. The press was able to call into question traditional religion and its place in a modern scientific world and suggested that science had become the authoritative voice for modern life. The press presumed that science, as presented by the knowledge class, could foster proper ethical and moral concerns and rightly order human relationships in modern society. Thus, the secular press was utilized to present two opposing modern projects; a new rational world espoused by secular elites and the old traditional world represented by the Church. Elites saw themselves as an avant-garde; carriers of a superior social order and future orientation that originated in rationalism for which there was no room for religious authority. They alone could reform society and it was their mission to bring its emancipation to fruition. The press became an important source of discursive practices that would inculcate uncultivated masses of popular subjects and enlighten their modern cultural orientation.

**Counterfactuals**

Is there an alternative explanation to the thesis presented in this study; namely that monopolization of the Catholic educational system by hostile state managers caused an otherwise productive Catholic school system to lose its competitive capacity thus marginalizing the Church’s social reproductive capacity and serving as one casual
mechanism among several to produce a society either indifferent or hostile toward Catholicism? Is it possible that the school system simply ran out of resources that can account for its decline in the beginning of the new millennium?

We know that the Uruguayan Church had been dependent on the ultramontane revival in Europe which produced a transnational mobilization of thousands of religious personnel. By most accounts, the ultramontane revival in Europe began to diminish by 1880s (Obrien 1997: 143; Anderson 1991: 696). Within Uruguay, Zubillaga (1992: 95) used archival records from the Curia to show that at least 75 Italians clergy arriving between 1850 and 1930 had a letter of recommendation or other document accounting for their work in Uruguay. Turcatti and Sanson (2005: 23) also utilized documents from the archives of the Curia to categorize Spanish clergy by the following dates: 47 clergy arrived 1852-1891; 47 clergy arrived 1892-1919; and 42 clergy arrived 1920-1960. On the feminine side, the major ingress of religious orders from France occurred between 1850 and 1900 while Italian religious orders came between 1870 and 1900 Monreal (2010; 2005). As members of earlier arriving orders began to retire, several new congregations continued to arrive into the 20th century; Sociedad del Sagrado Corazón (1908); Los Hermanos Maristas (1934); Los Hermanos de la Instrucción Cristiana (1950); Hermanos del Sagrado Corazón (1927); Hermanas de Jesús-María (1952) (Monreal 2005:50). A group of Carmelites arrived in 1910 (Geymonat 2004: 299). Villegas (1987: 16) reports that in 1957, there were 198 secular priests and 464 regulars totaling 662 clergy in addition to 1,842 women religious. This meant that in 1957, there was one religious worker for every 1,309 citizens (2,412,470). Compared to 1901 there were 891 combined men and women religious (and clergy) translating to one religious
worker for every 1050 citizens (Faraone, Paris Oddone and Oddone 1997: 100). In addition to foreign-born religious personnel, Uruguay had the capacity to train clergy in the Seminario Conciliar run by the Jesuits which was fed by a Seminario Menor. These figures would suggest that there were sufficient human resources (religious personnel) available to serve in the school system during the years of batllismo when the school system stagnated. 

Financial resource could have been problematic for the Church after disestablishment when the annual government support was withdrawn in 1919. Before disestablishment however, the annual budgetary allotment designated for the Culto was quite small. The Church, bureaucratically speaking, was under the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto and in the beginning of the new millennium actually experienced a decrease in its support corresponding to the first term of Batlle.

### TABLE 7.1

**CHURCH ALLOWANCE PROVIDED BY THE STATE: SELECT YEARS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budgetary Year</th>
<th>Budget (pesos)</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Salaries</th>
<th>Other Expenses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901-02</td>
<td>26,609</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15,040</td>
<td>11,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904-05</td>
<td>19,009</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12,869</td>
<td>6,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906-07</td>
<td>15,009</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12,869</td>
<td>2,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908-09</td>
<td>16,450</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14,300</td>
<td>2,150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Anuario Estadísticos: 1907-08 Tomo 1: 911-917

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36 Stability among the population of Catholic educators is corroborated by Table A.13 which shows that from 1900 to 1950, the teacher to student ratio in Catholic schools was consistently 30:1.
However in anticipation of disestablishment, Church leaders were able to raise a popular endowment of approximately $1,000,000 pesos to compensate for the loss of revenue from the state (Mecham 1966:258). In an attempt to explain the forthcoming separation from the state, the editor of La Semana Religiosa made the following appeal to the faithful:

   In primitive times, all these expenses were covered by voluntary offerings of the faithful in fulfillment of a strict obligation and natural right. More recently, the perception of contributions by the faithful in the form of tithe and first fruits was substituted by the resources for the worship and clergy supplied by the state.  

Using the government subsidy from 1901-02 as a gauge (26,609 pesos), the endowment would have provided enough funds to manage the Church for 38 years; at that budgetary level. The state support however only covered the management of the Curia and very little else. Church related ministries however were designed to operate independently from the state contribution to the Church. In the visita ad limina of 1896, Mariano Soler explains how auxiliary ministries of the Church were supported financially. Women religious serving in hospitals or workhouses for the poor received a stipend from the state. However, those serving in schools “received nothing from the government”. Men and women religious attached to schools, according to Soler, were supported by “the offerings of the faithful and with the matriculation fees form students attending the schools.” Hence, Catholic schools were designed to be solvent and self-sustaining from

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38 The visita ad limina of 1888 provides an itemized budget regarding the distribution of the government subsidy for that budgetary year as follows; Bishop 6,480 pesos; Provisor, 1,296 pesos; Secretary, 540 pesos; Chaplin for the Bishop, 324 pesos; Caretaker, 162 pesos and Office expenses, 150 pesos totaling 8,952 pesos in 1888.
the start and did not derive financial benefits from the state. The withdrawal of state
support due to disestablishment in 1919 would have had no effect on the way that schools
were financed.

The stability of both human capital, in the form of labor, and economic capital
would suggest that Catholic schools had sufficient resources during the era of batllismo
hence, the loss in market shares cannot be attributed to those two causes. There was
however a deficiency in human capital associated with the leadership of the Church that
arguably had profound ramifications not just for education, but for the entire Catholic
enterprise in Uruguay. Francisco Bauza passed away in 1899 and Mariano Soler in 1908.
This left a significant vacuum among the Catholic leadership. As a layman, Francisco
Bauza was critical to the Catholic educational initiative as the principle author and voice
pressing for the right and liberty of education which was continually threatened by the
state. As demonstrated in this study, Soler was modernizing the Church in the face of
social change. Both Soler and Bauza were able to confront the arguments of free-thinking
rationalism advocated by urban doctors and articulate a contextualized vision of the
Church in modernity. Their loss in terms of human capital was incalculable. Although
Ricardo Isasa replaced Soler, he carried the title of Apostolic Administrator and was
never appointed as Bishop or Archbishop. The national episcopacy suffered as a result.
Mons. Jose Johannemann was appointed Apostolic Visitor in 1918 while
disestablishment was debated in congress, but he was an outsider (Geymonat 2004: 306).
The Uruguayan hierarchy made a regrettable mistake by not preparing a successor for
Soler in the same manner in which Vera had an experienced leader in waiting. The loss of
capable leadership in the Church only emboldened Batlle’s vitriolic attack on the Church

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and served to motivate his relentless anticlerical campaign that unfolded in his second term in office (Zubillaga y Cayota 1988: 302). The loss of leadership in Bauza and Soler and the lack of apparent heir who could maintain their level of intensity defending Catholic interests was significant in terms of human capital and warrants the recognition that the lack of capable leadership in a crucial time was also a factor contributing to the marginalization of Catholicism in Uruguay; although it is difficult to measure the relative significance of this variable in relation to other causes.

Conclusion

This study makes three claims. First, that secularization, especially irreligious and intensive secularization as occurred in Uruguay, is the outcome of purposeful and intentional actions of human agency. Urban doctors serving in the capacity as state managers and editors of the press purposefully worked toward the marginalization of the Church in Uruguayan society by monopolizing education and using the coercive power of the state to discredit and constrain the development of Catholic schools. Disparaging Catholic education and religious personnel by the anticlerical press thru the use of scapegoating, stereotyping, fear-mongering, glittering generalities, labeling, demonizing, ad nauseam and ad hominem attacks served to misinform and misrepresent both Catholic education, religious personnel, and the Church thus reinforcing the project of urban doctors.

Second, this study claims sources of causality operating at varying levels that serve to explain the secular outcome. The monopolization of education contributed causally as explained by Stinchcomb’s use of abductive logic to understand how the
constitutive properties of a monopoly interact to diminish competition between entities in the same field. In a larger context, Bourdieu’s field theory serves to explain a secular outcome as a function of conflict between elite projects driven by habitus and determined by dominating symbolic capital. Urban doctors not only were able to monopolize the sub-field of education, but dominate symbolic capital defined in this study as a reciprocally recognized capacity for communicating values, beliefs, ideas and practices to non-elites in order to affirm the social project’s relevancy and legitimacy within the confluence of ideological propositions. At stake for the group able to dominate discursive and representational capital is the opportunity to gain the loyalty, allegiance and trust of popular sectors. Disdain by anticlerical state managers toward Catholic education referenced in their very public legislative attempts to impose unreasonable and coercive restrictions on schools, reinforced by Batlle’s public display of contempt for all things Catholic, and exacerbated by anti-Catholic propaganda in anticlerical press was sufficient to win the public relations war with the Church. Hence, dominating symbolic capital as defined in this study goes a long way in explaining the outcome of the culture war between the Church and State.

Last, this study understands the marginalization of religion in Uruguay as a function of state configuration. Located in the context of existential conflicts between divergent groups with differentiated interpretations of society shaped by conscience human activity, a Multiple Modernity framework would assert that there is nothing inevitable about the relationship between the modernizing state and secularization. The significance of state configuration in Uruguay is magnified when contrasted with a similar state configuration such as Costa Rica.
Chapter two identified a similar colonial heritage (better stated; a lack there of) shared by Costa Rica and Uruguay. The comparison does not stop there. A World Bank comparative study (Rottenberg 1993) of Costa Rica and Uruguay found striking similarities regarding certain broad socio-economic and political variables. Both counties are small with a relative homogeneous population, have a relatively high per capital income thru exportation of primary products, and both countries have followed redistributive policies and were among the earliest welfare states in Latin America. The study attributes the welfare state as a source of relative social equality reinforced by a democratic form of governance. Both national Churches experienced virulent anticlericalism. The Costa Rican Church experienced structural secularization of most of its civic functions in a similar timeframe to Uruguay. In the era of Liberal reforms, the Church in Costa Rica also had no conservative party to defend its interests. Anticlericalism was not only inaugurated by the second expulsion of the Jesuits, but included the expulsion the Bishop in 1884 (Salas 2000). The response was not violent because many of the clergy supported liberal reform. A majority of anticlerical policies were decreed between 1880 and 1890. There is evidence that anticlericalism became personalistic thru President Mora who acted like a “regal tyrant” in controlling the church. Picado (1988: 57) points out that the brutality carried out by liberals was

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39 Among the secularization of civic functions, Picado lists the following: 1) derogation of the Concordat; 2) secularization of cemeteries; 3) prohibition of religious processions outside of the Churches; 4) prohibition of combating laical education promoted by the state; 5) suppression of diezmos; 6) prohibition on establishing religious communities; 7) prohibition on accepting votes from members of religious communities; 8) approval of divorce and requirement of civil marriage; 9) a de facto separation of the Church and State; 10) expulsion of Bishop Thiel and all the Jesuits for the second time; and 11) shutting down the Seminary of Santo Tomas under the threat that it would be secularized. See Miguel Picado, *La Iglesia Costarricense: Entre Dios y El Cesar*. (San José, 1988).
unjustified because the Costa Rican Church was weak and not a threat to the liberal vision of the state. The critical juncture for religious continuity was the formation of the Unión Católica by a lay wing of the Church that joined with Unión Católica del Clero and dominated by clergy. There are conflicting perspectives by Williams (1989) who suggests that the party sought to defend institutional interest against Liberal Reform, and Picado (1988) and Salas (2000) who indicate that the party was out to defend the rights of workers, artisans and peasants regarding fair wages. The election was tainted by fraud and the liberal candidate stole the Presidency. The liberals however, were dismayed at the power of the populace and the result of the election was a modus vivendi whereby the liberal government came to respect the popular support of the Church and the Church agreed to disband Unión Católica. The liberal government remained in power for forty years and avoided confrontations with the Church. The Church refrained from meddling in partisan politics and focused on its pastoral work. With regard to education, the state in Costa Rica took a very different route than Uruguay. Catechism remained available in public schools and families wishing to opt out could do so. Although there was no government subsidy for religious education there was collaboration between the Ministry of Public Instruction and Church leadership stressing the importance of religious training for the formation of holistic personal development. The 1949 Constitution made Roman Catholic and Apostolic religion the state’s official religion in addition to protecting freedom of worship and conscience for other religions that are not opposed to universal

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40 Several researchers (Sanabria 1984; Salas 2000; Picado 1988) believe that anticlerical liberals in Costa Rica were influenced by President Barrios in Guatemala because the order of anticlerical measures followed the order of Barrios who sought to extend his regional influence within the old federation of countries thru the Tratado de Paz y Amistad.
morality and good customs (Fox 2008: 296; Mecham 1966:334). Social services have not been nationalized in Costa Rica as they were in Uruguay leaving the Church space to operate in the cultural sphere of social and economic improvement.

The point of this cursory analysis is to support the Multiple Modernity framework; two states with numerous historical, social, political and economic similarities yet a differentiated modern state configuration in which religion has been sanctioned and prospers in one state, while religion is marginal and with limited influence in the other. Costa Rica today is characterized by a relatively strong religious society where a Catholic majority has experienced a robust Protestant expansion of 15 percent (CID-Gallup: Costa Rica, 2000; Fox 2008; See Table A.1 for a comparison of Latin American countries). This global and cursory comparative analysis between state configurations serves as a recommendation for future study between Costa Rica and Uruguay which could serve to understand how the Multiple Modernity framework provides further explanation for processes of secularization in modern societies.
## APPENDIX A

### TABLES

#### TABLE A.1.

**INDICATORS OF SECULARIZATION IN LATIN AMERICAN CASES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weekly Church Attendance (%)</th>
<th>Saliency (%)</th>
<th>Active in Rel. Organ. (%)</th>
<th>Practice Religion (%)</th>
<th>Non-Religious Rate (%)</th>
<th>Relative Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Argentina</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bolivia</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brazil</strong></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chile</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Colombia</strong></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Costa Rica</strong></td>
<td>51^f</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dominican Repub.</strong></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ecuador</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>El Salvador</strong></td>
<td>58^b</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guatemala</strong></td>
<td>70^d</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>87^d</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mexico</strong></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nicaragua</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paraguay</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peru</strong></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uruguay</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Venezuela</strong></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources**

- b = *World Values Survey (Four waves aggregate of the values study 1981-2009)*
- c = *Latinobarómetro (1995-2009)*
- d = *World Values Survey (2005-2008)*
- e = *World Christian Encyclopedia (2001)*
- f = *CID-Gallup Survey (Gómez 1996:33)*
Notes:

**Relatively Strong Secularization** = Uruguay, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela

**Relatively Moderate Secularization** = México, Perú, Bolivia, Brasil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Colombia, Costa Rica

**Relatively Weak Secularization** = Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala

The order of religious intensity by individual respondents differentiated by national origin that appears in Table 1 is consistent with the findings of ECosociAL-2007 (Valenzuela, Scully and Somma 2008:119) which ranks the national religiosity of Guatemala, Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Mexico, Chile and Argentina. ECosociAL-2007 utilized a religious scale in order to generalize the most religious (Guatemala) to the least religious (Argentina) among seven Latin American societies.
## TABLE A.2

**DONORS WHO CONTRIBUTED TO RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of Donors</th>
<th>Nature of Donation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Beneficiary of Donation</th>
<th>Citation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Dr. Juan Gomez and Dr. Juan Vidal, members of the Municipal Council,</td>
<td>Specificity not listed</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>Hermanas del Huerto (Hermanas de la Caridad)</td>
<td>Vener and Martínez (1998: 20);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interceded on behalf of the President to obtain government support for the establishment and the residence of the religious order to assume responsibility for the Hospital de Caridad in Montevideo. Juan Damasco Jackson was a donor.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Monreal (2010: 161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sr. Juan Francisco García de Zúñiga, Sra. Ascensión Alcain, the Berro family.</td>
<td>$8,000 pesos for the acquisition of land to construct a school for girls</td>
<td>1854</td>
<td>Hermanas Salesas de la Visitación</td>
<td>Vener and Martínez (1998: 21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Donors</td>
<td>Nature of Donation</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Beneficiary of Donation</td>
<td>Citation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Señora Isidora Ussaz</td>
<td>Acquired various houses as convents for the Capuchinas in Montevideo and New Paris</td>
<td>1893</td>
<td>La Hermanas Capuchinas</td>
<td>Vener and Martínez (1998: 31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Sras. Elena Jackson, Mercedes Horne de Azua, Algorta de Acosta, Señora Migone, Sra. Carranza</td>
<td>Contributed to the formation of Oratorios Festivals thru the distribution of clothing, toys, organized raffles to acquire school utensils.</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Las Salesianas</td>
<td>Vener and Martínez (1998: 41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Clara Errazquin de Jackson and her children Sofia, Elena, and Juan and other “pious persons”.</td>
<td>Constructed a new building for the Colegio de Nuestra Señora del Huerto with a donation of $80,000 pesos.</td>
<td>1869</td>
<td>Colegio de Nuestra Señora del Huerto</td>
<td>Vener and Martínez (1998: 51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Inheritance to a sister of the Hermanas del Huerto</td>
<td>Inheritance of land used to construct a residence and school for the Hermanas del Huerto</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td>Instituto de Hermanas del Huerto</td>
<td>Vener and Martínez (1998: 57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Señora Mercedes Barreiro de Sierra.</td>
<td>Donation of a house in the town of Florida used to house sisters and house a school</td>
<td></td>
<td>Colegio de Hermanas del Huerto</td>
<td>Vener and Martínez (1998: 57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Donors</td>
<td>Nature of Donation</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Beneficiary of Donation</td>
<td>Citation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Collective collaboration of Cofradías: Cofradía del Santísimo Sacramento, Cofradía San Vicente, Apostolado Seglar, el Centro Don Bosco, La Liga de Damas Católicas, Cofradía María Auxiliadora, Cofradía del Sagrado Corazón, las Hijas de María, Cofradía de las Vocaciones Salesianas.</td>
<td>Collectively donated to construct a school</td>
<td></td>
<td>Taller de Don Bosco (Salesianos)</td>
<td>Vener and Martínez (1998: 66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. The Jackson family and the Buxareo family</td>
<td>Donated 150 hectares of land to construct the first School of Agriculture in Uruguay</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>Sociedad de San José (Salesianos) - Escuela Agrícola Jackson</td>
<td>Vener and Martínez (1998: 66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Dr. Alejandro Gallinal</td>
<td>Donated land for the founding of a new school</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>La Escuela San Miguel (Salesianos)</td>
<td>Vener and Martínez (1998: 67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. The Migone family and the Damas Católicas</td>
<td>The Migone family donated land and the Damas Católicas raised funds for the school’s construction</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>Colegio and Escuela María Auxiliadora (Salesianas)</td>
<td>Vener and Martínez (1998: 71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Jackson family</td>
<td>Donation used to purchase a house for a residence for the sisters and a school</td>
<td>1873</td>
<td>Hermanas Vicentinas</td>
<td>Monreal (2005: 76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Clara Jackson de Heber</td>
<td>Financed the founding of the Convent of Santo Domingo and school</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>Las Hermanas Dominicas</td>
<td>Monreal (2005:78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Sofía, Clara and Elena Jackson gave economic support</td>
<td>Financed the opening of a school for poor children in the barrio</td>
<td>1881</td>
<td>Hermanas de la Visitación</td>
<td>Monreal (2005:80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Donors</td>
<td>Nature of Donation</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Beneficiary of Donation</td>
<td>Citation</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Clara Jackson de Heber and Sofia Jackson de Buxareo</td>
<td>Donated the property, building and furniture to establish a new school</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>Hermanas de San José; Colegio Santa Clara</td>
<td>Monreal (2005:86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Felix Buxareo and Sofia Jackson de Buxareo</td>
<td>Donated a house in order to initiate Colegio San José</td>
<td>1889</td>
<td>Colegio San José: (Hijas de Nuestra Señora de la Misericordia</td>
<td>Monreal (2010:16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Dona Placida Costa de Burzaco</td>
<td>Constructed buildings for the <em>Seminario Conciliar</em> and Colegio.</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>Jesuitas</td>
<td>Sallaberry (1935:4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name of Religious Order</td>
<td>Range of Years</td>
<td>Number of Arrivals</td>
<td>Citation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Hijas de María Auxiliadora (Salesianas)</td>
<td>1877-1895</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Vener and Martínez (1998: 30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Las Salesianas record new Uruguay novitiates</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Vener and Martínez (1998: 41)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Las Hermanas Capuchinas Uruguay novitiates</td>
<td>1894-1897</td>
<td>10 Novitiates, 8 of whom made final vows</td>
<td>Vener and Martínez (1998: 47)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Spanish secular clergy arriving to Uruguay from varying parts of Spain</td>
<td>1852-1891</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Turcatti and Sansón (2005: 23)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Spanish secular clergy arriving to Uruguay from varying parts of Spain</td>
<td>1892-1919</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Turcatti and Sansón (2005: 23)</td>
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<td>13. Uruguayyan novitiates identified at the time of the writing of <em>visita ad limina</em> in 1888.</td>
<td>1888</td>
<td>43</td>
<td><em>Visita ad limina</em> (1888:21-23)</td>
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<td>14. Uruguayyan novitiates identified at the time of the writing of <em>visita ad limina</em> 1896.</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td><em>Visita ad limina</em> (1896: 21-22)</td>
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### TABLE A.4

**STUDENT POPULATION BY PRIMARY SCHOOL CATEGORY**

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Total Student Population</th>
<th>General Population</th>
<th>Ratio: Population to Total Student Population</th>
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<td>76,809</td>
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<td>7,639</td>
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<td>164,262</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Total Student Population</td>
<td>General Population</td>
<td>Ratio: Population to Total Student Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
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Source: Nahum 2007: 99-100, 114-115 compiled from Anuario Estadístico 1900-1949
## Table A.5

### Student, Teacher and School Population Per Total Population

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Student Population</th>
<th>General Population</th>
<th>Student Pop. per 1000 Habitants</th>
<th>Total Teacher Population</th>
<th>Total Population Per Teacher</th>
<th>Total Number of Schools</th>
<th>Total Population Per School</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1900</td>
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<td>2055</td>
<td>455</td>
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<td>1315</td>
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<td>1649</td>
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### TABLE A.5 (CONTINUED)

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<th>Total Student Population</th>
<th>General Population</th>
<th>Student Pop. per 1000 Habitants</th>
<th>Total Teacher Population</th>
<th>Total Population Per Teacher</th>
<th>Total Number of Schools</th>
<th>Total Population Per School</th>
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<td>5891</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>1747</td>
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<td>5938</td>
<td>368</td>
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<td>2,218,868</td>
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<td>6005</td>
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<td>1819</td>
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Source: Nahum 2007: 99-100; compiled from Anuario Estadístico 1900-1949
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<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Budget: Public Primary Education ($)</th>
<th>Cost per Student ($)</th>
<th>No. of Religious Students</th>
<th>Savings to the State ($)</th>
<th>Percent (%) of Total Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>773,351</td>
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<td>11,412</td>
<td>233,603</td>
<td>30.2</td>
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<td>11,382</td>
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<td><strong>10,674</strong></td>
<td><strong>215,187</strong></td>
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<td>224,048</td>
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<td><strong>13.1</strong></td>
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TABLE A.6 (CONTINUED)

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Budget: Public Primary Education ($)</th>
<th>Cost per Student ($)</th>
<th>No. of Religious Students</th>
<th>Savings to the State ($)</th>
<th>Percent (%) of Total Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
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<td>21,845</td>
<td>947,199</td>
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<td>22,412</td>
<td>985,007</td>
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<td>22,951</td>
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<td>24,959</td>
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Source: Nahum 2007: 110; compiled from *Anuario Estadístico* 1920, 1925, 1935, 1943, 1944
### TABLE A.7

**RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION BY GENDER: 1908 NATIONAL CENSUS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-Identified Religious Affiliation (15 years and Older)</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent (%) by Religious Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>289,377</td>
<td>348,681</td>
<td>637,681</td>
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<td>Protestant</td>
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<td>16,498</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Other (not specified)</td>
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<td>237,838</td>
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<td>Montevideo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
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<td>104,267</td>
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Source: *Anuario Estadístico, Tomo II, Parte III* 1908: 948-949, XXVI

### TABLE A.8

**RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION BY GENDER: 1892 MUNICIPAL CENSUS OF MONTEVIDEO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-Identified Religious Affiliation (15 years and Older)</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent (%) by Religious Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>85,504</td>
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<td>10,657</td>
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<td>Free-thinkers</td>
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<td>345</td>
<td>8,882</td>
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<td>Liberals</td>
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<td>205</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rationalists</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>280</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dissidents</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<td>Deists</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>.04</td>
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<td>Atheists</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>71</td>
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Source: *Censo Municipalidad del Departamento de la Ciudad de Montevideo; Anuario Estadistico* 1892: 367--69
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Private Laical Students</th>
<th>No. of Private Laical Teachers</th>
<th>No. of Religious Students</th>
<th>No. of Religious Teachers</th>
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<td>11,412</td>
<td>389</td>
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<td>507</td>
<td>11,382</td>
<td>394</td>
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<td>1904</td>
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<td>443</td>
<td>10,992</td>
<td>429</td>
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<td>1906</td>
<td>9,171</td>
<td>377</td>
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<td>307</td>
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<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>8,197</td>
<td>339</td>
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### TABLE A.9 (CONTINUED)

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<th>Year</th>
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<th>No. of Private Laical Teachers</th>
<th>No. of Religious Students</th>
<th>No. of Religious Teachers</th>
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</thead>
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<td>808</td>
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Source: Nahum 2007: 99-100, 114-115 compiled from *Anuario Estadístico* 1900-1949
### TABLE A.10

ILLITERACY RATES AMONG LATIN AMERICA REPUBLICS (1908)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>School-Aged Population (6-14 year olds)</th>
<th>Illiterate Children</th>
<th>Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>218,938</td>
<td>92,901</td>
<td>42.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1,226,000</td>
<td>655,810</td>
<td>53.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>649,855</td>
<td>444,564</td>
<td>68.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>254,400</td>
<td>184,766</td>
<td>72.6</td>
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<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>126,368</td>
<td>93,368</td>
<td>73.9</td>
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<td>Panama</td>
<td>83,805</td>
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<td>85.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>4,103,000</td>
<td>3,537,078</td>
<td>86.2</td>
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<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>390,783</td>
<td>342,233</td>
<td>87.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>911,910</td>
<td>806,940</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>532,313</td>
<td>494,062</td>
<td>92.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Data from the source cited above may be inconsistent with data pertaining to each nation represented in the Table. See Newland (1994) for divergent data.

### TABLE A.11

STUDENT AGED POPULATION (6-14 YEAR OLDS) IN 1908

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>Male Students</th>
<th>Female Students</th>
<th>Total Student Aged Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>11,804</td>
<td>11,590</td>
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<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>11,517</td>
<td>11,392</td>
<td>22,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>13,126</td>
<td>12,775</td>
<td>25,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>12,049</td>
<td>12,203</td>
<td>24,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>12,572</td>
<td>11,981</td>
<td>24,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>12,226</td>
<td>11,805</td>
<td>24,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>13,473</td>
<td>13,262</td>
<td>26,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>13,723</td>
<td>12,957</td>
<td>26,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>13,490</td>
<td>13,317</td>
<td>26,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>113,980</td>
<td>111,282</td>
<td>225,262</td>
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</table>

Censo General de la Republica en 1908. Anuario Estadistica Tomo II: Parte III: 845
TABLE A.12
PRIMARY STUDENT POPULATION OF SOME STATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State (Year)</th>
<th>Total Student Population</th>
<th>Ratio: General Population to Total Student Population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ontario (1903)</td>
<td>450,278</td>
<td>20.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States (1904)</td>
<td>16,256,088</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quebec (1904)</td>
<td>920,666</td>
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<td>Switzerland (1903)</td>
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<td>New South Wales (1903)</td>
<td>243,516</td>
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<td>Britain (1903)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany (1901)</td>
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<td>Norway (1901)</td>
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<td>Holland (1903)</td>
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<td>Sweden (1902)</td>
<td>747,608</td>
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<td>Belgium (1902)</td>
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<td>Uruguay (1905)</td>
<td>74,870</td>
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<td>Italy (1902)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Costa Rica (1904)</td>
<td>22,826</td>
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<td>Ecuador (1894)</td>
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<td>Mexico (1902)</td>
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<td>Brazil (1890)</td>
<td>360,000</td>
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Reproduced from: Memoria Correspondiente al Año 1906: Dirección General de Instrucción Primaria. 1907: 30-31

Note: Data from the source cited above may be inconsistent with data pertaining to each nation represented in the Table. See Newland (1994) for divergent data.
TABLE A.13

STUDENT TO TEACHER RATIO IN PUBLIC AND RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Public Students</th>
<th>No. of Public Teachers</th>
<th>Ratio: Students to Teachers</th>
<th>No. of Religious Students</th>
<th>No. of Religious Teachers</th>
<th>Ratio: Students to Teachers</th>
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<td>212,509</td>
<td>36,884</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nahum 2007: 99-100, 114-115 compiled from Anuario Estadístico 1900-1949
APPENDIX B

ANTICLEICAL PRESS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periodical</th>
<th>Run</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Intransigente</td>
<td>1st Run</td>
<td>1894</td>
<td>1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idea Liberal</td>
<td></td>
<td>1893</td>
<td>1894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Liberal</td>
<td>2nd Run</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Librepensamiento</td>
<td></td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Anatorcha</td>
<td></td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>1902</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Field Notes on each Anticlerical Periodical

1. **Title:** La Idea Liberal

**Heading:** Liberty, Equality and Fraternity

**Affiliation:** Organ of the Genuine Liberal Party

**Editorial Redaction:** Baldomero Pujadas

**Collaborators:** All of the Liberals that desire to occupy a place in the advancement of the struggle of intelligence, for liberty, and for progress.

**Place of Publication:** Montevideo

**First Edition:** October 1, 1893.

**Duration:** October 1, 1893 to June 4 1894

**Frequency:** Every Monday, the 1, 8, 15 and 22 of each month.

**Number of pages:** 4 pages with 4 Columns

**Size:** 18 x 12 inches: 3 pages of text plus one page for advertisements.

**Sponsors:** Approx. 30 per paper.

**Extension:** Montevideo, the Countryside, and the Exterior.

**Termination of Circulation:** June 4, 1894, after 30 editions

**Observations:** It is a voice for republican liberalism and strongly anti-Catholic. Front page presents a highlighted and centered section entitled “Anti-clerical Section”.

Periodical advertised all events and activities for the *Club Bilbao* and news of the Liberal Movement. Each edition presents a regular column entitled “Ultramontane Trivialities” which amounts to a weekly gossip and tabloid column in response to the local Church’s activities. Beginning Feb. 19, 1894, initiated a series of front page spreads on Liberal heroes, such as Bilbao, Pedro Homaeche, Victor Rappaz, Prudencio Vázquez y Vega. .
2. **Title:** El Intransigente

**Heading:** A Genuine Liberal Publication

**Affiliation:** Sponsor of the Genuine Liberal Party

**Director:** Adolfo Vázquez-Gómez

**Administrator:** Juan V. Porto

**Editor / redactor:** Luis Guimaraens

**Editorial Redaction:** Baldomero Pujadas

**Collaborators:** Eugenio Pérez Choza - Sole Representative in Buenos Aires

**Place of Publication:** Montevideo

**First Edition:** June 21, 1894

**Duration:** June 21, 1894 to December 25, 1895; Numbers 1-78

**Frequency:** Every Monday, the 1, 8, 15 and 22 of each month.

**Number of pages:** 8 pages with 4 Columns

**Size:** 21 x 14 inches @ 6 pages of text plus 2 pages for advertisements

**Sponsors:** Approx. 10-11 per page = 20 sponsors per paper.

**Extension:** Montevideo and the Countryside

**Observations:** Advertises for and reports on Masonic events. Like all anticlerical Liberal Press of Uruguay in this time frame, recognizes; 1) Bastille Day; 2) September 20; and 3) mocks Holy Week. By August, advertisements covered 2.5 pages. Favorite target of criticism is the Jesuits. Almost every edition carries an article criticizing the Jesuits. By October 18, they also began to devote entire front page sections to heroes of the Liberal project like Jose Pedro Varela, Dr. Elbio Fernandez, Garibaldi.
3. **Title:** La Antorcha

**Heading:** Organ of Libre Pensamiento – Free Thinker’s Society

**Affiliation:** Free Thinker’s Society

**Director:** Enrique Fresco y Díaz

**Administrador / Editor / Redactor:** Alfredo Castro

**Collaborators:** Diverse Liberal Writers

**Place of Publication:** Montevideo

**First Edition:** October 8, 1899

**Duration:** October 8 1899 to February 25, 1900; First Year = 21 editions; pages 1-168 pages; Second Year = 76 editions; pages 1-576. Total of 744 pages completely dedicated to anti-clerical demagoguery; no other news or information presented.

**Frequency:** Every Sunday closest to the 7, 15, 22, 30 of each month.

**Number of pages:** 8 pages each edition with 2 columns and no advertisements – but each edition covered in a light (wax-paper) title page and the back side carried advertisements.

**Size:** 8 x 12 inches; 2 columns with no advertisements

**Sponsors:** Back side of cover page carried no more than 6 advertisements.

**Extension:** Montevideo, the Countryside, and the Exterior

**Observations:** The Antorcha has the most professional appearance and composition of all the alternative anti-clerical press. Professional format may be attributed to a later date in comparison to El Intransigente or La Idea Liberal or possibly due to its international connection to the Free Thinker’s Society. At the top of each lead column appearing in every edition there appears a brief outline of the paper’s content which includes the title
of the article and the author. For the first year (Editions1-21), two questions appeared under the outline and in large print asking……. “How does the Church-State union benefit the State? (¿Qué beneficios reporta al Estado su unión con la Iglesia?”). And, “How does the Church-State union benefit the nation?” (¿Qué beneficios reporta al pueblo esa misma unión?”). On one level, the Antorcha presents an in-depth and lengthy expose on topics favored by anticlericals—such as the Jesuits, the Pope, and the general nature of religion. These were written in a similar genre as the pamphlets of the Association of Liberal Propaganda. The readership must have been the highly educated elites due to the pedantic content. Numerous articles were subtitled indicating associations with Free Thinker’s Society chapters located in Europe or other Latin American cities. Clearly the most sophisticated content intended for the seasoned anticlerical. It reads more like a professional journal for the most ardent anticlerical (one indication of its sophistication is the continuous page numbers between editions; i.e. editions No. 1-21 were page numbers continuously from page 1-168. On the other hand, each edition carries a section entitled Luz y Tinieblas (which later became Datos Diversos in the second year; this also explains why the page numbers changes). This section reads like a gossip column or tabloids which featured local news regarding the Church’s activities. Frequently derived from El Bien, these vignettes tended to mock what Catholics were doing; either locally or internationally as many vignettes featured stories outside of Uruguay. The Antorcha presents the strongest anticlerical voice among the alternative press.

4. Title: El Liberal (First Run)

Affiliation:

**Director /Editor / Redactor:** Enrique Fresco Díaz

**Administrator:** see Title Block – This is the paper with all the big names across the top

**Collaborators:** Juan Paullier, Mariano Berro, Dr. Elías Regules, Dr. Ramón Díaz, Cristina Dufreehou, Dr. Arturo Puig, Dr. Pedro Díaz, Dr. Álvaro Guillot, Septembrino Pereda, Jaime Oliver, Dr. Pedro Rodríguez, Dr. José Sienra Carranza, Dr. pedro Hormache, José de la Hanity, Dr. Manuel Otero, Dr. Juan Gil, Antonio Aguayo, Ángela Pérez, Manuel E. Rombys, German E. Gutiérrez

**Place of Publication:** Montevideo

**First Edition:** 15 de marzo

**Duración of Run #1:** 15 de Marzo – 29 de Junio 1900; No. 1-84;

**Frequency:** Daily, every morning

**Extension:** Montevideo and the Countryside.

**Number of pages:** 4 pages with 6 columns; last 2 pages dedicated to advertisements. Average 25-30 sponsors. Page 2 contains business news and commercial activity, vignettes of local news and a section for news vignettes sent by telegram from other countries.

**Size:** 26 x 20 inches;

**Observations:**

Every front page has stories dedicated to anticlerical demagogy including a section for news vignettes sent by telegram from other countries. Genre is popular reading and tried to compete commercially with *El Día*. Last two editions contain direct messages to patrons asking for patience and support. The latter editions began to carry a regular block
in the paper with the intent of mocking a Saint of the Day in the Church. In addition, there was a block to recognize memorable and important names of Atheists. Late editions became 8 pages but the size was much smaller than before, 22 in. x 15 in. with 6 columns. Interior pages consisted of commercial and Granadera news, agriculture and industrial news. Big internal spread on “Cosas de Teatro” Solis and others Teatros were supported thus confirming the tradition of the Theater in Montevideo. Theater Solis regularly presented satire of the Church. Toward the end of the run, there appeared fewer direct attacks on Catholicism and an increased promotion of Liberalism. Attacks on Catholicism were located on page six in a regular ½ page spread entitled “Especial Para el Liberal” and it featured Liberalism from around the world.

5. **Title:** El Liberal (Second Run)

**Heading:** Liberal Propaganda and newsworthy commercial information

**Affiliation:** Free Thinker’s Society

**Director /Editor / Redactor:** Belén Sárraga de Férreo

**Administrator:** Roberto P. Morelli

Secretary: Sta. Maria Gamblin y Blanc

**Collaborators:** Diverse Liberal Writers

**Place of Publication:** Montevideo

**First Edition:** Abril 1908

**Duration of Run #2:** Abril 1908 – 1 October 1910, No. 1-690;

**Frequency:** Daily, every morning

**Number of pages:** Initially 4 pages

**Size:** Initially 30 x 20 inches; 7 columns
Sponsors: Last page, dedicated exclusively to advertisements; average 25 advertisements on last page. Page three consisted of; 25% dedicated to sponsors; 6 or more. Page three contained commercial news regarding farming, agriculture, and industries, Grain Stock market report, Market report on wool, stock exchange, and monetary exchange. Page two contained; international news by country of interest, football, Turf (Horse Racing), Police reports. Page one contained; El Palacio Legislative – Parlamento, anticlerical articles and editorials.

Extension: Montevideo, the Countryside, Argentina and the Exterior.

Observations: Front page presents anticlerical articles. Frequently, it was the lead article; an editorial criticizing some dimension of the Church written by Belén Sárraga de Férreo; the editor. In addition the front page contained a regular daily column entitled Confronting the Church (Frente a la Iglesia) written by the same columnist; Zar Adán. Possibly due the status of Belén Sárraga de Férreo, notices regarding activities of the Association of Liberal Women appeared. In many ways, its market paralleled El Día, the principle daily of the era; it appealed to the popular sector, easy readability, and provided local/international news with definitive anti-Catholic demagoguery.

Changes in the Format: Beginning with the November 18 1908 edition, the daily changed its size and format and size - 22 x 16 inches; number of pages – 8 pages. 2.5 pages devoted to featured stories and perspectives; one page combined vignettes of international news by country and commercial news (see commercial news above). 4.5 pages devoted to advertisement space. An average of 60 advertisements appeared representing a doubling of sponsors and advertisement income. The first weeks (November 18) of the new edition contained six empty blocks of advertiser’s space
available. One month later (December 18), all advisement spaces were occupied. The upgraded editions contained an expansion of the daily column *Frente a la Iglesia*. A very noticeable link to the Free Thinker’s Movement was established. This is the most obvious change. *El Liberal* functioned as an organ of the Free Thinkers Association of Uruguay which charted Belén Sárraga de Férreo’s involvement with the Association. A new daily column appeared entitled “Triunfos del Librepensamientos” which appeared on the front page alongside the *Frente a la Iglesia*.

5. **Title:** El Libre Pensamiento

**heading:** Official Organ of the Association of Liberal propaganda; Founded in 1900.

**Note:** Interesting that the daily, *El Liberal*, had a stronger connection to the International Association of Free Thinkers (Libre Pensadores) but the APL chose a title that reflects their organization.

**Director:** Adolfo Vázquez-Gómez

**Administrador:** Juan V. Porto

**Editor / redactor:** Luis Guimaraens

**Editorial Redaction:** Baldomero Pujadas

**Collaborators:** Eugenio Pérez Choza - Sole Representative in Buenos Aires

**Place of Publication:** Montevideo

**First Edition:** December 10, 1905.

**Duration:** December 10 1905 to October 10 1919.

**Frequency:** Initially, the 10th and the 25th of each month; later, in 1909 changed to the 10th, 20th, and 30th; then by 1911, resorted back to the 10th and 25th.

**Number of pages:** First year (1905) 4 pages with columns
Sponsors: The APL

Extension: Montevideo, the Countryside, Argentina and the Exterior

Observations:

Adolfo Vázquez-Gómez was the former administrator of El Intransigente (see above).

See Carlos Rama’s article “La Cuestión Social” (1969: 70) where he states that Adolfo Vázquez-Gómez was the director of a newspaper called the Socialist in 1906 which served as the organ for the Socialist movement. Presentation is very similar to La Antorcha in that the genre and the style are directed at elite doctors. The anticlerical rhetoric is very strong. There are no advertisements and not one sponsor. This means that the income must be provided by the sale of subscriptions. Very few of the columns are about events in Uruguay. The vast majority of entries are of an outside source such as France, Spain, Argentina, or they are pejorative perspectives toward the history of Catholicism. The anti-religious target is not exclusively limited to Catholics, but major religions as Protestantism and Jews were targets as well. Similar to La Antorcha in that it contained section of tabloids and gossip columns regarding Catholics.

Changes in the Format:

Third year (1909) the frequency expanded to the 10th, 20th and the 30th of each month.

However, beginning with the first issue of 1911, the frequency went back to the 10th and the 25th.

Observation of last few Years of the Paper; 1917-1919

A new regular column appeared entitled, “Religión y Chacota” which contains jokes, anecdotal stories, mockery of God, the Church, Religious beliefs, and anything about positive Religion.
The first editorial of the first issue of each anticlerical press typically is dedicated to expressing the purpose and objective of each respective press. Below are sample sections extracted from each periodical.

Our desire, our only aspiration is to continue without interruption an unending appeal (propaganda); a constant diffusion of liberal ideas. Our ambition is to introduce to readers—particularly to fanatics—to pull back the veil that obscures the light and see that which since remote times has been bequeathed from generation to generation. It is a pity that the daily press does not dedicate a part of their literature to combat the many absurdities that one finds in various religions and sects; to combat the theories of a growing number of men and women who trade in ideas (“En la Brecha.” October 8, 1899. La Antorcha. pg.1).

Our colleagues wish that the Propaganda Liberal profusely proclaim that, without cultural reticence as the valiant protector of free-thinking, our action is not limited to the struggle against superstition and against fanaticism that the ultramontane Catholic exploiters preach, but that it also extends its liberty campaign against all superstitions and all fanaticism from which ever positive religion. Such alterations are in effect the oppression of the fullness of human intelligence and of the growing development of essential liberties, represented by the Catholic superstitions founded as predominate among religions which impose dogmas and devotion restricting the exercise of reason and free-will (“A los Miembros de la Asociación de Propaganda Liberal.” December 10, 1905. El Libre Pensamiento. pg.1).

El Intransigente is born to support liberalism which characterizes this republic, but is not an organ of any traditional militant partiality or of a new sectarian organization which participates in the ordinary political discourse…. The philosophical school to which we belong, although is divided in different fractions, each one with its own special processes will not stumble over imagined speculation or gross obstacles. Rather it searches for the truth; the consoling truth and at the same time useful (PRAGMATISM) for social life and searches to shift bombastic language of the authors and the persistent concerns of the nation (“Prospecto.” June 21, 1892. El Intransigente. pg.1).

Our mission is to disseminate the truth proving that liberalism is virtuous and correct to proceed; it is civic-minded because it is founded on natural law, and therefore, liberalism honors the popular sectors born of irreproachable and austere customs, of ideas of political liberty and conscience and thus; reciprocal respect among all types of thinking. We
want a liberty of conscience without accepting harmful influence favoring deception; that is to say that we will not allow the conquest of uninstructed people to be carried out contrary to our perspective and patience as a benefit to the speculation of any religion (“Nuestro Programa.” March 15, 1900. El Liberal. pg. 1).

Our appearance in the press has a definitive objective: to disseminate (*propagar*) liberalism in politics and anticlericalism in religion. In order that the nation progresses appropriately and that human wellbeing, although relative to the era, is in all aspects true to the democratic principles that are the base and foundation of political organization. As for authoritarian governments with theocratic governmental orientations, they do not become homelands, nor do they progress, nor do they enlarge themselves. We compare ourselves, not to Russia, but to the United States and we confirm the prior assertion. The United States is republic and deeply democratic, enjoying an exuberant life and is perhaps the most powerful and rich nation in the world. Meanwhile Russia is governed by an emperor – the Pope – and lives in abject misery under the yoke of henchmen (“Nuestro Programa.” October 1, 1893. La Idea Liberal. pg.1).

The Central Committee hopes that the new force of the *Asociación de Propaganda Liberal* increases the number of associates with the beneficial effect of dissemination in the rural population such as in Montevideo, especially in these moments that approaches an urgent necessity to combat with decisiveness and energy the advances of a bold and disrespectful clergy that prevails with impunity and assures its powerful influence due to the inaction of liberals, and violates and insults the laws of the Republic and conquers positions with the hope to unleash a battle against the institutions that we honor before the civilized world (“A los Socios.” January 1, 1902. Boletín Oficial de la Asociación de Propaganda Liberal. pg.1).
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